US Tensions w/China Cross a New Line! What’s Next? Conversation w/Carl Zha! Part1

All right, hello everybody and welcome to Geopolitical Trends, where truth matters. I have an exciting, exciting show for you tonight because I have a great guest that you guys been asking me for over 4 months to get him on the show, and my answer to you was he will be here in due time because the man is busy and you all know how it is. So So the guest is here and I am going to bring him in, none other than Carl Zaha. Here he is. Hi, Carl.

Hi, David. Thank you for inviting me.

Of course, you are most welcome. And I couldn't wait for the conversation to have this with you. I'm not going to waste any time because I want to pick your brain on a host of issues that I believe as geopolitical analyst, I am very concerned as to where things are moving forward, given the rhetoric that is coming out of Washington vis-à-vis China. And this is one of the first topic I'd like to talk to you about, is I'd like to get your assessments as to where do you see the US-China relations in light of the US growing military presence in the region going forward?

Well, the US militarization of the Western Pacific around the Chinese coast. This is nothing new. This has happened since, uh, World War II. I mean, since, since, especially since 1949, the founding of the People's Republic. And what we— I, I like to put it into a historical context because, um, if you look at the Vietnam War era, during that time, the entire South China Sea was actually American Lake. You know, you got the US Air Force, uh, base in Clark Air Base in the Philippines, the Subic Naval Base in the Philippines, and the US have the naval base in, in South Vietnam, and it has base all over Vietnam. It has bases in, in neighboring Thailand, etc., etc. So compare— and it has the so-called Yankee Station and Dixie Station, which are these two aircraft carrier groups that were permanently stationed in the air in the South China Sea. So allow the US aircraft to, to carry out bombing of Ho Chi Minh Trail and North Vietnam. So compared to 1970s, right now US has actually been in retrenchment, um, after the end of the Cold War. US got kicked out of— well, US got kicked out Vietnam, and then US got kicked out of the Philippines. But because the Philippine Parliament voted to not extend the lease on the Clark Air Base and the Subic Naval Base. So what United States is trying to do right now, they're trying to sneak back into Asia, you know, especially in the Philippines right now. They're under the guise of the China threat, they're trying to come back to the Philippines. So they're trying to reignite the Cold War 2.0 and But, but US is having its hands full at the moment because as we all know, US is carrying on a proxy war in Ukraine against Russia, which I think US had bite more than you could chew. And, and at the same time, now with the Middle East conflict breaking out, uh, US had to full-heartedly support Israeli atrocities in Gaza, and, and that led to the US intervention in Yemen to try to break the Ansar Allah-imposed blockade on the Red Sea traffic. So the US empire is overstretched. I mean, as much it wants to pivot back to Asia to confront China, which is one of its top priorities of the military-industrial complex, uh, it's a case of the spirit is willing but the flesh is weak. The US just doesn't— it's spread too thin. And, and let's face it, right now Israel demands all the attention because Israel has always been the US golden boy, you know. Ukraine and Taiwan, I'm sorry, you guys have to take a back seat, you know, take a number, go back in the line, because everything is going to, to Israel right now. And, and as we know, the US bombing campaign in Yemen has been very ineffective. That's not lifting the blockade on on the Red Sea. I mean, Ansar Allah is effectively a world naval power at the moment because they're redirecting 11% of the world traffic, of the shipping traffic, away from the Red Sea through Suez Canal to around the Cape of Africa. Oh, except they're not attacking the Chinese and Russian shipping, you know, like that's why all the ships are going through Red Sea now. They're putting on the call sign Oh, it's full Chinese crew, or we're going to deliver to China, or, or this China-owned ship. So I mean, even like that, that British ship that was attacked earlier, they're trying to falsely depict themselves as a China-owned, uh, owned ship. Of course, who— the NCR had better intelligence, they knew it was not. They hit it anyway. So, so, and, and that— this is why you are seeing like Bloomberg articles about how China enjoys the unfair fair discount over their shipping insurance through Red Sea. I mean, like, duh, just like, no, don't support genocide, do not support Israeli atrocity in Gaza. That's, that's the whole purpose of the Red Sea blockade. But yet US cannot do that. Not only US cannot do that, but right now US cannot even get its own, um, United States Defense Department commissioned ships, probably carrying weapons and munition for Israel, to to go through the Red Sea. They just got turned back by the Ansarullah missile barrage. So, so yes, U.S. do want to confront China. U.S. do want to create tension, uh, all along the periphery around China in the so-called First Island Chain. This is an area, that island chain that stretched from Japan down to Okinawa, uh, through the Philippines, all through South China Sea.

But No, believe it. But speaking of Philippines, well, sorry to interrupt here because before I forget that, speaking of Philippines, now if we are to say that the Philippines— because I remember, uh, right after Marcos Jr. took over, his first trip was to where? To Beijing, right? And came back and signed the military agreement with the US to expand about 9 bases. I'm aware of 4 that they have not been disclosed. Okay, the question becomes, is, is the Philippines playing both sides and why?

So the, the right now, I think Philippines is not playing both sides. Now they have— I think what happened is after Marcos' trip to Beijing, you know, he immediately later he went to Washington and Uncle Sam made him an offer he couldn't refuse. You know, like, you see, think of US as a mafia. You think US government as a mafia, everything makes sense. Everything makes sense. You know, this is— they made him an offer he couldn't refuse. And, and right now they're basically spurring all the— they're reversing the, the, the policy of Duterte, his predecessor. During Duterte, like, now, now you hear, oh, China posed a threat to the Philippines in the South China Sea. Now, you— like, you— that wasn't the case when Duterte was president because Duterte was having a, uh, having a conciliatory approach with China. He was mostly against US imperialism in his own country. That's why US didn't like him. And, and, and that— at that time, mostly the China-Philippines relationship was good, and China was pouring a lot of investment to, uh, to build infrastructures, you know, to do Belt and Road, uh, projects. But now with Marcos accepting Washington deal, they're now rolling back a lot of the Chinese investment in the country and to replace with what? With United States bases. U.S., U.S. Marines coming back, U.S. Navy is coming back, U.S. Special Forces are coming back, um Well, I mean, you know, Philip, I know this, the Philippines, they, they, they, they elect their own leaders. It's a democracy. It's a democracy. So, so, you know, I think, um, you know, they, they, they have to live with the, the, the consequences of their actions. I mean, which just means less Chinese investment. Let's face it, United States is not going to be able to match China in terms of economic development in Southeast Asia. I mean, the The amount of US— the amount of US dollars that US invests in Southeast Asia economies has been dwarfed by the Chinese investment into Southeast Asia. Where I am right now in Indonesia, we just had a— we just— Indonesia just completed this first high-speed rail, uh, from Jakarta to Bandung, and it was built by the Chinese. And, and it's—

I heard about it.

