US-China Tug of War for both Cambodia & Vietnam!

All right, hello everybody and welcome to Geopolitical Trends, where truth matters. Very, very excited to be with you as always, but also today because it's a, it's a special day. I have a guest for you that you guys want to hear from, and, uh, there is a lot to cover, so this is why I'm gonna get quickly into bring in my guest here. But first, I want to let remind you of tomorrow, the live stream at 12:00, 12:15. I'll be talking about the recent development in Malaysia. And I'm also want to remind you about my upcoming panel discussions regarding the BRI on August 3rd with my guest Dr. Dashan Fang and Dr. Yan Lian. I look forward to that conversation. So without further ado, let me bring my guest here. Here you are. Hi, Digby.

Hello, David. Nice to join you again.

Oh, very, very excited to have you here, guy. By the way, guys, uh, I'm gonna just introduce, uh, Dr. Digby James very, very briefly. I put the full bio in the description, so, and I highly recommend you might want to go and read that bio later on. For now, I just, just sit back, relax, and enjoy the knowledge you're gonna be getting from, uh, from Digby here. I call him on a first name basis. I dropped the Doc part, so usually. All right, let me guys tell you first of all who is Digby. Well, Dr. Digby James Rank, he's the chair of the Belt and Road Capital Partners Geopolitical Risk Investments and Trade, Public Diplomacy, and Education Partnership advisory firm. Wow. Dr. Reng is also the founder and publisher of Along Mekong Media and advisor to the president of the Royal Academy of Cambodia. He holds research degrees in both international relations and public diplomacy. So the, the bio is long. As I said, guys, make sure after we're done here— no, no, no, no, no, don't be, because it's very— I read it in its entirety, Digby. Very impressive, I'll say. Oh, well, of course, I, I have a background in international relations as well, so that's why I found it very, very fascinating. So, all right, let's, let's get into this. And by the way, guys, just prepare your question towards the end because I asked Digby and he said he has no issue with sort of taking some questions from you guys because, uh, that's great. Yeah, so we have the time. Just prepare your questions and we will, uh, get into the conversation. I don't need to remind you guys, please keep the conversation civil. So far we never had an issue. It was one time last time I missed somebody, but I did track that person. I did track him. I have my ways of doing that and I banned him from the channel completely. So sorry, that's how it works with me. Yeah, I have no tolerance for this, Digby. And I have a wonderful community, you know, they are very engaging, very intellectual, very respectful. And I would not allow anybody to kind of get into this nonsense.

We're all about peace, aren't we, David? We're about multipolar peace.

I agree with you. I know this kind of coming in here. If you don't have anything to add to the conversation, please leave. Simple as that. So, all right, Digby, let's get into our conversation here because I need to get a lot of— I'm I have questions for you, but let me start first. I would like to have your take on where do you see the current geopolitical landscape? We're not talking about just your part of the world. We're talking on the global stage. Where do you see it?

Well, on the global stage, what do we see? I suppose that there's two major conflicts going on in the Ukraine and Gaza. But the reason I'll start there is because if you look at a— if you just look at the map, that's virtually a straight line north-south. And so those two conflicts that are going on are basically, in my mind, a kind of power vacuum. There's the contestation over power in that space. And then at the same time, what you've got is a movement of wealth and power in terms of economic, geo-economics, driven mostly by China and Asia. India is growing at 7.5% or 7.6%. China is growing at 5%. Southeast Asia, where I am, is growing at 6%, average 6%. And so that line is moving and it's been moving for a long time, since at least the end of World War II. And that line is basically now past, gone past Ukraine, Gaza. If you look at that north-south line, it's basically past that. And so this is what we're seeing is basically that the center of global wealth and power has moved specifically right into the centre of Eurasia. And this is witnessed by those conflicts that are going on now. But it's also witnessed by the fact that all of the North Africans, for example, have revolted about this sort of post-colonial situation they were in with France and with the Europeans and Americans. And so many of those countries have now kicked out the American forces or European forces, and it's sort of pushed pushed the West, if you like, back to the Atlantic on the African continent, which is sort of not often sort of noticed. But also, since the Americans left Ukraine— sorry, left Afghanistan, they've also been pushed all the way back to the conflict zone, which is the Ukraine, right? And also Gaza, Eastern European, Eastern Mediterranean. Now, in the Pacific, we can see that the Americans are now pushing, or at least shall we say, they're trying to secure their perimeter. So their longtime Western Pacific perimeter. But the difference there is that I think there's been a complete switch. The narrative was always that it was American deterrence for aggression by China and so forth. But I think that's completely been turned on its head and it's really Chinese deterrence of American activities. And this can be seen in the capabilities of China. They've displayed their capabilities. With the intent of they can put a protective quarantine around Taiwan. They've shown that they can do this at least 3 times now. And they've also just shown recently with the Philippines tension in the South China Sea that they can also have and maintain a deterrent factor there as well. Because remember that it was the Philippines and the United States that were trying to change the status quo of the South China Sea. The Second Trench, as it's known, is not in Philippine territory. It's so, you know, any claim over that would have increased their claims in the South China Sea and therefore changed the status quo. So the Chinese have shown their capability to be able to arrest that as well. So that means that China is now the deterrent power and the US is ipso facto is the belligerent. And so now you can see that. So there's a general push of the West further west, going back towards Western Europe and the Atlantic. And also that in the Pacific, that it's China that is now the deterrent power. And I think that's very clear. And clearly in Ukraine, the Russians now have the upper hand and that conflict is going to come— it's going to a sort of final phase in some way. But I just want to say that the Americans have achieved and the Europeans have achieved one thing, and that is they have effectively partitioned the Ukraine by doing this. This whole process now has gone to, you know, and one wonders why they just keep going, and it's clear that the Russians are winning, and it was an existential threat. And I always said there was no way that the Ukraine was ever going to be able to defeat Russia. Of course not. But the thing is now that the Ukraine has effectively been partitioned. And that makes me worry because that's what happened to Vietnam, that's what happened to Korea. Korea is still partitioned, and now the Ukraine is partitioned. Now, in Gaza and Israel, I think that whole area— I mean, there's clearly the sort of the Jewish-Palestinian problem in itself, but then in a geostrategic framework, That section of the world, that's the last part of China's Belt and Road that is not connected terrestrially. In other words, it's blocked between Iraq and Syria by American forces. And that last land— that would mean that the Belt and Road, the Eurasian substructure of transport, would be completed, in other words, all the way to Africa. And so the Americans are blocking that. And we can see as a last thing before— this is a long answer, sorry.

Yeah.

