What Role Can ASEAN Play in the Emerging Multipolar World Order? Conversation w/John Pang…

All right, hello everybody and welcome to Geopolitical Trends, where truth matters. Excited to be with you on this July 22nd. Well, the month is almost over, so, uh, I am waiting on my guest, John Panck, to get here. Sometimes communication, you know how it is, he's on the other side of the world. Uh, at the same time, I'm just gonna say hi to some of you.. And we'll just— or all of you for that matter. So if— yeah, John is not here yet. So, uh, Tennis, good to see you as always. Uh, who is here? Muslim Reverb. Ah, that's an interesting comment. ASEAN has a slave mentality. They look up to the Westerners as masters. Uh, is that all of them or just few of them? Hong Twa, good to see you. It's an interesting comment. The centrality of, of ASEAN is neutrality. But would you consider Philippines and Singapore into that? So, good to see you. Uh, hello, Dr. O, John. I have an online course. Well, Hamad, let me know if, if you are taking an online course that falls within my academic background. I'll be happy to help. So, uh, if, uh, Liu, good to see you. Good to see you as always. Uh, who else here? Uh, Wong Casey, good to see you. One Horn, good to see you. Timeline Dunkley, good to see you. Uh, uh, Tom Sawyer Wires, good to see you as always. Seth Me, Chase, uh, KL, good to see you. And Jenga, good to see you as always. Isabel, uh, Melado Jensen, good to see you. Speaking the Truth, I like that screen too. Speaking the Truth too, good to see you. Army with Harmony, good to see you. Samantha Raj, good to see you as always. Okay guys, I'm waiting on John here. I just want to take this opportunity to share with you some housekeeping items. Tomorrow, remember to join me tomorrow, uh, for my live stream about the two main events that I'm gonna talk about them together. Jus Leang, good to see you, brother. Jus, thank you so much for being an avid supporter, and I appreciate your insights, by the way. Jus, uh, uh, David King, good to see you as always. As I said, I'm going to be talking tomorrow about both the recent, uh, H Group, uh, from Yemen attack in Tel Aviv, which is a big, big, big development. I know Western media is going to be sort of limiting the conversation on it I spent time in Yemen. I am very familiar with that group, uh, back in the day, and it is far, far stronger than what you can even imagine. The second part of the same topic, I'll be talking about the decision of the Russian President Vladimir Putin to go ahead and arm the H Group, and he's going to arm them now with some bullets, whatever. We talking about anti-ship missiles, we're talking about some advanced systems. Of course, they're going to need to know how to operate all that stuff, but that's not a problem at all. Uh, uh, as a matter of fact, uh, to my knowledge and to my contacts and what— some, some members of the H group were spotted in Moscow a few weeks ago. So, so, so that's what I'm going to be talking to you about tomorrow. Uh, I set up the interview for March— for March— July 27th with Carl Zaha and Jerry Gray. Jerry is traveling but he will be back on the 22nd— on 26th, rather. Then 27th, we're gonna, uh, uh, get together and, and just have a conversation. That is, uh, on Sunday the 28th, most likely I will do the community conversation with you because that's always something I do with you at the end of every month. I know the end of the month is going to fall on Wednesday, but nonetheless, I don't mind doing that on on, uh, Sunday. So rest day, whatever they say. No, no. So this is what I'm gonna be, uh, and I'm also working on the panel for my two guests that they're gonna be here. I'm still coordinating because, uh, one of them is traveling overseas and, uh, the, the schedule. So I gotta be, uh, aware of this one here, and, and we just go from there. Uh, okay, I am waiting on— John is here, but there are some technical glitches here to stage. Here is John. Hi John, can you hear me? No, I can't hear you here. Yeah, yeah, I can hear you. Yeah, the sound. No, I can't hear you. So, okay, can you hear me?

Yeah, can you hear me now?

Nice. I do, I do, I do.

Perfect. Everything okay? Okay. Yes, I just want to make sure that— make sure we're good.

Loud and clear, loud and clear. So we're very excited to have you here, John. I was talking to the community about some other, uh, housekeeping stuff, whatever. So we're gonna get into it right there, guys. Guys, John is here, and by the way, we're gonna do the same format, uh, just prepare some questions for John towards the end when we get to that.

