The $250 Billion Question: Will Trump's China Trip Actually Deliver? W/Einar Tangen

Hello everybody and welcome to Geopolitical Trends, where truth matters. Excited to be with you as always. I am waiting on my guest Einar Tengen. Uh, Warwick Powell couldn't make it this time around, so what we decide to do is next week, uh, Warwick will be here, I believe on Monday the 18th. I will confirm the date with you, but for now I'm, uh, only going to have my conversation once Ayner Tengen is here. We're gonna go ahead and address exactly the summit that just concluded in Beijing between President Trump and President Xi. So before I— while I'm waiting on Ayner, I want to just share some few housekeeping items with you. Tomorrow, make sure to join me at 12:15 15. I will be addressing the secret bomber in the air. So that I will be addressing that tomorrow while waiting, uh, for Einar Tengen to join us here. Actually, he's just logging in right now. So let me, uh, at the stage. Yeah, here's Einar coming in. Uh, we're waiting for Einar to show up here. So hello, it's just the connection part. So tomorrow, just to let you know, uh, I will be doing a live stream at 12 15, and I already addressed some of the topics that I mentioned yesterday in that short clip. So I will be addressing that one tomorrow, and next week we'll be talking to Warrick once I lock in the date with him. So, all right, let's wait for— we're waiting on Einar to just connect here. Sometimes it's hard. He's in Beijing, by the way. Is there the connection? Sometimes can get very, very challenging. It's a, it's an interesting, uh, dynamics given what, uh, what just took place, uh, in Beijing. Uh, a lot, a lot of people here in Washington are saying, you know what, uh, Trump just showed how pathetic he is. You know, that's basically the argument, and I'm gonna let my guest Einar address that aspect of it. So, okay, let me see. Here is Einar. So we're just waiting for him to— okay, here is Einar right here. Let me see. Yes, you are there, except you have to flip your camera.

I already flipped it.

Yeah, yeah, it's still showing sideways.

I am endeavoring to persevere. Let me hang up and call again.

Sure, sure. There you are.

Um, yeah, unfortunately that's portraits, so yeah, yeah.

Okay, so as I said, we're waiting for Einar to connect here. He'll, he'll be here in a second. For those who do not know, maybe this is your first time here, I'm just going to give you a brief intro about Einar while we're waiting for him to reconnect. Uh, Einar Tengen is a senior fellow at CIGI, that's the Center for International Governance Innovation. He's also an international commentator on geopolitics and the global economy. He's based in Beijing and specializes in China's role in global governance and urban development. So, so we're waiting for— is the connection, guys. Sorry, Anna, I'm sure you can understand, uh, when you are halfway around the world. So that's a part of how it's going on. So, uh, while I'm waiting here, I'm seeing some names I haven't seen for a long time. Tamputra, good to see you here, man. It's been a long time I haven't seen them. Good to see you here. And, and happy to see all of you, Phil. And, uh, uh, who else? Truth Seeker, as always. Uh, Hangin G, as always. Good to see you, Leang. Good to see you here, as always. Willie Holman, as always. Hong Nguyen, good to see you. And yeah, you got a good point, Hong Nguyen, when you made the comment about, uh, uh, let me share it here. It's funny one. Dr. O, she don't hold all the cards, China makes the cards. And you are spot on, you're spot on. So once again, just on a serious note, while we're waiting for Einar to log in back, uh, on a serious note, you have to think about this particular, uh, trip for Trump to China. And, and literally, when I sit back now and, and look at it, what has he achieved? Nothing. Zero, and China didn't make a concession for him whatsoever. Even though, if you only know the delegation he took with him, we're talking about 30 top CEOs here in the US and all that stuff. Well, maybe some of those got a deal, but not, uh, some sort of, uh, Donald Trump himself, which he has to show for. And that is again where the issue, uh, why this trip in my opinion, and we're gonna be, uh, listening to what Einar has to say, uh, in my opinion, is a failure, or was a failure rather, because Trump now, uh, sort of, uh, uh, he has nothing to show for. And it demonstrated that China is in a different, uh, position right now than what it used to be. So, uh, vis-à-vis the US, and that's exactly the point for why I, I believe— I mean, I'm not even gonna start with which— I don't want to spoil it for you about the arrival of Donald Trump to, to Beijing. I mean, when you look at it, President Xi Jinping didn't go and greeted him at the airport. It was the US ambassador, it was the vice president for— vice the vice president for the Chinese, the second in command. Those are the ones that were at the airport, not President Xi. And that in itself tells you the message loud and clear. And again, it's because we don't understand how the Chinese think and operate. Chinese don't like to be pressured. Chinese don't like you know, they deal with things differently. And Donald Trump doesn't have that personality for that kind of sort of dealing with a different culture completely, let alone an ancient civilization. He doesn't have that kind of understanding. And that was the reason why the reception at the, uh, at the airport, uh, was basically by, uh, the vice president instead of President Xi himself. And this is online. The other thing that caught my attention, which I will bring it up again with my guest once he logged in here, has to do with Mark— Marco Lu. The Chinese gave him a name for that. And, uh, now please correct me for those who speak Chinese. Is the term Lu— Lu means toilet? Because that's what I, I read elsewhere. That's exactly what it means. And, uh, uh, basically, uh, that's what it meant. And, and please correct me if I'm wrong because I need to understand that. But suffice it to say that China, what I end up doing is it changed its name, his name, to Marco Liu. To let him in China because he's a persona non grata. He has sanctions on him. He's not allowed to be in China. But because he was so desperate to be, to visit China and see, and maybe for good, for him to see where China is instead of just, uh, issuing statements, uh, especially during his time in the Senate. And I used to listen to these hearings about bashing the Chinese and so forth. And now, uh, and that's exactly what happened. So the Chinese end up changing his name if he wants to join the Trump Summit despite the sanctions. So, and that is why he was introduced under— in Beijing under the name of Mark Liu. That's how he was introduced. Uh, it tells the story right there. It tells the story because to the Chinese That's a subtle message was sent to Marco Rubio, uh, with a touch of humiliation. And Chinese don't have to be loud about it, don't have to be aggressive, don't have— no, no, no, no, no, no, in a subtle way. And, and Marco probably got the message. Maybe he didn't because I don't know, whatever it is. But that's one of the things that caught my attention, uh, as far as, uh, his, uh, uh, taking part in the delegation. The two other key elements that surprised me, one of them was the Secretary of Defense. Makes you just wonder why the heck, why on earth the Secretary of Defense would end up going in a trip like that. So, but again, uh, whatever Trump, uh, trying to, uh, sort of, uh, uh, show to the Ch— it didn't work. It didn't work with the Chinese because the Chinese holds the card. When you think about, for example, and I'm going to share stuff with you prior to the arrival of, uh, uh, Einar Tangen, he is trying to connect. That's the bottom line. So you guys bear with me here till he comes in. Uh, when I share this, uh, uh, picture with you here, look back in 20— in 2001, and look back in 2025, which which is just last year. Look at the China or the US. Who is the top trade partner as of now? Look back in 2001 with the, with the blue was the US trading with everybody. Look now in 2025, and that in itself gives you an idea of where things— I looked at another chart, a graph, but it's in Arabic language, and I'll translate it for you. This is about the exchange of goods between the US and, uh, China. It's about $582 billion. That's the size of the trade between the two countries as of 2024. So when you think the Sadrat Seniya, when you think about the export of Chinese goods to the US, look how much— $438.9 billion. That's Chinese exports to the US. Look at the, the exports of the US to China, $143 billion. And I mean, the difference is as clear as daylight. And we're looking at about the, the surplus of almost $300 billion, the Chinese. And that tells you right there where the economy— and when I said last time when I said that, uh, oh, here is right here.

