Rumble in the East: India's Solitary Stand Against China's Economic Empire!!

In this Geopolitical Trends interview, host David Oualaalou talks with Parveen Shahani, editor of Force Magazine and former Indian Army officer, about India’s strategic position vis‑à‑vis China and the broader Indo‑Pacific. Shahani argues that China now outpaces India in the three pillars of hard power—economy, technology and military—yet Indian discourse remains fixated on competition rather than cooperation. The conversation critiques India’s foreign‑policy choices, notably the over‑emphasis on the G20 presidency at the expense of a more consequential SCO chairmanship, and the country’s ambiguous stance in multilateral groupings such as the Quad, BRICS and SCO. They discuss India’s economic policies, including the recent rupee‑based trade deal with the UAE, reluctance toward a BRICS common currency, and the broader move toward local‑currency trade. Shahani highlights deficiencies in India’s defence posture: an outdated 1986 US Air‑Land Battle doctrine, lack of a vibrant indigenous defence industrial base, and the challenges of modernising the armed forces. The interview also touches on nuclear strategy, warning from India’s former chief of staff about the risks of using nuclear weapons against Pakistan, and the growing strategic partnership between China and Pakistan. Throughout, both guests stress the need for India to recognise the shifting global balance toward a multipolar world, to prioritise pragmatic cooperation with China where possible, and to avoid fragmented foreign‑policy that hampers economic growth.
Chapters
Hello everybody and welcome to Geopolitical Trends. I'm so excited to be here because today I'm gonna have a great conversation with a great guest. So my guest today is Parveen Shahani. He is the editor, the publisher, the owner of Force Magazine. For those who have not Checked for the magazine. You need to check it out. And by the way, guys, I will provide you all the links for to Parvin's, uh, social media and the, the YouTube channel and all that at the end. But I need to tell you who Parvin is. It's, by the way, he is an analyst and he is a former military guy inside India. He was, as a matter of fact, uh, uh, an officer, commissioned officer in the Indian Army for 13 years. Parveen is also an author of many books, including his recent one. It's called The Last War: How AI Will Shape India's Final Showdown with China. Very, very interesting book, guys. You need to take a look at it. He was also a visiting scholar at Sandia National Laboratories in Albuquerque, in the US, and I am very familiar with that, uh, with that, uh, with those laboratories there. So I'm very, very familiar. So, well, without further ado here, let me bring in my guest here, Parvin. Here you are, Parvin. How are you?
Hi, David.
Yeah, good to have you. So excited to have you here. As a matter of fact, uh, a lot of my viewers were excited to— once they heard your name, it's like It's so exciting to hear what Parvin has to say. So I'm very excited. I'm very happy that you carved out time for me here. So we're going to have an in-depth and objective conversation because a lot of people are in need of hearing both sides of the arguments. And this is what we're going to be addressing in this conversation. Yana, we're going to have it a conversation. This is not a Q&A session per se. Just a conversation and we just go from there. So, well, I'd like to start with the first thing, Parveen. You are from India, of course, of course. And I'd like to get your feedback, especially for our viewers, about understanding within the social structure of India. Is constructive criticism, is it acceptable in India? And the reason I'm saying this is because I did a video recently about India and BRICS, and some apparently from India did not like what I had to say. And I didn't mean to criticize India, I was just pointing facts.
See, now that, David, you are talking of facts, I think facts are very important to be laid on the table for the simple reason that the entire global geopolitics It has shifted from Europe now to Asia Pacific. Now, this is the reason, uh, and the reason for that is very simple— it's China. Now, the point is, China is one nation which in its own thinking is not really competing. In its own thinking, it is working towards the inclusive world, and India happens to be China's neighbor., and we have a border dispute. And traditionally, India has seen itself as a competitor to China. The question now is, which needs to be understood by most Indian analysts and people, is that China is no longer in terms of national power— when we talk national power, I am referring to the hard power which is 3 things, which is economy, which is technology, and which is military. So in terms of hard power, China has outpaced India. So the— at your point is valid that the reason why most of the Indians do not want criticism is that they are scared of truth. They are unwilling to reconcile to the fact that China, with the same population, with the same civilizational history, has outpaced India in hard power and actually today is competing in a sense with the Americans. Honestly, China is looking at cooperation. Competition is what the Americans are looking at. And the Americans are looking at competition for the simple reason that they've been taken completely by surprise. I mean, the rise of China was there, everybody saw it coming, except that the American assumptions were wrong about China. If they had one assumption correct, and that one assumption is it is a civilizational nation, it is not a nation-state. I say, so understand the civilization, that means China has the wisdom of 5,000 years. So how can you expect China to be on the same page as far as their traditions are concerned, their culture is concerned, their thinking is concerned as the Americans? Nothing wrong with the American values. Now the issue is, as far as India is concerned, most of the Indians, they unfortunately don't even know China. They know America because it mean that American dream also for most Indians. So we have, which is good, we have very good connections with America in various fields, but we have to also accept the truth. And as I said, this is the truth. If you understand the truth, then you would want to know more and more. You would want— yes, what are the other fellows saying? I want to know that. But unfortunately, we are at that stage, like the Americans don't want the truth. I'm honestly— I'm saying this is the way when I read your papers, I read your paper, New York Times, Washington Post, I see that they are just sort of parroting what the, what the establishment wants them to say. But having said that, let's be honest, America is still far, far more open society, far, far more willing to take criticism than India is.
