The End of American Dominance as Russia & China Deepen their Strategic Partnership?

Hello everybody and welcome to Geopolitical Trends, where truth matters. I'm your host, Dr. Oualaalou, and I'm very, very excited to be with you on this Saturday the 6th, if I'm not mistaken. So it is indeed. So I know some of you might say, Dr. O, can you take a day off? Whatever, I will take a day off tomorrow. But also, this is to highlight to you my commitment to the community. To me, when you do something, do it out of love, do it out of good intentions, and do it because you want to. Your heart is into it. And that's how I feel about what I'm doing here for our community. So I'm very happy to do it. Very, very excited just to be with the community here. Share the knowledge given the topics that we address. So, uh, today's topic, I will be addressing to you the strategic partnership between Russia and China, especially in, uh, during the recent visit of the, uh, uh, foreign minister of Mr. Wang Yi to, to Russia, in which he met with both Mr. Lavrov and Mr. Shoigu. So I will be talking about the geopolitical aspects of it much bigger picture. I'll be sharing with you some excerpts from my book, and, and we go from there. But first, let me say hi to our wonderful community. As always, Leanne, good to see you. TNN Channel, good to see you. It's time to celebrate. Uh, Dave H, good to see you. Uh, uh, Farahon de la Paix, good to see you, and hello to you as well. Uh, Kisi Wong, good to see you. Say It Like It Is, good to see you. Aliami Toure, good to see you and hello to you as well. Sang Brewery, good to see you as always. And Ahmadovich, good to see you, greetings to you as well, my friend. Taiwan Steel, here you are. And where is Rampal? So one is not here yet. BSG, good to see you. And Ashim Schroeder, uh, uh, okay, we can, we can accept that argument. You wrote, I don't think this is the time of the end of American dominance. That's a valid argument. I will present you my own analysis and, and facts and let you decide for that. So, all right, let me, uh, first of all, uh, some housekeeping items. Make sure to join me on Monday. Jayant Bahndari will be here. So I was gonna be addressing the topics of the Russian president's visit to India. Then I decided, you know what, I'm gonna request from Jayant Bhandari to come over, join me here for this conversation regarding that visit and some other topics. So make sure to join in on Monday as we will address this particular topic. Second thing, also next week I will have my dear friend Professor Anna Malendog, She's going to be addressing also issues of the Philippines that are of a crucial, crucial importance because Philippines is at a crossroads. You know, it's almost make it or break it. And apparently the current president, President Marcos Jr., sort of is not really grasping the severity of where his country is as far as that crossroads. So Professor Anna Malindog will be addressing some of these issues next week. So I am also gonna be doing, uh, I think 3 or 4 more analyses for you regarding 4 other topics. I'm not gonna say much about them right now till I make sure that is what I'm gonna be addressing. So, all right, let's do some headlines quickly here. I have about 2 for— yeah, 2. Uh, the first one starts from Lebanon. Believe it or not, this might surprise you given all the tension that's going on in, in, in Lebanon, right, with Israel going on and, and so forth. Well, here is what the US just agreed to do. The US agreed to sell about almost $100 million, a deal of US tactical vehicles for the Lebanese Army. It's laughable, laughable in a way that we are allowing the conflicts to go in so we can sell more weapons to them. So the US State Department announced its approval of a potential military sale to Lebanon that includes, uh, some sort of medium tactical vehicles and, uh, uh, with, with payloads of about 5 tons. So as far as the, you know, the, the, uh, uh, what, what's going to be used over in this, suffice it to say that this is where the issue is. We create conflicts and we turn around and sell weapons, sadly. So second headlines, it has to do with demonstrations in Germany. What you're looking at, those are— to my viewers in Europe, I'm sure you're aware of this, uh, this is a student demonstrations in Germany protesting the conscription law. In other words, the German Merz government The chancellor wants now to impose military service, and German students won't have it. You know, the population that— it's like here for us. Do we want wars with Venezuela, with China, with Russia? With— no, no. And do you think that the American government is gonna— for example, in the case of Philippines, Japan, South Korea, Australia, Germany, Europe, and so forth— do you think we're going to be sending our own troops? No. So this is what happened yesterday. Germany witnessed student protests in about 90 cities across the draft military service law, which was approved by the federal parliament, uh, the Bundestag, uh, which aims to increase the number of soldiers. So thousands of students participated in the protest demonstrations called for by the school strike initiative against compulsory Military service, which basically consists of youth and students organization. So what you had in those demonstrations, more than 3,000 students gathered near Haltestellen, uh, uh, towards subway stations in Berlin. I remember the stations because I remember one time I, I, uh, I, I, I was there, so I recall that place. Then headed towards Oriana Platz. A plaza that is where a large number of parents participated in the event supporting their children. They don't want to go to war, and yet Europe is still pushing for war, wanted to have a war with Russia. Well, how ridiculous that is. So I just don't— I quite don't get it. I really don't get it. So anyway, let's get into our analysis. Here is how What I'm— since it is a topic I'm familiar with, given that I wrote a book about Russia and I detailed in about a chapter and a half the relationship between China and Russia and how I see it moving forward— that was when I wrote it back a few years ago— so I decided to structure this analysis based on some key questions. So this way, you know, the layout of how I'm going to be presenting this particular analysis. So I will be talking about the significance of this China-Russia, uh, deepening their security, uh, coordination. Uh, we're talking about the depth of engagements and so forth. I will also talk about the consideration that— is it official that China and Russia in a strategic partnership? You know, it's worth asking a question, and I'm going to base most of this analysis based on what I wrote in my book, but also the updated information given the changes around the world. The second thing— the third thing, rather, within this outline is I'm going to be addressing, given the history between Russia and China, is whether Russia will enter into a military treaty with China or vice versa. Those are, those are questions that are worth addressing. Then I will address the depth of this relationship that is reflecting whether it is reflecting the new multipolar order and who's guiding it. And the last thing I will conclude this, uh, analysis is with excerpt from my book. So this way it put things in perspective for you since I talked about this few years ago. So, so what we're going to start with is we're going to start with the The idea of first, first of all, when you think about Russia, China in light of the recent visit by the foreign