Nuclear Weapons Changed Everything: Why Iran Should Copy North Korea's Strategy

Hello everybody and welcome to Geopolitical Trends, where truth matters. Here is what happens if Iran goes nuclear: the US stops threatening military strikes and starts negotiating. Sounds counterintuitive, right? It's already happening with North Korea. So the US talks tough to North Korea sometimes, or maybe all the time, but it never actually attacks. And why? Because nukes change the rules and Iran knows it. And with this, we're gonna ask the fundamental question: is Iran making the same mistake twice by entering into negotiations with the US? Of course, there are those who are saying— I'm one of those saying that they're repeating mistakes. Argument because it holds. And that argument is that Iran's previous negotiations, particularly the JCPOA, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, which was in 2015 when the agreement was made, ultimately backfired. Why? Because US withdrew in 2019 under Trump, reinstated sanctions, and didn't reciprocate Iranian compliance. And from this view, engaging again sets up Iran for similar disappointment. So the US political landscape is unstable as we speak. Why? Because usually the administrations change. So enforcement is inconsistent. And this is why Iran has to think Is Iran giving up leverage here while at the same time getting uncertain promises in return? And I find it very, very sort of confusing as to what— why Tehran will be thinking in those terms of, well, let's negotiate again with the Americans. The counterargument to that is that it suggests that Iran Because Iran is facing constrained options, rather. Without negotiations, Iran faces even more intensifying sanctions, the regional isolation, which I don't believe in, and potentially the military confrontation, which is what's at the heart of what's going on. All of those are costly for Iran. I understand that argument. So negotiations, even risky ones, might be preferable to the alternative. And this is again when you have to go back to the 2015 agreement deal. It did work for several years, so the failure didn't come from— the failure came from external U.S. politics, not the deal itself or the way it was designed, because better termed, or better terms, or safeguards might have addressed this vulnerability before. And this is again where you have to think, and I'm finding myself, why is Iran entering into these talks with the US once again, knowing what just happened last time? It just doesn't, doesn't add up. So whether, even if you think in terms of the JCPOA, whether actually constrained Iran nuclear program effectively, I will say yes, to a degree. There are those, of course, the skeptics and the critics, uh, the, the critics that argue that this spews this sort of the, uh, verification mechanism. Well, of course you can't trust the IAEA, the International Atomic Energy Agency. That's the back door. You can't trust them. They never— I never did anyway. But the thing is that the US withdrawal from that agreement was inevitable, and that in itself should give Iran a pause into thinking, should we get in, into other negotiations here? And this in itself, the question that is ultimately involved around is the judgments about the risk tolerance for Tehran. Of course, the trust issue, and one of the key is whether past patterns determine future outcome. This is again what Iran has to deal with right now, and that paved our way again for that legitimate questions. Has Iran learned anything from past history when the US withdrew from the JCPOA in 2019. It's, it's to those who say, well, Iran appear to have learned. Well, apparently not the case, because if they are getting involved in negotiations once again, that means they haven't learned. What Iran learned back then is that the acceleration of its nuclear program after the, the 2019 withdrawal of the US that it suggests it understood the risks of restraint without reciprocations. In other words, Iran gave up something, but it didn't get something back in return. And that's when Iran began enriching uranium at a higher level and expanded the centrifuges operations. And that essentially signals that if the US wouldn't honor its commitments, Iran wouldn't either. But just think about it, in case Iran had the nuclear capability, we will even be having this discussion? I don't think so. And I'm gonna get into the case of North Korea to draw parallel for you to have a better understanding. So please make sure to stay with me till the end because I have one particular or two major announcements I want to make. One of them is question and one of them is an announcement. So make sure you stay with me till the end here. So what Iran end up doing after that in 2019, it diversifies its negotiation, uh, negotiating partners and sources of support. Why? Because if it depends solely on dealing with the US, it's not going to work. So what Iran end up doing is they diversified that and strengthened the ties with Russia and China. And that in itself reduced the isolation. And that in my opinion suggests that Iran learned that relying on a single adversary for a deal is very, very risky. But still, it leads us to ask the question, why are they moving forward with these negotiations? Because now Iran is saying we will sort of give up something in return for something. Are you once again gonna trust the Trump administration? Because it was Trump that pulled the US out of the JCPOA