So yeah, because I find it very challenging For example, and I've, you know, I'm a student of history and I've, I was in the military myself, I worked in Washington. So India was part of our sort of under the microscope because of how the changes within Southeast Asia, let alone for India, a nuclear power with the neighbors that are also nuclear powers, which we will talk about later. It was always that thinking. Of why India is not seeing the big picture. And I compare this, for example, the era now of the Prime Minister Modi to that of Atal Bajpai, for example, or to Mama Han Singh. You know, I look at him like on the opposite end because— and I'm going to say it straightforward, Parveen, because I don't sugarcoat things— I think for the Prime Minister Modi has failed to deliver on his promises prior to becoming a PM. And this seems like some entities inside India are not liking when statements like this are issued. We kind of— you become labeled as, well, you are anti-India, or you are— when in reality we're not. We're just stating the facts. The economy of India has not moved at pace with where the world economy is moving. And that's the, uh, sort of a reality that they seems to have a hard time accepting. So this leads me to talk about, uh, SCO, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, which India, by the way, just chaired recently. I did watch one of your video, by the way, guys. I don't know if you watch Parvin's channels on the, on the defense force. It's a very interesting sort of platform by which to listen to an objective analysis. You know, I encourage you to check it out, guys. So anyway, Parveen, you talked about how India, when it chaired this SCO, represented a failure. Why that is, in your opinion?
See, uh, this year India had two presidencies. It has the presidency of G20 and the SCO. So in my opinion, a disproportionate importance was given to G20, and perhaps the reason for that is the Indian leaders want to be identified very close to the Western leaders. But I look at the G7, which happened recently in Hiroshima, I am of the opinion that in fact the importance of G20 has come down. See, G20 came into being because G7 was not delivering. I think now with the rise of China, or now China being seen as a competitor, as an enemy, adversary, whatever you call, so the importance of G7 is back in the game. So the point I'm making is If the Indian, uh, and the policymakers had seen the thing carefully, they would have realized that of the two presidencies, actually the SCO was more important. Why it was important is because the importance of G20 has gone down substantially because we saw at G7 it was all about China, China bashing Ukraine. That was all that was done. Now, as far as SEO is concerned, SEO is evolving, SEO is dynamic. If we see from where SEO has come, it came into being in 2001, but it came from Shanghai Five. So what was the whole idea? The whole idea was connectivity and infrastructure building, you see. So what is being done is, and if we— the Indian government carefully sees the whole thing, they will realize that yes, a lot— because the Americans now are perhaps creating a geopolitical void in the Middle East. They are perhaps now as not so much active, primarily because their focus has shifted. Now focus has shifted to Russia and basically China. So China— for China and Russia which are working together, the opportunities and options have opened up. Now I want to make one very important point here, basically for the— your viewers. When we say SCO, please remember there are two geopolitical powers which are in it, which is Russia and China. Let me just define what I am saying. I categorize powers in 3, uh, you know, categories. You have medium powers. I mean, I'm not talking of the smaller powers, they are hardly— you have the medium powers. Then you have major powers, major powers like Japan, France, Germany. These are major powers. Then you have geostrategic players. Geostrategic players are those nations which have the capability, capacity, and political will to influence events beyond their borders. And there are only 3 nations today, that is China, Russia, and America. Only 3 nations I would categorize as geostrategic players. So what you have today is in SCO, there are 2 geostrategic players, and the geography is favorable for the SCO. After all, geopolitics is about geography, which is not the case with America. I mean, on the other side, G20, there is only one geostrategic player. Now, I'm not trying to undermine America, but what I'm saying is that every nation, including India, has to keep its own national interest in mind. While we want relations with all the nations, I believe that SCO was not given the importance it should have been. If it was not held in a virtual mode, then there was a possibility of Xi Jinping coming to India. And I think that would have been a major breakthrough for India because India— as I said, geopolitics is about geography— India needs cooperation with China, provided India understands that today China actually is in an entirely different geopolitical category globally. Once we reconcile to that, something even the Americans are not reconciling, then I think a lot of the problems of the world, they'll be sorted out. So this is my reason why I said that SCO was not a success at all. It was a failure because we missed the opportunity of having Xi Jinping and perhaps President Putin also coming to India, having a physical, uh, summit and understanding the importance that this is one organization which is growing. It is growing by the day. There are so many nations which are today wanting to join the SCO. They lined up. Yeah. So we have to understand what is— why are they lining up? Because they understand that we want a globalized world. We do not want a fragmented world.
