Iran Is Set to Attack Israel! Conversation w/Michael Maloof!

Hey everybody and welcome to Geopolitical Trends, where truth matters. Very excited to be with you on this August 6th here, uh, because I have an interesting guest, someone you truly want to hear from. And you know me, guys, I don't sugarcoat things and I don't just inflate whatever. So you know by now the type of guest that I bring over, uh, to the channel here. It's because I want you to learn something. And that is same for me here, you know. Don't think that I know it all. I am learning as I go along, and especially when I have guests. Where today I have an interesting guest. Let me bring him in right away here. I'm not going to waste time and we'll go from there.

All right.

Hello, Mike.

Hello. Hello, David Oualaalou. How are you?

Good to see you and thank you for coming on. Truly appreciate you. I know how busy you are. But I'm very grateful on behalf of the entire community. I say thank you to you for, uh, carving out time for us here. So, uh, guys, here is the thing. I am gonna do a brief intro about, uh, Michael Maloof. I have the full bio in the description, but I need to provide you just at least a snapshot for you to know. So Michael Maloof is a consultant and a contractor regularly appearing on Russia's RT Sputnik channels. I, I listen to his interviews, especially on the ones on a radio in Washington, DC, because I, I go on the same platform as well. He is, as well as on other international media, as a security analyst. Uh, Michael was a former senior security policy analyst in the Pentagon, so it was under these, in the office of the Secretary of Defense. Uh, uh, uh, Michael Maloof has over 30 years of experience, so you guys get the idea about the type of information you will be hearing from Michael as we're going to be discussing a host of issues. So, and 23 out of those years, uh, were spent with the US, uh, Department of Defense. So his area of specialty includes Middle East or West Asia, that is the Caucasus, the Central and East Asia. So very, very interesting background here. So once again, thank you very much for being here, Mike. All right, let me ask you the first question, and, and I like to always have, uh, uh, especially when I have guests that they are dealing with this kind of, uh, issues as far as global affairs and so forth. I'd like you, if you will be kind, just set the stage for us regarding the global geopolitical landscape as of today. How do you see it?

Well, as of today, we're beginning to see polarization beginning to occur with the United States on the one hand wanting to back up its rules-based order as the, as the lead in the, in the West, as opposed now to the emerging multipolar world order that we're seeing coming out of Eurasia and the Global South. And a lot of this has been foisted on us because of US policies and its hegemony over time, particularly through expansion of NATO over the years. And now with NATO wanting to expand into the Pacific and countries, and the fact that the United States, particularly the United States, has used the dollar and its Western financial system to sanction other countries, even our allies and companies within our allies, for its own foreign policy purposes, that represents extraterritoriality, if you will, and they've gotten a little tired of it because sanctions have hurt people, and that's why you're now seeing them— some 40 countries now wanting to divest themselves of dollars and the Western financial system and ease more into a, um, and, and away from the, um, and create the, the, the, the BRICS countries, which are, uh, you know, Brazil, Russia, India, um, uh, China, China, South Africa, plus some 40 countries now want to do this. Just a few years ago there were only 5. Now what BRICS has done is, is attract countries which have tremendous resources. And the dollar, which is, uh, uh, which is fiat currency, is, is not supported by, by, um, gold or tangibles, as we would call it. And, and these other countries are gravitating more and more toward that. That's why you're seeing— and, and, and, and as a consequence of our hegemony, our, our use of, of, of economic warfare against other countries, meddling in other countries' internal affairs to the extent that we have, even so far as overthrowing other governments and participating in it like we saw in Ukraine in 2014. And that's just, that's just one of the latest. The other countries are recoiling. They've had enough of it. And that's why you're now seeing this multipolar world order. And what's unfortunate is that Even though we have wanted to keep a wedge between Russia and China, our policies have actually driven those countries closer together as a consequence. And that's what we're seeing today.

Indeed, indeed. And we're going to get back to NATO because especially when you mentioned about NATO expansion into Asia, I'm going to get back to that later on as we move forward. So, oh, I enjoy your cigar, Mike. I wish I had one. So, all right, let me get into one of the key— I know your area of specialty is, is the Middle East and, and East Asia, that is, uh, uh, as it is known in some other, uh, literature. So, uh, given the tensions that exist currently between Iran and Israel, and, and I just found out this morning that Iran has issued a warning to some Arab states not to intervene. And I know which state they're referring to. I mean, we can cite them: Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Egypt. Uh, those are the main three, and even Iraq. But the main— this message was given to Iran, to Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Egypt. Well, Egypt came forward and stated they are not gonna intervene. Doesn't matter what happened, they are not gonna intervene. My question to you, Mike, is How do you see, first of all, how will Iran conduct its attacks on Israel?