Oh wow, this is live.

It is live. As a matter of fact, my community here, and they are very, very interactive, John. They are very respectful and they are—

Hey, that would be fun. That would be really fun.

I'm hoping to do it. I'm very intellectual, believe it or not. And I'm not saying it to be Mr. Nice here. They know where I stand. I don't do that kind of stuff, but they are very engaging and I'm very, very excited to have them here. Of time. So I'm so glad.

This is, this is going to be fun.

I also, John, when we're done, please don't leave because I want to talk to you privately after.

Yeah, great, great.

How I always do it.

So yeah. All right, guys, are we set up straight?

We are. Because you are good to go. Yeah, you are. We are perfect. Uh, for us, we just care about the substance of anything. That's, that's the most— So what, John, I want to start first with, if you will be kind and just briefly introduce yourself By the way, guys, I have a full bio for John that I put in the description along with his social media handlers. But for now, I just want to have John to, uh, introduce himself here, and we'll just go from there.

Uh, okay. Um, I'm actually a sort of, um, scholar, uh, slash, uh, think tank person. Um, I've actually spent, uh, most of the last, um decade doing this sort of think tank work. But prior to that, and all of it, almost all of it focused on ASEAN, East Asia. I'm currently based in Hangzhou in China and working on China-ASEAN relations. Prior to that, I've had stints in basically in government in Malaysia, but, and also in the private sector there in consulting. So I look forward to this conversation. As you know, I've set out some of the range of my interests in the bio, and so we can talk about those.

Yeah, indeed.

We can talk about ASEAN issue on those lines, or on some of the lines that people don't normally pursue, such as the civilizational aspect of, of multipolarity.

Yeah, and that is one of the reasons, John, why I reached out to you. And by the way, on behalf of the entire community, I say thank you for carving out time for us. I know how busy you are.

Thank you.

But that was, but that was also one of the reasons why I reached out to you, because I wanted the community here to hear a different perspective, something they don't hear about, because we don't read much about the other aspects of ASEAN and so forth. And just, guys, to let you know, to let you know about John, John has held senior fellowships at Columbia University in New York City. So, and the Rajan Tanman School of International Studies in Singapore, where he helped start the Center for Multilateralism Studies. Now, as an academician myself, I can tell you the weight of something like this. So it's very, very impressive and very interesting. So, well, let's get into this. John, we'll start our conversation here by I want to start first. Where do you see the world going? First of all, as far as multipolarity, we'll start with that, then we'll hone in into the role of ASEAN into this new setting.

It's— multipolarity is a very useful and interesting concept for where we are today. But let's distinguish multipolarity in strategic terms, in terms of international relations. The way the word is normally used, um, uh, and, and that's rather more, more recent. We're already multipolar in that sense, but actually in terms of the, um, of trade, of global trade flows, uh, global supply chains, it's been multipolar for a long time. So from a sort of Southeast Asian and East Asian perspective, where I've been active both in this sort of policy work And also in business, it's, you know, you already had to have this view of the world that was not multipolar. I mean, there was not unipolar. So it's been like that. It really is about political reality catching up with trade and industrial reality from that perspective.

Very, very interesting. Now, with that, just if I may extend a little bit onto this one here. To shift into the ASEAN, and I'll start with Malaysia first since you did some advisement for the government. So you are not an average person to— you have a better understanding, if I may use the term, as to where Malaysia, how Malaysia sees these changes going on the geopolitical landscape, and what role in your opinion Malaysia will play in, in sort of moving strategically with this shift.