Yeah. But the way I see it, Parveen, is that you will think that strategists inside India will be thinking in terms of the next 5, 10, 15, 20 years, and they can preposition India to play that role. But the policies that I am watching now emanating from New Delhi, they go in the opposite direction. So I don't quite understand what is the rationale for the Prime Minister's Modi's government to sort of embark on policies that will hinder the progress, economic that is, of India. And what am I referring to here, Parveen? I'm referring to, for example, the opportunity for India to build its infrastructure. Well, how that infrastructure is going to be built if you don't cooperate with other countries that have the means to do it.
So you see, the answer to that is really simple, and I'll give you the perspective which you are unable to understand of most analysts in India. And the perspective is, as I said, India— I'm saying India, when I say India, I'm referring to the government in place. The present government in India refuses to accept that there is— there should be no combat with China. There is no competition with China. There can only be cooperation with China. So the Government of India wants to compete with China. It wants— it believes that, yes, we are still, in terms of national power, we are there somewhere very close to China, which is not the reality. And therefore, and therefore, the whole thinking is that if we piggyback on the Americans If we piggyback on the Western nations, then there is a possibility that we will be able to compete with China. And if we speak with China now, you see, if we normalize relations with China, then there will be no option but to do cooperation with China. And you don't compete with China. The Americans also can't compete in infrastructure building and deep pockets. Yeah, so how do you compete with China? So that's the reason.
Yeah, but at the same time, if I am to follow your argument, Parveen, which I might disagree with to a degree, is that if we are to follow the narrative of, well, let's piggyback with the West, with the United States, does India understand what the outcome will be? And I'm giving you an example here, like what's going on in Australia. Look what is going on in Australia now. That embarked on policy to picky bag with the Americans, and look where they end up. I mean, this is why yesterday the Prime Minister of New Zealand made it clear to the Secretary of State Antony Blinken, who's visiting there, that New Zealand wants to stay neutral. They don't want to follow the footsteps of Australia because they saw the outcome. So why will India, seeing all this in front of its eyes, will go ahead and do that? That's to me what's mind-boggling. I don't get it.
I, I, I'll explain. You see, New Zealand is an important country in Oceania, South Pacific nations. Now the Americans suddenly have woken up to the reality that the Chinese are investing money and they are building infrastructure in the South specific nations. What is the Oceania? And now the Australians are also realizing that while for security purposes they are tied to the Americans and the West, insofar as trade is concerned— see, David, it's simple as that. When a nation trades with— when 139 nations of the world are the primary trading partners of America— of China, That means you don't disengage or you don't decouple from China as far as your industrial supply chains are concerned. It is impossible. Now, the issue with India is that India realizes that we can project ourselves as a big nation because we offer certain things to the Western America which New Zealand can't. And what are those things? Number 1, geography. You see, number 2, a huge market. Number 3, India is the largest arms importer in the world. You see, number 4, a huge disciplined military. You see, so there is no comparison between New Zealand and India. But the whole— there I agree entirely with you. That I do not agree at all with the Indian government policies. Indian government has failed to understand that, look, there are implications of geopolitics. There are very serious implications of what is hap— see, David, this is a decisive decade. Plenty will be decided in this decade, for sure. And what is that plenty? I would say The key thing which will be determined is the new age technologies, where they are going, how will artificial intelligence influence military, economy, politics, diplomacy. This is the key thing. So the Americans realize that, as far as— which is why they have chosen China as the main competitor and adversary, that China has the entire AI ecosystem. And only China is in competition with America. So if the Indians also realize we can actually get a lot from China— for example, we in India, on political grounds, Huawei 5G was rejected. The fact of the matter is that even cyber issues can be there in the American, uh, supply chains as well, in the Western supply chains as well. I mean, I'm not saying it will be there It can be there anywhere. So you have to technically test. If it is good, accept it. See, I'm not saying that I favor China. What I'm saying is, for India's national interest, this is the best thing to do. Concentrate on your geography.