Hello?

Yes, can you hear me? Yes, I can hear you.

I can't hear you.

Okay, let me try it again. Let's try. Can you hear me now? Yeah, I can hear you. Can you hear me? Okay, let me add you again. There we go. All right, can you hear me, Einar?

Ah, yes, now I can.

No worries.

Computer today, uh, can't get anything to work.

No worries, Einar, the community understand and they are standing by waiting for your arrival. Connection is normal part of it. So, and, and I already want to—

I signed on 10 minutes before, but I got—

I know, I know. I told the community that's usually your own time. And anyway, so good to see you, Einar, and, and, and truly, truly appreciate you being here. And I already want to hear and introduce you to the community, to those who might be here for the first time. Let me repeat it again. Who is Einar? Einar Tengen is a senior fellow at the CIGI the Center for International Governance Innovation. He's also an international commentator on geopolitics and the global economy based in Beijing. He specializes in China's role in global governance and urban development. So what we're going to do, I, I'm going to play a quick clip here, then we'll take it from there. Take a listen, guys, because I'm not going to play the sound because it has soundtrack. YouTube doesn't like that. Just take a look, take a look. All right, you get the point on that. And the reason I wanted to share this before I ask, uh, Einar, uh, as to when you see the who was waiting for Donald Trump at the airport. And with this, Einar, I want to ask you the question: what strategic calculation, in your opinion, did China— or does China's decision, rather— to have President Xi Jinping absent from Trump's arrival ceremony communicate?

Well, it's, uh, first off, you have to go back 9 years, uh, and actually Trump was greeted by somebody who was actually more senior. Uh, the vice president is in fact a figurehead. He's the person who shows shows up at funerals and goes to events on behalf of the nation that don't require policy, but it just requires somebody to be there as part of the event. So I don't know if Xi Jinping was busy. I doubt it. I think the calculation was that, um, you know, they're gonna in essence make them meet on neutral ground. It was not going to be you know, Trump. I mean, Trump being greeted by Xi as if Xi was waiting for him. This was a meeting of equals, and I think that's what we'll be talking about.

And for this one, Einar, was it— was this particular message sort of directed or signal— or specifically directed to domestic audience, bilateral audience, or multilateral in this case?