The last part about this is the Red Sea. And so Gaza is on the Red Sea and it's also the buffer state between Egypt and Israel. And so I think Gaza is clearly going to have to remain there. And there's a question of 2 million people and their lives, just terrible atrocities here that's being ignored. As a power shift, that's very interesting because the BRICS Plus— so now, you know, we've got the Saudis, the Iranians, the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, and Ethiopia. And, you know, we know that Yemen is kind of, you know, trying to block the mouth of the Red Sea, the Indian Ocean. So access to the mouth of the Suez from the eastern Mediterranean is also in question here. And I think we can see that the BRICS Plus has basically now embraced the Red Sea as a sort of a It's an embrace of the Red Sea. And so US control of that critical waterway is diminished, very much diminished. And I think Gaza, Israel has a lot to do with that. That would take a long time to go into, but that's the current state of affairs. I think a receding West and a dynamic sort of East, if you like, or Russia, China, India. And I think India in triangulation should be included in this. Those three economies, Russia, India, China. Enormous. Plus BRICS Plus, you know, when you talked about introducing Malaysia, I think that's the trend. I think that's where it's all going. And in the lead up to the US election in November, I think we're going to see the fallout. We're going to see some big changes and possibly the end of at least the Ukrainian war. I don't know about Gaza and Israel, but I just spoke to Pascal Lotters yesterday and he thinks it's going to go on for a while. I'm hoping for a resolution of some kind before November or at least immediately after November.

Well, most likely, given— I just talked to someone in Washington, D.C. earlier, and it is my belief that the Russian president is not going to react to anything right now, given what just took place in Finland. You know, there was some sort of launching of some artillery or some sort. From Finland into the Russian territory. But the Russian president is not going to react because he is very shrewd. He's going to wait till November to see what the outcome of the American presidential elections— that will determine the direction. Yeah, this is my belief. That's how it's going to work, even though, uh, for us, American foreign policy has no structure whatsoever. So, all right, let's Yeah, go ahead.

No strategy.

What was it? What was it?

Tactics and no strategy. But I don't think that's really true. I think that the whole idea about keeping that neoliberal transmission belt alive, but it's definitely withering. And the BRICS plus Iran is much— the world is embracing that.

Yeah, it's moving into a different direction. So yeah, well, good. Let's, uh, let's talk about your part of the world where you are. You are in Cambodia.

Cambodia.

I would like to start first where, you know, I've been in Cambodia back in— okay, if I am, if I am to remember, back in 2009 or 2010. I am aware of the International Correspondence Club. I spent a lot of time there. Yeah, I used to go there a lot.

Sure.

Sometimes I'll have dinner there, but my stay in Cambodia was very limited anyway. What I wanted to get your take on is where the Cambodian economy is as of today. We don't hear much about it here in the West.

Yeah, well, it's changed a lot since you were here, of course, 2008-9, in the post-GFC, right? Or during the global financial crisis. Yeah, basically the Cambodian economy has benefited from the very long and stable rule, if you like, or control by Hun Sen and the Cambodian People's Party. Now, a lot of people, it's been demonized enormously in the West, but what one has to realize is that Cambodia is benefiting enormously from the political stability. So 1993, that's basically when the Paris Peace Arrangements went into place. And so they were able to have complete sovereignty over Cambodia. The government had complete sovereignty. And for the first time in a very long time, the Khmer Rouge, the Vietnam War, all of that, they were able to start economic development. And that's what they did. And it was off a very low base, year zero. The whole Khmer Rouge thing was year zero, right? So from the very slow at the beginning, like a J curve, right? But what's happened is all the basic infrastructure was put into place. I mean, really basic infrastructure. But starting after the GFC and China kind of supporting ASEAN and then the ASEAN-China relationship really strengthening, Cambodia started to benefit enormously. And so the stability, political stability. The US is the largest export market. Europe is number 2. China is number 3. And of course, everybody in Asia, in ASEAN, that's all clear. And RCEP came into force. But the real kickoff was about 2014. So the Americans had interfered in the election process, a color revolution, basically. It failed, but the government lost any kind of fairy story tale they had in their minds, and they really concentrated on economic development. And at that time, the Belt and Road, China's Belt and Road, was just really kicking off. So they took full advantage of that, and the economy has just boomed. We're looking at more than 7.5% annualized growth for more than What is that now? Almost 10, over 10 years. So that's phenomenal. That's really, you know, 7.7%. I mean, that's fantastic. And you can really see it now. So they've gone from year zero to lower middle in— sorry, lower income, lower income country, lower middle income country. So it's just phenomenal. And if it keeps on this path, and I think the IMF just upgraded it over 6% growth this year. If they keep on that path, they'll be at middle income by 2030. And so right now in Cambodia, there's a real little economic boom going on. And I'm involved in a lot of that through my Belt and Road Capital Partners. We're involved with the government in trying to organize FDI and the supply chains here and benefiting from the benefits of the middle powers, the larger middle powers on either side of Cambodia, which is Vietnam and Thailand. And Malaysia. Malaysia is going through a mini boom as well. And so what's going on? Yeah, so Cambodia is just placing itself critically in the supply chains for ASEAN and also, of course, for RCEP. And that includes, of course, Australia, New Zealand, Korea, Japan, and China. And I think that's the really exciting part, is the amount of economic growth, the boom that's going to go through RCEP. And it's the only part of the world that's getting that level of growth. But other BRICS countries in Africa and South America also got growth. So look, that trade is all good. And I see Cambodia doing very well out of this as long as Myanmar and the Americans don't try to destabilize this too much. Philippines is underperformer, right?

Yeah. And here is the— I want to share with the audience here the map of Cambodia just to have an idea, at least for them to know why the US is kind of eyeing now on wanting to woo Cambodia into its camp, which I don't think so. They're going to— the US is not going to succeed. The government will not succeed. Now, what can we say about Vietnam, given that Vietnam is also close by?

I think geography is sort of some kind of destiny, right? So you can't move anybody. You can't move these countries. The borders have altered over time, but basically they can't be moved. And no matter what, Vietnam is always going to have to come to some kind of look at its geography. It's got to remain as a partner with China no matter what. China. And it's also within the ASEAN framework. That's good for it. And look, it's having some problems. It's just had some political changes with the death of its former party leader. They've just had a transfer of power. But that look, they did it relatively smoothly. I think there was only a couple of little bumps in there, and that's worked out quite well. I think demand, you see, because they made themselves more dependent on the Americans and the Europeans, sort of in this kind of, I will call it a sort of a flowering, if you like, of relations for the benefit of the Americans. There was a definite joint interest there. And you have to remember that the interest, what was the real interest was economic. I mean, they just wanted an influx of capital and technology and access to market, and they got that. And so they took that deal. But the thing is, the demand from Europe and from America is receding. It's dropping just slowly, but it's definitely dropping. It's still vibrant, but it's definitely been affected. And that's true for Cambodia as well, and Thailand and Malaysia. I think there's some alterations going on in the Vietnamese economy right now. And definitely they're refocusing back to ASEAN. And they'd like also to— I think they've been also coming to an accommodation with China, more friendly accommodation with China as well. They see that there's problems in the US. They know, they understand the problems in Ukraine. So better just be safe at home and have good neighbors. That's a better way to go. But there's still, I think, a lot of resentment in Cambodia, for example, about Vietnam, and that's something that has to be dealt with. But Vietnam is the largest source of tourists into Cambodia. It's really a big market. So everywhere you go these days, there's busloads of Vietnamese. It's only 3 hours. I can get in a car and I can be in Ho Chi Minh City in 3 hours. So look, that relationship is going It's going to, I think, let's see, the key here is that Cambodia is now between Thailand and Vietnam in real terms. And what it's doing is basically making itself an essential hub or node for componentry that goes into the car industry or into other industries. So semi-manufactured, semi-finished, or just component parts that go into the larger manufacturing of its ASEAN partners. Or that go into the supply chains for export elsewhere. So that's where Cambodia is placing itself and that's working very well. I think that's going to keep happening and I'm an active part of that, actually.