Yeah, it's traveling at 350 kilometers per hour, something that US will probably not see for a long time. And, and, and this is Indonesia. Indonesia is having a high-speed rail, a legitimate high-speed rail, before United States, right? I mean, this is what China can do for countries. Yet, um, the Philippines, they're, they're deciding to make their, um, bet with the US right now. You know, we'll see how that works out for them. But I, I'd like to remind people, Philippines, um, despite have not experiencing a war since World War II— the Philippines has not had a major war since World War II— compare Philip economy of Philippines and Vietnam. Vietnam experienced a very, uh, very brutal, uh, war, a war of liberation against the colonial power France and United States. And, and Vietnam was desperately poor in the 1975 when, when the war ended. And, and but compared today, Vietnam and the Philippines— Vietnam per capita, uh, GDP per capita is overtaking the Philippines. And it's, it's just the, the gap is going to grow. And because, you know, Philippines right now, it's, its economy is depending on exporting labor to the rest of the world. Vietnam, they actually have countries investing and building not only infrastructure but factories. A lot of the Chinese factories are now being outsourced to Vietnam. So this is a difference. Look at— because Philippines, for, you know, it has been a US colony for, for, uh, for a long time. And, and even after it reached independence, Philippines was still largely a US vassal state ruled by a very small clique of oligarchs who, who do US biddings. And, and, you know, you can see the result. I mean, like, the, the biggest contrast is just look at Philippines and Vietnam. Vietnam has much more better prospect than Philippines despite having just pulled itself out of a very brutal war.

So yeah, interesting, interesting. For those who might be just joining us right now, I'm having a conversation here with Karlza directly from Indonesia where he's at. So, uh, to follow up on the point you mentioned about the presence of military, I have a picture here, uh, that I'd like to share with our viewers. This one has to do with the location as to where the US Special Forces are. Those are Green Beret, if I'm not mistaken. And this is closer to the Chinese border. So the question that comes to mind is, what are we doing there and what for?

Well, I mean, well, they're, they're not there to stop the People's Liberation Army from landing because, you know, whatever, like, the few dozen Green Berets is not going to do shit. I'm sorry, can't swear. They're not— they won't even be able to do crap. But what they do serve, yeah, is they're serving as the so-called tripwire. There's a so-called tripwire forces by, by placing— have physical presence of US personnel there. So if there a conflict does break out and US say, oh, our, our troops are in danger, support our troops, you know, they killed our troops, or they hold troops hostage, that's a way for to bring United States into a full war. That is their purpose. And, you know, the other purpose is gathering intelligence. But I mean, come on, I, I don't know what kind of intelligence they can gather. People can look up the, the, the, uh, Kinmen Island on Google and look at the view of Kinmen Island. It's like you can see the, the city of Xiamen, which is one of the major Chinese seaports, just across the waters. And, and Kinmen is relatively undeveloped, you know, in comparison. So I, I like to joke, you know, what are these Green Berets gonna do? They're gonna sit there stuck in this tiny island and look at the amazing Chinese cityscape just across the water, which they cannot go because, because of their, their deployment, their military deployment on the island. And, and, and, you know, that, that's the only thing they're gonna do. But, but, but the— it's designed to be provocative. U.S. is trying to lay a bait.

Yeah.

Or China. You know, you see Anglo media, they always try to predict something disastrous was going to happen. Back in 2019 during Hong Kong protest, for example, every— a lot of the pundits were saying, oh, it's going to be Tiananmen 2.0, the People's Liberation Army tanks is going to roll down the street of Hong Kong. I mean, that's— anyone who knew what's going on in Hong Kong, in China, knew that's bullshit. A lot of people in the West genuinely believed it because they really want something bad to happen to China because they knew US itself is facing a lot of trouble. And so as a sort of hopian and copian, they wish something equally bad could happen to China. They can at least feel better about themselves. And I think this is a case where, um, you know, a lot of Anglo media were kind of very giddy, almost giddy about a potential war breaking out over Taiwan for the last several years. And they're talking about, oh, the election, Taiwan election might trigger a Chinese response, which is, which is preposterous. And because China has time on its side, China, Chinese— China's strength is still growing. You know, they talk about slowing China's economy and, and booming US economy, but if you look at the numbers, US economy—

it's a lie.

Yeah, US economy—

even the US, our economy, our economy is not doing well. He's not doing well.

Well, I mean, they look at the numbers. The US is doing like 2.5, uh, percent annual growth. They were like, oh my God, Biden is amazing, right? He saved US. He's putting on the US on the back, on the path of the growth. And the, the Chinese growth number is 5.3%. So they say, no, China, China's growth slowing down. China is declining. China is going to collapse. You think about it. Wait, wait, China's economy just grow twice as fast as United States, and you're celebrating a great victory of 2.5% growth, whereas China literally just registered a growth that's double that of United States economy. So, but there's a lot of coping and coping about China. I mean, this is what the newspaper, you know, they try to sell to their audience. Um, but, but U.S. also want to increase attention in the Taiwan Strait, in the Philippines, in the South China Sea, so they can justify to ship, to deploy more U.S. military assets all along the regions. I mean, the increasing tensions helps the military-industrial conflict. It helps US to sell more weapons, sell more weapons to, uh, Taiwan. US just— Congress just approved what, like a $95 billion, uh, uh, uh, budget to, to supply Ukraine, Israel, and Taiwan. So like, okay, 117.

Yes, 117. I was shocked. Even for that, part of it was Taiwan.

What for? Exactly. Is there a conflict in Tai— is there a war in Taiwan right now? I mean, like, like, okay, Israel, okay, we know US will support Israel no matter what. Okay, Ukraine, there's actually a, a, a, a conflict going on right now. There's no conflict in Taiwan, so what the hell are they doing? I mean, this is just a way to funnel money to the defense industries. I mean, I mean, right now US has deindustrialized so much, only thing they can do is military Keynesianism, is just to continually pile money to give it to the defense industries, because that's the only thing US is producing domestically at the moment, just weapons. It's, it's sad, but that's, that's, it's a state of affair.

Let alone that, if you think about it, as a former military myself, uh, we are not in a position to fight two-front wars because we couldn't even win one, let alone fighting two. And second question, a second part of it is that China's of today is not of China's of 30 years ago. Things have changed drastically, and this is why I don't understand even One who is here and I spend my time in DC and all that didn't get it. Why aren't they getting it that you cannot be creating tensions or fomenting more tensions with China and thinking things gonna work out for you? It won't.

Well, I mean, I think there is a lot of US conceit. There's, uh, you know, there's a lot of hubris in Washington, especially with the end of Cold War. And this is why when, uh, after the Cold War, when Russia wanted to be— actually wanted to join the West, that you— that they decide, no, we're gonna expand, they use the opportunity to weaken Russia further to expand NATO eastwards, which led to the current Ukraine conflict. I mean, it's the same mentality, but this also extends to— I mean, that, that same mentality extends to China. U.S. is so used to be number one. Now it worries its number one status has been challenged by China. So it's doing whatever— it, it, it think everything is justified as long as keep US in the top spot, which means they have to contain China, which is kind of fool's errand because, uh, you know, how do you do that? How, how, how do you contain China? China is well integrated into the world economy right now. I mean, if you look at the China is literally the world's factory. You, you, you, you blockade China, you sanction China, you're sanctioning yourself. I mean, like, like the, the, the— you don't have to even have to blockade the Chinese port. The, the Chinese goods just don't have to leave to head to come to California, you know. And then, then you're going to have a, have a major crisis go on, on hand. But, but, but a lot of the people in Washington, I think they are One, they're shortsighted because they all care about is fearmongering to get votes and also to, to please their financial donors, which is a lot of these, uh, weapon manufacturers. So I mean, they're not thinking long term, like 5, 10 years, you know. That's beyond anything beyond the election cycle is not something they, they, they, they actively think about. This is a difference between China and the United States, by the way, because China, they have 5-year plans, right? They have multiple 5-year plans. They plan ahead for the future. That's why they're able to build this amazing, uh, infrastructure across the country. In U.S., everything is short-term. They look— it's like, uh, because U.S. is run by Wall Street, right? So, you know, Wall Street type, they just look at the quarterly profits, they look at the stock price, the quarterly reports. So everything is geared to the short-term. I mean, this is the fundamental difference. Between the two systems.