No, it was directed at everybody. You know, obviously, you know, optics are something that go across all things. This was played on Chinese television, international television. This is a very strong signal. But, you know, I don't get wound up too much in this kind of thing. It was just simply a way of showing that these two were equals. The fact is that it was a red carpet greeting. The vice president was very warm. Trump was very impressed with all the cheering, high high school students, and of course, you know, all the pomp and circumstances that China was very, very careful to arrange. So it was a very warm and friendly greeting, but it was not a greeting with a waiting Xi Jinping. But he didn't do that last time either.

So, you know, I must admit, Einar, I was surprised at one particular decision that Beijing made regarding Marco Rubio. You know, he's a persona non grata. He's not allowed to be in China and being sanctioned. And the Chinese kind of— I don't know what was the calculations for them to allow him, under a different name, of course, to be there. Was there any justification for that, in your opinion?

Well, they parsed it out as something that he thinks he said it as a senator when he was an advocate. They said, okay, he's banned as a senator. Uh, but in terms of his role as, uh, you know, Secretary of State, uh, he was allowed in. Now, I mean, I, I don't— once again, this is a minor issue. Uh, Rubio is not an intellectual giant or anything. He's not going to hold sway or have some big effect on any kind of negotiations. He's there as part of Trump's team. You do not want to create an international, uh, incident and sour the, uh, beginning of these negotiations, which are extremely important, by simply indulging in some sort of retribution against a minor player.

So when we consider this visit, which the timing of it now, if we are to think about the significance of it, if we are to assess this particular trip or summit or visit, whatever term you would like to use, Can we assess it in terms of as a routine high-level exchange or some sort of a structural inflection point in the bilateral relations between the two?

The latter. This is definitely a watershed moment. What it showed was that Donald Trump, who's gotten himself into hot water domestically, Epstein files, prices going up, an unwanted, unpopular war. Industrial policy failed, and then internationally because of this adventure in Iran, which has created an oil shock, which will create a food shock, which is going to roil the elections that are coming up in November. So, he was in Beijing hoping that he could use some leverage, in this particular case Taiwan, to somehow get China to help him with Iran. This is kind of a pipe dream. It's emblematic of the Trump administration thinking in the sense that China does not control Iran. And, you know, this is the same old adage that was used with Russia. China should solve the Ukrainian war by putting, you know, pressure on Russia, as if that would work. This is the kind of thinking that goes on in Washington. It seems to be a loop cycle And you create a problem you can't solve. You then go to who you, you say is your competitor and, you know, somebody who's an existential threat to your society and say, hey, by the way, can you solve my problems? I mean, this is, this is like my neighbor saying, I want to burn down your house. I'm not going to tell you when, but I am, I'm dead set on getting rid of you. Oh, by the way, can I borrow a cup of sugar? You know, I mean, it's, it, it It is absolutely ridiculous, but this is the premise. Donald Trump is very transactional, and he said, okay, I'll give them Taiwan, or I'll give, you know, something on Taiwan, they give me something on Iran. And that's just not the way it works. Um, so yeah, it's definitely an inflection point. What you saw was two leaders meeting. Uh, it's not 9 years ago. China has changed dramatically. And I think when, uh, Donald Trump was traveling from the airport downtown and then staying at the Four Seasons. I think he's got a full picture that the country he saw 9 years ago has been utterly transformed. Many people, of course, won't be familiar with the area, but when he visited back then, the area around the Four Seasons, while nice, was, you know, there were some areas which weren't that great. They had a river there that was kind of very low and slow flowing. Today it is a centerpiece of, uh, you know, the urban environment. It's a riverwalk where people gather, children are playing, people are doing their tai chi, uh, there are restaurants and shops lining it. It is vibrant, vital, and very crowded. Unfortunately, because of security, the crowds weren't there, but you could obviously see a very important piece of urban environment that goes to the quality of living. So, uh, that and the roads, uh, that he traveled, uh, since that time they've added, um, I think two, two new, um, area ways of getting to the airport. One is still in construction, uh, he would have seen parts of that, uh, he's also, he starts looking at the built infrastructure and how new it is. Somebody who was involved in real estate like him has a very keen eye for any kind of change. They're always looking for momentum in in terms of where is the best spot. So yes, this was something that really impressed him, and this is something that, you know, he all of a sudden realized he's not the one who's dominating here. It is simply two countries, very powerful countries, sitting down and trying to iron out how they can work together at a time of crisis, because globally we are in crisis.

Yeah, well, you're absolutely correct, I know, regarding the infrastructure. I remember I I did my second trip or third trip to China, and each time I go, I'm seeing something new. And I was like, my God, where, you know, the country is moving in the right direction. So that's, uh, I want to go back to something you mentioned about Taiwan, given that the hope for Donald Trump was that he'll give something to— did any, in your opinion, did any of his advisors told him about the meeting between President Xi and the opposition leader of the KMT? That flew to Beijing and met with President Xi Jinping. In other words, China doesn't need Donald Trump to do anything about Taiwan.