Oh, I see, I see. Well, it's just because for us, I mean, yes, I did hear about, uh, like for example, the recent decision by the Indian government to turn down the $1 billion investments from the BYD regarding the Chinese car manufacturers, which by the way, just for the record, this wasn't 100% Chinese because there was— there were rather some Indian companies will be involved in the project. So it wasn't solely just controlled 100% by China. So, and I am surprised that the Indian government turned that down siding. The reason for that is security, which to me as an American, I read it like from a playbook of what we told the Europeans to do regarding the Huawei technology.
I, I, from my perspective, yeah, it's not security, it's geopolitics. Yeah, but India, does India Yeah, it is geopolitics that we are competing with China. So how can the electric vehicles in our country—
yeah, but does, does the Prime Minister Modi realize that he's jeopardizing the opportunities, economic opportunities for Indian workers?
See, that is for the Prime Minister to decide. I am not in that game of deciding for the Prime Minister. Yeah, but I'm just expressing to you my personal opinion, how I read the situation. So in my opinion, it is not a good decision to have turned down 5G Huawei. It is not a good decision to have turned down these electric vehicles, $1 billion that they want to invest. Yeah, because we should have checked them technically for security reasons. If it was fine, it should be accepted. David Oualaalou, perhaps Your viewers should know, even today, 70% of electronics, they are imported from China. Wow. India, India imports 70% of electronics from China. This is a fact. So the point is that we should not get into, you know, just to politics of the whole thing. We must understand, you know, and a lot of countries are understanding that, look, in fact, that is the reason that today even the Americans have adopted that, look, we are no longer talking decoupling, we are perhaps not even talking de-risking, we are talking diversification. You see, you can keep talking in any way, the fact of the matter is that China is indispensable to the industrial supply chains. Period. Yeah, Europeans are coming to realize, and Americans are coming to realize that that is the reality of the world. We have to face that.
Yeah, and we already— there is already my contacts in Washington, D.C. that I talked to, still inside in Washington, in the government there and so forth. There is a big concern for, for example, the policies we embarked on as far as the cutting off the, uh, or, or forcing other countries like in Netherlands, for example, to stop selling the equipments for— from the ASML for the, the microchip. And now things are backfiring on us here in the United States. So I criticize the government, the Biden administration, for doing something that it didn't think long-term impact of it. And now we're trying to figure out how. And this is why I argued about the point from India coming from that perspective. So, but this leads me to think in terms— and I'd like to get your take on this, Parveen— the idea of how, if we are to move this into the, uh, let's say, the military dimensions, you know. And I do know and read enough about Indian military structure and so forth, even in my days in Washington, DC. So I'm, I'm trying to wrap my head around the idea of how India will be, for example, able to manage, to manage some sort of an odd position of being a member of the Quad while at the same time wanted to advocate for, let's say, cooperation in BRICS or SCO. I mean, it doesn't do it as much in RCEP, the Regional Comprehensive Economic partnership because India is out of that. So how do you think India is able to manage this?
So you see, it will get difficult by the day. Yeah, I agree with you. And the reason for that is that we will see in this decade— this is my assessment— that more and more Western countries will realize that perhaps Development, prosperity is far more important than security. We will see that as an outcome of the Ukraine war. In the Ukraine war, as far as I am concerned, I do not see Russia losing at all the war. How it will end up, that is another story, you see, because as I said, Russia is a geostrategic player. And Russia today, if you see the reports 60,000 rounds, artillery rounds, they are firing every day. That means this is the strength of their indigenous production. This is the spurt in war that they can generate. So the point I am making is that a lot of countries, smaller countries, ASEAN nations, they are not happy with NATO also coming to Indo-Pacific region. So therefore it will get more and more difficult for India to stand on two stools. You see, it will— it can either be with the US defense networks, or it can either be with the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, with the BRICS nation, both of which are evolving. So it will become more and more difficult. For example, you take the instance of this SCO only holding a virtual conference. Perhaps one of the reasons for that was that, look, because we want to devote so much of attention and importance to G20, let us downplay SCO. But for how long will you keep downplaying it? Because after all, India is not a small country. India is a huge landmass, you see. So it is a matter of time before a government in Delhi will realize that you have to take sides. I am sorry to say, in fact, let me say something further. Which perhaps your viewers may not agree. See, when we say we are passing through turbulent times, it is because we have entered a multipolar world, and there is no balance of power in multipolar world. Yes, you see, it doesn't work. So there is uncertainty. But the very fact that the Americans have identified China as their key competitor, which is what they have specified in their National Defense Strategy, National Security Strategy. It means that they are cognizant of the fact that eventually the competition is between America and China. So perhaps by the end of this decade, by 2030, we will start seeing the contours of bipolarity once again, and India will have to sort of decide India is too big, it has to decide. See, the government of India cannot be sitting on two stools. It is not possible for a huge nation like India to do that.