back in 2019. And with this, you say to yourself, where it's unclear whether Iran has learned or not, the core vulnerability remains. And those vulnerabilities are realistic. That was part of the reasons, of course, there are some foreign entities that have pushed for the demonstrations inside Iran. But one of the realities that existed within Iran itself domestically is the economic conditions, because Iran's economy desperately needs some sort of sanction relief. And the US controls much of the global financial markets. So without the US buying in, our other partners can only do so much. Those are realities. We can't ignore them. In this case, Iran may have understood the risks that it's involved, and that's what's compelling it to negotiate because of the alternative. And why? Because to Iran's calculation, and this is me thinking outside the box, sustaining isolation and economic collapse are far worse than getting into negotiations with the Americans. But at the same time, this leads us to another question because this is like a chain. They are all connected. Whether Iran can actually prevent a future US withdrawal. Who's to say if Iran enters into negotiations today, and let's say a year from today, the US will withdraw from the agreement? No, in my opinion, no negotiating tactics fully insulate Iran from US domestic political shifts because that is what happened. It's exact setting that was in 2019. The withdrawal happened partly because of ideology and domestic politics right here in the US, not because Iran violated the deal or so, none of that. It's because of us, the same scenario that I'm seeing the possibility of it happening. Then the practical tensions that exist, Iran, in my opinion, learned that it needs leverage and shouldn't fully comply with guarantees. But also, and I am sort of, when Zarif used to be the former foreign minister at the time, I'm sure he learned at that time that also Iran has learned it has limited ability to guarantee US commitment. And we put this within the context of the current negotiations, if happening. So my, my sort of now seeing Iran trying to build a much harder to reverse mechanisms to maintain nuclear hedges. At the same time, if you go that route, that's gonna make some sort of negotiations harder. And with all this, you put all this aside and you say to yourself, what if Iran acquired the nuclear weapons? Will we see tensions between the US and Iran today? And here is where I'm using North Korea as an example, where the US dares to threaten North Korea. And to me, it's, it's a counter factual arguments that we ought to think about. I mean, just think about it. Are we gonna go and threaten North Korea? There are those who say, "Yeah, we threaten North Korea all the time." I don't think so. I don't think so because we know the North Koreans are not gonna be bluffing and they're gonna retaliate. Have we ever moved any, like the way we're doing with Iran right now? And this is again where Some are arguing using North Korea as a comparison point reveals, in my opinion, something very important about how nuclear weapons reshape strategic dynamics. That's just part of the dynamics of it. When you look at the North Korean model, and once again, I am— because this is when North Korea conducted the test in 2006. It was over. The US couldn't do squat about it. Even though there are, as I said, those who say, "Well, the US does threaten North Korea regularly through military exercises, the rhetoric, and show of force." Yeah, but actually US doesn't threat North Korea the way it does with Iran. Because those threats that the US issues, whatever, remain largely rhetoric. Rhetorical, window dressing, bunch of hot air because they don't translate into actual military strike or regime change attempts like what we're seeing in Iran. And why? Because once North Korea acquired the nuclear weapon, which was tested in 2006, first one, the calculus changed fundamentally, especially on part of the US. This is why a direct military action sort of becomes genuinely risky for the United States. So the relationship shifted towards deterrence on part of North Korea. On the part of the US will be the sanctions and some sort of periodic diplomatic overtures rather than military options. We are not seeing this with Iran. So Iran is now in critical state. Is it to embark on making the damn bomb and move on, or it's going to be living in this vicious cycle? Because here is the thing: if Iran has a nuclear weapon, whether it does or not, for at this point, they must have something. But if it is declared, that's a different story. But we go with the assumption that Iran doesn't have nuclear weapons. But if Iran does, tensions might likely still exist, but the nature of the US behavior would probably shift similarly the way it was with North Korea. Because here is what she will include. For example, you consider the continuation of the economic sanctions and the diplomatic pressure, like what we're doing to a degree with North Korea. You will maintain some military presence in the area. Of course, we have the bases in Bahrain, the Fifth Fleet. We have the Al Ubeid in Qatar. We have presence in Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Egypt, and Iraq to a degree, and soon to be Syria. So we will maintain those kind of deterrent capabilities in the region. We will issue more sort of rhetorical threats, more bravado towards Iran, but we will avoid military strike that could