Malaysia, it lies at the heart of Southeast Asia. If you're familiar with the map, the western part of Malaysia is a peninsula, the Malay Peninsula, that is really sort of the southernmost tip of the peninsula of the Asian continent, of all of Asia. It also lies between the South China Sea and the Pacific in general and the Indian Ocean. It was right between. Um, it also— on one— it, it also lies beside the Malacca Strait, about which you may have heard quite a bit. Of course, it's the world's primary trade artery. A huge chunk of global trade goes through there, and in particular oil and gas, oil and gas, particular oil for East Asian markets and North Asian markets. At the southernmost tip of Malaysia, of the Malay Peninsula, is Singapore. So this is an extremely important part of the region in terms of trade, absolutely nodal. But Malaysia also has— Malaysia is the sort of lies at the end of— it didn't just begin in a post-colonial period. The Malay Peninsula has always been at the centre of global trade when trade was centred in the Indian Ocean and came up between West Asia and India and China. So that's an almost 2,000-year-old circuit of trade using the trade winds, for example. In which once again the Malay Peninsula was at the centre. Now this is not just for Malaysia, but also for all of Southeast Asia. It is not just geographically in between, but culturally a kind of in-between zone or a mediating zone between civilizations, Islamic civilization, for example, later on to the west and, and Chinese and the Sinic world in, in the east and to the north. So, so that's where Malaysia stands in terms of its long history. Now, post-colonially, uh, from 1957 onwards, Malaysia has had a policy that will be very familiar if you followed ASEAN. It's basically that of independence. It follows the what, uh, is called the Five Principles of, of Peaceful Coexistence that China celebrated recently. Those are Asia-wide— in fact, Asian Afro-Asian principles enumerated or elaborated in Bandung in 1955. Those are the core principles of ASEAN, and Malaysian foreign policy has adhered to it quite firmly. Malaysia was the first country in Southeast Asia and one of the first in Asia actually to— or in the world actually to, to, to recognized the People's Republic of China in, in the 1970s. So this, um, and it's had a very stable policy with respect of policy of independence and neutrality between East and West despite the Cold War, and now despite the, the new Cold War.

Yeah, very, very interesting. If we don't hear much about literally the depth of the role Malaysia plays, of course we hear the issues about the corruption that exists, which in every system, oh yeah, within ours But we don't hear much about the depth about, okay, what is really the role of Malaysia into all this? I am aware of the role because I used to travel in that part of the world and given my own academic studies, whatever, I always believe that Southeast Asia, when you look at or think about Southeast Asia, what comes to mind right away? Malaysia and Indonesia. That's off the bat from any, then you'll think about the role of ASEAN and so forth. And speaking of ASEAN, John, and I don't want to pivot into this one here, we are noticing now, uh, the whole ASEAN kind of, uh, it, it's in a strategic position, is taking a step back and watching the shift on the geopolitical landscape, especially in that part of the world, given that what the US NATO wants to do by expanding to Asia, what the European Union is doing by expanding its agreements with South Korea and Japan. Now, for ASEAN, in your opinion, how do you think they're going to manage this knowing that there is a player like Philippines who's been playing both sides?

Okay, so Malaysia is a founding member of ASEAN. It was 5 countries that constituted the original founding members in 1967. And, uh, it still remains one— it remains one of the pillars of ASEAN. And that, that role, of course, uh, the, the, the role you mentioned, or the stance, the posture you mentioned of standing back, uh, with a, with a, a non-alignment, is deliberate. It's in the DNA of, uh, Malaysian foreign policy, uh, but also of ASEAN foreign policy. And the strength of it is in that this set of principles is held throughout. It's not a supranational organization like the EU. I would say, thank goodness, it's a consensual organization of, uh, of sovereign states. And so what the Philippines is doing is disappointing in terms of ASEAN's principles, quite frankly. Some of its positions violate the neutrality and the refusal to the assuval of militarization, and in particular the absolute avoidance of military alliances. So Southeast Asian countries commit not to— it's committed to something called ZOPFAN, Zone of Peace, Freedom, and Neutrality, and We, um, we're not interested in military alliances. These are precisely the things that lead you into war but also lead you into dependent relationships. I think our notion of sovereignty is tied to— is very much tied to this, uh, insistence of non-alignment, if you will. Well, many people don't see that there's a very strong link between remaining non-aligned.

Yeah.

And remaining sovereign. Yeah, okay, this is from hard experience. Every one of these countries has been in one way or another dominated by European countries.

Yeah, but at this— at the same time, John, I am very concerned as to what Philippines has been embarked on regarding its policies vis-à-vis China. Now, yes, here is the thing that I am noticing from within ASEAN, and I've been reading different, uh, white papers regarding these aspects, of course from Washington here, but I also looked at some overseas. Uh, I look at two countries, Vietnam and Philippines. And when I take to those two countries just as an example regarding their policy towards China, how they are dealing with China— Vietnam is dealing with China quietly, Philippines is dealing with China openly. In other words, wanted to expose. And, and to me, that's the, the wrong approach from Philippines. And I'm wondering If Philippines part of ASEAN, it's gonna drag other countries into this kind of thinking that it's going to be doing the bidding of the United States in that part of the world.