Yeah. Now, how come, how come, based on what you said, which makes perfect sense, you know, I, I can second, I second that, how come countries in the region, the likes of Japan, the likes of South Korea, and I will even include two other, Australia and India, why are they allowing themselves to be used? Because we are opening more logistical hubs in those countries. So how come they are trading with China but at the same time they're allowing this? What's the rationale for that, right?

Because, you know, U.S. empire in East Asia is not sustainable with its overseas bases in Japan, in Korea, in Australia, and this is its network of alliances, right? Because the U.S. faces tyranny of distances. It has cross the entire Pacific Ocean to fight China. So if he doesn't have the forward deployment bases in these countries, US can't really— can't do anything. But in the case of Japan, uh, I think there's a little bit fear, there's a little bit guilty conscience, because the Japanese politicians, they still remember what their grandpa did in China in World War II. Let's remember Shinzo Abe, the, the former prime minister of Japan who got assassinated, his grandpa's nickname is a monster of Manchuria. His, his grandpa Nishi was one of the architects of Japanese colonial project in Manchuria. And, and, and, and these, these politic— you know, they have the— these dynasties. Japan, Japan is, you know, People say Japan is a democracy, whatever, but Japan has been a one-party rule for most of the post-war period, right? And a lot of them are the holdovers from the old, old, uh, political dynasty that stretched all the way to the World War II era. Uh, you know, Shinzo Abe is an example, and now, like, uh, you know, his relative is still, still in the government. And, and, and these people, they, they fear a rising China because they always fear that, you know, China is gonna take revenge on what, what Japan did to them. So, so, so even though they, they don't exactly like US for what US did to them, like nuke— the Japanese nationalists still remember they got nuked twice— but they're like, okay, at least, you know, maybe at least the US can maybe can save us from a resurgent China. So that fear It's that fear that's driving the Japan-US security pact because they, they, um, but, uh, Korea is a little bit different. Well, South Korea, South Korea is also a Jap— uh, let's face it, both South Korea and Japan, they're, they're client states of United States. They don't have true sovereignty. I mean, any Japanese prime minister who dare to say no to US, they get replaced very quick. They don't last long in the office. So that's one thing, you know, they still have militaries, uh, US military bases on their soil. And, and two, you know, South Korea, they're, they're facing, um, their, their issues with, with, with North Korea, with DPRK. And, and, and so they kind of depend on United States to provide security. They feel like they need the US protection. And because of that, they have to go with whatever, uh, US wants them to do. You know, these, these politicians, when US says jump, they say, well, how high? Uh, this is why the South Korean politicians allow US to station the THAAD, um, the anti-ballistic missile defense in South Korea. Ostensibly, that, that missile system is supposed to deter North Korea, but everybody knew It was there to contain China. So because if you place the missiles closer to China, you can shoot the Chinese missiles down, respond faster. And, and this is why China was very angry with South Korea when the— when U.S. did deploy the THAAD system in South Korea. So, so South Korea, they, they are kind of got their hands tied because they, you know, they can't really say no to their master United States either. Um, now at the— but there's also economic anxiety in both Japan and South Korea too, because even though they did a lot of business in China, their company continued to, to get a lot of profit in China. But with the rise of the Chinese domestic industries, they're facing tough, tough competitors now. You know, like, like the, the South Korean car industry in particular, they're losing their market share in in China so quick to the Chinese domestic manufacturers. To, you know, same thing with Japan. And, and so they— so it's, it's a mixture of fear, uh, their own fear about the, their own loss of competitiveness against the Chinese economy and the, and the continued rise of China. And that prompt them to, to cling on to the US security alliance. Now with the Australia. Now Australia, interesting case because China is Australia's biggest export market, biggest export partner. You know, if you look at the Australian economy and China, Chinese economies are actually complementary. China imports a lot of raw material commodities from Australia. There's actually a, a show from— a comedy show from Australia, um I think like 5, 6 years ago, they actually pointed out this absurdity of the education. It's like they do like a— it's a satire, you know, like they have a, they have a security, uh, meeting between the Prime Minister and his defense officials. So they were like, how can we justify an increase of $360 billion in defense budget? And he look around and nobody says anything. And they say, okay, how about, how about I say I, I point out something, you say yes. So they're like, oh, not— how about, how about for we are defending our trade route? They're like, yes, defending our trade route. Okay, who is our largest trading partner? China. And everybody nod. So like, so you are saying we need to spend $360 billion to defend our trade route with China against China? Everybody's just like, yeah, nod. I mean, that what Australia is facing right now. They are being dragged into this because—

that's funny—

because the United States, because their security alliance with United States, they are literally going against their own national interest. But again, Australia is, uh, unique in a way. It's Australia and New Zealand, they're like the two white settler colonies right next to Asia. So there's always inherent fear of being taken over, of being swamped by like the Yellow Peril. I mean, I mean, that's why Australia for the longest time they maintain the White Australia policy, which only accept immigrants from white countries. Um, you know, that, that was only repealed like, you know, a few decades ago. And so, so, but there's still fear of this like Chinese or the Asians going to come over and take over Australia. And that, that plays perfectly into like the, the, the, the Five Eyes intelligence. The Five Eyes intelligence agency is a cooperation between intelligence agency of the Anglo countries: United States, Australia, UK, New Zealand, Canada, right? So the Anglo Five. So, so they, they kind of stick together because Australia feels like, okay, we have to stick together with the big brother United States. Again, they're the ones who got our, our back during World War II. We rely on, on US for defense against the hordes of Asians to come in to take us over. And so, so this is a, this is Australia's predicament. Uh, India is a little bit different because India is, uh, it's, it sees itself as a great power. I mean, India is ancient civilization. It's— that's true— as ancient as China. It sees itself as the inheritor of a great civilization. It's a great— sees itself as a great power. But India and China had this thing called the border dispute since 1950, since the founding of the People's Republic and, and the founding of modern India. They had the border dispute, um, And, and that, that border dispute was never, uh, resolved. In fact, the two fought a war in 1962, uh, for the border. And it's, uh, it's really because, uh, you know, China at the time offered to make a compromise in 1959, and Zhou Enlai went to New Delhi and said, look, how about let's just respect— let's just, uh, you know, make the, the the current border that we each other control, the international border. We just finalize and make international border. But India did not agree because that means trading, uh, conceding. So, so China's offer was, okay, we claim— because we claim this part of your territory, you claim this part of our territory, let's just do the swap, you know, we trade our claims, then we just finalize our border because, you know, Nobody, neither side want to give up the territory we already control. We just swap our claim. But India rejected that, that, that, that proposal. So the two sides went to war in 1962. And because that border issue, uh, there's also, you know, the, the kind of, um, a rise of Indian nationalism as well. Because the, they, they all— because India and China, they're two inheritor of two ancient civilizations. They're both two of the world's most populous countries, so there's a little bit rivalry going on when India saw that China kind of pull ahead after, you know, after— yeah, after— because I, I lived in China in 1980s. I remember at that time the Chinese GDP per capita is about the same as India, maybe even a little bit lower. But after 2000, China just took off. I mean, like right now, uh, China's economy is like 5 times greater than that of India. It's a 17—