minister, Mr. Wang Yi, to Russia, how significant is this? Of course, before getting into this, it behooves us to provide some, some sort of a context of, of, of what this is all about. So what you're looking at, you're looking at a China and Russia are even moving further into deepening their strategic partnership. I didn't say their bilateral relations. I didn't say their friendship. I didn't say their partnership. I said their strategic partnership. And this will be through institutionalized, for example, coordination, through, for example, joint military exercises, through, for example, aligned position on regional security matters, even on diplomatic front, especially when it comes down to the UN Security Council. Uh, usually China and Russia will vote the same way. So while this reflects some sort of a genuine shift in the global power distribution, which is away from the US dominance— this is where that, uh, statement by one of the viewers here in the chat box said Oh, the dominance of the US is not over yet. You got a point there. I'm not denying this, but also you have to understand the emerging multipolar order based on this depth of this relationship, of this strategic partnership between Russia and China. And this multipolar order is more complex than the sort of the term suggests, if I may be frank with you about this. So rather than creating some sort of a stable three-way balance of power, meaning Russia, US, and China, okay, the world now is moving into more fragmented setting, per se, into competing regional centers with many nations hedging their bets across multiple poles. Here is one example for you, and I know one of you in the chat back— chat box, rather, mentioned Russia, China, North Korea, and Iran. Yeah, that will form some sort of a major bloc. And can you imagine if other countries will join in that? Where is it going to be? And that's my point into this multiple poles that's going to be now reflected on the new global order. So, so the US as of now still holds some significant capabilities. Yes, some of them military, some of them economically, but also diplomatically, you know. But at the same time, the US must adapt from a position of primacy or hegemony to functioning as one of major powers among others. And as a matter of fact, I do have a question here when we— when I move into the analysis as to whether the US stands a chance in in defeating both Russia and China when they combine their military capabilities. I have some pictures for you, so make sure you stay with me till the end of this livestream. And this is where you see the leveraging of alliances and competitive advantages in specific domains. So at the same time, the US must recognize and accept the limits to its global reach. That is the importance of understanding the— this, this strategic partnership and what it means, at least from a geopolitical perspective. So we, as I mentioned in the outline, we're going to be talking about the few— I'll be answering rather the questions that I mentioned to you, and we'll start with the first one, which is Russia and China deepen security coordination, okay, as Mr. Wang Yi want to visit Russia. How significant is that? Well, of course, the, the visit, it's quite significant. You know, it's already building on an already deepening partnership rather than just marking a dramatic shift. No, be adding. Think of this partnership like a building. You build the foundation, and you start building upon that foundation. So you want to have a strong foundation on which to build a higher building, higher structure, whatever you want to call it. And this is where you see the difference, for example, between Russia and India. Will it— will you call it a strategic partnership? No, I won't. Some other analyst might. I won't. So this is where— why it's, uh, it's worthy to address this particular aspect. So we'll talk about the depth of engagement. So Mr. Wang Yi's visit— and let me share the picture here— Mr. Wang Yi's recent visit, uh, was his third trip to Moscow this year. That's significant, and that says something. So, and what it, what it reflects, it reflects a sustained high-level engagement. You don't have, for example, any, any cabinet member of the Chinese government's visit will be significant, but we're talking at the higher echelon of the government. So the two countries, China and Russia, held the 20th round. Yeah, 2-0, the 20th round of strategic security consultations. That tells me Something is in the works moving forward. I'm looking over the horizon, geopolitically speaking here, and I am seeing something in the works. And this to me indicates a well-established recurring mechanisms and, uh, sort of a coordination rather than just one, one, one-off event. No, no, no, no, no. That's the meaning of this depth of disengagement. Then you think about the scope and the focus of this. And of course, the discussions among the two officials, in this case, Mr. Wang Yi and Lavrov, and Mr. Wang Yi and Shoigu, the head of the Security Council, I believe, in Russia. So, so what do you think about the focus and the scope of this? The discussions addressed the major issues of strategic security interest. It didn't address the economic aspect. Once again, this should give you an idea and a hint as to where things are headed. Security interests in both countries, and that including the regional security tensions. Of course, you have to consider what Japan just did, which I will be talking about. You have to consider what Philippines just did during the ASEAN summit when they criticized China. You have to think about, of course, what Israel is doing with Taiwan regarding the missile technology and so forth. This is what it means by regional security tensions. Of course, the global security, stability, and major power relations, and of course the Asia-Pacific situation. And one specific concern that surfaced was the statements on Taiwan by Japan's new Prime Minister, uh, Sanae Takahashi. So which both countries, in this case China and Russia, view it as raising tensions in the region that is fomented through a third party behind the scenes. I will be talking about Japan towards the end of this, especially from the perspective of Russia and the perspective of China. Then you think about the alignment of those two countries, Russia and China, on a sensitive issue. And this is again, when you do an analysis, you have to cover all the aspects of a strategic partnership. The broader context of this is that next year, okay, it's going to be more— it's going to mark the 30th anniversary of the China Russia Strategic Partnership. Just think about it, the 30th anniversary, and of course the 25th anniversary of their Treaty of Good Neighborliness, being good neighbors. Given the history, you all know the history of this. I detailed this in my Russia book, uh, and, and I, I said back then, I am certain both countries will put that history to to rest, turn the page, and move on with the new direction of the global order. And all this, this making now a significant milestone in this relation. So this is why both sides use this visit to set, you know, the whole reason. You need to understand this, the reason of Mr. Wang Yi's, uh, uh, uh, visit to Russia, his meeting with Lavrov. And meeting with Chorgoi. Yeah, this talks about the security interest and so forth, but this is also to set the priorities for 2026. Now you understand why at least I'm doing this analysis for you on these topics to get you ready for 2026. So, so the significant— the significance of this