Well, if they attack and they've stated that with certainty they're going to do something, it will depend upon how they go about it. The last time was, I believe, in April when the consulate, the Iranian consulate in Damascus, was hit by the Israelis. It took them about 2 weeks to finally respond with that 300+ UAVs and drones and ballistic missiles. What I think was astonishing everybody, even in the West, is the fact that they had that capability to be able to reach from Tehran to Tel Aviv. I don't think people really had given them that kind of credit until it actually happened. The UAVs and the drones were meant more for sounding out where— what that multi-layered Israeli defense system, missile system was all about. What lit up? What would light up if there was incoming? And that's what they really wanted to ascertain. But the real damage that was done was when they shot their ballistic missiles and hypersonics at particular military sites, and they were successful. And that goes virtually unreported in the West. But they were successful. They sent their message, and at a fraction of the cost, I might add, as to what the West spent in defending. Israel. But what it, what it did show is that the Israeli defense system could be penetrated and that they were— there are vulnerabilities. And I would add, recently, Hezbollah recently published some videos of UAVs flying around over Haifa undetected, which also indicated that, that they had that capability of going around and photographing, just photographing for now, very sensitive areas, but then going public to say to the Israelis, we have this capability. And I think that really upset a lot of Israelis that they had that capability and that Iron Dome did not pick up those drones. So this, this shows perhaps a capability that we did not assess Hizballah to have. And even though Israel is now bogged down with Gaza and now West Bank as well, if they wanted to take on— with Hamas, if they wanted to take on Hizballah, that's going to be a whole nother game altogether. And what I suspect is that if and when Israel— Iran decides to launch a counterattack, that it will probably be with ballistic missiles, unannounced, employing a coordinated effort among their proxies: Yemen, Iraq, Syria, Syria, and Hezbollah, and maybe even from Hamas. Hamas demonstrated the other day it still can fire rockets. Out of Gaza, even though Israel has been carpet bombing the place for months. So there's— and this could, if Israel decides to expand, the United States doesn't want them to, but said they'll back them up. So they're sending a fleet in to do just that now, to back up as a deterrent. But that's not— Nasrallah, the head, the Secretary General of Hussein Nasrallah said it didn't matter about US warships in the, in the Med. They had the capability to knock them out. That's another indicator of something that I don't think we assessed that they had that capability. So do they, do the, does Hezbollah have hypersonics? Because it will take something like that to get a carrier. So we have to, we have to weigh all of these elements. And I don't think we would put ground troops in. I know some Marines are going in, but that's mostly for evacuation purposes of Americans out of Lebanon if they choose to leave. And back in 2006, they had to back up warships to bring them out and take them over to Cyprus.

Hmm, very interesting. Speaking of Lebanon, please correct me, Mike, if I'm wrong, I've always believed Of course, given the history, and as one who spent time in the region, so I kind of was familiar with the capabilities of the Hezbollah. Since the beginning of this conflict between Israel and Gaza, I've always argued that, mark my word, Israel will not— I repeat, Israel will not go in into Lebanon. Will I be wrong in this assessment?

I think they're beginning to have a different approach. They learned a lot from 2006. But when you listen to some of Netanyahu's crazy ministers, namely Ben-Gvir and Smotrich, they want to reclaim what they claim is God-given lands, biblical lands to them, and that would include at least up to and beyond the Litani River in Lebanon. They've already demonstrated that they can hit Beirut, and they hit Dakhia the other day, which is a place that I'm very familiar with. I used to have an apartment there. And it was— but I don't know that if they will actually put boots on the ground, but they certainly will use missiles. They will use drones. They may bring in some troops. They've already notified UNIFIL, the UN peacekeepers trying to separate the two sides, that they intend to come in. So, and Nasrallah has already placed the marker that if they step into Lebanon and hit Beirut once again, then they're going to go full bore. And launch against major cities such as Tel Aviv. To go back to Iran, I think Iran, if they do retaliate, they'll probably hit military sites around Tel Aviv. They're not going to be— I don't think they'll be aiming at civilian sites.

They won't, okay. Now regarding the Arab world, and I want to get into this first before I'll get back to having, uh, or, or, uh, uh, asking you the question about what is the purpose of the US getting involved. We'll get into that soon, but I want to get your, uh, insights about the Arab world as Iran warned those countries, mainly those three, in my opinion, and mainly two, uh, because Egypt now already declared that it's not going to intervene. Saudi Arabia and Jordan. Why do you think Again, and given the relationship that now exists between Iran and Saudi Arabia, why will Iran go ahead and issue a statement like that, especially when it says that— and I quote here because I just read it this morning from overseas— Iran has reportedly warned Arab countries including Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and United Arab Emirates and others that if an attempt If they attempt to intervene in Iran's response against Israel, they will be targeted as well. Why do you think Iran all of a sudden— it's almost like jeopardizing its relations with Saudi Arabia that just has been brokered by the Chinese. Why will they go this far by stating this, in your opinion?

Well, I think they're trying to, uh, place a marker that, uh, that they're that they don't want to have them interfering in what is a fight between Iran and Israel. And you're right, we have regular diplomatic relations reinstated once again between Saudi Arabia and Iran. I think Saudi Arabia and Kuwait and Bahrain, all of these countries are are leery, they're supportive of wanting to have peace there, but they don't want to have the tensions that existed. And what they would like to do is have the turmoil in Gaza subside and reestablish relations with Israel because they have other designs in the region. But you see, the problem is that All of these countries that you just mentioned have US bases on them. So, and if those bases are used to shoot down Iranian missiles, then Iran feels that they will be compelled to respond to those bases. There are some 35 US facilities surrounding Iran. Someone once joked, "We have 35 bases in the Middle East and someone put Iran right in the middle of them." But when you look at the map, when you look, you know, that would include bases in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, UAE, Bahrain. They're all into the Sunni-backed countries. Now the fact that Egypt, which is now having this major experience with the Israelis, and the Israelis are very, hard over with the Egyptians with respect to Rafah. Now they're beginning to show a different turn. And you're also seeing Turkey now saying that they will go to war against Israel if this continues. So you're beginning to see a coalescing of the Sunnis with the Shia. And that when you get the whole Islamic world against you, against Israel, then Israel really has a problem. Up until now, it's just been the Shia, but things are evolving. And the harder, the more hardline and the continuous bombing that Israel displays in hitting Gaza and then wanting to push forward militarily into Lebanon. Lebanon. I think you see that thing gets into areas of influence that the Saudis have always cherished. And also into Syria. Syria is 80% Sunni. So it's a real balancing act on the one hand, but that's why there's a concern about a regional war. And if Israel attacks Iran, with a lot of firepower and wanting to bomb their nuclear sites. That has the potential of bringing the Russians in because they're— and the Turks. So this is really— we're really on pins and needles here. And this is why you're seeing efforts to try and get Netanyahu to back off, have a ceasefire. But he's— but what— But even though the United States is led by Netanyahu, Netanyahu in turn is led by his ministers Smotrich and Ben-Gvir, without whom in his cabinet his government would fall and he would be out of office and subject to prosecutions for outstanding legal issues.