Absolutely. Vietnam is practicing what is called the, what we talk about as the ASEAN way. That is that you seek, that you negotiate, that you use diplomacy that you don't push things out and do, uh, pressure by media. That's— it's not diplomacy, right? If you're conducting your foreign policy through media statements, um, through made-for-media productions, right? Uh, and, uh, and, and so on. So, so what the Philippines has been doing, or what it has been doing as a proxy very much, and I see it as a— I think everyone in the region sees it as, as as proxy to someone else's interests and machinations. Those are absolutely not— they violate everything that ASEAN stands for. Now, having said that, despite the fact that you see, okay, there's an ASEAN, and for the first time in a long time you see such open violation by one of its members of these core principles in the, you know, of the culture, the political culture of ASEAN, it's not like the organization is going to go away or is in crisis. Precisely because it works on this basis of, you know, persuading one another of a kind of sociality between nations, developing rich links between them, and trying to coordinate around this set of principles. There's a kind of waiting for the Philippines to get over this particular period, and it probably will because it's really quite recent and under only this particular leader. Well, I think that there is a background to it, but it's, it's really, of course, you know, yeah, gone to this stage right now.

Yeah, but at least with Duterte, when Duterte was in power, is kind of, uh, looked at it from, in my, in my assessment, uh, not about fear, afraid of China, but looked at it from an economic perspective that, yeah, it will make more sense for the Philippines to cooperate with China to expand its economic prosperity.

Duterte was a— yeah, it was a sovereignist, uh, foreign policy. Yes, indeed. Whatever you say, you know, about the way he governed at home, that's not— yeah, you know, in ASEAN countries, don't mess in each other's business in that regard. Yeah. Um, he established good relations with, uh, all the other ASEAN countries and with China. Yeah.

Now I wanted to get your take about, within this context of ASEAN role into this new multipolar system. Of course, we are aware of what NATO just stated as far as the need for establishing stability and security in Asia, which I laugh when I, when I hear this.

Yeah, yeah.

Why the heck is NATO going to Asia for? That's one. And second, how will ASEAN countries— will they take a firm And this is the key word, John, will they take a firm stand in rejecting openly and publicly NATO's expansion into Asia?

To answer the first question, it's what is NATO doing? What do they think they're doing? It's performative. It's really quite pointless, fairly toothless. It's more about what the US is going to extract from NATO partners, from European partners in terms of resources, in terms of money. And material, uh, for, for Southeast Asia, uh, to, to, to shift them to East Asia. Um, totally unrealistic given that they're already over, overextended even in Europe, right? So, so it's just ludicrous and, and, um, and incoherent. I don't think it's taken that seriously, as you know. We're not, we're not worried about Spanish galleons and, uh, or, you know Dutch carriks out here again, um, and they'll just be laughed at, really. It's, it's really a— it's, it's, it's absurd. But the, um, ASEAN has— I think ASEAN leaders have made particular statements rejecting in the past, um, for example, um, the AUKUS agreement. While they don't— it's not the style here to come out in a very direct way and just say, look, this is bad. But they have said this, this goes against, you know, questioned what this is about. In general, they try— the regional policy is to be open. It's open regionalism. It's to be friendly to, to all. There's no notion of breaking relations with the West or anything like that. Okay, so, you know, just because some ASEAN countries now want to sign on, like Malaysia and Indonesia and Thailand to BRICS, you sometimes see the sensationalistic reporting as if, oh yeah, that's— they're done, you know, they turn their back on the West. No, that's not— that's not what these leaders are trying to, uh, to project. They will go with, with the flow. So there haven't been, um, very strong statements against, uh, NATO yet, but you may see some coming. This, uh, you know, the, the NATO, uh, thing has been on and off They talked about opening an office in Tokyo, about coming NATO Asia-Pacific, but even at the last meeting it was more implicit than, uh, than not. So it's really not the time for very tough statements yet. It's just people like me who see it coming, uh, who tend to be rather clearer about it.