trip lies in the consistency. That's what you need to understand. And the institutionalization of coordination rather than just a dramatic escalation or what have you. Both countries, Russia and China, are sort of cementing an alignment that serves their shared interest. And there is one common objective, and that common objective is to counter the US influence and promoting— because the US influence is not for good. This is where the problem, and this is why I titled the thumbnail right here, Rewriting the Global Order, because that's what it is. That's the importance of this. So what can, as I said, because the US influence, they want to counter this and promote what they call a multipolar world in addition to coordinating responses to regional security. This means Japan with its recent provocation, but also the US pushing Philippines into— over the cliff, and also security concerns in Asia. Of course, what Australia is doing. And so now the question that some still will be asking, especially in the West, oh, this is just a friendship, this is not a strategic partnership. And this is why I had to ask the question here. Can we consider China and Russia are already a strategic partnership? Yeah, you'll be amazed to learn that some in the West are in denial about this. So they are absolutely, absolutely are in a strategic partnership. They are clearly in this partnership. And this is though the nature and depth of it are worth understanding precisely. So, for example, and I'm going to give you 2 or 3 examples, it's, it's a topic I am very familiar with. As I said, I wrote a book about Russia and I addressed this kind of issue, so I kind of, uh, uh, get some of my, uh, uh, I sort of analysis that I put in the book and share it with you, but I have to update it, all that. So you think about the official status, both countries, Russia and China, explicitly frame. This is the keyword. That's why that, that friendship, and that's why the visits of the China and Russia and vice versa are very important. They frame their relationship this way. So like I mentioned, they have a formal Treaty of Good Neighborliness, Friendship and Cooperation. And this, by the way, dates back to 2001. It was in 2001 when I start making the argument that you're gonna have to be ready for where China is gonna be in the next 20 to 25 years. And here we are. Of course, I was, uh, I got pushed back back then. Oh, China won't do this, China won't do that. I said, mark my word on it, give it time and you shall see. And here we are. So And this is not about me right and they're wrong. And no, no, no, it's not about that. It's about just understanding where the trends are headed. This is why I really felt excited to do this for you. And of course, I had some viewers— Kevin James, I remember, uh, asked, uh, asked me to do the analysis for you as well. It's because of the trends that I'm seeing coming. So, and this is why you have Russia and China conducting on a regular basis, some high-level strategic consultations. Remember, with, with Mr. Wang Yi's recent visits, is the 20th— that's the important— is the 20th round mentioned in Mr. Wang Yi's recent visit. That says something right there. And this isn't informal cooperation. No, no, no, no, no, no. This is institutionalized and codified. And what drives it? We gotta ask another question. What drives this strategic partnership? Well, this partnership, you have to understand, is rooted in the shared strategic interest rather than just a deep ideological alignment or even a historical friendship. Goes beyond that. Both countries, Russia and China, see themselves as really a counterweight to the US global dominance, because US global dominance has not served and is not serving humanity. Let me just say it straightforward, because if we are serving humanity, why would we go about fomenting tensions, creating conflict, uh, encouraging wars, you know, uh, sort of pushing for whatever? Why? Instead of cooperation. Because also Russia and China also wanted to demonstrate that they have the capability to resist pressure on sovereignty issue. You look at Taiwan, you look at Xinjiang, you look at human rights and so forth, which is usually we use this kind of stuff to justify whatever. This is why in the idea, in the case of, uh, of, of, of of the provocation by Japan recently. It just didn't make sense to me at all. Why would you go about that? And at the same time, both countries, Russia and China, are also working on creating alternatives, Western-led economic and security, uh, structures. I just read yesterday or the day before that Russia purchased something from China is using the yuan. Forget about now the US dollar. And as a matter of fact, the Europeans now are moving into creating the 20th sanctions on Russia. What if you are creating 20— the 20th sanctions? That means the 19 you created before didn't work. What makes you think, Europe, that when you create your 20th sanctions on Russia is going to work? And that is where you see this depth of this relationship. The official status of this relationship between Russia and China is that they coordinate also on major power relations and regional security matters. So now we are to keep some limitations in mind. Like I always say, when you do analysis, you can always think in terms of the positives or the upward, because you also have to think the downward also, because it's part of the much broader picture. And this is where it comes the difference that I want you to understand. This strategic partnership isn't an alliance in the traditional Cold War sense, you know, neither has a binding mutual defense commitment. That's one thing I mentioned in my book, and I will— I will, when I share the excerpt with you, uh, you'll, you'll, you'll hear it— is that I said whether there will be in the next few years the possibility of a military alliance or treaty. So far it is not the case, but their par— their partnership, their strategic partnership between China and Russia is one of a pragmatic one, because you have to understand also the history. That's why I said Moscow and Beijing turned the page on that dark historical era of the tensions between the two. So some analysts in the West are also saying that, oh no, no, no, no, no, no, They, meaning China and Russia, are competing against each other in Central Asia. They have disputed border history. Yeah, it was back then. They don't deal with it right now. This is not India, which, by the way, like I said last time, if India was sincere about reaching out to China, they would have agreed to sit down with the Chinese and address the border issues once for all. But India never did that, and it will never do that. Mark my word on this. So, and this is where you start. And of course, those Western analysts are saying, oh, they have a different economic systems, they have a different strategic priorities. Some of it is true, but at the same time, the much bigger picture is what draws them together. So Of course, we have to understand that Russia does lean heavily on China economically speaking, especially after the sanctions that are imposed on, on, on Russia. At the same time, China maintains more flexible in its global relationships. That is the, that is the, the, the, the, the good aspects of this partnership. Then you look at the current trajectory. So the partnership between these two countries has deepened notably since 2022. And this, of course, what happened in 2022? The Russian military operations in Ukraine, you know, as Western isolations pushed Russia