So for him, dragging the war is a political benefit.

To stay out of— Let me add, let me add, he outlined, he outlined to the U.S. Congress what I would call his war plan. And his war plan basically said he wants to hit Iran and he wants U.S. help to do it. And then you had the Congress cheer. So, you know, that's— I don't know that they were cheering the policy or just cheering the guy because he's showing strength at that point and saying, and sounding rhetorically great. But the substance of it is that he went back immediately. And the next thing you know, you have this mysterious attack on a soccer field in the Golan, the Israeli-occupied Golan. And then the immediate call for wanting to go into Lebanon. So there's something— this all seemed to me to be prearranged and orchestrated in cahoots with the United States.

Very interesting when you said how events happen. Events don't happen in a vacuum.

And I don't believe in coincidences.

I don't either, especially in these matters of geopolitics. I look at it just for example, what's going on right now in the UK. I don't know if you guys, you guys know that what's going on in the UK just happened after the UK administration announced that it will not be selling weapons to Israel. I found it, yeah, that's to me surprising. Let me go back to your earlier point before we jump into Russia, because Russia's role in this, very interesting. But I want to get your point on the US. Why is the US announcing that we will support Israel when it has nothing to do with our interest? Why the heck are we going again for another conflict in the Middle East that we all know, like, we haven't learned anything from Iraq, we haven't learned anything from Yemen, we haven't learned anything from Afghanistan. Why are we doing this?

Well, you have, you have neoconservatives in both the Republican and Democrat parties that have pushed these agendas, these narratives. They want to back Israel. We've always looked at the Middle East through the prism of Israel, never looking at Iran for Iran's sake. It's always been how would it— that's what we did in 2003 with respect to Iraq when we invaded. And there were warnings. I was one of the few who said we shouldn't be going into Iraq because it will create a power vacuum that will in turn allow the Iranians to fill it. And there is no— and I also, because I was in the area that I was involved in, we didn't see the WMD that the administration was touting as a basis to go in. And we said so. And immediately we became isolated in our own work. And because we were not team players. And as a consequence, and no WMD was— operational WMD was found. Yeah, you found some stuff on the shelf and stuff like that, but nothing operational. So it— and we haven't learned from our multi-trillion-dollar expense in Iraq. Or Afghanistan, and, and we're still suffering from that. As a result, we have a 30— we're now accumulating a $35 trillion debt that we have no way of paying off. Yeah. And, and so these have accumulative effects. All of our, all of our actions have consequences, and we don't realize that. Well, all we do is react to events. We have no strategic thinking at the helm, and this is what's really problematic. And I don't see it forthcoming perhaps in either administration. Hopefully, if Trump gets elected, he will have learned not to rehire these neocons that wanted to push him into going to war against Iran and giving him a blank check for Israel.

But even, Mike, even with Trump, there's a lot of voices. I'm one of those. I argue that the guy is not qualified to be president, first of all. Has no understanding of what global affairs are all about. And third element, he's already giving in to Israel. So my assumption is that once he becomes a president, if he becomes president, so it's carte blanche for Israel to do whatever. And that's what my fear.

I have a theory. Yeah, he's learned a lot from his first term. He gave, he gave Bibi Netanyahu all that he wanted. He pulled out of the JCPOA, the nuclear Iranian nuclear deal, and look what happened. They were in compliance at the time in 2018.

Indeed.

And as a consequence, because we pulled out of this agreement, no other country ever wants to enter into any agreements with us again. That and for other reasons, you know, the promises on NATO expansion. All of these agreements we made, we threw them out. All of our arms control agreements, we have pulled out of them. So no country wants to enter into anything with us, into agreements any longer because of our past actions. And we have done this to ourselves. And as a result, I think what Trump may do Now this is my theory that because if he wins, he will not be able to run again. And he's a real estate guy and he wants to protect Trump International. I think he's going to look more toward working with the Saudis if he's in the administration. And the administration— and the Saudis want a two-state solution. They want normalization, they want to reestablish the Abraham Accords, and because that was the way, but this time you have to figure out a way to deal with the Palestinians. Before, that didn't happen. And this is one of the stipulations that Crown Prince bin Salman has been stipulating, that you have to have the two-state solution. He wants to go back to the '67 Borders. Yeah, I doubt that will happen.

I doubt it either.