Well, that was clearly the message. Shortly before they left, the Chinese ambassador to the United States said there are four red lines and Taiwan was the one at the top. And also, on arrival, Xi Jinping once again reiterated this, you know, First off, he said you don't want a Thucydides moment, the idea of rising and existing powers clashing militarily. And he said Taiwan has to be managed or it will threaten the relationship. I don't think you can be any more clear than that. And that meant, and hopefully got through to Trump's people, that this is not a negotiating card. It's not in your hand. This is something that belongs to China and will be resolved by China. And as you pointed out, there are already connections there. You know, you have, what is it, 600,000 Taiwanese people living in the mainland and making their living. 34, 35% of the entire nation of Taiwan's economy is directly or indirectly linked to the mainland. So, you know, this, this is a reality. It's been used by the international press and the US as some sort of card, like they're protecting democracy when they can't even implement it at home. I mean, this gerrymandering that's going on right now, no one questions it. If it had been the other way around, Democrats are doing it, there would be Republicans who say it's time to get our guns, we have to fight this. So you have this intense polarization based on whose vision is being implemented, but the problem is neither vision by either side are going to solve the problems that America has.

Well, it's interesting. I'm watching now that I'm waiting to see, probably on first thing on Monday morning, I'm going to reach out to some of my contacts in DC. But what I wanted to know is, because prior to Donald Trump flying to Beijing, the State Department put a hold on an armament deal that was supposed to be for Taiwan, which Congress has approved. And now makes you just wonder, after Trump coming back from Beijing empty-handed I'm just wondering what the decision is going to be moving forward. We'll see how that's going to go. Now, if I am to move, uh, uh, Einar, to talk about, uh, was there anything substantive achieved in these meetings, in this summit, specifically when it comes down to trade, in your opinion?

Yes, uh, and it's, it's not— it was very transactional. Uh, there are two, uh, reportedly 200 Boeing airplanes that were ordered, which is less than the reported 250 Airbus airplanes that were ordered when Mertz came. I think this is very calculated. Obviously, there are a lot of things unresolved. Rare earths, although it was mentioned, it was not mentioned by the Chinese side. And, uh, you know, you had this kind of people were expecting that China was going to give out a basket of goodies, but what they said is, if you want something, you give us something. This is going to be a trade. This is not going to be, uh, something where we capitulate to you. But in terms of progress, I think there is a tremendous amount. First off, the realization that the world is, is not a unipolar. I think, uh, hopefully, um, Donald Trump and his administration realize that it's interconnected. Uh, they're not going to get away with that. They still might be dedicated to this idea of containing China, but the political realities in the moment demand that there be some sort of understanding between these nations. Otherwise, Donald Trump is going to still have high tariffs, which are paid for by the American public. Uh, he's going to have an international situation where there is absolutely no predictability. Now, there were talk about two boards. One was the Board of Trade, and the other one was a Board of Investment. Um, and what's in important is— I don't know if they're going through, we haven't been given any final readout on that, but these are processes. Remember, for the last few years since Donald Trump came in, and even before that include Biden, there's been very little direct contact. It's been, you know, I'll lob bombs at you and, you know, you retaliate, and that kind of thing. And now having the attempt at creating process very important because that means there's some acceptance of what is going on. So it's— to me, it was a massive watershed because it's a realization by Washington that they don't live alone and they are not the sole superpower. They need to adjust to a world as it is, not as they want it to be.

Well, I'm, I'm, I'm likely thinking in terms of these— this trade that Even if he goes with the direction of keeping the tariffs, the Supreme Court already issued its final say about it, that it's unconstitutional for what he's doing. So to me, will I be wrong, Heinrich, in saying that he doesn't hold any cards against Chinese now? He has the weak hand.

No, I would disagree with that. I mean, he used the wrong process in order to implement tariffs. He was just doing it that, you know, he'd say, well, I don't like you, here's a tariff. Or, you know, if you don't give me what I want, here's a tariff. That is prohibited. You can have tariffs on the U.S. system. There's 3 different areas, 301 investigation, 252, I think it's 252, and the— but you have to have findings. You have to say, okay, there's a legitimate reason that is recognized by Congress to restrain trade or to implement these tariffs. Based on these findings, and Donald Trump wanted to dispense with that and use an imperial presidency to, you know, kind of like the Red Queen in Alice in Wonderland saying, "Off with their heads!" Or in his case, like, "Put on other tariffs!" So at this point, he's confronting reality. It's not good. He's obviously very, very concerned. Everything has kind of turned against him. Uh, he was hoping he could bring back some red meat. Uh, he had been floating, for example, going back to the Boeing, uh, issue, he had floated this idea that he was going to get 500. Well, why? Why float that idea? He's hoping that China would give him face, that they give him 500 planes, and then he can boast. He says, oh, Mertz got 250, I got 500, I'm the best dealmaker. So this is the kind of optic he was looking for, but obviously he didn't get it. Now people are on pins and needles. We're waiting for, uh, you know, Truth Social or a tweet, uh, indicating how he thinks he's going to spin this, uh, because he can't go back to the US and say, oh, I, you know, I got nothing. You know, that's, that's not the, the rhetoric of the ultimate dealmaker, right? So he has to figure out how he can declare victory, uh, or, uh, the alternative is he says, well, I, I, they didn't give me what I want, so I'm going to punish them. I'm going to give 5 million percent increase on tariffs, and they'll be sorry, and all this kind of nonsense. Um, but, you know, China is well aware that in the background, this, this bipartisan push to contain China continues. You know, you start looking at the bombing of Nigeria, the takeover of Venezuela, the attacks on Iran. What do they have in common? These are all, uh, countries that were supplying oil to China.