Wow. Well, that would be very interesting if we see Thailand end up joining BRICS. That would be just like, to me, it would be a nail in the coffin for the US aspirations to rule.

Right. Malaysia has just done that. That's fantastic. I mean, the key thing in ASEAN is Indonesia, right? I mean, if Indonesia goes BRICS, well, then ASEAN is BRICS. Yeah, but you had a piece yesterday, something about that. ASEAN, I call it ASEAN Plus. You know, ASEAN Plus Three, right? So it's ASEAN Plus BRICS Plus. It's a win-win, right? ASEAN Plus BRICS Plus. That's definitely a win-win. I think that's the trend for sure.

Except that Indonesia withdrew now from the application to BRICS.

Yeah, but if Malaysia is doing it, there's an interesting thing going on here, a triangulation. I don't know whether this was originally led by Hun Sen, because Hun Sen has now performed the political magic trick which everybody wants and the Americans are having trouble doing right now, is he had a smooth transition of government to the young technocrats. So all those old revolutionary guys, the guys that were fighting the Khmer Rouge and did all that in the jungle and stuff, they've all basically sort of filled emeritus positions. They're kind of one step back now. And all these young technocrats have taken control. The whole government is run by 45-year-olds, which is really great. They've all been to university. Some of them are younger. Some of them are a little bit older. They've all been to university in Europe or America or Russia or China or somewhere. They've all been to university and they've all got at least master's degrees or PhDs and they know what they're doing. They're technocrats and that's fantastic. And so there's a lot of— to go in and out of this little lower middle income into middle income, that's what's needed. And so Hootsen has engineered this really well. But now he's been concentrating on the change in governments in Malaysia and Thailand. And what they're doing together is building a little triangulation there to strengthen the Gulf of Thailand and to strengthen that part, that sort of continental part of ASEAN, which relates directly to Myanmar, for example. But also in terms of economics, right? And I think the Indonesians are sitting back and saying, okay, well, let's You know, let that happen. Let that happen. We're not going to try and discredit that or undo that or anything else. They're going to go for it. Remember, ASEAN is consensus-driven. Everybody has to agree to all these kind of decisions. And that ASEAN integration is progressing at speed. At speed. And they just had the foreign ministers meeting in Laos. So that's— yeah, yeah. And that's definitely, you know, the talk there was all about peace. And all about integration, cross-border transactions, customs, all that sort of stuff, and getting that to go faster, getting the rails online. The new line from Thailand to Kunming just opened through Laos. So that's all going forward really well. And I think the Indonesians are watching this really carefully and they're saying, okay, if the Malaysians, the Thais, and the Cambodians can get this structure worked out, this triangulation, it can effectively perhaps, I wouldn't say preclude, but it'll definitely limit the European and American influence that has had a negative influence specifically about Myanmar, but also about the Gulf of Thailand and things like that. That'll limit that a little bit more, strengthen ASEAN a bit more, and I think it might even give a solution for Myanmar in the near future.

But I still, I won't trust the Europeans given what, uh, now with the visit of the Giorgia Meloni to, to China seeking— see, I mean, I use the term, I did a video on it, but I use the term begging for Chinese investments after withdrawing from the BRI only 12 months ago, a year ago. So under pressure from the US. And this is where I, I wanted to have your take into with this trajectory that we see now, the US is pushing too much towards Asia, you know, with, with NATO, with the, the, the sort of the upcoming decision by NATO to open an office in Japan, with all the tariffs imposed by the United States on China, and with the changes that's taking place in Asia. Do you think these two forces are going to collide at some point? And if they do, which location is going to manifest itself where?

Yeah, well, so that's the alliance structure idea, right? The Americans are trying to build an alliance. It's a military alliance. That's essentially the thing. What they're trying to really do here is establish firm parameter— parameters, military security parameters, within which they can then have a decoupled supply chain. Because the American weakness is— well, there's a couple of them, but let's just say the American weakness with their alliance structure is that it relies on, it relies on supply chains. So, and the, you know, to America. So America is the great importer, if you like, you know, for Japan, for Germany, for Taiwan, for, but they've had to limit that because of their economic situation. You know, Trump did that, you know, he got into a fight with the Koreans, the Japanese, everybody, right? And he's going to do it again. And so they're all thinking about that. And I think that's got something to do with Meloni coming to China. She's saying, oh my God, you know, those tariff structures are going to go in. He's not going to be nice to Europe. He doesn't like the euro, of course. So the Italians and I think the Greeks as well, obviously the Hungarians and the Serbs and the Slovaks. So I think there's a real recentering of European power in real sense. The Baltic states had all kind of taken over the control of the EU and NATO, if you like, with American backing. But I can see that Hungary, Serbia, Slovakia— and one has to remember that the Austro-Hungarian Empire was a real centre of power for a very long time in Europe, and that's Central Europe. And I think we can see that coming back. They're all connected to Russian resources, Chinese resources, trade networks to the Arab world, to Turkey, to everywhere. And they're going to have a new industrial base courtesy of all of this. And I think, yeah, you can see that power, and that's got to do with what I talked about before, wealth and power moving east. Right. I think the Hungarians are basically now kind of the central power there, economically at least. And I can see that's happening. And that has a direct influence over the Italians and the Greeks as well. So I can see they need that. It's the Mediterranean thing, right? Eastern Mediterranean again. I think that you can see a real geo-economic shift here. So that power, wealth is moving to the centre of East. That's going to really balance Western Europe because remember, Western Europe, like Japan and Korea, does not have resources. It has to import all of its resources and energy inputs, for example. So how are they going to compete? How are they going to compete? I think that they're going to have to start looking eastward, but in terms of not of East to Russia, but just east generally as Eurasia. Right. And reconsider how they think about Africa. They're going to have— the colonial thing is dead. And so there's no exclusive access to resources anymore. They have to compete on the global market for resources. And the Americans are the most expensive. So, of course, they want resources from somewhere else. And I think that's what's going on here is everybody's benefiting from low-cost energy, low-cost mineral inputs, and low-cost manufacturing and low-cost technology transfers. And that's what's going on. And the Americans and the Europeans have to really reconsider what's happening here. And I think one outcome of that is what the Italians have now flipped for the next 3 years. Right. So that's an election cycle.

That's correct. Does that mean, Digby, does that mean that the possibility— and I put this in quotes here— the possibility of Italy going back to the BRI is sort of a foregone conclusion. Can we assume?