No, especially with Smotrich, especially with Smotrich and Ben-Gvir. They're an interesting duo. They basically, they're really representing another faction within Israel that is against the mainstream government. They are basically Samaritans and backing the settlers 100%, and the settlements have already been decreed and determined to be illegal under international law. Yet they're the ones who are pushing the settlements into, into the West Bank and ultimately into Gaza. They want to move all the Arabs, all of the Palestinians out of those regions completely and open them up only for Jews and the settlers. And this is perhaps creating— and now they want to draft the more ultra-Orthodox. I wouldn't have them in my military because you wouldn't be able to rely on them. So consequently, I think it's tearing the internal fabric of the country apart. So there is the potential for civil war even within Israel.

Well, yeah, I mean, regarding the Saudis, if Trump will go into that direction, I mean, I was aware of one delegation from Saudi, from, uh, Israel, uh, that traveled to Saudi Arabia, even though you and I know how the Saudis feel about the presence of Jews on their land.

Yeah.

And even though the conversation was, it was, it was sensitive at that time, nobody knew about except some of us who were inside at the time. And, and it was the argument as to can a deal works out between Saudis and the Israelis as far as diplomatic relations, whatever. This is, I believe, why the Saudis or why the Iranians issued the warning even to Saudis despite they just broke out a sort of an agreement, reached an agreement between the two.

Well, I think it also has to do with the fact that if U.S. bases respond to the Iranians from Saudi Arabian soil, they're going to be attacked. So they're probably giving them fair warning. Well, some countries have said, like Kuwait, yeah, I think Kuwait has basically said already you cannot use your bases to attack Iran. Yeah. Now I haven't heard that yet from Saudi Arabia.

Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates are wishy-washy. We all know how they are.

They're seeing which way the winds are blowing at any given moment.

Indeed, indeed, Mike. Hey, I want to get your take while we're still in that region before we move elsewhere. I want to tell— I want to have your take about the role behind the scenes of Russia. If those who understand international affairs or geopolitics, there is no way that the Russians will miss this opportunity, geopolitically speaking. So, uh, I am aware of a, a trip by the intelligence officers from the GRU to two locations. One of them is Yemen, one of them is Iran. So is this, in your opinion— and given that, by the way, Russia has already delivered, to my knowledge, some sort of advanced weapons, but this one's to Yemen, the, the, the H group, the Houthis, uh, the anti-ship missiles— is this, in your opinion, a development that suggests that Russia is telling Iranians We have you back. Go for it.

Oh yeah, absolutely. I think it also stems from the fact that the West has been supplying weapons to Ukraine as proxy. So Putin's response has been, okay, if you're going to help my enemy, I'll help your enemy. And that's what I see happening. What I think has gone into Iran are EW, electronic warfare systems. And these are— there's 3 of them that they put up, and they go up about 37 meters each. And there's about 3 of them, and they are meant to scramble incoming missile electronics, the electronics of incoming missiles. And it's a microwave. It's a form of EMP, but it's meant to neutralize the guidance systems of these missiles should the Israelis fire them at the Iranian bases. So, plus, I think they're probably going to give— the Russians will give the Iranians advanced S-400 missiles. Air defense systems, at least the S-400, possibly the S-500. And that's only so far, the S-500's only been relegated to the Russian military. But you get to another point, having Russia having Iran's back. Yeah, their relationship has grown more into an alliance. And you had Shoigu, the former defense minister and who's now the national security guy for Russia, going into and meeting with Iranian officials, not only for military but economic talks. And you got to keep in mind too that Iran now plays a very, very prominent role as part of the Belt and Road Initiative. Initiative that, that would include Russia, China. Uh, it's now, it's now a full-fledged member not only of BRICS but also, and that's recent, but also of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, the SCO. Yeah, the SCO. They represent what I, what I see evolving with the SCO, even though it's primarily an economic base. And you have the Belt and Road Initiative, it's to set up economic corridors. You have the Eurasian Economic Union as part of this group. All of these elements combined— the BRICS, the SCO, the EU, and the Belt and Road— when you put all of these together, it really constitutes this new multipolar world order of which Iran now is a very prominent member. And, uh, and along with Russia, along with China, and they are part of the corridor process to move the Belt and Road Initiative as it's, as it's, uh, as it's developing. You have more than 140 countries now that belong to the Belt and Road. Wow. That's quite extraordinary. And that goes into Africa, into Latin America, and you even have some European countries that have expressed an interest in wanting to join that because they see the EU has limited days. The economic union, European Union, has limited days. It's fracturing. It's become sort of a supranational government, which countries such as Hungary, Slovakia are recoiling against because it's dictating everything, all of their internal, external policies, and countries are are tired of it, and you're probably going to see more and more, and you're seeing them now, you're seeing the economic, the European Union talking more of creating its own defense system apart from NATO. So they're beginning to see a fracture in NATO as well. Yeah. And you're seeing, and you're seeing the Germans and the French beginning to compete to do that. So I think, I think, and And Iran, and they're very reluctant to impose any more sanctions on Iran. And Iran, because of all the sanctions over the years, both Russia and Iran and even China now, all the countries that are heavily, heavily sanctioned have found ways around the sanctions. And that's why they've now created the BRICS mechanism through which now they're divesting themselves, they're de-dollarizing. And going with exchange of their own currencies. And that could also represent ultimately trade-free zones among these countries so that when they trade, they're not being subject to tariffs. And this will be apart from what the West, the EU and the United States is offering to them with all kinds of contingencies and, and stipulations and restrictions, and they're sick of it.