$17.3 trillion GDP for China in comparison to $3.7 trillion for India. I looked—

so it's more than 5 times. Okay, so it's more than 5 times, it's almost 6 times. Um, so, so this is why, you know, I think this is on part of Indian nationals, it feel like a little bit rivalry, but at the same time India is different from Japan, from Korea, from Australia, because compared to true US vassal states, uh, India is not really a US vassal state. US is its own man. The US— I mean, India is its own man. India is playing for the best interest of India. So what that means is right now they are at a position to cash in on the geopolitical rivalry between China and, and United States, the same way that China played the role between the competition between US and USSR during the Cold War. Because back then, the both side also tried to compete for China, and US played the China card during the Nixon visit to Beijing. So this is what US is trying to do vis-à-vis India. They're trying to play the India card against China by, um, by, by welcoming India into the Quad. The— from the Indian side, they can get access to more advanced U.S. military technology, the U.S. investment, uh, but at the same time, they're, they're— they still pursue an independent policy because India did not— it's still part of the BRICS. They, they did not sign on, on the sanction against Russia because India maintain tied with Russia that dates from its legacy with India ties with Soviet Union. So India is kind of— India is truly playing both sides. They're trying to get the best from the both side because China also tried to offer investment to India, trying to woo India on its, on its side, uh, you know, away from the US. So, so, so, so India can, can sit on the fence and continually collect goodies from both sides. I mean Geopolitically, India is sitting in a, in a, a golden position. Um, so in this, in this situation, India is very different from Japan and South Korea. Japan and South Korea really don't have much to say in this matter, whether they, they sign on the anti-China bandwagon or not. That's decided for them in Washington. And, and, and Australia is still a little bit different because they're sort of vassal state of United States, but really they're kind of more like the deputy of the US Empire. They're like the deputy of US Empire in the South Pacific because they, they, they also derive a lot— all these Anglo countries, they also derive a lot of benefit for being included in the US Empire system, you know, more so than say Korea and Japan. They have a little bit more ownership of the US Empire system, um, because they're the Anglo brothers, whatever. So I— this is my, my take on this, uh, these countries Well, that's correct, that is correct, except I have to push back again—

not push back rather, but just to extend the conversation regarding the investments that India is hoping to get from the US. Well, I am noticing that more international corporations are leaving India, so basically we're giving them lip service. Otherwise, why are they leaving India? Like, for example, the, uh, the iPhone— they are taking back their manufacturer to China. Things didn't work out in India. And this is where, when I read— when I read articles from like New York, uh, New York Times and Washington Post and so forth, all of them saying what? India's gonna rival China economically. Well, hold on a second, you know. What are you saying? How can they rival China, when their infrastructure— India, that is— is not up to date for it to compete vis-à-vis what China is doing. So, and this is why I'm thinking India cannot be on both sides of the fence forever.

Well, India is like the great brown hope for the Anglosphere, right? Like, okay.

I thank you. Froze. Yeah, we have some slight communication here, guys. Hopefully Carl will come back. Let me take a look at the chat box quickly here. Uh, yes, indeed, it froze. Yeah, it's frozen. So can you guys hear me? Okay, let me see here. Can you hear me? Oh yes. Okay. Yeah, yeah, here is— Carl is gone. It's just the communication. He might come back. So I'm going to stay here. Of course he's coming back. And, uh, one of you wrote that, uh, it was Modi that froze him. Well, it won't be nice of Prime Minister Modi to do so because if we are to say a democratic country, then freedom of speech, right? So yeah, just communication, uh, because Zaa is in Bali, remember. It's just the— he might come back. So I'm going to stay with you here, guys, till it comes back to, uh, we're only halfway into the conversation. So, um, and yeah, just to go back to the point of where Carl was talking about those 4 countries, uh, South Korea, uh, let me see, he's tweeting me here. Let me check Twitter quick here. I mean, X, that's what they call it, and see what he's saying. Yeah, he just sent me a message here. I'll let him know. Okay, yeah, he's coming back. He's just restarting his computer. So, so the idea that he mentioned— oh, TNT, I want to say thank you so much. Dr. Dave, thanks for having Carl on. Of course, and I knew, guys, you've been asking for it. It was just a matter of time, and, and here is Carl back. Here he is. It was just—

I got too excited and broke the internet. I have to restart my modem. Sorry about that. Yeah, um, so I think I was talking about India.

Um, yeah, about the 4 countries and mainly India for that.