Yeah, I don't think it's left. I mean, look, it was all— it kind of was the froth at the top of the beer. Yeah, because they're still locked in. There's still all these partnerships in place that were signed. And part of the deal for 3 years was actually to meet the obligations to the previous agreements. So they're related to BRI. So with ports, with spending, with investment, etc. Because Italy has been investing more in China than China has been investing in Italy since that turnaround. So, yeah, it's BRI in all but name. And I think the Greeks are already there, right? So Italy, Greece, you're moving east here, Eastern Mediterranean, right? So, you know, the next one around is France, right, on the Mediterranean. So, you know, that's the shipping, right? So shipping into the Mediterranean, Suez, Indian Ocean. So that relates very much to Israel and Gaza, I think, because remember, Gaza is on the eastern side of the Suez Canal and Egypt's got the western side of the Suez Canal. Right. And you can see that operating both sides of the Suez and the Yemen at the bottom. So I can see that that BRICS embrace of the Red Sea gives access specifically to the Mediterranean and to Europe. So that's Eurasia coalescing. I think that's really the trend, and the Americans are doing everything they can to stop it. Because remember that Ukraine is a transit and buffer zone. It has always been that, and it doesn't have a lot of resources. The east where the Russians are, that has resources, but western Ukraine has very little in resources, very, very little. So that's going to be problematic for whoever kind of in that partition, whoever, you know, the Germans and the Lithuanians and the Poles, right? I think the Poles might flip. I think it's— I can't see why, you know, it's not to their benefit to stay in the situation they're in. They've had fabulous economic growth, but that growth has been powered by low energy. So, you know, they have to really think about how they're going to continue. So, yeah.

Interesting. Yeah. Now with this, with this explanation you provided, will it be fair to say that the shift that is already, it's already there as far as moving from unipolar to multipolar?

Will that already happen?

Yeah. Will it be fair to say that, for example, and this is my personal view here, for example, when I see Malaysia getting into BRICS, which we will get into that from a different angle. Which getting into BRICS, that's— that means Malaysia wants to play a role into the supply chain. And that in it— and that in itself with the big picture is a reflection of where this next multipolar, or where the multipolar system is going to be guided by. It's going to be guided by economics, not ide— not ideology.

Yeah, not ideology.

Yeah. Would it be fair to say that the US is going to be fighting this tooth and nail, especially in Asia, to prevent the economic progress from taking effect.

Yeah, that's that idea about the neoliberal transmission belt, right? That everybody has to adopt the American standards, the American accounting, legal, the rules-based order. And I think most people think the rules-based order is kind of a military thing. Or sort of like NATO and what, but it's not. The rules, if you like, are all the standards, the approval on aircraft, the approval on pharmaceuticals, using English, always using English. These are the rules. And that's all about services, mostly about services, and also about regulation and legislation and control all of the kind of standards for everything, for chip design, for boat sizes, for measurements, for whatever it is, those are the rules. And they have been dominated by the British Anglo-American system for 300 years. And so now the new global majority, if you like, all those sort of post-colonial, what we're talking about in Africa and Asia and so forth, they're tired of all of that. And what they need to be able to do is So they've now got other countries to look for where they share consensus-driven rules. They're setting up their own rules and their own ways to facilitate, to approve aircraft design, to approve monetary transfers, customs agreements, and everything else without going through the Americans, without having to meet those American standards. And so those rules are falling apart. And I think that's what the Americans are really fighting about. Because that's where they make most of their money too. They make a trillion dollars a year out of that, at least. Wow.

Wow. A lot of—

that's one of the rules, right? You have to use the dollar.

The dollar. Yeah. Well, speaking of that, that paves the way to our conversation regarding Malaysia.

I'm just going to go back to Malaysia for a second. Yeah, that triangulation I was talking about, Malaysia, Cambodia, Thailand, Thailand, that if you think about it in geoeconomic terms, like big scale geoeconomic, that's just like becoming a key hub or node in a supply chain, in a regional supply chain. That's a really important regional supply chain. So you've got large-scale vehicle manufacturing, machinery manufacturing, solar, and all sorts of manufacturing going on there. And that's really key. And it's all based around the Gulf of Thailand. See around the Gulf of Thailand. So all the shipping, Gulf of Thailand, and then out into the South China Sea, and then off to like Singapore, where— or Busan in Korea, where you've got to go onto really big ships, and then it goes off to the United States or America or South America or Mexico or somewhere, or India or whatever it is. Because the Gulf of Thailand, quite shallow, so the size of the ships is limited. But Busan in Korea for Northeast Asia, perfect. And then across to the US and then down to Singapore and then across to the Middle East on the Indian Ocean and so forth. And Sri Lanka, Sri Lanka is going to prove to be very important. So that's, you got to think about hubs and nodes like this globally. So obviously the Red Sea is one, the Malacca Strait is one, the Gulf of Thailand is one, the Bay of Bengal is one. And so this is the scaling, continental scaling. Which tells you that multipolarity, you're talking about global consensus as opposed to one power telling everybody what they have to do.

Yeah, interesting. I need to have your take on BRICS, the expansion now with Malaysia, but from a different angle. And that angle is, how do you think How do you think India perceives or views Malaysia's application into BRICS? I'm curious to know about this particular country.

Yeah, that's a good question because I don't think I've directly thought about the India-Malaysia connection other than, of course, there are a lot of Indians in Malaysia. I did. I think 20% of the population, something like that, maybe even more. And that is true in Singapore as well. For example, there's a, you know, fairly large proportion of Indians. And India, of course, has been in Southeast Asia for what? I don't know, a couple of thousand years at least, maybe 3,000 years. And that is very evident in the languages and the written script, for example, in Thailand and Myanmar and Cambodia and Malaysia. I think the Indians are going to welcome all of this. Look, there's a real warming between the Indians and Southeast Asia already. That's already going on and it's very business-focused, I have to say. I don't think the Quad thing— I was looking at the photo yesterday of the Quad members. They just made a statement, was it a couple of days ago? And Jaishankar, so the three others, right, Australia, Japan, the US, they were all standing very close to each other. And then there was a big space and then there was Jaishankar. And I think, you know, that's— the Indians are still very much fixated on the idea that they are also a major pole and that they don't have to be in alliance structures. Non-alignment is fine for them and they're going to operate with who they want, how they want. And, you know, it's very transactional. If the Americans want to give them something for some small consideration, they're perfectly happy to accept the money and the technology. And the market and all that sort of stuff. So I think India is welcoming that, and India sees that they have to have a strong relationship with Southeast Asia. And look, India has a very strong— one example, so Malaysia is a good point. It's kind of like what I was saying about Indonesia is I think they're saying, okay, look, let's just see if this is going to— how that will function. It's a model, right? And Malaysia was stuck for years. For the longest time, Malaysia was stuck in what's called the middle income gap. And the reason for that was very simple, was that they relied on American-owned corporations, Japanese-owned corporations, and licensed technology for assembly and componentry and so forth. And then they just got stuck there because they didn't own anything. There was no R&D. They didn't have the other two ends. They didn't have R&D and they didn't have amps. So they only had the manufacturing part, which is about 6% or 7% of profit. And so now with the transfer of technology from China and Indian support and so forth, they're able to break out of that and they're no longer dependent on that. And they've got bigger export markets and more inputs. So look, I think Malaysia is an exciting model. And then, yeah, for the Gulf of Thailand generally and for peace in Myanmar as well. And so the Indians are looking at that, the Indonesians are looking at that, the Vietnamese are looking at that, ASEAN is looking at that, RCEP is looking at that. And that's what I really think is that the Indians are saying, okay, if we can get that to work, then the India, ASEAN, China, Russia thing and Middle East as well, Indian Ocean, right? The Indians are, of course, very occupied with the Indian Ocean. It's called the Indian Ocean for a reason. I think it's all positive. They're just saying, okay, that's going to be a great model. Let's see how it works. Let's see if we can integrate that as well. India is definitely a big plus in this. I don't think it's negative inside.