Wow, that would be very interesting to see. Now I'd like to get your, uh, your take on, uh, I know you did an episode on your show regarding the nuclear policy, especially when it comes down to Pakistan and India, China to a degree. For that, I'd like to know your perspective of what— why do you think Lieutenant General has issued enough of a warning about the nuclear policy?
See, this is a very interesting question. Why interesting? Because it concerns India's geography, which is geopolitics. As far as I am concerned. So therefore, what General Kidwai did on the eve of the 25th anniversary of that test— made a statement where he said that, look, now we have nuclear weapons with a zero-meter range. Now, when you talk of a zero-meter range, are you talking about artillery shells? Are you talking about nuclear landmines? The answer is no. Why no? Because all the wars that we have fought between India and Pakistan, Pakistan has maintained a parity at the campaign or the operational level of war where outcome of a war is determined. In the western sector that we have, there was a military line in '49 which was created. It still remains on the ground. By a different name. What this means is Pakistan Army has never been defeated. And then please understand, if you see the, the topography and the demography around this line, there are huge population centers, there are a lot of very important vulnerable areas. Cities are there, Lahore is there, you see, just 40 kilometers from the border. The point I'm making is they have no intentions of using nuclear weapons. The warning was basically, perhaps in my assessment, to tell the Indian government, don't do anything before your 2024 elections. Don't try and use Pakistan to gain your votes in the election. Something that perhaps the Indian government, in my assessment, did in the Balakot strike, did in the 2016 surgical strikes. So the point I'm making is that it was a warning by Kidwai, but it was given in a very subtle way. Yeah, that look, that we have this. Even if you have it, first of all, you will not have it for the simple reason Pakistan is a responsible nuclear power. It will keep the nuclear weapons control at the highest level. For the simple reason, you know, and I know, David, there is nothing called a tactical effect of a nuclear weapon. A nuclear weapon also will have a strategic effect. Even if you use an artillery shell somewhere, it has a strategic effect. So they know that. They are responsible people. So that is why I said I saw that as a warning to India that please don't use Pakistan, do any misadventure This is my assessment, uh, before your elections.
Yeah, yeah, yeah. Later on, that the decision about the nuclear use in Pakistan is concentrated within the headquarters only. The— to my knowledge, to my knowledge, in my days in Washington, the Air Force and then, and the Army in Pakistan do not have access to that. It's the headquarters. And when I say headquarters, I'm referring to part of it has to do with the ISI.
That was, uh, yeah, I mean, we, we don't know where it is, but, uh, all indicators are that it is under the direct control of the General Headquarters, which is their army headquarters. Yeah, through organization which is called the Strategic Plans Division. And I won't— I don't think their generals are irresponsible. I don't think they will let their nuclear weapons loose. This will not happen. They are under tight control, and that is where they'll stay. You are right, as far as their Air Force and the Navy is concerned, they have the administrative facilities to be the vectors just in case they are required to be used. You see, they'll provide the logistics, the technical backup as a vector of the nuclear weapon. But that is a situation which will not happen actually today. Again, something the Indians don't realize, that what has happened is that today the strategic embrace between China and Pakistan has become very intense, very, very intense. If you have— anybody has followed what has happened since 2019 And now the Chinese are helping the Pakistanis in a lot of areas which concern the military. For example, David, if I may say so, the whole thinking about nuclear weapons— see, nuclear weapons are unusable. They've only been used once. When you today have a capability which has a strategic effect like cyber like counter space. Why wouldn't you use that first? I mean, after all, what are we looking at? We are looking at— any nation is looking at— why do you do the strategic effect? So that instead of doing a war of attrition, you are doing a war of cognitive confrontation. You are directly hitting the political leadership and the military leadership of our country through the cyber attacks. Through a cyber war. So that will be— that will minimize the casualties and get the two warring sides to the table far more quickly. I'm not saying by itself they can do everything, but what I'm saying is today they present a, a very good substitute to nuclear weapons. And that is where a lot of people in the world should concentrate on understanding these capabilities and what they will do before the war, in the crisis period, in peacetime, and in war.
Yeah, well, that's why I'm hoping— literally, if I wish for something, I wish for one thing to happen for India on, on two fronts: one with Pakistan regarding the Kashmir, and one with China regarding the Ladakh. I hope they can sit down and figure out a way of how to solve that issue.