The Economist has been— had article, I think, back in 2000 or 2003 saying India is going to overtake China, right? I mean, now 20 years later, we know We know that didn't happen. And, and even, even Apple, when they talk about moving the iPhone production to India, they, they, their very overly ambitious plan was to move 25% of the iPhone production to India by 2050. Right now it looks like they're not even going to reach that goal because right now over 90% of the iPhone still made in China. So one of the problem is, as you mentioned, it's the lack of infrastructure Um, and, and, and a lot of the business regulation environment in India just not very friendly toward, uh, foreign investment. This is why foreign investors go to China in the first place, because Chinese philosophy is if you build it, they will come, right? Like China rolled out a lot of preferential tax, uh, tax, uh, policies to lure foreign investors to come to China because China understand once you put your factories here, you know, you can't just pick it up and move and leave. You know, it's not like a hot money, it's not like the stock market, you can take your money in and take it out. If you actually put a physical, you know, Tesla plant in Shanghai, when you leave you cannot take the plant with you, right? And so, so China understood that, so they, they did a lot of tax incentives. But on top of that, China built amazing infrastructure. They build ports, they build power plants, they build, um, you know what, one of the— some of the problem that when, uh, um, when these multinational try to decouple from China and move to country to Vietnam, for example, uh, some of the problem that they face is like power shortages, right? Um, like because It's, it's a, it's a whole new— the, the manufacturing is a whole process, and, and it's not simple at just moving factory there. You need a, you need roads, you need railroads, you need ports so you can ship your goods out. You also need reliable power to sustain your factories. But Vietnam is, is, I think it's going to be fine because China is actually helping Vietnam to upgrade its power infrastructure right now. But, uh, India is, is a case where they make it very they have a very, uh, protectionist, um, trade policy to protect their, their domestic companies. So, so make very difficult for the foreign investors to come in to do business. This, this was the case when, um, I, I was looking into invest in the Korean POSCO steelmaker when I heard Warren Buffett invested in POSCO back in 2000s. And, and so I followed that development for a while. So, so, you know, POSCO discovering India, they have a lot of, um, uh, like a cheap, low-quality iron ore. But the Korean steelmaker discovered, invented a process to refine high-quality steel from this low-quality iron ore. So they, they thought this was a marriage made in heaven, you know. They just move up, open a factory in India, and they were just able to produce more steels. But they ran into a lot of problems, you know. They ran into a problem first with the land acquisition, and, and like, you, like, 6 years later they still couldn't build a plant because, you know, there's a land dispute. Something would not happen in China. In China, when they want to build something, they will build a factory in 6 months, right? So this is a reason why a lot of foreign investors chose to build in China in the first place. Yeah, it's not, um You know, here in the United States, because we are so de-industrialized, we think like, manufa— oh, it's just a bunch of people making like shoes and toys for us. It doesn't matter who do it, you know, and we can, we can just send, send, send, send the jobs to, to, to elsewhere. But that's not how manufacturing works. I mean, this— China was being very smart about it. For example, when they welcome Tesla to China, they're like, okay, you don't have to techn— you don't have to do technology transfer. You can own your factory 100%, but what we do require you is use local, build, uh, from local components and, and, and use local suppliers for, for your parts. So this made Tesla to help to develop a whole series of supply chain in China to supply its Tesla factory. That also helped a lot of the, like, it spurred a whole growth of, of, um, of industries surrounding the electric vehicles. And now those, those suppliers for Tesla also supply to the Chinese electric vehicle makers. That's, that's outgrowing Tesla at this point. So this is the— China has had a very smart industrial policy for the last 40 years, um, and they, they, uh, you know, because they have— they built a whole ecosystem of supply chain inside China. So this is why even if more or less like the now the low margin labor extensive stuff are moving out of China to places like Vietnam, to Indonesia, Bangladesh, etc., but the, the high-end manufacturing still stay in China. In fact, China is now challenging Germany in the role of, in the, uh, in the realm of high-end, uh, uh, machine manufacturing. That used to be like the Germany's exclusive domain. So India still have a lot of catch-up to do, but there's a lot of hopians and copians in the Anglo media. Like, most of these, um, let's face it, most of these, this journalist, so-called journalists from the West, they, they, they, they're not specialists. They don't— they have very little, uh, knowledge in, in, in this, in specific of manufacturing. Well, Because manufacturing is gone from the United States, they wouldn't have any for sure, and, and, uh, manufacturing. And, and so, so they, they're not reporting based on the facts. So, so that's what I'm saying. And, and most of the time, a lot of the financial reporting, especially on China, they're geared toward foreign investors. They're geared toward the foreign investor, particularly those foreign investors who invest in them. Speculate in like stock market, right? And we all know stock market is, is not exactly reflection of the real economy. The two can, can be quite decoupled. So this is why when you hear a lot of gloom and doom about Chinese economy, what, what's really happened, what's really saying is foreign investors right now are losing money in the Chinese stock market. That, that's what those— what's really being reflected in, in enough stuff like Bloomberg, Wall Street Journal, and Financial Times.

Well, I, I don't invest in stock market, Carl. I made it clear from the '90s to never put my money in stock market. So let me tackle one another point here while you're talking about the economy here, because very, very important. And I've been arguing, and I'm in the process of writing a book about China. Of course, the economy is going to be a major section of the book and so forth. And I'll just, uh, uh, get your take about where do we see the chip industry moving forward, given how we decided to sanction China regarding chips and it end up backfiring on us.

Where do the US— the US sanction on semiconductors on China is the best thing that ever happened to the Chinese domestic semiconductor manufacturer. Because before, before Chinese company actually want, you know, they actually like to leverage the global supply chain, right? Like before, um, you know, Huawei for example, they will always use top of the line product, top of the line supplier. A lot of the time that means a US product, you know. This is why they would use, buy chips from Qualcomm or, or have their own chip designed by, by, uh, manufacturer in TSMC, the Taiwan Semiconductors, because that's where most of the advanced chips are manufacturing, uh, rather than go through the Chinese local domestic, uh, chip supplier. Because the, the local domestic semiconductor sector is couple, couple generations behind. So for, for big global company like Huawei, it's like, why do I need to go with second-class product when I can source the first-class product that's reliable and, and more economic. And, and so, so this is a— this is what— this way the Chinese semiconductor industry have— has, has trouble to catch up for decades because they— it's hard to compete with the established brands, right? But now when US now says Okay, Qualcomm, you cannot sell chips to Huawei. And Huawei's like, okay, fine, we'll, we'll, we'll design our chipping house and we'll have them manufactured in Taiwan. And the US tells Taiwan, they're like, no, Taiwan Semiconductor chips, you cannot sell to China, to mainland China. And now, now Huawei has no choice. They can't, they can't source other opponents other than the Chinese domestic manufacturers. So now they have to go to SMIC. The, the Chinese domestic semiconductor manufacturers say, okay, we'll, we'll, we'll give you a lot of money so you— so to help to invest in you so you can upgrade your production line to produce advanced chip for us. And that strategy work. And this, this force all the Chinese tech companies to work together. Before, they're, they're not, you know, because it's a global marketplace, they, they rather to work with global partners than, than the domestic ones, if the domestic ones didn't produce products that's up to par. But now the Chinese companies have no choice. It's do or die. They, they do or die together, and, and that's forced the synergy. Now, I mean, this— the US semiconductor ban on China is 100 times more effective than Chinese government's own initiative to promote the domestic semiconductor manufacturing. Because, uh, you know, it's— this is just because now it, it made an existential issue for the Chinese high-tech companies. Even the companies that still, uh, didn't face the same restrictions as Huawei at the moment, they, they see what happened to Huawei, they say, well, we could be next, you know, we better have— we better, you know, have developed our self-reliance to, to work together with our Chinese partners than continue to rely on this very unreliable US supplier supply chain, right? So, so this is why, um, and, and let's face it, you know, like, US— China produce engineers in like tens of thousands, hundreds of thousands every year. They, you know, they don't lack talent. Um, they— what, what they, what they need is a proper incentive You know, today technology, it's, you know, today's technology, you just pile a lot of talent, you pile a lot of money. If you give it the right incentive, give it time, you know, things will happen. And this is what's happening in China right now. Like, they are making a lot of progress because they have to. They realize in order to survive, they have to. They're forced to innovate by the US sanctions. So I think that was the best thing that ever happened to the Chinese tech space. And this will seriously threaten Chinese— US tech dominance down the road. I mean, 5, 10 years from now, if China no longer had to rely on the core US tech, what US, you know, what's going to be left for the US?

Like, that's true.

Tech dominance is one of the pillar— I was considered one of the three pillars of the three American Empire, you know. It's the financial dominance, tech dominance, and military, right? Those the three— I call the three pillars of US Empire. Right now, uh, we're seeing all three on very wobbly legs, right? You know, financial, because you US's own sanction against Russia is triggering the, the, the rush toward de-dollarization all over the world. Tech, because the US sanction is forcing China to, to, to develop its own domestic industry. Well, military, look, US has— people say, okay, people will put the video of like all the US aircraft carrier and, and US plane flying on sky, so This is what's backing the US dollar. Well, guess what? All that is also backed by the US dollar. So it's a chicken and egg thing. When the dollar goes, all that will go too. And that— we already seen the problem in Ukraine. US spend a trillion dollar in defense budget. What does that give to United States? They couldn't even supply artillery shell to Ukraine. You know, you— Russia alone is outproducing NATO countries in, in the artillery shell production, you know, because this is fundamental issue is because U.S. have— and, and to extend a large part of Europe has been de-industrialized. Okay, their economy is highly financialized, which means, you know, oh, $1 trillion sounds a lot of money, but when, you know, when to produce one missile or one F-35 you, you, you need like hundreds of billions of dollars. At the end, you know, it's just a number. The dollar just become a number. It's, it's meaningless. You are, you're— the amount of dollar does not match, does not, is not matched by a real industrial production. I mean, people can see that by— I, I remember somebody post a chart of, of manufacturing, like why China is an industrial, industrial giant. Each it measures China's industrial output versus industrial output from United States and Europe and Japan. So, so China industrial output right now is more than US, Europe, and Japan, South Korea combined. So that is, that is a difference. That's, that's, that's why, that's why there's a lot of anxiety in Washington about China, because they, they realize, okay, the continued rise of China means the end of US, uh, US hegemony.