Very, very, very interesting. One last thing on this part, and we move on into talking about the Ukraine-Russia conflict. Hypothetically, in the case of Iran and Israel conflict, uh, uh, when— I'm not going to say if, but when Iran launches his attack and if Israel retaliated are we gonna see an expansion of the conflicts that will include other major powers, including China? What do you think, Mike?

I think you'll see certainly Russia.

Okay.

You will certainly, and Turkey. Turkey's the second largest military in the Middle East. That's significant. And even though it's a member of NATO, they are a member, but Turkey is very interesting. It wants to create its own Turkic expansion through the Caucasus, the North Caucasus, and into Central Asia. We're seeing that emerge. Putin is very aware of that, and even though it might compete somewhat with spheres of influence by Russia, It's not necessarily conflicting, even though he sees it competing somewhat for influence, and that doesn't bother Putin at this point because they do get along quite well between the two, and they are all members of the SCO, all members of BRICS. Well, Turkey is not, but they are certainly— they have good bilateral relations. And Turkey relies very heavily on Russia for oil and gas.

Yeah, but can be— Mike, Mike, can Turkey be trusted?

Well, Erdoğan, and again, this is the cult of the personality, he's guiding all of this. This is the strength of his personality that is moving Turkey into this prominence. As long as he's around, I think he's the one who's guiding this. He has this aura around him. He's almost like a mini Stalin, if you will. It's the cult of that personality, as I say. He is Turkey, Türkiye, as they call it. And he has been very supportive of Hamas, and he's actually had Hamas living in Turkey for a time. He's also trying now to make amends with Syria. Yeah, so he's paving the way. And also with Iraq, I think he wants to pull out of northern Iraq, which they've had bases there illegally for years. And so I think he's trying to lay his foundation, reestablish his orientation more toward a Turkey, spreading his Turkic influence and countries that have— Previously, I mean, Central Asian countries historically have always been under the Turkic influence. You look at the western part of China, Xinjiang Province, that is all Turkic. Those people were Turkic before the Huns moved in recently. But they are— the Turkic influence goes way back to the Ottoman. And so I see him really wanting to reestablish a neo-Ottoman Empire.

Very, very interesting. Uh, hey guys, just for you, for those who just joining us here, I'm having a conversation here with Michael Maloof. He's a former Pentagon official for over 23 years, almost 30 combined with the experience. Uh, let's, uh, let's shift the conversation to the Russia-Ukraine conflict, and after that we move into Asia because I like to have your insight, Mike, on, on those key, key geographical locations and also the policies that's going to be emanating from not only Washington but Brussels as well, but also from Moscow and Beijing regarding the host of issues there. But let's start with the Russia-Ukraine. We all know, we all know, I mean, it doesn't take a genius to figure it out, Ukraine is a failed state. Ukraine is done for. So now what is the end game for NATO with its sort of fomenting more tensions and providing the support and all that stuff into Ukraine? That is, what is the endgame in your opinion?

I think that the United States has basically, basically looks upon their effort in Ukraine to have been a failed case. That's why you're beginning now to see them working on Armenia. Working through the Transcaucasus areas, uh, and to, to once again to find ways to isolate Moscow, Russia. You see, the whole idea of Ukraine was to isolate, and bring— and in bringing NATO countries up to the Russian Federation boundaries was to isolate and contain Russia. And so consequently The United States is making yet another effort to go through the Transcaucasus to work with Azerbaijan and Armenia and to try to move its influence into those regions. It's going to be difficult. It's going to be difficult because they— because these people also see how we're now treating such countries as Georgia, the country of Georgia, in which we used to do military operations. Now we're sanctioning them again because they dared to pass their rules, uh, for, uh, on, uh, on, uh, foreign agents in the country. We have, we have similar rules, but they did it, which, which identifies how much money's, are coming in from abroad into NGOs. And we do the same thing if it's a government. We don't do it on private entities, but entities that are associated with government, we do it. That's what Michael Flynn was, uh, uh, indicted on, uh, a few years ago. He was working through a Turkish company that had ties to Turkey, to the Turkish government. So we, we do the same thing. Again, being in charge of the rules-based order in which we can make the rules, we can also break them whenever we want. So that's what's happening.

Which is not right.

No, it's not right. And it's that inconsistency that is hurting us internationally.

Yeah, so now what's going to be happening to NATO? Because we're all seeing the fragmentation that exists within that organization. It's a relic of the past, in my opinion.

This is my theory of what's going to happen with NATO. I think if Trump comes in, NATO, the NATO countries, such as the Scandinavian countries, they're going to begin looking less at a cohesive NATO because 32 countries can no longer agree in unison on one thing. It's impossible. So they may fragment into many alliances. Such as the Scandinavian countries or some of the European countries. And we see it already in the MENA, the Middle East and North African countries, in which Morocco and these countries have actually set up their own defensive alliances. And that's what NATO has gotten away from. It's gotten away from being a defensive alliance into an offensive alliance. And this is why when you have nuclear weapons on your soil and all that, you're no longer a defensive country. And when you're moving in missile systems aimed at Moscow, that's— those are offensive. Even the anti-missile missile systems that we wanted to install in Romania and what have you, they could be turned around and used to launch Tomahawks. That makes them offensive. Russia knows that. That's why they're now bringing their own— that's why they basically said, okay, you tore up the INF, the Intermediate Range Treaty, so we're no longer going to adhere to it. And they're going to be moving hypersonics into Kaliningrad and what have you, which makes— puts them even closer to Europe. Europe Europeans must realize the gravity of what they're agreeing to, particularly in Germany. Germany has agreed to take these missiles, and the people have not voted on it, and they're really upset about it. It's the leadership, and I make a distinction between the leadership and what the people want. They do not represent what the people want, and that makes them prime targets at all times as a consequence. Now, one of the reasons why the United States tore up the INF, even though they've made a baseless claim that Russia had violated it, um, is that other countries now have developed intermediate missiles, and they would like to include China, Pakistan, India. They all have that, even, uh, North Korea, which— good luck on that. But, uh, all these countries have intermediate ballistic missiles now. And at the time, we had the INF Treaty was only with Russia, then Soviet Union. It was a bilateral arrangement. Now we're seeing, now these other countries have it, and it makes it virtually useless. And, but as a practical matter, when we get Germany and Scholz, the chancellor, is so weak, agrees to have missiles like that installed, that gives NATO that offensive capability that people should be alarmed about because that's putting hypersonics aimed right at them, not the United States so much, but they're the ones who are on the front lines.