I do have some reservation, Digby, uh, uh, regarding India's approach to certain policies inside BRICS. I'll give you a quick example here, uh, and I just found out that the Russian president, when they talked about the payment system, do you know that there are countries inside BRICS, they didn't want to disclose the name of the country. You know, I kind of digged into this and I found out it was India. They are refusing to support the payment system. So a lot of people in the world are thinking, oh, BRICS already came up with this, with the payment system. Yes, they are working on it. But the idea that not all countries are on board. Hmm. And this is where I see the challenge and makes me wonder, okay, if we are to think about, for example, the assimilation of the inclusion of Malaysia into BRICS, of all of them, all of them will be thinking in terms as an entity, then why not bring in ASEAN into it as well? And all of them form this, this major economic bloc that G7 and G20 will stand no chance against.

Yeah, it goes back to what the Indians, that kind of independence that they want. They're a pole by themselves. I mean, their economy is not that big, but they're a huge country. I mean, massive, right? And I think that's why they haven't joined RCEP. That's why I think they'd still be more willing to just— they want the rupee, the Indian rupee, to be able to be traded with any ASEAN country, for example, set all that up. I think they're going to concentrate on all the bilaterals, bilaterals and possibly trilaterals, currency payments and things like that. And they want to set that up first before they go fully into a BRICS-wide thing. I think that might be because, remember, they still have one foot in the Western camp with the Quad and other things. And they're playing that quite well at the moment. They're profiting enormously from the oil trade. And that's hugely profitable for them because they're reselling in euros and dollars, remember. So I don't think they want to destabilize that for the moment. That's not going to last forever. I think they're just being cautious, to be honest with you. It's a time frame thing. I don't think they want to jump into the deep end on this. But I can see that because of ASEAN integration, I think that's basically going to become a one currency. I don't think they won't switch to one currency, but basically it means that all the currencies within ASEAN will have some kind of real stability, like a basket. And you trade like that at the basket. And so India will benefit from that directly. So I think that's just a question of time. I think they don't want to They don't want to be too fast on this one. They don't want to leap. They just want to walk into it. Yeah, softly, softly. But I think you're right. I mean, it sometimes feels like they're holding back the others a little bit. And maybe that's true because remember that China's economy is 5 times bigger than India's and the Russian economy is bigger than India's now. So I give them time. But that triangle, that real triangle of Russia, India, China, resources, energy, people, manufacturing, digitalization of industry and everything. Look, I mean, that's logs on a fire. That's the future right there. And ASEAN is a really important part of that.

Well, let's hope India plays sort of its strategic cards the right way. That's all I will hope for them.

It's got 7.6 GDP growth. There's no way they want to threaten that. There's no way they want to upset that at all. Can't happen because their population is exploding. I mean, they're still growing in terms of population. How are they going to feed all these people?

Feed all that. Yeah. And given the infrastructure and so forth. So I wanted to have your take on, or your insights rather, about the recent, which was it, like what, few weeks ago, I guess, the Chinese Premier Li Qiang visit to Australia, you know, after he visited Malaysia. I'd like to have your insight, Digby, about, you know, where do you see that relationship going? I mean, we all know about the tensions between Australia and China, by which Australia is paying a heavy price, even though the government in Canberra is not coming forward with the truth.

Okay. Yeah. So it's a double game, isn't it? I mean, that's the typical— well, it's very Anglo-American society culturally and everything else. They talk about multiculturalism, but basically it's all sort of Anglo-American in real terms. The Americans basically control the Australian economy in terms of— they always say, for example, America's number one in FDI, and that's reinvested. That's not new money, that's reinvested profits. Tells you that the Americans have the largest controlling interest in the mining industry, in the services industry, in retail, all that stuff, right? So they make it look like China is the biggest trading partner with Australia and it's all about iron ore. Sure, commodities, but who owns those mining companies, right? So it's who controls that, and that's the Americans. So the Americans have a really sort of pretty strong control over the Australian economy. All the former Australian politicians work for Northrop or some defense industry company in America. I mean, that's not always true. I don't want to overgeneralize, but there's definitely that kind of a current going on. The Americans have an outside influence in Canberra, and that relates to defense as well. But then the government, especially the Labor governments, have a much softer— historically, since the 1950s, since Gough Whitlam in the 1950s, they've always been softer towards Asia. They've always seen Asia as the future no matter what. And the biggest problem to overcome was the multicultural thing, getting used to the idea that Asians would be part of Australia's makeup. That was a real problem for a long time. The White Australia policy, all of that. There's a real residue of racism still available there somewhere. And then there's all those cultural contacts plus economic contacts with the US and an emotional, nostalgic, empirical empire sort of attachment to the UK. Because remember, King Charles is still the King of Australia. There's a reason the Union Jack on our flag, right? Yeah. Okay. But as an international relations scholar, I just say, okay, it anchors the political system, and that's okay. Yeah, it anchors the system. It's really not that important in terms of— but so, yeah, so they want to have the soft opening to Asia, and that's happened again. I mean, here in Cambodia, the Australians are very active, have a new ambassador. They're being more active in China. They're more active everywhere. Australia's biggest problem, of course, is that it doesn't have investment funds in a big way. Does have some investment into Southeast Asia and China and so forth, but it's never big, not in real terms. So they make lots of noises about wanting to be partners with ASEAN and doing investment and whatever else. But basically Australia is selling services. It's selling commodities and services, and that's where it makes its money. But manufacturing and all that sort of stuff is very limited, of course, that sort of stuff. Industrial, not in no real way. And that tells you why the relationship about the nuclear submarines and AUKUS has been so important. It's not so much about the subs. The Americans get to base their subs in Australia. That's short-term, definitely what the Americans wanted, and that's what they got. And, but the nuclear thing is more about the Americans selling and supporting nuclear upgrading for their allies in Asia Pacific. So they're upgrading and trying to sell nuclear power to Australia. And that's— you see that the Liberal government, the Liberals in opposition have been saying, we need nuclear power, we need nuclear power. And that's what they're doing. They're saying, okay, we're going to use American technology. But remember, the Americans haven't built a nuclear plant for 3 decades or something. Best nuclear technology in the world is in Russia and China. And that's true. They did this nuclear deal with the Philippines, right?

Yeah.