China.

Was part of a diversified stream. Then you start looking at the Panama Canal, all right, Straits of Hormuz. There's a real concern that the U.S. is implementing a policy that was enunciated in a book in 2022 by Eldridge Colby.

Colby.

Eldridge Colby is somebody that you're your, uh, your group should be looking at, because he wrote this book and he said the way we are going to get China is we're going to deprive them of their energy, and we're going to, um, you know, so they can't produce. And in addition to that, we are going to control all the strategic points so that we can cut off their logistics. So this clearly is the overarching plan, but the realities are that if the U.S. does that, $4.3 trillion of imports that it depends on are put in jeopardy. And this is, this is what is really hard to fathom, how supposedly intelligent people— I should mention Eldridge Colby is the Undersecretary for the Department of War or Defense, depending on who you're talking to, Congress or the president, uh, in charge of policy. So he keeps a fairly low profile, but he is in fact the architect of the kind of nonsense that the US is pushing, thinking that it can contain China and, you know, reestablish its hegemony without scorching itself.

Well, that's why I was really concerned with what one of the— about a month ago, the finance minister of Indonesia, when he made that remark about putting a toll on the Malacca Strait, And I kind of like, wait a minute, why is this guy saying this now? I know it's been floated back in the 2000s, but what concerns me the most, Einar, was when the US went ahead and signed a military agreement with Indonesia, especially to have access to that. And to me became, uh, very, very concerning. While we're talking about this, uh, because you brought up something to my mind, I was thinking about And I wanted to ask you, since you are in the finance, uh, uh, realm of understanding it, uh, will I be wrong if I am to say, uh, Einar, that the trend moving forward from China's perspective in reducing its US Treasury holdings, over which has been for, for the last decade, but moving forward into this direction, because when you consider Back in 2013, China used to hold about $1.2, $1.3 trillion. As of early 2026, I looked at the numbers, it's about $693— between $683 and $693 billion. In your opinion, do you see this trend moving forward for the next decade?

Well, I mean, what you're noticing actually is a drawdown in terms of the amount of trade that's going on. Remember, the reason that Chinese government holds U.S. Treasuries is not as an investment. China is— this is not part of the Sovereign Wealth Fund. They hold those dollars there because they're used in the interchange of trade. If you have to settle something in dollars, you have to have dollars, or you have to take renminbi, convert them into dollars. There's of course a cost involved and some time, so you keep enough U.S. dollars there to cover your, your trade, but they've been reducing that as the amount of trade with the U.S. has gone down. And as that continues to go down, you can expect it to go down further. But I doubt that they're just suddenly going to make a move and try to liquidate it and panic the market. People have to understand China does not wish the U.S. ill will, and for a very important reason. The United States consumes almost 20% of the world's, uh, you know, GDP, um, and it's only 4.5% of the world's population. If you ruin that, right, China loses. Because even though China may not be exporting directly to the United States, a lot of their intermediate goods and things that they produce are in fact part of the supply chain that does, uh, go to the U.S. So, uh, they're trying to manage a situation where, you know, it's like a screaming kid and you're trying to give it a— you're trying to be nice to it, but it's, uh, you know, fighting you and things like this. So, um, don't, don't, uh, I, I think it's counterproductive to sell this idea that there's a plot by China to destabilize the U.S. and be happy. If you're talking about Putin, perhaps. Uh, in his 2007 speech to, uh, at the Munich Security Conference, he made it very clear he was not was happy with the US-led order and was dedicated to get rid of it. But you have never ever heard that coming from Xi Jinping or anybody in the Chinese government. They have always consistently maintained that they want to have a managed relationship that allows not only the two countries to do well but the rest of the world.

Yeah, well, certainly in Washington there are these conversations, and I had it, uh, I had a conversation with some individuals. The, the key word is been circled, at least within certain entities within Washington, is that China is trying to undermine the US. And to them, you know, I usually ask questions, and when I ask, they say, well, look at the trend for 50% reduction from this, the, the, the reduced US Treasury between 2013 and 2026. And to them, this long-term is it's, it's an indication of that China is trying to undermine them. My argument, uh, uh, Einar, and please correct me if I'm wrong, I am thinking that what China is trying to do here is to some sort of a strategic diversification that is driven by geopolitical tensions, that is driven also by the reduction in the dollar reliance. Will I be wrong in this assessment?