Yeah, well, that's why we end up shooting ourselves in the foot with these sanctions. The moment I heard about it back then, and I was like, what the heck are they doing? They don't realize that this is going to push China. It's exactly what happened with the ISS, the International Space Station, when the bill was passed in 2014 banning any Chinese astronauts from accessing ISS. The Chinese said, fine, we will build our own. We were thinking that the Chinese were just bluffing till they end up building their own. And it's the same thing I'm seeing with this chip industry. Now correct me, Carl, if I'm wrong here. This China was able already to build the 4-nano technology for the chips?

I saw some reports, but I'm not, uh, I'm not so sure about that because I also, I also heard that some of its, uh, stockpiles from, um, yeah, uh, you know, what they bought before the sanction took place, uh, you know, some of them— I mean, China has a capability to design, yeah, 5, 4 nanometer chip, but, but traditionally they sent their design to Taiwan to have the Taiwan Semiconductor, uh, to, to manufacture it. So I heard— I— what I heard was some of them may be one of those, uh, previous batch stockpile, uh, from before. So, uh, but, but I mean, I— it's just a matter of time. It's just a matter of time. I, I, I, I— if they didn't come out with it this year, they will have it in the next few years. I mean, this is not— this is, this, this is Given China has the resources, China has a talent, China has shit tons of money, China has an incentive to accomplish its aim. So I, I mean, it's just— we're just talking about whether this is going to happen in next 2 years or next 5 years, but it's gonna happen.

Well, I intend to follow up on it when I visit your area. I'm gonna be in your area at some point in, uh, Uh, probably around May or so, and I intend to, uh, check on this particular topic here. Now let me turn over to— there are two other topics I'd like to get your take on them. One of them is Indonesia presidential elections. Where do we see— where do you see this is moving forward, given now when you consider Indonesia's role in the economy within Asia? And how the US is trying to leverage whatever with Indonesia. Where do you— what, what do you see?

Well, so not many people talk about Indonesia, right? Even though Indonesia is the 4th most populous country in the world, right? The top 2 is China, India. Number 3 is United States, and number 4 is Indonesia. A lot of people don't even realize it. A lot of people don't realize how big Indonesia is. If you superimpose the map of Indonesia onto Europe, in the— that the Indonesia will stretch from the city of London all the way to the border of Afghanistan. That's how big Indonesia is. Wow. And because the Mercator projection, which makes the northern part of the globe super big, you know, it makes Greenland looks like a continent. So because Indonesia is on on the way, there's— it looks small, but you can actually, you know, like the true size of India is— Indonesia is actually quite, quite large. Um, so Indonesia is, uh, is right now— I don't foresee too much change because for, for, for almost a decade Indonesia was under a very popular president, Joko Widodo. And, and, but because the limit a, a li— the constitutional limit of two terms. Jokowi cannot run for another president, third term. Yeah. So instead what he did is he made a deal with Defense Minister Prabowo, and so that Prabowo is having a running mate, vice president, who is the son of current President Jokowi. So, so this is way of Jokowi trying to ensure his political legacy, you know, by, by having this political dynasty. Um, and so, so I, in the short term, I don't expect the policy to change dramatically from, um, from, from the current, from the current policy, from the current Joe Koei policy. Um, I'm, I, you know, I, I saw some reports say US want to do, uh, regime change or, or color revolution revolution in Indonesia. I don't put too much stock in that because US don't need to do color revolution. US can just buy Indonesian politicians. I mean, this is Indonesia. US can just buy the politicians like they bought, uh, Bongbong Marcos, right, in the Philippines. And, and so, uh, but having said that, Indonesia is a lot more, um, have a lot more Chinese investment, you know, it's a lot more integrated with the Chinese economy. Um, like right now I'm talking to you on the 4G network that's built by Huawei. You know, Huawei built the 4G network in Indonesia. Um, the, the electricity is supplied by the Chinese-built power plant on Bali, right? So, and, and like Like everybody in Indonesia, most people can now afford a smartphone is because the Chinese smartphone made it affordable for everyone, even in countries like Indonesia, to own— everyone to have a smartphone. My— our nanny has a smartphone, right? She has a Vivo.

Um, interesting.

So either Vivo or Oppo, which is a Chinese brand. And, and so, so So Prabowo, the new president, he understands that, um, you know, he understands that, that, that economic destiny of Southeast Asia right now is tied with China because the gravitational pull of the Chinese economy. And China actually is making also Southeast Asia one of its top priority for its Belt and Road project, right? China is investing a lot of the, um, you know, everything from infrastructure to, you know, I already mentioned power plants and a high-speed railroad and 4G network communication. Um, so, so even Chinese gaming companies, right? There are a lot of, uh, my, my wife, she plays mobile games that's made by Chinese developers. So, so like, um, you know I, I, I think— I don't think United States has anything to match in terms of offering investment into Indonesia to replace the Chinese investment. Uh, what United States will do, probably they will just, um, trying to offer to develop the defense ties, because right now only thing U.S. can offer is military, right? They can't offer it, they can't compete with China economically, but they may offer to sell Indonesia, some like F-18, you know, some F-15.

Actually, actually, Carl, they agreed to sell the F-15s but not the F-18s, right?

Right. Yeah, they already agreed to sell F-15s, but I mean, they could still dangle out like F-18s or whatever, like they want to try it, right? Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. Yeah, that's what they do. So I mean, like, I, I know a lot of people are very excited they're gonna get U.S. planes, but okay, well, sure, you know, it's this, this because fundamentally U.S. foreign policy at this point is driven by Pentagon and the weapon manufacturers. So it's their interest to, to continue to sell weapons to Indonesia, and U.S. military does have a close tie with the Indonesian military ever since the Cold War, right? The Indonesian army officers were trained in United States, and this is how CIA were able to help the coup in the 1960s to, to, you know, to, to in Indonesia. So, so now, um, now, now in Indonesia is what is, is for currently under Jokowi, Indonesians foreign policy is very friendly toward China. Um, and I don't expect it like, like 180-degree change like Bongbong Marcos, just because Philippines is a bit special case because Philippines has a— it was a US colony for so long. It has, you know, it's, it, it, it hasn't pulled itself away from the US orbit yet. But Indonesia is more an independent state, more like India, right? They— Indonesia will ultimately, um, try watch out for Indonesia's own best interest. And so, so I think, um, you know, I, I don't, I don't foresee, um, first of all, the, the, the election Prabowo won overwhelmingly means there's probably going to be a transfer of power. And I don't expect the policy to change drastically in the short term. In the mid— medium term, long term, who knows? Um, you know, we'll see. But I mean, right now, US is— most of US attention is still tied to Middle East, right? To this golden boy Israel. Whether US like it or not, it's, you know, it's— its attention is going there. So it's gonna take— it's gonna take a while for US to to, to, to, to put its mind back on pivot to Asia. We'll see how that works out.