Again, sorry, I'm interrupting you, David. Uh, you on this— see, the issue is not Kashmir. Pakistan says Kashmir is the core issue, but it also says let's talk. So the key issue is, can India and Pakistan normalize their relations? Can India and Pakistan sit down and talk all the issues including Kashmir. That is the whole issue. So it is not about Kashmir. It's not that Kashmir will get resolved and everything will be resolved, because there are actually not many problems between India and Pakistan. You see the positives. The positives are we come from the same stock, we have same traditions, same culture, same background, same history, same civilization, same language. See, so we, we are same. Yeah, we, we are so similar. Two, one people in two nations. Certainly we can live in a friendly way. So they are saying talk. If we can talk, if both countries, I think will be a major breakthrough if both countries can sit down and talk.
Yeah, I did look at, uh, two separate, just to share it with our viewers. I came across two of the— oh, this one is different one here. Uh, it was a map of the, uh, where it was defined. I don't think so. I have it here. Uh, let me see. It was a map that— yeah, uh, Jamu. I just wanted to share it with our viewers here just for them to see because I got it from two different, uh, and I usually tend to provide both sides of the arguments. Uh, usually we have a, a great viewership here and they are very intellectually savvy to understand the difference between the two. So, and I usually present them with both sides of the argument. So this is one map that I found, this is from India, I believe, and the other one I found from Pakistan, or vice versa. This is from India, the other one from Pakistan. So So that was just my thinking in the idea of, you know, I wish— because I used to travel to Afghanistan and I'm very familiar with Rawalpindi and all the area of Lahore and all that, and including certain areas in India as well. And I was always in the back of my mind, you wish one day that, you know, issues can be resolved and everybody move in a peaceful way and live, you know, prosper, and so forth. But I also understand that for us in Washington, we know it's pressing— it's a pressure point that we can use on both countries. That I know for sure.
This is what both countries' leadership must realize, that our prosperity lies in being together.
Yeah, I agree.
Yeah, and Pakistan need to work together. We have already lost 75 years since independence. Certainly we can build on our strengths now, but this is a message which is not getting, uh, you know, through as far as the Indians are concerned. I don't know about the Pakistan side.
Yeah, that's— I hope that I need to get your— you are a former military man, so you are a commissioned officer, so you'll understand the force structure of, uh, I'd like to get your take on the Indian, in general term, military structure, where India is militarily. I know they have a good, good navy, but they do have other stuff as well. I'd like to get your take on that, Parveen, if just for our followers.
See, uh, what has happened is that since independence The Indian state has only focused on Pakistan as an adversary, as the enemy. So for example, the Indian military started following the 1986 US Air-Land Battle Doctrine, 1986, and it still follows the same. That means your war concept is of 1986 Because in my assessment, the Indians kept their sight only on Pakistan. They never saw China, with which we have a disputed border. If we had seen China, we would have realized that China learned a lot of lessons in the Gulf— Gulf War, Operation Desert Storm. And it was in Operation Desert Storm in 1991, the Chinese, the PLA, came to the conclusion that we are actually in competition with the US military. So today what has happened is, irrespective of what equipment we get, India gets, what matters is what you have. You need generals who can then exercise the art of war. Art of war is how do we optimize what we have, the science of war. Do we really understand Who's our main adversary? Do we understand what the adversary is doing? So India missed all that because then after 1991 in Jammu and Kashmir, for the last 33 years, the Indian military has been doing— rather, Indian Army has been doing counter-terror operations. You see, a parallel can be drawn from the Americans. The US military wasting away a decade in Afghanistan, in Iraq— that is the time that the PLA went ahead. So suddenly now the US military has woken up to the reality. Sometimes in 2014 when they came out with the Third Offset Strategy— yeah, Third Offset Strategy came because suddenly it was realized that, hey, look, the Chinese They can fire as long as we can fire. They can fire with precision as much as we can fire. So how do we compete now with China? So that is when the— so the point I'm making is, as far as Indian military is concerned, if you have a war concept which is some 35, 40 years old, then obviously you can— look, bean counting means nothing. You can get equipment from all over the world. You can make it in your country. The fact of the matter is there are two problems here with the Indian military. And why I always talk of problems is because we need to rectify them. One is that our war concepts are totally outdated. That means even our science of war is wrong. And number two, which is equally important, no country can say it is a military power if it does not have a vibrant defense industrial complex. Something that the Russians today are demonstrating in the Ukraine war. So these are the two things I would want perhaps the Indian defense minister to focus on, what is going on. So there is no categorization. We remain still, you know, concentrated on Pakistan. And for Pakistan, it is very simple. All the Pakistanis need to do is to match us at the campaign level, to just stay in step with what we are doing in terms of inductions. And now, plus, as I said, they are getting military supports from China, from the PLA. Yeah, this should be a big trouble for India. So this is where the Indian military stands today.