Indeed. Well, I, I can tell you, John, from at least my experience back in Washington when I was inside the government, And we were aware of those kind of conversations back then. We're talking about back in 2004 when the conversation started about expansion in— and some of us were like shaking our heads saying like, what the heck? What is it for? So to me, it's a foregone conclusion that NATO is going to proceed.

It's a foregone conclusion.

It's going to proceed.

EU investment is valued in the region. Yeah. EU countries as partners. But they're coming in with the Navy to posture and to try to tell us how to solve our problems. It's really none of their business. They have no place here. They look like clowns. I wrote a piece, you know, called, um, Asia Needs NATO Like It Needs a Hole in the Head, because NATO's manner of, uh, of proceeding, its preference— not just preference, yeah, uh, the fact that it is about exclusive military alliances with an ever— with, you know, that are ever expansionary and that it creates an us versus them. It polarizes everywhere it goes. It creates an enemy, and indeed it needs an enemy. This is the opposite. If you read, you know, the opposite of that, that's what ASEAN stands for. So it's absolutely incompatible with the region. If they want to come, they can, they can try, um, but, but it will be seen very, very dimly.

So Yeah, interesting. Well, because when I read the final communiqué of NATO, how much they— I got to plug in the computer. Yeah. How much they are sort of pinpointing exactly as China being—

There's a lot of talk, but I see it more about the US squeezing its allies for more military spending.

Well, it's going to be the like.

I think with a Trump, with a Trump, yeah, with a Trump administration, with an incoming, a likely incoming Trump administration, I'm not, I don't think we're going to see NATO out here. You might even see NATO, you know, you know, NATO has enough trouble, uh, in, in, in the North Atlantic.

Yeah, but, but even with Trump, I won't trust him because already the conversation behind closed doors as to what's going to be happening between the US and China regarding trade. So he's already, he's already put in, his people already put in the plan to sort of ratchet up the tensions regarding trade with China, which is not good, not good in my opinion. So yeah, I want to, I want to shift the conversation to BRICS since you mentioned BRICS earlier, and I like to have your input into, from an economic, at least from a global economic perspective. Where do you see the role of both BRICS and ASEAN regarding the global economic order?

I think they're both components of, uh, uh, multilateral arrangements in a multipolar order, that you're going to see more of these, um, well, some people have said a kind of a multinodal arrangement is, is a better description of it. In other words, people relating to one another rather than— you have to understand where we're coming from. In a colonial order, you have all these particular countries, especially in Southeast Asia, you could see this. They were centered on, you know, London at one point, or Amsterdam, or The Hague, you know. And you had a bunch of hub-and-spoke structures centered on colonial metropoles. And then with this unipolar order of the last few years, the US became the center of this all, that hub-and-spoke thing. Centered in the West, in the North Atlantic. That's no longer going to be the case. These countries are going to relate to one another, they're going to do deals with another, that are circuits among themselves that don't necessarily have any reference to the West. I think there'll be a very— it's a very interesting question what happens between NATO and— sorry, ASEAN and BRICS, because ASEAN will remain ASEAN. It's a regional organization, whereas BRICS is not, right? So it has its place, just like the SCO continues to have its place with BRICS. And I think there'll be very interesting interactions. I'm looking forward to next year when Malaysia chairs ASEAN, and when Malaysia's application to BRICS will also be up. I think we can be a bridge between the two, and I look forward to that.

It is to my, uh, to my knowledge that, uh, Indonesia and Singapore opted out of joining BRICS. And I just got the word Singapore hadn't, hadn't made itself.

It's, uh, yeah, yeah, I think Indonesia had, had mentioned that, uh, you know, flagged an interest but not Singapore as far as I know.

Yeah, just the word that I got was Indonesia and Singapore kind of dropped their interest in BRICS. And makes me just wonder, okay, must be something behind closed doors that pushed—

yeah, there's a lot of pressure. There's a lot of pressure not to, to take part, which is strange. Yeah, from our perspective is rather strange because these are not exclusive arrangements. This is— this reminds me of, uh, you know, the, uh, all the ruckus over the Asian Infrastructure and Investment Bank. Right, a few years ago, AIIB, right? Uh, huge pressure on certain countries, especially Japan, not to join and so on. And then in the event the UK joined, I mean, what is all that about? Uh, why the insecurity about it? So yes, there's pressure and there's increasing pressure on Southeast Asian countries. Yeah, this represents an attack on our sovereignty.