The Americans are trying to sell in nuclear power all across Asia because they think they can make money out of it. And they've used the subs as a kind of a way to open that up. So what they call technical upgrading, right? Nuclear upgrading, capacity upgrading, but also locking them into contracts, long, very long-term contracts. And this tells you about the supply chains, right? This is the Americans trying to fix their perimeter for their supply chains where they think they can be strong. But remember, this is a very funny thing, that the Americans just waived one of their sanctions with the Russians so that an American nuclear company can buy Russian uranium.

Uranium.

Yeah.

Right.

Why don't they buy Australian uranium? Indians.

Yeah.

So, look, Australia's got those two things. Look, its export market is not the US, right? Its export market is RCEP in the biggest possible way. And they've signed another deal with the UK and with France and everything. But it's so small. The reality is that Australia's future in terms of any kind of economic, real economic action is into Asia. Possibly you could think about it as a kind of a shadow American way to get into the Asian economies. Basically, that's what they're trying to do. They're trying to set up the perimeter as a military perimeter. And within that is supply chains that are decoupled from China and where they can then try and access all of the Asian markets with American standards, rules. In Australia, Australia are part of that. The Philippines is part of that. That's the geo-economical approach, right? So I think that's what's really going on. Nuclear is a leading edge for that, for power, right? Renewable energy, it's a big thing, right? I think that's the way that's that real balance there. And then the security issue for Australia, come on, they're really half— I mean, what are they going to do? What? I mean, they're basing out of Darwin. They're basing out of Western Australia for the subs, the American, American B-52s, American Marines. Right. But, and maybe the Australians are paying some money for that as well. A lot of money for that. But Australia, at the end of the day, it's still a long way away. And I think they're not going to get directly involved in all of this and not directly. They have to just be one ship in the flotilla, if you know what I mean. But when push comes to shove, I don't see that they're going to do— no, no. RCEP is much more important to Australia, and ultimately it's going to be more important to the American companies that control the Australian economy. They don't want to destroy that. They don't want to destroy that.

Well, I tell you, as one who works inside the government, so And I was on those sides of the sensitive aspects of it. I tell you, we don't— I ain't gonna share anything with any country whatsoever. Even I used to have it in the military, even for the training, even the training itself. You know, I was involved in training some foreign forces and so forth. There is a cap where you can train on certain aspects of it because that training stays in the US. We do the same for this nuclear stuff and And, and to me, I look at it just with the example, Digby, of the, uh, of Pine Gap. Why? In Pine Gap, there is one section there that is off-limits to Australian nationals, even with the TSCI or even the other two levels above top secret. They can't get in there. Yeah, it's just the way they— the way it works.

Yeah, yeah. But Pascal Lottes, um, and his, you know, neutrality studies yesterday, he said to me that if you look closely at the Japanese-Korean arrangement with the Americans, the Japanese, what they wanted was a unified— they wanted a single point or a single contact point or coordination office in their coordination of security relations with the Americans. And whereas the Americans have got a diversified— so Okinawa, Tokyo, this command, that command. And so the Japanese found this all very confusing. And so the Americans have promised to put in a 4-star general to kind of coordinate all of that. But yeah, it seems to me that there's— what I'm trying to say is, on your point here, is that loss of sovereignty, right? Oh, control over assets based on your own territory. So the Australians don't have any control over those submarines, Pine Gap. Maybe the B-52s. Do they have nuclear weapons? Well, they're definitely capable, right? And so that's the kind of ambiguous arrangement, you know, because Australia's policy is to not have nuclear weapons— non-proliferation, right? So yeah, Pacific Islands, they don't like it, they don't want it, you know. Fukushima, hello. Uh, nobody wants that. Yeah, so nuclear, okay, but nuclear power, civilian nuclear power, okay. But using it to secretly kind of develop a capacity for nuclear weapons.

You're right. And that's usually how we do it.

So yeah, yeah, that's a deep—

yeah, yeah, that's a nice version. What was it, Digby?

No, I was just going to say that, um, I, I, you know, I definitely am not a fan of new, you know, proliferation of No, no, no, nobody is. I think the new nuclear reactors are okay. I mean, especially China's got these new non-meltdown pebble-based nuclear reactors. China has the best safety record in nuclear. I mean, if nuclear security— China is actually number one in the world. If you want the safest nuclear reactors, you want a Chinese one. But the Russians have also got fabulous nuclear tech. The French are still pretty good at that stuff. I think the American stuff is not tested in real terms. They haven't built any nuclear for a long time. It really worries me. And look at Boeing. Look what they got. They got cosmonauts. I'm going to call them cosmonauts, not astronauts. They've got stuck in the space station because Boeing rockets are not working. Oh, whoops. Do you really want to let them go to Three Mile Island again? I don't know.

No, I went to school around that area later on, but it wasn't— I had to get out. The Three Mile Island wasn't a good one. So let me get your take on one more final topic before I turn it over to the community for some questions. You guys, just please prepare your questions. I'm going to just tackle one last topic with Dick here because I like to have his insights on it. Then we'll move on into the— I'm gonna give him the floor, of course, for last word here. So what I want to ask you, Digby, is about the role of Philippines. We can't ignore Asia without— or we can't talk about Asia without talking about the, the, the wrong path. And I use this one, the wrong path Philippines has been embarking on since Marcos Jr. came to power. So Where do you see this is going? And if it is the case, which we all know it's going the wrong direction, is Philippines the weak link inside ASEAN?