So can, can India overcome this challenge within the next, uh, 15—
all challenges? Look, there are no challenges if you identify the challenge and then have a realistic roadmap to work on it. Nothing happens suddenly. You see, a country like France, once General de Gaulle came, they decided, all right, we want to be self-sufficient, and they took 30, 40 years to be that. So if you just want that and a miracle will happen suddenly in 2 years, 3 years, I'll have a vibrant defense industrial complex, well, that will not happen. Yeah, what happened is you can— you have the money, you can buy things from outside. Nobody is giving you core technology, nobody will give you IPRs. See, all you will do is you will be able to assemble what they are giving you in your country and feel happy about it, which in case of a war with a major adversary will be a disadvantage because you will not be able to match the adversary, whether it is a short war or it is a long war. In the— in, in, in having that spurt of production, in making up for your losses immediately. That will not be possible.
Yeah. Uh, let's turn to, uh, India's trade with other countries, and I have one specific country in mind. It's because I, uh, I'm gonna have— I'm gonna just give a heads up to whomever is gonna watch one of the video I'm gonna release next week. It's a little bit explosive because of the information that I got my hands on in Washington regarding the economic outlook for India and so forth. Uh, India recently just got a deal with United Arab Emirates to trade in bilateral using rupees. So, so we all know the— that India is objecting to BRICS currency. And the reason is, is because India wants to prop up their rupee. But reality on the ground doesn't support India's arguments because India's economy on the global stage is not at the same level as it is of China, which is, you know, a fact. It's reality. Do you think, in your opinion, Parveen, that now that India cut a deal with United Arab Emirates, this could pave the way for India to expand its bilateral trade with other countries using the rupees?
So, you know, it's a very good question, and the answer is very simple. A lot of countries, big countries, and one of the outputs of the Ukraine war is they are moving to local currency trade, something which has now got pace. Lot of momentum has come in this. Now, the problem with the BRICS is, from the Indian perspective, that there is yuan, and yuan is one of the SDRs of the IMF. You see, the SDR, you have the topmost, of course, is the dollar, then you have yen, then you have pound, and then you have euro, and now yuan also has joined the list. And what we are seeing is there will be more and more investment as the BRICS countries— more and more members join in. Then there will be more and more, uh, you know, interaction in yuan for the simple reason not only the Chinese will be the major investors, but for also the reason that it is an SDR currency. So a lot of countries, smaller countries, would want to hold the reserves in yuan in their central banks, you see. So the— and then the world is also moving towards digital currency, again something with the Chinese are sort of channeling the whole thing. So the point is very simple: it is a good thing for India to do trade, uh, with UAE in rupee, but also India must learn a lesson With respect to Russia, Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov is on record saying that I have something like 4 billion rupees, what do I do with this money? You see, the point is that rupee is not a currency which is of strength of yuan, renminbi. It is not of that strength. Yeah, so we have to— and this is why India is hesitant to accept the currency. You see, after all, the BRICS countries started with Brazil saying that, look, we should have a common currency. India immediately opposed that, that no, we don't want a common currency, because eventually the common currency will be the currency which is already the SDR.
Yeah, yeah, but, but at the same time, if India doesn't one, that's how it's gonna hinder the progress of the entire economic block.
What I'm saying is, keep one thing in mind. Yeah, what I said at the beginning, that India should realize it is not in competition with, uh, with China. Hence there is no politics. It should look at cooperation for prosperity of its own people, period.
Yeah, so is this why India will object to allowing other members to join the BRICS?
So, so I expect India at the BRICS summit— it's happening now in Johannesburg very soon— I expect that to be one of the issues which will come up, and India certainly will not be in favor of it, of a common currency. India, India is not also favoring in BRICS more members joining in. Because India feels that its importance will go down in the BRICS if more and more members join in. Because there are a lot of— see, the world is realizing that we don't want wars, we don't want deterrence, military power. We basically want cooperative security, and we want development, we want infrastructure, we want investment. See, these are things people want. So if you want to say that China only, you know, gives to the BRI nations and they are entering into a debt trap, I mean, I'm not buying that. Because today there are something like, I mean, so many, more than 100 have joined the BRI, and they are not being forced by China to join the BRI. They are joining of their own will. So you see, the point is, the moment you criticize somebody That means you're not confident. Honestly, I don't see America as a confident country today. I'm sorry to say that. This is my— if the Americans were confident, then they have so many— in the last one month, Blinken has gone, Yellen has gone, John Kerry has gone, Kissinger has gone. Everybody has gone to China, you see. But the Chinese have not traveled here. Yeah, yeah.