more closer to China. So, so it is also some sort of, uh, uh, uh, what's the word I'm looking for? Worth distinguishing between the strategic partnership, which is real usually, and also an alliance or friendship, which oversimplifies the transactional nature of the relationship. It's like what the US has with some countries, you know, those are just a friendship. We use them, and when you're done with them, you ditch them. And that's usually not a good way of doing business. So, so the short answer to this first question that I asked, and the question was whether China and Russia deep, deepened security coordination, the significance of it. So the short answer is yes. So, but with the caveat, and that it's a pragmatic alignment of interests rather than a blanket mutual commitment. And both, I believe, Moscow and Beijing are aware of that. Liking this video so far? Don't just be a watcher. Go ahead and hit the like, share, and subscribe button. And don't forget to tap the bell so you will not miss any of my videos or live streams. This way you will be supporting the channel that stands for the truth and objective reporting. The choice is yours. Thanks for your support. Indeed, appreciate your support. Now let's move— give— let's move into the depth of this particular conversation here. And I am going directly to— given the history between Russia and China, will Russia enter into a military treaty with China, or vice versa? Meaning, will China enter into a military treaty with Russia? And to me, it's, it's, it's logical question to ask, because that question hinges on whether their current interests will be served by such a formal commitment, because it is a commitment. That is why so far I didn't see it happen. That doesn't mean they are not committed. It just— when you enter into a military treaty is a different ballgame. Except that in the case— the way I'm gonna just create, uh, sort of, uh, share a brief, brief comparison to give you an idea. And the comparison I will do in the case of Russia and China if they enter or when they enter into this military treaty, it will be different than, for example, what the US has with Philippines, what the US has with Japan, what the US has with South Korea. Because in that relationship, we dictate the terms to those countries, to the Philippines, to Japan, South Korea. In the case of Russia and China, it won't be. That is where the difference— that is. But suffice it to say, we'll move forward with this question. So now you have to think about the constraints against such a possibility. Russia and China so far have shown reluctance to formalize military commitments. When I wrote my, when I wrote my Russia book, I refrained from convincingly saying, oh, it's going to become a military alliance. It's because of the commitment part. Because I, doing the research, I found from both ends there is a slight reluctance from both. And that was the reason why one of the constraints is this reluctance to formalize this military commitment, because that goes beyond the existing framework between the two countries. So, and when you think about the factors that work against this mutual defense treaty, there will be, there will be a few. You think, for example, the asymmetry of their relationship, which is very significant. Russia has become economically dependent on China after Western sanctions, which could— what— make— what— it could make Russia wary of being locked into obligations that favor the stronger party. It's, it's a normal calculation. Those are geopolitical calculations. If you don't think about them, then you are missing the, the big picture. China, conversely, maintains strategic flexibility and doesn't want to be automatically drawn into conflicts that serve Russia's interest, like Ukraine. Which is when you look at the history of China, China has never get involved, It was except in 19— I think what, late '60s in Vietnam for a specific reason. Other than that, none. So that's why a binding treaty could constrain that flexibility both countries have, especially on China's part. So historical mistrust also still lingers to a degree, even though both countries has turned the page on that, but it's still there. So the two countries had had a border conflict, as you know, and sort of competed for the influence of Central Asia. And they were at some point, still to a degree today, some sort of Moscow and Beijing have differ regarding the regional priorities. Moscow see it this way, Beijing see it that way. So, but these tensions, of course, didn't disappear. Just because current circumstances created an alignment. That's what I'm saying. They have to be ready and honest about this military alliance because it's a major shift. So, so when you think about geopolitics, you think about the possibilities. So what might change this calculus of both China and Russia? Because a formal military treaty It could become more likely if the geopolitical environments shifted significantly. It is already shifting because we're moving from a uni— we have moved on from a unipolar to multipolar, but that's not enough. For instance, if Western military pressure on either country intensified substantially. On one end. Or, for example, if they— meaning both of them, Russia and China— face common military threats that seem existential. So the deepening of their relationship, or security consultations, that is, and the coordination could eventually create the right conditions where formalizing feels Necessary. It is time. It's now or never. That's the only one of the conditions, at least I see. And so far, what Russia and China are doing are taking the middle path. They don't want to rush into this. They don't want to slow down either. For now, they seem comfortable. Why? Beijing and Moscow seems to be comfortable with the current arrangements. Institutionalized strategic, uh, uh, coordination, the joint military exercises. And I did some video— videos for you, not more than one. If you just go to the channel, check it out, a few months ago. So, uh, you think about arms sales. Yeah, they do have arms sales, believe it or not. You think about intelligence sharing. Yeah, intelligence sharing between the two countries. It's all happening. And all of this happening without the rigidity of a formal mutual defense pact. And this in itself, it gives both countries the benefit of coordination while at the same time preserving their freedom of action. That's the way I see it. So while it's possible, again, I don't rule that out. Neither country, China or Russia, appear at this moment to have strong incentives to formalize their, their military treaty right now. The partnership serves their purposes at a lower level of commitment, and that's enough for them at this time. If conditions change, it will be a different, different ballgame altogether. And this leads me to the other fundamental question: does the depth of the relationship between China and Russia, okay, reflect the new global multipolar order? That is the reason again why I put this text on the, on the thumbnail, Rewriting the Global Order. Of course, the Western think tank is gonna say there is no such thing. You and I know, you and I understand the reality and understand the truth and know the truth that it is. That is why I had to ask the question, is it reflecting the new global multipolar order? So, and the answer is yes, it does reflect, and not only reflect, it reinforces what both countries, Russia and China in this case, describing as a multipolar world order because it's here already. And