Yeah, well, that's why some countries don't understand that when we say, yeah, we support you, that doesn't mean we're going to fight on your behalf. They don't get it.

There you have it. Yeah, well, it, it's, it's, it's a serious problem, and I think people are coming to that realization that, that the United States drove them to this predicament, had, had them wean themselves from, uh, their reliance on Russian energy, energy, and now they're having to grope around the world looking for new forms of energy, and what the United States offers is so expensive that they realize that they're being economically built and extorted as a consequence. And it only benefits the United States. It's not benefiting them. Them. Yeah.

Well, like I always say, Mike, Europe is like a child that never grows up and is always in constant need of direction and discipline. That's how I've always viewed Europe. Because, you know, I have family lives in Europe. I have family in France, Germany, Holland, England, and so forth. And especially the ones in France. I've always used to argue with the family that anytime I go and have dinner and we chat and you always hear the president. At that time, I remember it was Jacques Chirac when he was president. Then he came François Mitterrand after him, then Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, then François Hollande. All of them talking about we need to build our own defense. It was nothing but a talk. It was nothing but a talk. And I told my family, they ain't gonna move forward. You guys are so weak. You don't have a political will to stand on your feet to say to the Americans, no, we're not going to do that. You know, Angela Merkel, Angela Merkel, when she was a chancellor, she was the only one, in my opinion, able to tell the Americans, no, we're not going to do that. That's why she maintained her good relationship with the Russians at that time.

Well, she ruled very well, and her absence now is being really felt. Because, because Scholz is so weak. And Macron cannot— even though he wants to be in charge, he's awful. He doesn't even have internal support. He's awful. So it's— Europe is in trouble. EU is fracturing. And even though it wants to be a supranational bureaucratic overlay of nation states, that's beginning to grow thin as well. And I think you're going to see more countries increasingly rebel against it.

Very interesting. Let's shift to Far East, and especially I want to use a term you mentioned earlier, Mike. It has to do with NATO becoming an offensive alliance, not a defensive. And this cannot be more clear than NATO's plan in Asia. So why the heck is NATO going to establish an office in Tokyo? And why are we fermenting tensions in the Far East? Is that where the next—

NATO, yeah, NATO is under Stoltenberg especially, has been an entity trying to reestablish its identity after the end of the Cold War. You see, when the Cold War ended, NATO stayed, but the Warsaw Pact went away. And as a consequence, NATO expanded some 5 to 7 times and up to the Russian border. And that's against— get this— 3 presidents, a Secretary of State promised that that wouldn't happen. Secondly, there are half a dozen agreements that the West agreed to with Russia called on the issue of what we call indivisibility. That you don't arm the West at the expense of the East. But that's precisely what happened. And we threw out all of those agreements by doing— by moving NATO the way we did to the border. That's an offensive effort. And so consequently, since NATO is not— unless and until NATO breaks up, I think the SCO is going to become the Eurasian version of a— it's like security alliance. Yeah, a defense alliance. Yeah, I think so.

Very well, because if we go with your analysis here, Mike, I'm seeing the trend in Asia regarding 3 countries, actually 4: Japan, South Korea, Philippines, and Australia.

Yeah, yeah. And Australians have already said we don't want NATO in there.

Yeah, but, but Australians, they just talk, Mike. I won't trust them. You and I know, we've both been in, in DC. I know you and I know that the decisions regarding Australia are made in Washington, not in Canberra.

Well, I, I, I'm not that quite, quite familiar with the internal politics of Australia, but It looks like their prime minister is recoiling against some of the decision-making by the AUKUS, and they want to keep their relationship well with China because of trade. They want to, and secondly, I don't see Japan or South Korea or even the Philippines uniting to go up against China militarily. Maybe economically they may compete, but not, but not militarily. That would be a disaster for them. And, and, and now you have Russia moving into North Korea, which is a very significant move, and that I think will give North Korea a whole new life. Yeah, on the one hand, and I think that's diminished the South Korean impetus to work with the United States vigorously in having these military exercises and what have you, because it's aimed at them. And every time we do that with the South Koreans, the North Koreans react. And we got to stop doing that. And we got to— and North Korea is a reality. It's just the way it goes. And the Russians now have made that very clear. By entering into these economic and military agreements with them. So the— and, and it has moved Russia along with China. And I think the Chinese are happy about that because they don't really get along all that well with the North Koreans. But I think having the Russians there to placate the, the, the North Koreans, I think that that helps in, in relation to the whole SCO movement and association. It keeps some stability in the region, and it also keeps the— also checks the influence, the growing influence of NATO and Western powers coming into the region. India, India is still working with— it's part of the SCO, it's part of BRICS, just as BRICS includes both India and China. So I see them work, trying to work things out. Politically with some of their disagreements. And we also see India's relationship with Russia becoming solidified. And that really, really upset the United States recently when Modi, the Prime Minister, gave Putin a big bear hug.