Yeah, well, it's just islands, right? Look, Philippines is always the underperformer. I mean, it should be doing a lot better. Its education system has improved a lot. They have 100 million people. They've got lots of resources, generally speaking. They've got access to trade networks, all that sort of stuff, but they always underperform. And I think this has really got to do with the fact that their internal political situation is always subject to Washington in some way. And although Duterte got in and was more China-friendly, The American— what can we say? The American shadow in the Philippines is very deep and very long. They basically went in there at the end of the 19th century under William McKinley and then with Theodore Roosevelt. American Empire, right? The bloodiest, one of the bloodiest, most horrible colonial wars. The Americans killed about 2 million Filipinos. They invented waterboarding in the Philippines, should be remembered, torture and everything else. And that was Douglas MacArthur's father. That tells you that sort of linkage, right? And then Douglas MacArthur saying, I'll be back, World War II and the Japanese and all that was the fact that he'd been there because his father was the general in charge of the war. Against the Filipinos, right? But the Americans have been in there and they're going to stay in there and they've got that Defense Forces Treaty. But what's going on here is the Marcos family. I mean, we know that there's this family politics in Asia. I mean, that's really clear to everyone. So the Marcos family is back in the top end. They've kind of regained— they've used all their resources, American money and organizational skills, and all that sort of stuff to regain power. And so what are they doing with it? Well, they're taking short-term solutions. Lloyd Austin is flying into the Philippines, or just is in the Philippines today or yesterday. $500 million. This is very hand-to-mouth, very short-term stuff. So they're getting influxes of cash capital, if you like, from the Americans, but they're not building factories or roads or anything like that. Building anything that's going to sustain their economy. They're just building bases, which actually is a cost structure, right? Philippines economy has got high inflation. Look, a little manipulation that just happened. So ASEAN meeting, sorry, an accommodation with the Chinese over ending the Second Thomas Shoal thing, right? Letting them resupply, uh, uh, Jialuer Reef. Okay, they came to that, but that was just 2 days before Marcos' State of the Nation address, right? So we got a little respite, a little plus with making him look good for 5 minutes while he made the speech. And then immediately following the speech, bingo. Oh, yeah. Now we're going to get $500 million from the Americans for upgrading military infrastructure. So straight back to the old playbook. And the Chinese kind of, okay, okay, fine, we'll take it, we'll take it, we'll let you have that. But what's happened, the Philippines is the underperformer in ASEAN. I think it can't escape ASEAN. There's no way for it to kind of, I don't think it's going to withdraw or anything. But the Americans are using the Philippines and Myanmar as a means of trying to create a wedge in ASEAN. Instead of Asian centrality, what they want is US centrality in Asia. That's their objective. And that's what their objective was in Europe. And they achieved that. And that's what caused the Ukraine war. They effectively broke the political back of the Europeans for strategic autonomy. Brexit, hobbled the French presidency legislative process. They broke up the German into a three-party alliance, which is very weak, and the Greens suddenly became warmongers, which is really weird. And that's what they're going to— they're trying the same playbook in Asia. They want to have a US centrality in Asia, and they're thinking Philippines, Singapore, break up Myanmar, create lots of problems in Myanmar, and eventually maybe Vietnam. Maybe they can swing it with the maritime states. And they get US centrality in Asia. But I don't think it's going to work. I think that's a losing proposition. But the Philippines is always the flip-flop, flip-flop. But then their economy suffers. And so clearly the Marcos family is going to get kicked out of power again because they've got high inflation, problems with employment. And remember that remittances, the money that comes back from workers. So there are so many Filipinos working on worker visas all over the world, cleaning hospitals or looking after wealthy families or whatever it is that they— but there's a lot of them, like millions of them. All that money they send back to the Philippines is actually the largest source of foreign income, is actually from remittances. And that's drying up because everybody else is stopping immigration and doing all of that. They want to have full employment, but the way to do that is stop immigration. So, yes, lots of Filipinos are coming back to the Philippines, and so that remittances, they've been dropping. So now how are they going to replace that? And power supply, if you look at this, World Bank just released a report. So power supply to households in the Philippines has just dropped. Which is really sort of a strange thing. And I think that's got to do with they can't buy, they don't have enough foreign currency to buy the oil. So they've had to reduce oil inputs. So there's lots of problems with the Philippine economy. It's always underperforming. The solution is clear. That's just go straight into ASEAN full bore and deal with the RCEP format, go with that. The Americans are still so strong there. They have so much influence and they're going to try and disturb that relationship. But I can see a return to another family dynasty, another family. I'm not sure which one. Duterte coming back. Yeah. Look, the Marcos, you know where it went last time. You're right. Yeah. Would the Americans condone the idea of upsetting the Philippines to that extent, I'm not sure that that's going to be possible anymore. So yeah, it's one to watch. The Philippines is to watch. But I think they definitely did not get anything out of this Second Thomas Shoal idea supported by the US to change the status quo. The Chinese showed them they have the capability to stop that, and they did it with you know, Coast Guard and water cannons, not artillery and, you know, big guns and missiles. They didn't have to do that. All they had to do was put the Coast Guard down there and say, status quo, don't change it, right? So the Chinese are not trying to expand their territory. They're just saying, we want the status quo. Questions about the Nine-Dash Line and everything still exist. But what they were saying was, we can't allow the US to push the Philippines to trying to change the status quo and then blaming China for it.

Yeah, it won't happen. Yeah, I found it very interesting. I found it very interesting that Vietnam, uh, manages its differences with China through dialogue, quietly, quietly. We don't hear much about it.

Yeah, and one has to remember Yeah, it's Vietnam that has really done the most in terms of reclamation of shoals and things like that, building islands and military. They've done it. They started it. They were the first to do it and they've been doing that for a long time. And that's been very— nobody talks about that. Look, I think the ASEAN network, they're going to figure it all out eventually. But the Philippines is vulnerable to US disturbance, influence. And that's what we see. But look, I think that the Chinese and the others didn't get involved. You see that they really didn't get involved. Vietnam, as you say, Malaysia, they all— no, no, no, we don't want to know about this. Let's just let the Chinese and the Philippines figure it out. And the Chinese said, okay, look, you're not changing the status quo. And that's where we're back to right now. Status quo. It has not changed. So this is like that whole year of tensions. What? Yeah, just sold.

Yeah, didn't amount to anything, basically. So that's—

it hasn't amounted to anything. And the Philippine economy has not improved. I mean, basically it didn't help their economy. So, you know, what, so they're getting handouts from the US now, $500 million handouts, inducements.

Yeah, which is a drop in the bucket. So I do believe at the end, I do believe that regardless of Philippines, whatever, but I do believe that ASEAN countries, as a geopolitical analyst, I'll be thinking in terms, you know what, Digby, that they're going to have to unify their message and send it back to the US by saying, we don't want any trouble in this part of the world. Leave us alone.

That is their message. I think that really is their message. Maybe they're not transmitting that message really clearly, but because it's a large grouping. Yeah, but ASEAN is definitely the trend, no doubt about it. And yeah, maybe you're right about that. That message needs to be made more clearly, and maybe it will be because of this Malaysia and BRICS+. There's a bright light right there on the Gulf of Thailand now. I think the ties are going to come from— I think this is the key here, is the Gulf of Thailand, Malaysia, Cambodia, Thailand. If they can get that triangulation done properly, then there's a possible solution for Myanmar. Because you have to remember that the rapporteur, the UN rapporteur, his report said there was $176 million worth of guns went through Thailand into Myanmar. Now, they're not going to the government. The government can buy guns from India and China and Russia, whoever they want to. They don't have to do this. It's the rebel forces that are buying these guns. And the question is, How are they paying for it? And it reminds me of Iran. I would just say it's like Iran.

Yeah. Or I'm sure you're familiar with the Fast and Furious operation that was right here on the border.

Yeah, absolutely.

That's exactly what it was. So the government said, all right, Digby, by the way, guys, just prepare a question. I'm going to give a last word for Digby here. Just to wrap up everything here. And but before you do that, Digby, please, can you tell my community where they can find you?

Yeah, you can find me on Substack, mostly on Substack. The leading one is called Long Mekong.

That's the first one.

Substack. Oh, that's the chair. So that's my kind of personal one. It's everything that I do, like being on your show. That sort of thing, everything related to speeches and all those sorts of things that I do. Do a lot of radio and TV and stuff and write a lot. So that's all available on the Chair on Substack. But I also have the Long Mekong, and I do another one called Small State Diplomacy. And look at global problems in global polarity. They're all on Substack and they're all sort of specific areas of IR. Because after all, I'm a professor and so I have students and things like that, and that gives them a way to publish their thoughts, which is really interesting. And then all the regular Twitter things, handles follow from there. But yeah, just go to the Substack, The Chair or Long Mekong and you'll find all of it there.