Well, in my opinion, yeah, yes. As I said, this is merely a Treasury move, uh, in the sense that you, uh, you have trade, you have to settle them in dollars, and it's, it's cheaper to have the dollars on hand. Um, the US— China is not trying to undermine the US. This is a narrative that's been created. China's total holdings are less than 5% of the total debts, you know, the $40 trillion and growing, uh, U.S. debt pile, uh, most of which is held by, uh, U.S. It's not held internationally, it's only a percentage of that. So, uh, this idea that somehow, uh, it's all going to collapse, uh, because of China is— it's nonsensical. Um, yes, China and the rest of the world have reacted to the weaponization of SWIFT, which is the bank settlement system, by the U.S. And they said, okay, and, you know, of course, there's been unilateral tariffs— I'm not— tariffs, prohibitions against other— any banks as part of the system from cooperating with different groups. Just before Trump left, his administration put a bunch of US banks and company— Chinese banks and companies on the blacklist, and the response by China surprised Washington because they ordered these companies to not comply in order to, in essence, go ahead with their business and don't worry, uh, we, we will, uh, help you figure this out. So China is, is pushing back, and that, that's really the story. 9 years difference between 2017 and 2026. It is a different world, and China is responding very, very differently. It's not a matter of confidence, it's a matter of necessity. They can't be pushed around and allowed the US to dictate their economic policies. So they are saying, okay, we have cards, you have cards, we are going to sit down and figure out how we can play together as opposed to, you know, throwing chairs at one another.

Well, I didn't buy that argument of that the Chinese undermining the Americans. I didn't buy that argument. That's why I was like the idea of, okay, what are you based this on? And their argument was, well, it's because we've noticed the trend of this dumping of the— but I'm glad you clarified.

Let us be real. Okay. Before China started addressing its real estate problem with prices going through the roof and obviously a bubble, the same people in Washington were running around saying China is about to have a huge Catastrophe. They don't know how to manage anything. This is, you know, this is emblematic of a country that's out of control. As soon as China moved to put a pinprick in that bubble and to manage it, well, it turns the other way around. Washington's running around saying, oh my goodness, their economy is about to fail. How could they possibly be so, you know, silly as to attack themselves? This is an own goal. This is falling on your sword. This is, you know, the end of China. So from that, my point being that no matter what China does, in Washington there are plenty of people who are going to assign whatever kind of motives they want. And often, ironically, the motives that they assign are based on what they would do in the same situation. So, you know, as I said, it's a guilty mind. It's the thief mind. I'm just stealing from them before they steal from me. It's a mindset. Unfortunately, in the US, we have this kind of empire mindset. We solve our problems by taking things from other people, but it's good for them because it's good for the world. These are just rationalizations. I think people should kind of separate the idle nonsense that people come up with to justify their silliness.

Yeah, well, I'm glad you clarified this, Honor. I really thank you for this because there's been some really major confusions regarding this kind of statements. While I'm thinking about the finance aspects, I want to ask your opinion about the decisions during the last BRICS summit in India, by which India refused to support the agenda for the, the currency that was proposed by the Chinese in agreement with the Russians and Brazil and and what have you. What's that? What's, what's behind that decision, uh, in your opinion, from the Indians, Indian government?

Uh, India's had a, uh, a problem with China, and it's largely, uh, emotional. Uh, the fact is that they, uh, if you go back to the '60s, uh, India was slightly ahead of China in terms of economic development, etc. In fact, at one time it was quite a bit ahead. But now it faces a situation where it's 3.5 to 4 times smaller than China, although it has the same population. So there's a kind of jealousy, insecurity about the fact that China, with a system that in, you know, if you go on Indian TV, they openly call it, you know, a dictatorship, and, you know, it's It's not run for the people, all this stuff. Well, if it's such a terrible, terrible system, how is it able to consistently deliver all of these things for its people? Whereas India, which says, oh, we're the greatest system on Earth, all right, we have a democracy, although there are real questions sometimes about how democratic it is. There's lots of, uh, indications that votes are bought, especially at the local level. And, you know, they say, well, yeah, we're really great. But then the question is, why aren't— isn't your system, if it's such a great system, delivering, uh, you know, the kind of goods that your people need? And this creates this desire to justify, uh, what's going on. Uh, what's, you know, they're saying, well, we have to stand independently, we're not like China. So when this situation with BRICS came up India was still wedded to the idea that they were on the U.S. side of the balance, that they were a doorstop to Chinese expansion— economic, political, cultural— and that somehow they, they would be rewarded for this because, of course, the U.S. and Donald Trump in particular does not like BRICS, as we can see from the amount of tariffs he imposed on them. Um, but it wasn't just, uh, India. South Africa was lukewarm on the idea. They didn't really want to get involved. They see themselves as too small to go toe-to-toe with the United States. But, you know, this is the problem. Um, you have countries that are either hoping to gain something because they have, you know, mixed feelings about their neighbors, or entities who have been frightened, right? This is, you know, you're living in a sort of mob idea. You know, the U.S. is a mafia. You know, if you don't give us what we want, cozy up to us, it's going to be bad for you. Uh, and you know, the rest— Donald Trump, it works a few times. Uh, you can see all the people who show up and fawn on him and things like that and give him gold baubles and things like that. But behind the scenes, I can assure you, every one of those countries is saying we got risk from the U.S. These people are crazy. We cannot have our, you know, our country being run by, you know, legislatures in Washington. This is not what they want. They're sovereign nations. They really do believe that they should govern their own people. And this is something where the U.S. is going against its own interests. Now, in terms of that specific example, you get I mean, India is perhaps coming around on that. They now understand, after having two color revolutions supported by the US in Nepal and Bangladesh, having a 50% tariff put on them, having, you know, very bad words said about their leader, um, the support— in their mind, the betrayal of the US, uh, in terms of the, uh, war that they had with, uh, Pakistan. Down. Um, the— these are all things that are very unsettling, and they're trying to figure them out. Uh, Jay Shankar, who's their, uh, their, uh, basically Secretary of State, has, uh, you know, always been very fond of the US. Uh, he started to temper that a little bit lately, but, you know, his son is an American citizen, had been working for the Heritage, uh, group allied, uh, very conservative think tanks, uh, until it became a scandal. And then he was moved to India where he's doing something with one of the, the Reliance Group. They set up some foundation for him, but you don't hear anything from substantive. So, you know, this is a thing where many— and this is not just Jai Shankar— many of the elites of India have children in the United States. Uh, they're very proud of the fact that Many Indians have risen to the top, especially of the technology pile, running companies and things like this. They see it as a land of opportunity. They wanted to be wedded for it, but it's not helping the majority of Indian people who have no access to the U.S. They don't have the money, uh, and they're basically stuck in a caste system, which, uh, is getting worse by the day because of the frictions with a very large segment of population in terms of the Muslim population. So, um, India has a lot of problems. There's this tendency when countries have problems to figure out who's at fault, and you don't want to point at yourself or your own system, so you tend to, um, uh, point to others. And China is the convenient whipping boy for India. I'm on Indian TV many times a week, and I can tell you that it is almost uniformly anti-Chinese on a consistent basis.