CIA director too.
And Henry Kissinger, CIA director also.
Yeah, you're right, you're right. Yeah, you're absolutely correct, Parvin. You're absolutely correct. And I don't shy away from criticizing my government here because the policies they are embarking on are like, you know, sort of those, as I always call, a fragmented foreign policy strategy. Plain and simple. It's because, for one reason, as a Washington insider myself, it's for one reason, and that reason is we cannot compete with the Chinese. That's the reason why. It's because we are wasting our dollars on Ukraine that has nothing to do with our own interest right here at home. So that's, that's the reality, the truth of it.
So, so the other reality is, David Yeah, the other reality is that America's big constraint is it has never been in a strategic partnership, an equal partnership with any nation. You're right, he does not understand that. You see, even when, even when they helped China, China got into the WTO in 2001, the whole thinking was, if you recall, in 2009 When Hillary Clinton was the Secretary of State, this Brzezinski was sent as a special envoy of Hillary to China to propose in 2009 the G2 partnership. Now, G2 was very simple. We will be together, but it will all be— the Chinese are saying that, look, most of the rules have been made by you, perhaps they need to be modified. The international rules, the international institutions. But the American thinking was, no, you come in G2 and you accept all that we have done. Why will they accept as a civilizational state? They politely declined.
Yeah.
And now they have come up with— now they have come up with a, a new type of major power relationship which the Americans are refusing to acknowledge and, you know, accept. Yeah. Look, You accept the major power relationship, you accept there is another major power which they are not happy to accept. See, I agree with you entirely what you're saying.
Yeah, you're right. This is why I always say Washington is in denial about the reality of the current geopolitical landscape. The world is no longer— it's no longer the sole property of a sole superpower. That era is gone, and some in Washington are in denial about it. So that's, that's just the reality of it. Uh, Armin, where can my viewers find you? Where can they find me?
They can find me on my YouTube channel. I'm there. I'm on Twitter. That is all. I'm only on Twitter, nowhere else.
Okay.
And I'm gonna—
by the way, guys, I'm gonna post the link to Parveen's YouTube channel in the description. I'll provide you all the, the link to his content so you guys have an idea. It's worth listening to what he talks about. And I'm really glad that— and by the way, Parveen, do you know how I came a hold of you? It was one of my viewers here who sent me the name and he said you need to invite Parveen. And you know what, I checked it right away and I kind of like Yeah, well, because this is what we need in this world, Parvin. People who can think objectively, people who can analyze things objectively, and people who can at least see the big picture and present the arguments without trying to influence people's thinking and so forth. And, and, and I truly enjoy listening to your explanations on your, on your channels, and I encourage you guys to take a look at that. And by the way, we're gonna have more conversations with Parveen. I'm sure I'm gonna invite him again here for part 2, some other conversations. So, so Parveen, thank you so much for carving out time for me here. And I truly—
thank you, David. Thanks a lot. Really enjoyed being on your channel and talking with you. Thank you so much.
Yeah, my pleasure. All right, you take care.
Thank you. Take care.
Bye. All right guys, here you have it. I hope you enjoyed listening to Parveen. He's a very objective analyst, you know. I've, I've checked him out, uh, you know, as a sort of, uh, uh, background to understand. He's very objective in his analysis and I enjoyed listening to what he has to say. Yeah, he is from India, but he's also presenting the arguments and this is why I asked him that question at the beginning. As an Indian, you know, because I read the comments about people did not like what I said about Modi and all, and I don't shy away from it, but it's the truth, is the fact. Wait until they see my explosive video that I'm going to release next week, you know. I'm sure they're not going to like it, but I don't care whether they like it or not because I don't do this to meet the sensibilities of people. Oh, I got to be careful about how they feel. I, I don't do that nonsense. I present the fact to the best of my knowledge. I check on the information, the accuracy of it, because my name is on the line. And I present you guys the facts, the arguments, and let you reach your own conclusion. So, so I will be having Parvin again at some point soon. And, uh, and by the way, remember to join me tomorrow at 12:15 for a conversation about Australia Australia has just officially surrendered its sovereignty to the US. Uh, it's almost like, should I start calling it the 52nd state? So I'll be talking about that tomorrow, and I hope you enjoyed this show tonight with Parvin. I look forward to seeing you guys, and as always, remember, your politics impact your daily life in more ways than one. Till next time, guys.
Bye-bye.
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