I remember seeing that one. Regarding one key point that I want to have your answer or your input about when you mentioned Japan and South Korea stand no chance against China militarily, which we all know. Now, can the same thing apply to the US? Do we stand any chance against the Chinese militarily, given our performance in Afghanistan and Iraq?

I don't— we have— I think we have a— that's going to be a difficult one because The, the, it depends upon their, uh, outreach there. We have the missiles, but if we move, if we move fleets, uh, carrier strike groups in there, those ships could be easily sunk. Um, we, we, um, it would, it will probably be a duel of missiles. We have submarines, ballistic missile submarines. We still have the edge militarily in terms if we use, if we use nuclear. Military, uh, conventional? No, no. Why?

The Chinese also—

I don't know how we would fight a conventional war against China. It would be, it would be impossible. No, there's no way. It would have to be nuclear or not at all. That's why we got to learn to get along with people.

I hope so. I hope so. So in general term, in general term, Mike, will it be fair to say that NATO's thinking of the expansion east suggest that that's where the next conflict theater is going to be.

They want to include it. The United States has been pushing to move into the Pacific for years. That's why they've been trying to get out of the Middle East, but the Middle East keeps dragging the US back in there. But, uh, they, they, their, their shift is more toward the Pacific, uh, but, but I think we're— I think they're going to be limitations. And, and the, and the Chinese right now have more warships than the US does. Yeah, a lot more, maybe 2 to 3 times more right now. So, and, and if they wanted, if they wanted to take out Taiwan, all they would have to do is freeze that island or blockade it. Yeah, and nothing would get in or out. They don't have to attack it. Uh, and, uh, and in the United— what would the United States do? What would the United States do? Nothing. What could they do?

And I never believed, Mike, that China will embark on military ventures regarding Taiwan. I mean, how can we say a country is going to invade its own? It's like us invading Hawaii. Just doesn't make sense.

I see a blockade. I see the potential for a blockade. I don't see an invasion. I don't see mass, mass missile attacks. No, I don't see that. But I do see that if I do see potential encounters that if we launch, if we use Japan and, uh, and, uh, South Korea as bases to launch from, that, that, that, that then puts them in the bullseye, and they don't want that. They don't want that because they're stationary. They can't move around. We come halfway around the world to create havoc when we should be staying in our own area of influence. I think if Trump gets elected I think he's going to work with Xi Jinping and with Putin to reestablish spheres of influence.

And yet, Mike, I mean, I'm going to challenge you on this, brother. Yes, it was Trump that initiated this whole trade war with China, which I have no understanding as to why the heck will he do that with a market that is so big. To create this.

I think, I think when you have China wanting to build EV factories in Mexico and then selling those cars into the United States, the U.S. workers don't benefit. Yeah, the only answer is to, to launch tariffs, 100% tariffs on them, maybe 150% tariffs on each vehicle, because our people are not benefiting. We got to think of Americans. And their jobs, bringing industries into the United States. Besides that, EVs are not going to be the answer for some— quite some time. You got to build an infrastructure first, and that has not been built. Besides that, the battery technology still needs a lot of improvement. So there's a lot that needs to go on. You just can't— can't— it's not like you have a switch-on, switch-off, uh, type of, of an approach with this. Takes years to lay the foundation and build that up. But we're not there. $9 billion to build 8 refueling stations for EVs. That's crazy. That's what the United States spent just on EVs. And we only have 8 refueling stations. 8 for $1.5 billion. That's outrageous.

Well, it makes more sense for us to invest in our own infrastructure here first.

That's the point. And I think— I think we believe in fair trade, but we can't have the Chinese economically undercutting us economically and underselling us because that constitutes something else that we have recoiled against. Even with our own allies, we've got to be— they still spy on us. Look at the theft of intellectual properties that the Chinese have undertaken. That's all got to stop, and they've got to stop the inflow, influx of fentanyl. Yeah, it's killing our people.

Yeah, but at the same time, we do have drugs coming out of Latin America. That's for our war.

They're going from China into Latin America and coming into the United States. Yeah, Trump has promised to take out the cartels. I think he's going to launch the military into the, uh, to bomb the cartels. We got to also clean out the cartel families that are resident now in the United States. DEA says they're resident in some 13 US cities. 5 of those cities are distribution hubs. They have quite a network already in the United States. That's just 6 cartel families. So we've got a lot of problems that we got to face.

Yeah, we start that— like I always say, foreign policy starts at home first.

That's right. We have both domestic and foreign issues, and they're related. They tend to be related to each other, and you cannot distinguish one from the other. They're all interrelated.

Indeed. Indeed. Hey guys, if you have just prepared your question, just please put a Q before your question so I know it's a question. We got over— I don't know how many people are watching here, but We got a lot, the chat box is full, and to make it easier for me to, uh, pick up the question right away. Well, first, uh, I want to say, uh, by the way, Mike, where can my, my, uh, my viewers in the community find your work? Where can they find you?