yet it's worth examining sort of the facts, what it actually means. So what does a multipolar framing represent for those two countries? And I'm only talking about Russia and China. I will mention the US separately here. So China and Russia use the approach to multipolarity to describe a world where power is distributed among multiple centers rather than concentrated in the hand of the United States, forward slash, the West. And when I say the West, you know, don't think about England and Germany and France. Those are literally useless. It's the US. Simple as that. I mean, if you know the conditions now, what's going on in the UK, or Germany or France, you know, give it a decade and you'll see where they're going to be. So the depth of this relationship, or their partner— this partnership rather, between Russia and China, in their view, the way they see it, is like, like, like a manifestation. It's a concrete manifestation of this multipolar order because they are operating as distinct poles of power, not together. This is what they distributed among multiple centers. That's the meaning of it. And at the same time, coordinating where interests align, but maintaining independence. I'll give you a brief example, a very, very short Look at the relationship between India and China and look at the relationship between Russia and India. That will give you an example. So the institutionalized consultation between Moscow and Beijing, the joint military exercises between China and Russia, the coordinated positions on issues like Taiwan, all this signal that power is genuinely shifting away from a unipolar Western dominance, forward slash, the US. And while understanding this, don't forget, reality is more complex than you may think. The global order as we know it is genuinely becoming less unipolar. We know it, we can feel it, we can sense it. You've been with me for over many years now. You've seen how from day one when I launched this channels and the other ones, and we went ahead into talking about global affairs, where we were back then and where we are today, because that shift is real. US relative power, global one that is, has declined. The rising powers, it's not rising, it's already there. The likes of China. And I disagree once again with those who say India is in that category. India, it is not. Nothing against India. I am, my assessments is based on facts, on capabilities. I mean, you look at what India suffered at the hand of Pakistan. What do you think India can sustain with other major powers? That's why I don't include India in this conversation because it's not. So suffice it to say, when we look at this, uh, the power decline of the US, the rising powers like, like, like, uh, China in this case, and just go back the 20 years. And if you go back 20 years is exact timing when I said back then in Washington, Mike, my word, give 20 or 25 years and you see where China is going to be. I didn't say give it 20, 25 years and you see where India is. It became— it was clear to me back then, still clear to me today. And this is why we call it multipolar, because one thing you need to understand in the world of international relations, multipolar can obscure sometimes an important asymmetries. That exists within the system. You think about China's economic and technological weight, which dwarfs that of Russia, India, and the US. That's why funny, when I read yesterday about— I was reading some stuff yesterday and about the upcoming G7 and the most advanced systems in the world, China is not, is, is not there. And I was just like wondering Are you saying to me that Germany's economy is better than China? That just doesn't make any sense. So now you understand at least why Macron had to go to China, because he wants to make sure the G7 summit, which France is going to have the presidency next year, will succeed. That's another topic for another day. So, so at the same time, Russia is increasingly, increasingly, given what's going on now, orbiting the, the, the sort of the China rather than standing as an equal on an equal pole. In other words, Russia here, China here on an equal pole. It's not. Russia can do it at this time. It might be able to do it later once the Ukraine conflict is over. Then you have other countries, other economic blocs, the likes of the so-called EU, the like of ASEAN, BRICS, Gulf states— some even include India into this— are trying to maintain a relationship with multiple powers rather than aligning firmly with one pole or another. Well, I have to push back against this. Those analysts who are saying this, they are misrepresenting the facts because the EU is aligning with the US. India is aligning with the US despite the US stepping on India right now, you know. So what India is doing is going back to Russia because of energy, but it couldn't go back to China because, as I told you, if India was honest about really forging deep relationships economically and otherwise with China, they would have sat down, agreed to sit down and resolve the border issues once for all, but they won't do it. So here is what I wrote, uh, back, uh, when I wrote my Russia book. I'm going to share this excerpt and continue in my conversation. Back then I wrote, I devote a detailed narrative about this point in the upcoming pages. For now, suffice it to state that Russia-China relations must concern the West, including the United States. I wager that both Russia and China will likely reshape the geopolitical landscape, including that of the Middle East, while pushing the US away from Asia as much and as far as possible. It is worth noting that Russia's global strategy is supported not only by its military, mainly because of its nuclear capabilities, but also through its seat on the United Nations Security Council, where Russia exercises its influence through advancing its objective and objectives and vehemently opposing or objecting to US interests. That was my argument back then. And this leads me to They paved the way for me to ask another question. I tend to ask questions a lot when it comes down to geopolitics, you know. So what does this relationship, this partnership, reveal, meaning between Russia and China? It reveals that their strategic coordination does suggest that the post-Cold War US-led world order is genuinely eroding. I didn't use the term collapsing, but it's eroding. It won't be an absolute collapse immediately. It will be erosion. And that's usually a gradual decline. And, and, and, yeah, gradual decline. But whether this creates a stable multipolar system or something else, sort of more competitive and fragmented remains unclear. I am seeing the latter part, especially for example when BRICS wanted to introduce the currency and India objected to this. That's an example of this fragmentation that exists. When India said, oh, I'm going to be the spokesperson for the Global South— hold on a second, you don't have the means to hold on on that status or claim that status. If anybody will talk on behalf of the Global South, it will be China, and China didn't do it, doesn't want it. It's just to highlight to you where that fragmentation comes, comes from. That is the important aspect of this. So that— suffice it to say that the partnership shows two powers trying to create an alternative power center. So, but at the same time, they are doing it partly, not entirely, but partly reactively. Why? It's because Western pressure, rather than building something entirely new. On the other hand, why do they need to build brand new? No, pick on the old