And I do follow you on Twitter. So you guys, if you want to check out Digby on Twitter, just follow him.

Yeah, it's the same, same handle for all of them really.

Actually, I have this one here, Digby. I put it— by the way guys, I put it in the description, but I'm gonna share it on the screen right here, uh, with you. Or I put it on the— yeah, if I, if I may do this quickly here, Digby, just because I wanted the community to see it with their own eyes. Right there, this is yours, right? Yeah. Yeah, so you got—

so that's— I have all related, yeah, to, you know, 6 countries in the Mekong.

Yeah, great. I have everything, guys. I have all the links to Digby Substack, all of them in the description, along with his Twitter handle, which is @dgdb365. So just check it out later on.

So every day, all right, let's—

let me take some questions from my community here. But first, I'd like to say thank you to Darren Arnie. Thank you very much for your Super Sticker, man. Truly appreciate you. Your words— thank you, Dr. O, for reporting on ASEAN in the Pacific areas regarding China relations. We rarely hear about this area. I give credit to Digby, you know. I don't take credit. I give credit where credit is due. So credit to Digby. Thank you so much, Darren. Truly appreciate you. Uh, another one is Speaking the Truth, an avid supporter of the channel. Thank you so much for your, uh, uh, Super Sticker. Appreciate it.

Thanks.

And I have a question here from Farhad Razavi, another avid supporter of the channel. Question: Is there any serious relationship between Russia and Cambodia?

Yeah, well, there, there's a relationship, definitely. And historically, I think there's always been a, a relationship. The Russians have been here for a long time and Cambodia talks with them regularly. But in terms of economics, it's very limited. There was a lot of Russian investment maybe 5, 6, 7 years ago before the pandemic. There was quite a big influx of Russian money, specifically into tourism. There was a lot in tourism, but in terms of supply chain components, food, agriculture and things like that, very limited. There are small amounts of food and so forth going, agricultural products, very small. But I think the area for growth is things related to river transportation. In fact, I've spoken about this. The Russians have enormous capacity historically for knowing how to do the best sort of things in terms of river transportation networks. Logistics and all that sort of stuff. I think there's an opening there for them here in Cambodia. I'd like to see that happen. I think there is more that can be done in agriculture and so forth. And the Russians have really great technology. I would like to see them helping us much more in relation to education, in the very technical, you know, aerospace, for example. That would be great, you know, satellites, technologies, all that sort of stuff. But I don't think they want to, you know, they don't want to compete with the directly with the Chinese in, you know, the new relationship between Russia and China. I don't think they want to set up any competition with the Chinese. They don't want to be competing against the Chinese. They want to take the space where, you know, they're— where there is space for them. And I can see that in the river networks. They can definitely help there. They can definitely help with their agricultural production. They're very good at that. The sciences, great sciences. I would like to see all of that happening. I think aerospace could be helpful too. There's probably some I haven't thought about, but yeah, it could definitely grow. But it's a very low base, the interaction between them. And in terms of geopolitics, I think Cambodia is neutral. Cambodia's policy is neutrality. Its largest trading partner is the US. Number 2 is the EU. Number 3 is China. And then all of the ASEAN networks. Russia is very small in this. So yeah, maybe energy. There could be something going on with energy and refineries. Who knows? Maybe there. It's got somewhere to go, definitely. And then in terms of multilateral forums, so the BRICS and all that sort of thing, I think there's a trend to that anyway. So that relationship is friendly. It's always been friendly as far as I can tell, and it's going to remain that way. But yeah, look, in terms of economics to support that whole thing, that's yet to be developed properly. But I think this Malaysia thing, Malaysia in BRICS is going to be really helpful. Really, really very, very helpful.

Yeah, good player. My last question here from Doggy Five. Good to see you. Which way do you think Singapore will swing in the US-China geopolitical contest?

Great question. Singapore has got one of the most strategic locations on the planet. Confucian hierarchical political structure. Look, nothing's going to change with Singapore there. They are going to just remain where they are because it's so small. And what matters to Singapore is being a node, a hub in the global networks. And as far as Singapore is concerned, they don't care which plane is coming from where, which ship is coming from where. They really don't care about that. What they care about is making sure they stop in Singapore and they're part of ASEAN. They know that there's no escape, so they're going to stay like that and swing pro. No, they're going to remain always balanced and hedged between the two. That's basically their function, to remain as a hub, because that's what they are. They're a hub. Singapore is not going to turn into some economic giant or anything. They can't. They can't.

Yeah.

And I think you'll see that Singapore's importance has always been because they had this very kind of— Singapore was a highly educated population, all spoke English very well. And so they've been able— For example, Kishore Mahbubani is a great spokesperson, right? The former foreign minister, George Foreman or George something.

George Yao.

Yeah, that's it. Sorry. He's great, argues very well, very moderated. So look, that's their kind of style. They're going to stay there, but their actual importance in terms of As a financial hub and as a transport hub and everything, I think that will remain. But they're going to have more and more kind of, what should we say, just like Kuala Lumpur as a hub, right? Sihanoukville in Cambodia as a hub. Indonesia, Malaysia is building another port nearby. I think Singapore is going to have to share more than they have in the past. I think that's true.. And I can see that Singapore is using its surplus to invest around the region strategically in logistics. And so, yeah, that's what they're doing. They know that they've invested into Australia, they've invested everywhere they can. Look, I don't think they're going to be switching. They're just going to keep staying in the middle and hedging. Both ways. Yeah, it's in their interest to do that.

Well, that's the best strategic position to be in. So, well, they'd be absolutely— yeah, I can't thank you enough, man, for carving out time for us here.

So, and I know it's too early for time for the show.

Yeah, next time let's do it again. So we'll have you back here again. I'm sure the community will want to They're going to be putting a lot of comments later on because I do respond to all the comments. Should you ever decide to look me up, and I'll send you the link directly to you, you can have it there. And I look forward to seeing you again.

Once again, your community is so active. That's what I really like about it.

They are.

Yeah. And then what's great is that I learn a lot from them. About what they're thinking about and what's important to them and how they look at it. And I think that informs what we do too. So that's great. I love the feedback. I think it's really important.

That's the way I always look at it, Digby. As an educator, you look at it both directions. It goes both ways. I'm here. I learn from them as well as they learn from me. Well, thank you again, Digby. Truly appreciate you, man. And I look forward to seeing you again. All right, take care.

Bye-bye. Bye-bye.

All right guys, I hope you find this conversation here with Big B very, very interesting, and I'm sure that you've learned some stuff. I learned some stuff from, from this. Like I always say, guys, when I bring a guest here, it's something that you will learn from, because that's to me the responsibility of not only bringing a guest because he or she is giving us his or her time but also for you to learn something that is worth your time sitting here and listening for an hour plus minutes to absorb the knowledge, whatever that might be. So, so, as I always say— by the way, remember to join me tomorrow at 12:15. I will be talking about Malaysia and BRICS in more detail. I'll provide you my own analysis, how I see it, a frog looking from outside in. And as always, remember Geopolitics impacts your daily life in more ways than one. Till next time, guys. Bye-bye.