Well, I have a little podcast, it's in its infancy, okay, called Real Michael Maloof. And, uh, and it's, uh, on Rumble.

Okay, well, I'll be happy. Okay, I'll put the link in the description and I look forward to checking that out. I do have an account there as well and, and we'll check it out. So, all right, let me, let me first say thank you to, uh, Shelley Porter for becoming a channel member. Truly appreciate your kind support. Uh, Multipolar World, good to see you and thank you for your super sticker. Truly appreciate you. And the next person I want to say thank you to is Super Mr. So-and-so. Uh, thank you very much for your super sticker. You said interview Syed Muhammad Morandi. I did send him a tweet message and never heard back from him, so that's—

he's a good friend of mine.

Really? I'm trying to get a hold of him, Mike.

In fact, I was in touch with him just yesterday.

I will be—

he's a very busy guy.

He is, but I will be happy if you can facilitate that for me. I would greatly appreciate it for the community if it's possible. Thank you so much, Mike. Truly appreciate it. A lot of people do not know that Mr. Morandi was born in the US, in Virginia.

That's correct.

Yeah, a lot of people do not know, so he's an American somehow. All right, yeah, go ahead, go ahead, Mike.

I was going to say he was born in the US, he studied here, he was also in the Iran-Iraq War. Yeah, and, uh, he was affected by the gassing and whatever that occurred.

Indeed. Yeah, and his dad was a health minister, it was a high-ranking official.

Yeah, yeah, and he's also, um, member of parliament.

Yeah, I would love to have a conversation.

He handles American Studies at Tehran University.

University, that's correct. And I did send through that email account but never heard back. So anyway, let's, uh, take first question from Army with Harmony, uh, an avid supporter of the channel. Thank you for being here. Question: How deadly is burning lithium in comparison to burning gas? How close can you stand to one or the other and survive? This probably pertains to the type of weapons that are going to be used in the Iran-Israel conflict. Can you hear me, Mike?

Yeah, I'm not a technical person, so I would have to defer on that. But I think any lethality is dangerous to your health. And so I will yield to the experts on that question.

All right, let's take another question here. Zulfakar Makani, thank you for being here. Question: Where does India fit with Russia and Iran?

Well, India fits right in there. They're all members of BRICS. They're all members of the SCO, Shanghai Cooperation Organization. They have some political differences, and their networks, their corridors, their trade corridors are all intermeshed with one another now, particularly for the Belt and Road Initiative. And for the BRICS countries. So India is very much involved, and India has long— it's more of a neutral country. It has more of a standing on the Eurasian side than— even though it would like to look westward, but it's much more comfortable in the east. And we've seen this now with its predominant trade being with Russia and with Iran. And we're seeing Modi reaching out to those countries in the Global South and in the Eurasian sphere of influence. It's major. When you put all those people together, they constitute more than what's in the West.

Very, very interesting. Another— this is a statement by Darren Arnie. Thank you very much for your Super Sticker. He said, excellent guest speaker, hope to see Mr. Malouf here again. Of course, yeah, Mike will be here given his schedule. He's a busy man, by the way, guys. Uh, we were just lucky to have him here. He's usually very, very busy. So, uh, there's probable net-led chaos in Bangladesh. Hope you can report on that later too. I will, I will do that, uh, soon. Last question I'm gonna take here is from, uh Last question from Amber Spirit: What's your prospects on the future of the EU, the European Union?

I think it's going to begin— we're already beginning to see cracks. It's trying desperately, the EU, particularly with Van der Leyen, trying to re-establish its authority as a supranational— by supranational, it's sort of a government overlay on all the other governments like of Hungary, Slovakia, France, and those countries now are beginning to rebel against it. And unless they draw in a little bit, I think EU is going to become a has-been as well. We already see Orbán of Hungary and Fico of Slovakia beginning to spin off from that because they feel that they're not getting the support from the EU, even though they're members of the EU. You had the EU actively trying to get Orbán off as the monthly president of the EU. So we're beginning to see cracks in that, and these other countries see that. You have a distinction between countries in the north and countries in the south as part of the EU. And the, and the south, southern countries are, are much poorer than the northern countries. So there's already a chasm between those two. So I don't, I don't see it lasting, uh, uh, for quite some time. Uh, I, I see it breaking up probably in the near future, or at least losing some of its, uh, influence that it has had in the past, because no one, no one trusts them. They're trying to establish now their own defense system. This goes well beyond what the purpose of the EU was originally intended. And now it's become unelected bureaucrats governing the internal and external policies of all of its members. And that's unacceptable to nation states. Wow.

Well, Mike, what an interesting conversation, brother. I look forward to having you back here. So on behalf of the entire community, I'll say thank you to you for carving out time for us here and look forward to seeing you again. Please wait for me until I say bye, and I want to talk to you privately.

So if you can wait for me later.

All right, thank you, Mike.

Sure.

All right, guys, I hope you'll find the, the conversation here with, with Mike Maloof an interesting one. He's someone that he's been around long enough to know how things are. Remember, When you become a policy analyst, those policy decisions end up impacting countries in the long term and so forth and so forth. And Mike's been around that for almost 3 decades. So someone who understands the ins and outs. So I hope you find it very interesting. I look forward to— I'm going to be reading your comments, by the way, guys. So please make sure to leave your comments in the, in the comment section and I will respond to it. As always, remember, geopolitics impacts your daily life in more ways than one. Till next time, guys. Bye-bye.