Wow. Well, this is why I'm concerned, John, about, for example, on the ASEAN front, I'm concerned with the countries like Philippines. On the BRICS front, I am concerned about a country like India. So yeah, yeah, that's to me, you can be wishy-washy, you can have both feet, uh, two feet on both sides of the fence.

They are very, very different countries. Yeah, India is too large to be assimilated to the West. You know, they're always going— the West is always going to be assimilated if they think they can just fold India in, into like that. Yeah, it may play the game, it may on occasion be more pro-Western, on occasion not. But as you see recently with Modi's diplomacy, in the middle of the NATO meeting in Washington, right, this big NATO do, he goes to, you know, he goes to hug— yeah, he goes to Russia, he goes to Moscow to, to, to give Putin a big bear hug. Um, so, so really India is not, not so easily folded into it. It has its problems with China.

Yeah.

Uh, but yeah, there's just too much of it. It really is its own subcontinent, right?

And speaking of those problems, John, do you think, do you foresee, you know, I'll ask you as an advisor to a government, you will have a better understanding than an average person. Do you see, in your opinion, that India may ever one day sit down with China and reset their relationships? Is this possibility?

I think it's— of course it's possible. I think it's possible. It's difficult now when populist politics dominates in India.

Yeah.

And China, the border issue, which is the main issue, is used to play up sentiment. Uh, well, Indian-style democracy is part of the, the reason why this is, this is difficult, quite, quite frankly, right? And the role in which, uh, these— in the way in which these, these, uh, conflicts or disagreements can become politicized rather than put on the back burner, which China has often suggested. Let's cooperate where we can. This is a relatively insignificant, uh, matter. And keep the status quo. So yes, it is possible, but, uh, of course not under the present, uh, government. I think there's a chance of some sort of stabilization or cooling of relations. In that regard, SCO and BRICS are very important. They enable them to sit down together.

Yeah, you know, well, yeah, but, but John, sitting down doesn't mean they're gonna agree. Cohesively with the, the policies of the entire team, for that matter.

Yeah.

And that's what I see. That's what I see India is doing in BRICS and Philippines in, in ASEAN.

Yeah. India has, uh, at certain times suspected of, of be, you know, behaving like a kind of a spoiler in BRICS, for example, right? Uh, of using that to balance China. But I think more multilateralism can help knit interests together so that you can avoid open conflict, avoid war, and just maximize the conditions for, you know, the possibilities for collaboration. Look, China is India's largest trading partner. It's a very, very important trade relationship. I think a Southeast Asian or ASEAN way of looking at it is to see that even if one might have adversarial relations in one dimension, They don't exhaust all the range, all the different dimensions of relationship, including people-to-people relations. So a lot is always going on. We never reduce things to a kind of univalent, you know, one-dimensional view, as I think liberal politics tends to do. Everything is warfare. Everything is your— my way or the highway. Everything becomes ideological and ideological fight to the death. It's not that. I think one doesn't need to expect, uh, you know, everything to be rosy. Yeah. And, uh, you do the best you can in the circumstances and allow development. I think that another, another thing about Asian diplomacy is you, you always pay attention to development and you use that— the bettering of your people, the betterment of your people. If each country views that as primary thing, we need to take care of our people, and that's a universal concern, you have a basis for shared interest even between China and the US. I mean, India still has a huge proportion of its children growing up stunted, malnourished, right?

It's not in the—

you know, there are things to take care of in terms of development, the things to take care of in infrastructure, for example, in development. So You know, focusing on, on, on, on conflict and on militarization is just the dumbest thing. Yeah, no one wants to do this, not China, not Southeast Asia in particular.

Yeah, and especially for a country like India, which it's in much need of the infrastructure than the military and so forth. Now, yeah, now moving forward into that direction, uh, because I do fear, I do fear that what my country might end up doing moving forward as the world shifts from that unipolar to a multipolar system, especially when it comes down to economics and the financial aspects of it. This is where the biggest dilemma is going to be in Washington, when the dollar will sort of be dropped from cross-border transactions, and especially when you look at in Asia.