Yeah, it might be too late for us. So, uh, hey guys, before I forget, uh, just prepare a question or two for Carl for later on. We have to tackle one more topic before I'll open it for a few questions because I don't want to hold Carl forever here. Uh, before that, I want to say thank you to, uh, Taroman Harris. Thank you very much for your Super sticker, truly, truly appreciate it. Jennifer Lee, one of the avid supporters of the chat, of the channel, thank you so much, Jennifer, truly appreciate it. So, and as I said, guys, just prepare your question and put Q so I know it's a question. Uh, just, I'll take one or two for Carl later on. The last thing I want to address with you, Carl, and I have my own question, by the way, Carl, regarding Indonesia. Why aren't we seeing Indonesia part of BRICS? Indonesia has a lot to offer. Why aren't they in BRICS?

Yeah, I mean, you would actually make sense for Indonesia to be in BRICS, um, but like I said, US still has a bit of influence in Indonesia still, especially through its tie with the military. Um, and, and Prabowo, the one that just won election, He's a defense minister. He actually has a very close tie with the US, uh, with the Pentagon, etc. So, so again, we're gonna have to see how— I mean, but even if Indonesia do not officially join BRICS, but the fact on the ground, uh, you know, like I listed, there's already a lot of Chinese investment in the country, and, and I don't think that's going to change anytime soon.

Interesting, interesting. Well, the last topic I want to address with you, because I can't let you go, Carl, without addressing this, has to do with Taiwan. Now, of course, that's the issue that is really turning the machine here in Washington. And as I said, I still have my contacts in DC, we talk and all that stuff. My always My concern has always been about why the politicians are fomenting more tensions through Taiwan. Where this is gonna— will it ever end? We all know Taiwan is part of China. Why aren't we playing this double standard of One China policy, but we go behind the scenes and provide weapons and aid and so forth?

Well, like I said, US policy currently is driven by Pentagon and the weapon manufacturers, and, and manufacturing tensions in Taiwan Strait and South China Sea helps US to continue to sell weapons, mostly expensive and outdated weapons, to Taiwan. Taiwan is one of the best customers for, for the US weapon manufacturers. And, and, uh, the thing is You know, also Taiwan is a cornerstone for the US containment strategy against China. I mentioned that geopolitically there's that one island chain, um, because the idea is if, if United States— if mainland China reunify with Taiwan, then the People's Liberation Army Navy can freely enter Pacific. Which United States considers American Lake, right? So you want to contain the Chinese Navy and the power projection within the first island chain, which is the island chain that runs from Japan through Okinawa, down through Taiwan, through Philippines, through South China Sea. And, and, and so, so, and, and like, like MacArthur famously said, Taiwan is unsinkable aircraft carrier. Right? And this, of course, it's unsinkable aircraft carrier for United States in case something happens. Um, so we'll— right, I mean, during the Cold War, people probably don't know this, but during the Cold War, United States actually stationed nuclear-tipped Nike missiles on Taiwan pointing at mainland China. And, and they actually had a plan to use them in the 1958 Second Taiwan Strait Crisis. Pentagon actually had a plan to nuke China if the PLA made a landing on the Kinmen Island and, and take, take over Kinmen Island in 1958. This was revealed by Daniel Ellsberg's leak.

Oh yeah, the leak, the Pentagon leak documents.

Yeah, uh, a few years ago, a few years before he died, he passed away, he, he, he revealed that there was a plan in 1958 to nuke mainland China if, if the, the Taiwan crisis developed to the point that PLA overwhelms and takes Kinmen Island. And, and all that nukes were only withdrew after Nixon visit to China. So, so type, before US actually wrote, during the Vietnam War, US actually rotated 60,000 troops through Taiwan. And, and, and, and after Nixon visit China, one of the term they agreed, you know, under the One China principle is that US will pull out all its military from Taiwan. But of course, that, that has been reversed under— first under Donald Trump, uh, when Donald Trump's, uh, decided to station Marines in the so-called, uh, the, the, the, the, the so-called de facto embassy, uh, uh, on Taipei, because, because Trump claimed it's a diplomatic compound, so he needs more Marine, uh, protection even though Taiwan is not officially recognized. And then now we continue under Biden, you know, now we know Green Berets have been sent to Kinmen Islands. Um, this all acts of provocation, um, but China is not taking the bait. China has handling this very rationally, uh, but we— but China will respond in terms of they will increased patrols around Taiwan Island. There will be increasingly more flyover by the, by the Chinese Air Force, more naval patrol around Taiwan Island, and, and, and, uh, which is assertion of sovereignty. And then, you know, uh, there's not, not much United States can do about it. Uh, I don't think there's an imminent war to break out Taiwan Strait, because like I said, time is on China's side. China is growing stronger and stronger year by year, you know. China in 2030 will be much stronger than China today, right? They keep on saying, oh, China is going to invade Taiwan in 2027. It's like, why 2027? That's just an arbitrary number, you know. China in 2030 will be even stronger than United— the gap between China and United States will just going to grow more and more. Um, and, and a lot of people don't realize this because they, they look at the US economy in the, in the nominal dollar GDP terms, but in, in the actual industrial output, the, the, the power balance between China and US, uh, you know, because US Pentagon planners all keep on thinking about fighting China like it's going to be a replay of of Pacific War 2.0, right? They think, oh, you know, we, we know how this played out, you know, we did island hopping, you know, we, we move all the way to Japan. But what they don't realize is today the power balance, the industrial power between China and United States is like that of 1941 between Japan and United States, except, except with the role reversed, except now China is in the position of US in 1941, and US is in position of Japan in 1941. You're right, you're right. So I mean, it's, it's crazy to think that they even, even win a conventional war against China at this point. So, uh, but, but you know, that, that will remain most, uh, people's fantasy because China is not looking to start a war in Taiwan, right? Unless US want to push, really push the button. You know, we all know what that button is, is Taiwan declare formal independence, which Taiwan will never do unless they have explicit approval, support, encouragement from Washington. But hopefully the Washington elite are not the— have enough sense of self-preservation. Yeah, let's help.

Let's go. Yeah, well, great. So, so great of you, Carl. Uh, I'm gonna take one or two questions for Carl here, and before I'll do this, uh, on behalf of all of you guys, we say thanks to Carl. Thank you so much, Carl, for really carving out time for me here and for all of us to learn a different perspective. So I'm very grateful to you. So Here's the first question from Doggy 5. Uh, this is for you, Carl. What do you think Singapore will do if war breaks out in Taiwan, given that Singapore has military bases in Taiwan?