trigger nuclear retaliation in case Iran had a weapon. And one of the fundamental things that hypothetically if Iran had the nuclear weapons, What we're going to do is we will pursue negotiations from some sort of a position one way or another, rather than assuming military superiority. The same arguments I can make now about North Korea. I mean, just take a step back and think about it. Do we issue any threats against North Korea? Especially the picture you're looking at, this is when the last testing of the ICBM. Which means it can hit the US. And that's where the key differences from this particular scenario in today. When you think about it today, when you think about it as we speak, there are a lot of movement. You all know Bibi Netanyahu is in Washington. You know, there's a lot of moving parts. But currently, the US and Israel retain that option of the military action. Or the strikes on our nuclear facilities once again, because Iran doesn't have yet a nuclear deterrent. And Ali Khamenei will have at some point to make some sort of a damn decision and move on with this. He can't be dragging the country forever, otherwise this vicious cycles is gonna be repeating itself. So, and that option, the nuclear deterrence, that option will disappear. So, because if Iran had the weapon or declared it, the US couldn't threaten regime change credibly. Regional allies like Saudi, like even Israel will face different security calculations. But for Saudi Arabia now, the calculations are different. And this is one of the key thing I'm gonna talk to you towards the end because, uh, I will, I will say something about it very, very important that no one is talking about. I'll, I'll mention that. The other aspects you have when it comes down to this, the paradox that exists vis-à-vis the ability to declare nuclear capabilities, is that nuclear weapon will reduce U.S. military leverage. Once again, use North Korea as a case in point. And as a matter of fact, I will even go as far as saying, and please share with the community your opinion about this, in Europe, do you believe that if the nuclear weapons will reduce the US military leverage, it might actually lead to some form or make negotiations easier. What do you think? I see it that way. I see that if Iran would've stepped forward, move on with the pro— with the nuclear program, declared itself a nuclear power, and the US wants to negotiate, now the negotiations will be much easier. Yes or no? What do you think? Because now both sides will have mutual incentives to avoid catastrophe. Because that's usually what happened if one nuclear power is being sort of attacked or a military strike against it and so forth. And that is where those miscalculations risks become even higher. What do I mean by this? What I mean by this, the idea like we did when we wanted to attack nuclear facilities for Iran. If Iran had the nuclear weapons, we will— it will become too risky for us to do that. That's my point. And this is where North Korea will be used as a template for Iran. You know, of course, tensions will persist. I'm not denying that, but they will be managed through two main things. One is deterrence. Second one is negotiations. Rather than having a military threat backed by credible strike options. This is where I see the difference. And for Ali Khamenei or Iran establishment in general, they're gonna have to move forward, either make a damn decision and move with it or stop talking completely. Because this wishy-washy is what's creating the problems for Iran right now. All these missiles can be nuclear-tipped if they choose to. Yeah, all this. And mark my word that we will think twice about sort of threatening Iran in that case. So when you have now the Iran foreign minister, Mr. Abbas Araghchi, I don't know, I'm not judging the guy. Because here is what he's saying. He's saying that Tehran is fully serious about the indirect negotiations that recently resumed with the United States. And Iran is seeking real negotiations that lead to a specific outcome. Didn't we have this back then? Why are you making the same mistake twice? There's a saying here in the US, I don't know if you're familiar with it. Fall me once, shame on you. Fall me twice, shame on me. It will become now the ball is in Iran's court. So when Mr. Araghchi is saying, well, we want the other side to show some level of seriousness and willingness to enter into negotiations that lead to a result. I am sorry, Mr. Arakshi, you are daydreaming, respectfully here. I understand the economic conditions Iran is under. I understand how we pushed the currency for Iran to really sink down. But till when? You'll be talking about these negotiations for— it's not going to lead to anything. It's just spinning the wheel, no more, no less. And that's exactly what Mr. Erevshi stated to some ambassadors and the head of foreign missions in Tehran ahead of the 47th anniversary of the victory of the revolution. And an exact word, I had to look up his statement, I pulled up and translated from Farsi. Here is what it says word for word, and I quote. There is no way to resolve the Iranian nuclear issue except through diplomacy, end of quote. You are giving the Americans a hint that you don't have the balls to move forward the same way North Korea did, and look where the results are. That's how we're interpreting this in Washington. We don't look at it like in terms of Iran is saying, if you address us in a language of force or in