So Right, right.

Yeah. Will this push the US, in your opinion, or the collective West for that matter, to embark on a very, very assertive, to the point of confrontational policies?

You mean, will desperation?

Yes. Yes, exactly.

And possibly catastrophically declining financial situation push them to do something desperate, right? Something foolish.

That's correct.

Yes, it is a worry. It is a worry. We see under the neocons, uh, and under neocon policy, a willingness to undertake, uh, you know, what the Chinese might view as lose-lose. You know, Chinese prioritize win-win or mutually beneficial relations. But neocons are willing to push lose-lose, even if I lose more than you, actually. Um, so it's a, you know, it's a very curious ideology. There's a lot to it. You, you know, you can— psych— there's a lot of, frankly, pathological, uh, a lot of psychopathy, uh, in it. Uh, but there's also some of it a kind of religious, millenarian, or eschatological push. They see themselves— it's a kind of secularized religion in which, you know, you're pushing for a kind of grand resolution, a war to end all wars. And it's really the greatest worry to have to deal with people like that. Yeah, they'll blow the whole place up. Rather than go down. So that is a risk. So managing the US down from its inflated— well, some of its people, its present crop of elite— down from these delusional, uh, from its sense of itself and of its place in the world, that's, that's going to be really a tricky thing. And our survival could depend on it, not to put too fine a point on it. Yeah, so I think that, yeah, the pessimistic side of myself I think would worry about some of the truly irrational elements in this. I don't underestimate it. So much of it is about some sense in which, you know, the self-understanding of the West relative in its dealings with the rest of the world is that it must be supreme, otherwise all hell will break loose or it's the end of the world. They have no conception, no experience of dealing with us on equal terms. I say this from experience, right? A lot of the time you see these, uh, fairly racist and condescending attitudes emerge really quite quickly. They'll come over to Southeast Asia, for example, and just lecture us, right, as if they knew anything, um, about how we think and, and live and what is important to us.

Yeah, it's always been that way. I mean, I, I was— I took part in some talks way back, and I kind of Yeah, yeah, you, you, you'll have to ask the boss, can I have a private word with you please? You put the box—

because you're not— yeah, could you not, you could you not do that?

Yeah.

And it's worse under the sort of neocon thing, uh, which is frankly supremacist. And that supremacism has a long history. It goes— it takes a while to get away, which is why I favor realism on the other side, to the extent that in the next— in the incoming administration, you have actual realists. Actually, I don't care if— I, I think everyone would breathe a sigh of relief even if they were robustly China hawks or Asia hawks, right? Yeah. Ah, yeah, you know, China cannot— as long as you're realist, as long as you're willing to come to some sort of— you, as long as you understand that it's better for us all if we don't blow each other up, there can be some sort of modus vivendi. We haven't heard that term in a very long time.

That's true. Well, the thinking in Washington is it's already— this is where my big concern again, this is why I always say we have a leadership deficiency here in the US and collective West. Do you know why, John? Because already statement came out of JD Vance, the candidate for the vice president, already stating about the support Taiwan militarily already. And that tells me right there, the writing between the, uh, the writing on the wall as to what the policy is going to be. And, and it is very concerning.

Right now we're dealing with very tiny differences, and we're grasping at straws here in terms of the differences between American policymakers. Yeah, but what choice do we have? You know, you either— this, this basket of sort of these fruitcakes the, frankly, the present lot who have no conception of diplomacy, and possibly others coming in who might want to push for, uh, robustly for U.S. interests and are willing to come to some sort of deal, perhaps something could be worked out. I'm just trying to be hopeful here, right, and grasping at some straws that one sees, but I think a return of realism Uh, and, and well, despite Vance's statements, I've said before, my, my notion is that he's not a neocon, that he's a realist. Yeah. And I think a, even a very robustly anti-China, if you will, realist, as long as one's a realist— and I don't mean, which of course realism carries the meaning of in popular, you know, in common speech of being realistic. Of course, that's part of it, but realism is this understanding that the other side is just like me, me, wants to maximize their security interests, their, their security and also their prosperity, etc. You, you have to, with a nuclear power, come to some sort of accommodation if you're not going to blow each other up. So as long as the diplomacy can return, that's a very, very minimal ask, I know, But I hope that's possible fairly soon. That's the thing to work for. Otherwise one despairs.