one, reinvent it, and move on. So deepening relations between Russia and China reflects the real shift in the global power distribution. But the emerging order, don't think is as easy as it might be, or it's messier than the multipolar label suggests. Why? Because you have players who will undermine it. I'll start with India first. Because this, in my opinion, suggests more accurately a world of competing regional powers, realignment blocks, and states hedging their bets. That's why I said last time, the— and I— it's in one of those videos on the record, I said the new multipolar order will be centered on blocks. Regional blocs, not in one country dominated. China's not after this, Russia's not after that. So, and within this leads us to ask another question: what role can the US play in this new order, if any? Because the world has moved on and is moving on without the US. But don't forget, the US still plays a major role in the global order as of today. So the US still has significant role to play, though it is very, very, very different from the post-Cold War, a position of primacy back then. So I'm going to share for you, uh, uh, uh, uh, outlines regarding this to put it in perspective for you. So you think of the US as a major power among others not unilateral. The US remains the world's largest economy because we still are, you know, there's still some sort of unmatched military capabilities, but that's just on the surface because we couldn't fight, you know, and we still need some sort of lead, or rather alliances like NATO, which becoming obsolete anyway. But we still have alliances with Japan, South Korea, Australia, Philippines. So rather than being the sole ordering power, which by the way still is with those countries, not around the world— look at Africa, look at Latin America— the US could function as one of major poles among several, you know, competing, cooperating selectively, and managing competition to avoid escalation, which is unlikely, by the way. And this would require the United States to accept that it cannot dictate outcomes globally the way it once did, or could. Then the US also can do this through some sort of alliance management. What do I mean by this? The US strength lies partly in its alliance systems, which, by the way, China and Russia don't have at this time. This is what I'm saying. If they are to go into the military alliance, it will behoove them to expand on that. They won't be just the two. They are major capabilities, and I'm gonna be talking about this, uh, uh, uh, soon, within a minute here. So, but if they expand on that by adding other countries, Then that's when you realize the management of this alliance. That is what the US is good at, still doing, of course, using other countries. So the US strength is partly lies in its alliance systems. As I said, China and Russia don't have that. So for the US, strengthening ties with Europe, with Japan, with South Korea, with India, with Philippines, with Australia gives the US influence And of course dominance over this correlation building, uh, rather than unilateral actions. And this, in my opinion, in a multipolar order will become more important. Why? Because it will be no single power that is dominating. Then you have these specific domains where the US still play a major role. Control. Even if the US cannot control everything, and of course it can't, it retains advantages in certain areas. Think of technology, think of innovation, think of the dollar dominance in global economy or finance, think of the cultural influence, even though it's going down. So, and this is going to be changing soon anyway. But the harder question we ought to consider is whether the US political system and the strategic culture can accept this shift. There is no answer to that at this time. Accepting a multipolar order? Yeah, if we are to accept this new multipolar order It requires comfort with the outcome of the US, which means outcome of what? That the US cannot control. And we have to be comfortable with other powers having legitimate sphere of influence. And of course, the instinct— I worked in Washington, I understand how that town operates— the instincts of Washington has often been to resist rather than adapt and cooperate. That's why you are witnessing what you are witnessing. At the same time, what are you left with? You're left with the strategic choices ahead. The US could pursue either containment strategies, which will not work, especially against China or Russia at this time, okay, or you have to move into accommodation strategies, negotiating spheres of influence. Or you have to consider competitive coexistence, competing in some areas where finding cooperation in others will be better. So each, each area or each sector carries different risks and different opportunities. So the core answer to this question is that the US will remain a major player as of now, but its role is likely to be less dominant as we move forward and more negotiated than it's become— it has been accustomed to. It's a fact. It's the reality that Washington needs to accept. The world has changed., and we need to change with it. And one of the key question, as I mentioned earlier, I'm going to address, is whether Japan is a common enemy for both Russia and China. You have to consider that given the history of both countries, Russia and China, vis-à-vis Japan. So some of the bad will say not quite they are not, or Japan is not. So, or maybe even framing it this way might not be right. Yeah, it won't matter for me. I just put it out there because what Japan does and can do is that it can create friction for both countries in different ways, like for example what we just saw with China. So I'm gonna do China's perspective Russia's perspective and where they both align. So from China's perspective, Japan is more of a direct strategic concern than anything else. The two countries have history— two countries, China and Japan, have historical animosity. Of course, World War II legacy, you can't forget ongoing disputes of Senkaku Islands, the atrocities, atrocities and the massive genocide that Japanese did in Ninjin city in China. In addition to all this, Japan hosts significant US military presence. So China views Japan as part of the US-led containment strategy in Asia. And of course, the recent statements by the Japanese Prime Minister on Taiwan which I mentioned earlier when I was talking about the visit of Mr. Wani, are a source of real tensions. So Japan is seen as an obstacle to the Chinese regional sort of influence, as an extension of the American power in Asia that's trying to contain and encircle China. From Russia's perspective, It's slightly different. Why is this? Because Japan is less of a primary concern for Russia. However, it factors into the picture of Moscow. Once all— also, when you think about Russia's historical tensions with Japan, the territorial dispute that's over the island of Shaolin, memories of the Russo-Japanese War, to those who are familiar with that era. And most recently, Japan has joined Western sanctions against Russia over Ukraine, and that at the same time it's strengthening— meaning Japan strengthening its military capabilities. But let's just put the dots on the letter where we might. Japan isn't Russia's main preoccupation. To Russia, the US and NATO are. Then where you have both countries, Russia and China, interests converge or align over Japan. Of course, the recent statements by Japanese Prime Minister. And of course, Japan's closer integration with the US security