Well, I mean, what is Singapore going to do? Singapore is just, you know, Singapore is a, is a military— is a US military base, right? I mean, like, this is— Singapore actually do not want a war to break out over Taiwan. Like most of the Southeast Asian states, they just want to continually trade with China. They don't want to be forced to choose a side. Right now, US is pushing them to pick a, pick a side. You're either with us or against us, right? But, but most of the countries in the neighborhood, they just want to continue to trade with China and make money. And, and, you know, If a war breaks out— I don't think a war will break out, but if the war breaks out, I mean, what, what can Singapore do? Singapore can— can they say no to United States? I doubt it. You know, US will just use Singapore as a military base. US will use Singapore to block the Malacca Strait, the very strategic Malacca Strait where most of China's energy is coming from, from Middle East. Um, But you know what, if, if a war break out, Taiwan, you know, it's, it's, it's, it's end of the human civilization. It's— I, I don't think there's any way. I cannot think of any way it's not going to turn nuclear, right? I mean, it's not going to end up in nuclear exchange, especially, you know, if a, if an aircraft carrier gets sunk, if a US aircraft carrier gets sunk in in South China Sea over Taiwan. I, I, I, I think, yeah, I, I can't, you know, US planner has talked about it, you know, they can use tactical nuclear weapons, you know. Once you go, go nuclear, there's no turning back. It's going to be Armageddon. So good luck, guys, you know. If it's gonna— I, I don't see, I, I don't see any way other than ending in, in nuclear winter if a war breaks out over Taiwan. That's, that's my take.

And that's why I don't foresee, I don't foresee that will ever happen.

Yeah, I don't, I don't, I don't see that.

Yeah, let me say thank you to Curious A. Thank you very much. Dr. Oprah signaled that he's willing to join BRICS, so that means Indonesia is willing to join BRICS. That would be, that would be great, that would be great. So, all right, let me see one more question for final one for Carl before I let you guys go, and we let Carl also get on with his whatever he needs to do. So I'll let you know, by the way, Carl, I'm gonna be probably in your neighborhood, not unsure yet. I will— I'll give you a heads up. I'll give you a heads up. Here is the last question here, the last question for, uh, uh, uh, they want to know your take on Chinese and US interest in Asia Pacific as a whole, particularly the Pacific region? For instance, US security pact with PNG, Papua New Guinea, how this is going to shape the security architecture? Most likely that's what the person wants to know.

Yeah, this is part of United States trying to shore up what's so-called the second island chain. So the first island chain runs from Japan down to Okinawa, Taiwan, Philippines. The second island chain goes from like Northern Marianas all the way down to Guam, Palau, and all the way down to Papua New Guinea, right? And US is freaking out about some US-China, uh, China security agreement with Solomon Islands, right? Solomon Islands, which is to the east of, uh, Papua New Guinea. You know, some of the of course, uh, you know, people, uh, what is that? Guadalcanal. Guadalcanal, there's a famous battle of Pacific War that people may remember. That's so, so, so, so when China had the— yeah.

Oh, Carl froze. Oh, I'll take this by the way to say thank you to Alamseen for the super sticker. Truly appreciate it. You know, let's hope Carl come back quick because I want to say bye to him before, uh, but connection sometimes, these things happen, guys. You all know, nothing surprising about it, but we'll see. Let's see if he comes back. Yeah, hopefully he will come back. Uh, and by the way, I'm gonna— I put the, uh, some info about Carl for those who do not know who Carl is. I put it in the description if you guys can, uh, log in there, uh, description of the video. And I'm gonna put the link for, uh, his YouTube channel, uh, for you guys in the description right here. You can check him out on, uh, on YouTube. I, I watch some of his videos there. So if you can, you can check him out there, uh, it would be very interesting. So let's see if he comes back here. Otherwise, uh, I'm gonna just have to sign off here and I will communicate with him at a later date, uh, just because the— how the communication is at that time. Anyway, guys, well, uh, yeah, it's unlikely he's coming back here, so Yeah, he's not here. So anyway, I do hope, uh, oh, let me say thank you here to, uh, Freedom Fox One. Thank you so much. Unfortunately, Carl is not here because it froze, so he's, he, he dropped in the communication here. What does China do if the US cuts off its food and energy imports? I'd be happy to answer that one for you. China will retaliate. And how China will retaliate? By also shutting down any import— or export, rather— to the US, which we will suffer right here. We have the problem right now with the chips, and it will be even worse because everything we have in the United States comes from China, especially when it comes down to food and so forth. So, so that will be very, very problematic for us, and the US will not do that. So I don't see them doing that one. So, uh, K, uh, Kim Cho, thank you so much, man, for your Super Sticker. Truly appreciate it. I appreciate you for doing that. It means a lot. Uh, let me see who else. And, uh, who I see, uh, I do see someone here typed in, uh, Chan Fu. If I need to get a hold of Chan Fu, yes, I'm aware of him and I'll be happy to reach out and extend, uh, an invitation on the show here if he will be willing to come over. So, uh, okay guys, well, I think Carl is gone, so he won't be able to reconnect here. Uh, oh, he's here. No worries.

No wor—

uh, tell him I'm gonna wait. Yeah, he's coming back. He's coming back, guys. So, because I want at least to, for the proper way to say, uh, bye and all that on behalf of all of you. So, so we'll wait for him here and he'll show up. Uh, yeah, there are some that individuals you suggested, guys, and I am reaching out to some. I will have another guest next week. I have not confirmed the date yet and I will let you know. Uh, so once that happens, and, uh, and we just go from there. Yeah, here it is, Carl. Okay. Yeah, sorry for this one here. By the way, Carl, where can, uh— there we go. Can you hear me?

Yeah, I can hear you. Perfect.

Where can my viewers— where can they find you?

Um, I have, I have my own YouTube channel, just Carl Tsah. Um, and I'm also a prolific shitposter on Twitter. Uh, my handle is just Carl Tsah, uh, no space. And also on Patreon, I host my Silk and Steel podcast on Patreon. So if you go to patreon.com, search Silk, the first result should be my podcast, the Silk and Steel podcast, where I talk about everything about China and with the main focus on history, and I'm doing a chronological retelling of the Chinese history from the beginning, from the prehistory to the present. Now I'm around 540 BC, so a long way to go.

It's always nice to know. Yeah, this is the link, guys, for, uh, Carl. This is his YouTube channel right there at the bottom. Uh, it's, uh, it's just youtube.com/@carlza. He's also on Twitter. Okay, because I am following him on Twitter. If you can check him out also on Twitter, follow him over there, uh, subscribe to his channel of course. And now that I found that, even for the history part, I'm gonna have to log in and listen to what you have to say, uh, Carl, for all this. So, uh, I'll take this opportunity to say thank you to Tamputra. Tamputra is one of our avid supporters, Carl, and he's saying thank you for inviting Carl Zhao. Of course. It's, it's an honor and privilege to have Carl here on, on the channel to have a conversation. Well, Carl, I can't thank you enough, man. I truly appreciate it, and I look forward to having another conversation with you. This is not your last time here. We'll reach out and we'll, uh, we'll extend the conversation even further. So thank you so much, Carl. Truly appreciate you.

Thank you, David Oualaalou.

My pleasure.

Inviting me back anytime, I'd love to talk.

I certainly will. I will do that, Carl. Thank you very much.

Bye-bye.

All right, guys, well, I hope you find it very informative here, and I will invite Carl again, especially now that he's doing this series on history. I need to learn more about the Chinese history given what I'm writing about China. I'm gonna be in that part of the world if I end up in Bali I will reach out to him, and most likely I might do a live stream from there with Carl. Why not? Well, we'll see how it goes. So, well, I hope you guys enjoyed this, and I look forward to seeing you next time. As always, remember, geopolitics impacts your daily life in more ways than one. Till next time, guys.

Bye-bye.