And there is a case this morning, as a matter of fact, the Justice Department now is going to drop the charges against Adani, the billionaire in India who's closer to Modi, because the lawyer involved was from Trump's team, got involved in it. So that just tells you the story right there.

But anyway, the, the, the— well, let me flesh that out. That particular lawyer is in charge of, uh, trying to reverse, uh, Donald Trump's 42 convictions. Uh, so that's why he's so prominent and obviously has it. But, you know, there was another part to this deal, to be fair. There was a promise of $10 billion of investment by Adani into the United States. We'll have to see if that actually happens., but obviously, uh, any fine money that he would have paid is not going to be collected anymore. So, I mean, these are the complexities of things, but it, it makes it look like pardons are for sale because this is not an isolated incident. You have almost over a billion dollars of fines that were levied against convicted people that have now disappeared because Donald Trump waved his magic wand. Uh, things now Ironically, here's a guy who used to say Sleepy Joe didn't know who he pardoned. When they asked him about a couple of the cases, he says, I don't know who that is, you know, it doesn't matter. I heard that maybe, you know, this guy was, you know, a victim of, you know, anti-Trumpism, so I pardoned him. Doesn't seem to know about the cases or anything like that. I mean, there's huge scandals. There is going to be a full investigation, at some point, probably when the House and the Senate switch to the Democratic side after these things, penis, and it's going to be an all-out bloodbath.

I'm glad you clarified that one, Einar. Thank you so much for that. I want to go back to just the one aspect I want to mention, especially for the agreements, if there are any. What I want to get your take on, Einar, is the the, uh, what should I use the term, the composition of the American delegation? Because when I looked at who's going, we're talking about prominently featuring some sort of deregulatory actors in the private sector figures. So what does it say about the Trump administration, uh, sort of, uh, concept of the state power here?

Well, you, you had 30 CEOs of the most prominent, uh, American corporations, and a of them were billionaires, over a third of them were billionaires. These, they accompanied Trump, and the idea is he likes a large crowd, he wants to show up and look powerful. He was also, I believe, saying that, you know, I'll get you something. Of course, you know, these guys can drop everything and run along if they think there's going to be some prize that they're going to be awarded, but I think he was a little bit taken aback. The fact is there was no goodie bag that China was handing out. It was basically trades. Interesting side note is that the Chinese government tried to arrange meetings with either Chinese government and/or industry within China, and these corporations refused. They said that they would talk through Donald Trump. So obviously, if he— if that was the case, and he even got Jensen Huang to, you know, fly to Alaska where they were refueling and then hop from his plane onto Trump's plane, to come there. But as I said, I don't think that any of them were particularly happy. Boeing had been, you know, there had been this number floating around of 500 aircraft orders, and it came down to 200. As I said, 50 less reportedly than the EU got. So, you know, it's not going to hurt, certainly helps, but, you know, people say, well, why was it? Isn't that a gift? I said no. Because China is very interested in avionics. They have their own domestic C-19 plane that they're preparing. They're doing it slowly, they're rolling it out, but it is available and it works very well, and the maintenance costs are considerably less. But they do not have the avionics. These are the systems that help you fly the plane, you know, the rudder systems. They're all electronic. A lot of it is software. They don't have the sophistication there, so they need those. So basically, uh, it's not like Boeing's going to produce those planes next week. This is something 7, 8 years down the line, which means on a transactional basis, if you don't— if you don't sell me the avionics, guess what? I'm not going to buy your airplanes. So this is the way that they're approaching Trump. Uh, it is very much, you give me— you want something, I want something. Transaction.