arrangements and viewing Japan's military strengthening with suspicion. That's how China and Russia sees it, see it, because Japan went ahead and increased its defense spending. Why all of a sudden? So this is where you have when, if you once again, and I, we talked about this, I'm not gonna beat the dead horse over this. When you coordinate rhetorically the statements of Japan's regarding Taiwan and the regional militarization, this gives you a sense that Japan represents to both countries, to China and to Russia, it represents a shared irritant. Like a thorn, in addition to being a US ally in Asia, that both see as complicating their regional interest, meaning the regional interest for China and Russia. So, so there are those who say, oh, it's not a common enemy. So that's those who say this, they are entitled to their perspective or their opinion. And one last thing I'm gonna share with you before I'll do conclusion, it has to do with one specific question. And that question is, can the US defeat both China and Russia combined when they combine their forces, militarily speaking? It's a complex question, and of course we have to define what do we mean by defeat. And when we say defeat, is it defeat under any circumstances, or under only specific circumstances? So the honest assessment, if we are to think about it, is that the US cannot simultaneously defeat China and Russia in a major peer-to-peer conflict. So the combined military capabilities, the geographic advantages, the nuclear arsenal of both countries make that essentially impossible for the United States. Even the US own strategic documents acknowledge this. I had a chance to read it one time. That's usually strategic. This comes from the Pentagon to be sent to Congress. They've shifted away from planning for two— meaning the US— from planning for two simultaneous major wars and now focuses on deterrence and managing competition. So why the US can't defeat them? China has the world second largest economy. As a matter of fact, is the first anyway. China would never want to acknowledge that. I'm telling you here based on facts. When I was in China, I found out China is number one, but they would never come forward and say it because they don't like the spotlight. That's part of their culture. So we'll go with this argument. China's second largest economy with a massive military establishment. You saw the parade, and that was just a fraction of that, and sophisticated capabilities in areas like cyber, like space, anti-ship missiles. And I'm going to be sharing some pictures with you. Russia, on the other hand, has advanced nuclear forces, significant conventional military experience, geographic advantages, and of course in its periphery. So fighting both for the US fighting both simultaneously will stretch American forces' resources— military, economic, and logistics— beyond sustainable level. Heck, we couldn't even do it in one against, uh, in Afghanistan or Iraq or Somalia. What makes us think we're gonna do it? And the US would likely face a defeat in at least one theater while trying to fight in another. Is the reality. So what the US could do in a conflict with one of them separately, the US will have significant advantages. Of course, some analysts here in Washington and in Brussels are saying what the superior Navy, the Air Force, technology. Yeah, it's all that, that's true to a degree. The advantage the US has is the allies, but even that wouldn't necessarily mean defeating one or the other in, in some sort of a decisive sense. So, but you look at one aspect, the Taiwan issue, for instance, Could be hypothetically— this is hypothetical— if a war breaks out in the Taiwan Strait, this could be catastrophically costly, even if the US prevails militarily. Because a direct US-Russia, for example, conflict involving nuclear weapons will be mutually destructive. There's no other way of looking at it. But regarding the allies, yeah, you look at Philippines. That's one of the advantages US have. Philippines, South Korea, Japan, Australia, and I will even include India. Why? Because the US will use India. And India will, will, will support the US because they always want to be at the good graces of America. So all this, you have to think about the strategic implications. And this is precisely why both deterrence and diplomacy matters so much. The US strategy, by the way, isn't a strategy, isn't a plan for winning. We haven't won a war since World War II, and even World War II, we didn't win it. They were the Soviets. America never won World War II. Let's not, let's not lie about this, historically speaking. So, and that is where that difference is. So the US never plans for winning. We plan— because if you think about after World War II, especially from 1952 forward, we got involved in conflicts Korean War, Vietnam, Gulf War I, Gulf War II, Afghanistan, Iraq. We did now the Red Sea and we had to move out. Did we win any of those? None. That's my point. So it's because what the US think about in, in this case of two-front wars It's going to make such conflicts unthinkable. Only the US is going to use the allies there, the alliances, the military presence there, but using the locals, not the— the Americans will be in the back. They might be part of it, but they will be in the back. And that's one of the clear consequences of this. So the goal, the objective is to prevent conflict, not winning it. So the practical answer to all this is no, the US cannot defeat, which is why military strategy focuses on deterrence, alliance building, and managing the competition short of war rather than a war-winning scenarios. And I'm going to share with you some pictures of some military hardware from both Russia and China. I might say, I might share, uh, also one of the— let me start with the submarine, the Chinese Type 094. This one here is the Chinese designation. NATO, by the way, gives it a name of Jin class, which is a class of nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines. And this one deployed by China for the People's Liberation Army Navy submarine force. Uh, here is the picture of the Chinese one right here. Now this one, uh, the zero— the Type 094 succeeds the Type 092 submarine and precedes the Type 096 submarine, which is under development, by the way. That's one. In case of a war, military conflict, that Japan gets involved, what Japan is going to deploy? It's going to deploy the, the JS Izumo. This is an aircraft carrier. It's a multi-role aircraft carrier cruiser. And this, by the way, to my knowledge, it It has been refitted to carry the F-35B stealth fighters. This is why you have the F-35B in Okinawa in Japan. Then you think about the US, what the US will deploy. There is one particular submarine, the US Ohio class. This submarine force consists of 4 operational classes. You have the Ohio, you have the LA or Los Angeles, you have the Seawolf, and you have the Virginia. So sometimes you hear them individually, sometimes you hear the Ohio class. When you hear Ohio class, that means all those operational classes here. So all of which are nuclear-powered. The Ohio class by itself consists of 14 SSBN that serve as the seabed leg of the U.S. nuclear triad. That's the trilateral— the air, sea, and land. An additional 4 Ohio-class submarines are configured as the SSGN that possesses both strike and special forces insertion capabilities. The other 3 operational classes, Virginia, Seawolf, and Los Angeles, are composed of the SSN attack submarines, which is tasked with engaging and destroying enemy