pressure, we will respond with resistance. And if you address us in a language of dignity and respect, we will respond in kind. What are you saying versus how the way, the mindset here in Washington? We don't think in these terms of what Mr. Arakji is saying. That's a waste of energy. We don't think like that. We think in terms of if we can pressure you because you have no deterrent, then we're going to do it. But if you do have nuclear capability, for example, we will think twice about attacking you or threatening you or even consider striking. That's where the difference is. Liking this video so far? Don't just be a watcher. Go ahead and hit the like, share, and subscribe button. And don't forget to tap the bell so you will not miss any of my videos or livestreams. This way you will be supporting a channel that stands for the truth and objective reporting. The choice is yours. Thanks for your support. So the argument that within this nuclear context, the head of the, uh, uh, representative of the Atomic Energy, uh, uh, organization in Iran, his name is Mohammad Eslami. I hope I pronounce it correctly. He's saying that raising the issue of reducing uranium enrichment to 60% in negotiations with the US is linked to whether the other party will lift all sanctions or not. Are you kidding yourself? Do you think we're going to do that? And this is again when I am left to wonder How much— and I know, I wrote a book about Iran. I had to dig into the history of that particular country and understand how its government operates. They are very pragmatic. Iran government is, they are very pragmatic. But that pragmatism, when you bring it into conversation with the Americans, it's going to lead you nowhere because we don't think in these terms. Because you don't have the leverage, for example, North Korea does, which why it went ahead and built the nuclear weapons because they know. They're for us to now to threaten North Korea. We won't. We won't. And this is again where you have that issue of understanding that in my opinion, Iran is making the same or is repeating the mistake. Holding negotiations once again. It's, it's like you did back after 2015, uh, or in 2015 that led to, uh, uh, the JCPOA, only to find out 2, 3, 3 years later the US withdrew in 2019 under Trump. Withdraw, reinstated sanctions, and that's it. And this is where you have to think, and you know, what has Iran learned from the history, past history? Accelerating pro— you're going to have to make a decision. You're moving forward with it. Get the IAEA inspectors out, withdraw from the NPT altogether, same way Pakistan did. India did, North Korea did as well, and they moved forward. Look where they are today. And that is exactly because if Iran acquired the nuclear weapon, we will see tensions between the US and Iran today. No, we won't. We won't because it won't exist. That is where the difference is. And you have to think in those terms. It is my conclusion for you. I just wanted to give you an update because I told you last time I'm going to be following up this because it's a very major developments going on in the region. We're talking about major changes to the geopolitical landscape, not only in West Asia or Middle East, but around the world. And that is why I'm doing what I'm doing as far as ensuring you being informed and keep up with the developments that's going., uh, uh, uh, developing today. And like I said, for the two players, US and Israel, they still, as of today, maintaining and retaining that option of the military strike. It's on the table. I am here to tell you that that option is still on the table, whether it's, it's going to be on a nuclear facility or elsewhere. I do not know. And only for one reason. And that reason is because Iran doesn't have a nuclear deterrent. That is the only option for that. And with this leads me to the two things that I told you I will talk to you about towards the end here. And in the form of question, I will greatly appreciate if you could answer this question for me. I'll put it later on for the rest of the community who did not have a chance to join us here. And the question is, could Iran, in your opinion, purchase a bomb from North Korea? Let me repeat the question, yes or no, please, uh, just answer that. Could Iran, in your opinion, purchase a bomb from North Korea, yes or no? And the second thing I want to talk to you about briefly is regarding the Saudi role. Tomorrow I'm gonna be releasing a video that's something nobody's talking about. I'm not gonna get ahead of it. Make sure to watch the video tomorrow. I'm gonna release it very early in the morning. You can listen and it will make more sense to you to see a much bigger picture than no, no analyst, no media, nobody's talking about. And I hope it will make more sense to you. Hope you enjoy this, and I look forward to seeing you next time. Please take the opportunity, uh, to support the channel should you decide to do so. Here is the link for the channel. I would greatly appreciate your continued support. And, uh, I'll take this opportunity to say thank you to Noel last time when I did live stream, uh, he posted a super sticker. I didn't see it. I saw it right after I closed the, uh, the stream. So I want, I want to give a shout out to Noel, uh, for, uh, his continued support for the channel. And to all of you, I am very, very grateful. As always, remember, geopolitics impacts your daily life in more ways than one. Till next time, bye-bye.