Yeah, because that's how he operates. So, uh, and with this, yeah, what does he expect? He wants to just take but not give? That doesn't work that way. So, so in this case, uh, Einar, what constitutes, uh, sort of Donald Trump's minimum acceptable, uh, outcome from this summit, agreements, engagements, whatever term you want to use?

Well, look, don't be bound by rational, uh, you know, rationality.

Yeah.

The fact is he keeps declaring that he's won the Iran War. I mean, I, I, I really, I'm, I would be very interested in how many people believe that when he keeps saying one day, ah, somebody has to do something about those guys, and by the way, I won the war, it's over. I think it's Yeah, so in this particular case, do not expect that his response is going to be bound by reason or facts. Uh, he's, he's weaving together what he believes is a narrative that, you know, makes him look like the big dealmaker. And, you know, I, I got them and they gave me more than I— I don't— that, for instance, the story now going around is he only wanted 150 planes, right? And he got 200. So, you know, what an incredible dealmaker. I mean, it's, it's literally just like that. He's just going to make up the facts to paint himself as, as, uh, somehow having a massive victory here. I don't think China cares because they, they understand the reality. And the reality is that Donald Trump knows that he can't push them around, and if he wants something, he has to give something. If Trump wants to run around and say that, you know, he, he, he, he body slammed Xi Jinping, he showed him who's, you know, all this, say whatever he wants, it doesn't make any difference in terms of reality. Those who are going to believe him are going to believe him. Those who won't, obviously.

Yeah, well, we're coming almost to the top of the hour here, so, uh, I want to just ask one question before I give you the last word, Einar. If I am to say, was the summit a failure?

Failure? Uh, the failure was, uh, in terms of Xi Jinping offered an aspirational message when Donald Trump came. He said, look, let's make this year something to be proud of, something that you can be proud of, you know, put it into our collective legacies. These aren't the exact words, but he was offering an aspirational, let's work together on this. And, you know, of course, Donald Trump, I don't think he even understood that. He just went forward with, you know, his, well, what can I get? What are you going to give me? And there was no give. It was all, you know, well, what do you have to trade? Um, so the failure was, I think, on the U.S. side to realize that, uh, that A, there is a change. I mean, they realize that partway, but they don't realize the other half, which is that the, the path forward is not trying to fight with China. It's trying to develop America's ability to compete to start import, you know, doing something about the infrastructure of America. And I don't mean just the physical, you know, reverse these nonsensical things about education, try to have a better living standard, draw your people together, things like that. That's not going to happen by buying more bombs and weapons or increasing your bloated defense budget from, you know, $1 trillion to $1.5 trillion. This was an offer to go towards rationalization, and I commend anybody who does that. But I'm sorry for those who don't see the reality that the future is something we can make, not something that can be taken.

Well, Einar, my friend, I don't know how to thank you. I can't thank you enough.

I'm very sorry about the technical difficulties.

No, don't. Don't you worry about it.

The, the internet here is, yeah. Uh, very, very, very difficult at the moment.

And yeah, no, no worries. No worries at all. I just want you to know how much the community truly, uh, uh, appreciate, uh, your, your time, appreciate your insights because, uh, those are not just simply informative, Einar. Those are illuminating. And I'm not saying it to be Mr. Nice. That ain't my personality. I, I say thanks as they are.

Oh, I think you're a pretty nice guy.

I am to a degree, but still, because I, I care about the community and I truly, truly want to hear about people to learn something. Well, because of the— where I see the— because we are in a world now where I see this relationship between the US and China, it's really— that's what— that's the relationship that matters.

Okay, but let's put it in simpler terms. Okay, and this is my last statement. There are people with empathy and people without empathy. And leaders with empathy are concerned about their people. And I could clearly see that Xi Jinping is very concerned about his people. And then you have people who have no empathy, and that would be Donald Trump. I mean, you've seen him in personal situations where he literally recoils from anything involving human misery or suffering, and he doesn't seem to care. I mean, his last— one of his last quotes before going overseas is, I don't care about the American public you know, finances. That's not— I care only about the war. I mean, this, this is somebody who does not live in the same world as everybody, and as a result, he doesn't care about what they have. And I've never seen a good government system that can be run by people with no empathy. That's the bottom line.

You're absolutely correct. So, well, my friend, I look forward to seeing you next time. And once again, I want to say Thank you for carving out time for us here, and, uh, uh, wishing you a good day and look forward to seeing you next time.

All the best.

Thanks, Einar.

Yeah, bye-bye.

To the community, I want to— I hope you all enjoyed. You know, as always, Einar is always kind enough to carve out time for us here to share his knowledge, his insights. Sorry, Warwick couldn't make it, so next time hopefully it'll work out. And just remember, tomorrow to join me, I will be talking about this Secret Bomb that is in the air as we speak, and I got a confirmation of that. So I hope to see you there, and I look forward, uh, to see you. As always, remember, geopolitics impacts your daily life in more ways than one. Till next time, bye-bye.