vessels, in addition to supporting onshore operations and carrier groups and carrying out surveillance. Now I wanted to start with this before I'll share some advances in the airspace. We'll start with the China J-35A. This is a multi-role, it's an advanced system, and I give credit to the China military here. That's their picture, belong to them. So, uh, this is the same picture here, just in the air. This is the Chinese J-35. Then I move to the Russian Kinzhal, which is the hypersonic missile. And again, why I'm sharing these pictures is to put it within the perspective of the capabilities, why the US will not be able to defeat both Russia and China if they join their military forces. Then we have the Russian Tsar Bomba, the largest nuclear bomb. That's the major one. I'm sure you've, you've heard about it. Then you consider the Russian Su-57, which is, uh, you know, it defies the laws of physics as far as maneuverability. And if this is not enough, you consider the Chinese hypersonic missiles, which are— you're looking at the, the YJ-15, YJ-19. And when you combine all this, I don't see how we will stand a chance short of using nuclear weapons. And if we use nuclear weapons, we know what the consequences will be and the response going to be overwhelming. This is why I don't understand, for example, why the UK is, is, is so— UK has become like, like, I, I don't know how to describe it. Degradation usually will lead you to embark on some really erratic policies, and one of those erratic policies is provoking the Russians. And what the British people do not understand is that it will only take about 10 minutes for a hypersonic to leave the Russian territory and flatten London. That's how fast they are. They won't even have time, meaning the British won't even have time to prepare the retaliation or counter that. What there is nothing they can counter against the hypersonics. You know, we don't even have something to my knowledge that we could counter the hypersonic. The same applied to the Chinese. The last thing that I knew a few years ago is when the Chinese conducted a specific test for one of these types of missiles. And that, when I dig deeper into certain, uh, relevant documents and so forth, I found out that all China needs to do is go to the Pacific, and from some parts in Pacific, they can hit Hawaii, direct hit, flatten or detonate something underwater, and you have this tidal wave that will flatten Hawaii and so forth. So, all right, and I'm going to conclude with my excerpt from my book, and that's it. If I have any questions, I'll, I'll take a look, see if there's any question or two. It is what I wrote as a conclusion here. Similarly, the possibility of a Russia-China alliance could provide both countries the right platform on which to further their cooperation on all fronts, including the military. There is no certainty about what the global geopolitical landscape might look like in the next decade or so. With certainty, however, one can conclude that the Russia-China alliance will further contribute to a precipitous shift in the global order and further decline of the US share of global power. Alas, the shift in the global balance of power is already underway. And that was what I wrote a few years ago. That was 2018 when I start doing the research on this. So, and by the way, if you ever get a copy of this book Uh, let me just tell you which pages. I'm gonna put the link for you in the chat box if you ever wanted to read. Uh, you go to page 220, from 220 all the way to 240. That's where I devote the arguments regarding this particular aspect. So anyway, I hope you guys enjoyed listening to this analysis. I hope it was worth your time. Uh, they're, you know, I do my best to provide you, uh, the insights that you will not be able to read elsewhere. It's because media nowadays, you can't count on it. You can't count on the media, uh, and media is controlled, as you know. I'm not telling you something you don't know. So what you are left with is independent voices, and there are some other individuals out there. I'm, I'm not denying this, of course. I, I encourage, uh, and I wish success to those individuals as well. This is moving in the right direction. Why? Because we want to keep everyone informed of what's going on, because truth matters, as I always say. Hope you enjoyed it. And, uh, let me see if there's any, uh— oh, Khadija say thank you. You're most welcome, most welcome. Uh, Singh, uh, thank you, Dr. O. Liang, you're most welcome. Thank you all. Thank you all. So it, it, it's always— it means a lot to me. I want you to know, guys, I don't take it for granted. Your support, your kind words means a lot to me. I truly— what keeps me going, and I mean it when I say this, you know, I'm, I'm, I'm getting old enough, you know, I'm beyond needing recognition and all that stuff. It doesn't mean much to me. So, so Oh, uh, American Citizen, uh, I can't thank you enough, first of all, for your continued support for the channel. So it means a lot to me. So your question: can the US isolate the Western Hemisphere in terms of shipping? Uh, no, they won't, because here is why. Uh, first of all, what makes us think that the US is going to resolve the issues in Latin America? As a matter of fact, the US might be trying now to find a way out of the conflict. Second thing is that China opposed BlackRock purchasing the Panama Canal. To my knowledge, there are some talks behind the scenes that BlackRock wants to purchase that. China opposed that. We all know why, because China invested into all this. Now, I don't see— and even if the, even if the US end up controlling this, what that's going to do, it's going to harm the Europe, the Western Hemisphere, more so than the, the, the other part of the world. Because where is most of the global economy is? It's not in the West, is in the Far East. So that's the way I see it. So, so much appreciate your support, uh, uh, for, for the channel. Rample Someone, you are most welcome, and thank you, thank you all for your continued support. So So let me take one more look in case there's— oh my gosh, yeah, my son bought me that book. A good one, Doc. Thank you so much. I would love one day if an opportunity presents itself to meet you and I will autograph it for you. So I, I hope one day to do that. So thank you so much. Okay, let me see here. So I'm gonna go work on some other stuff in the house here, take a break tomorrow, and I'll pick it up on Monday with new topic. Just to remind you, remember to join me on Monday for my conversation with Jayant Bhandari. And also I'm gonna set the date for my conversation with Professor Anna Malendog, and I will be doing, I will be doing the other analyses for the other topics. So Once again, truly appreciate you all. Uh, if you want to, if you want to buy me coffee, here is the link should you decide. Oh, not this one, is the other one. Yeah, right here. Should you decide to do that, I'm going to put both links to this one and the books in the chat box, uh, for those who might want to look at it, uh, later on. This is the link for, for that one, and I'm gonna put the link for the books. This is if you ever want to get a copy of, uh, one of the books. So, and again, I, I wish one day to meet those who purchased the copy, and I will autograph it for you. All right, I am gonna sign off here. I wish you a good weekend, peaceful one. I'm Relax, and I look forward to seeing you on Sunday. As always, remember, geopolitics impacts your daily life in more ways than one. Till next time, bye-bye.