And by the way, guys, what John mentioning about realism, those are the main school of thoughts that exist within the international relation theory. As far as if you go study international, you get—

you have liberal internationalism, a kind of idealism, and then realism.

And realism. So just FYI, guys, for you to know. Them. Now, I, I want to, I want to get your take, John, on, uh, uh, three countries in that part of the world, uh, and those are Japan, South Korea, and Australia. Now, New Zealand, I'm starting to put question mark on it because I feel New Zealand now is being sucked in slowly into the orbit of the US. But the main ones, Australia, South Korea, and Japan. We always know— well, I mean, we know that there is US presence on the Japanese soil, you know, same in South Korea, which to me, by the way, when you have that massive presence—

and same in Australia.

Yeah, yeah. To me, you are not a sovereign. You're sovereign on papers. That's it.

Yeah.

Where do you see those three countries moving forward given the shifts that's taking place economically inside Southeast Asia with the likes of ASEAN and BRICS as far as, as far as economics?

That's a good question, uh, and, um, I like that you put it in a dynamic context. Uh, first of all, China is the largest trading partner of all, all three, okay? Their actual economic interests run counter to, uh, their strategic interests as they define it. Of being under the US umbrella or being within the alliance. So their adherence to anti-China policies, particularly in trade, have been at their own cost as well, has cost them. Um, South Korea and Japan, uh, actually all three of them, uh, quite severely hit by, by what they have had to do in terms of export restrictions to, to, to China and deterioration of trade. So this is not a great policy for them, it's not sustainable, and of course it, it endangers them. Where does ASEAN and a growing ASEAN stand relative to this? Now ASEAN as a region has become China's largest trading partner, exceeding the US and EU. So it's by far the most important, and it's also the most— it's also a fast-growing region. So it's going to be more and more important as a balancer or as a, a kind of moderator and mediator in the, in, in the region, economically but also strategically. If these countries— these countries cannot maintain a kind of all-out enmity with China and still meet around ASEAN and trade with ASEAN, which is open to all. So as this region becomes— as Southeast Asia becomes more and more important, I think it'll have a moderating influence because each of them will have to come and, you know, there is a kind of ASEAN-centric regional architecture that I don't know if people are aware of, but the regional architecture of East Asia— and by that we just mean the, the, all the mechanisms for people to talk to one another— ASEAN-centric. The most important of these are all around ASEAN. Defense Minister, the ASEAN, the, the Asian Defense Ministers' Meeting, ASEAN is at the center of it. The ASEAN Summit and the East Asia Summit, they all occur around ASEAN meetings. So it's a convener because it's of— it's not a threat to anyone and it's open to all. But economically, it's also open to all. Now, if you have this, none of these countries can afford outright enmity. In fact, Australia has moderated its position recently. Japan and South Korea also moderated their position recently a little bit with a kind of trilateral that they had with Beijing, which is quite interesting. So they have, they, they have to maintain that, that balance. But hopefully they're socialized by Southeast Asia. They like to use that word socialization on, on others in a condescending way. Hopefully we socialize them into non-enmity, into coexistence. Um, it has to happen if there's going to be— if there will be a multipolar world. And as U.S. influence in the region recedes, and the U.S. necessarily has to take care of its own interests. These guys, these three, don't want to be left on the shore. Yeah, you know, like a, like an abandoned Ukraine or Germany if, uh, if, uh, if NATO is disbanded, for example.

Yeah, well, I do know they cannot become— yeah, yeah, I do know, John, I do know that, and I got this from, uh, uh, reliable sources, that, that Australia is concerned about both Indonesia and Malaysia's economies surpassing it.

Yeah, because Indonesia will at some point surpass even Japan. Okay, Southeast Asia. So, uh, growth rates and, and, and population, uh, included. So, so these are important countries, uh, in, in, in terms of, of where the growth is. Um, and they usually— they've been overlooked for, you know, West Asia, Middle East, because of all the conflict there. And then there's a Eurocentric view of the world. You overlook this, but this part of the world is where, you know, if you recall the spice trade, the real Europeans coming here from the 16th century, for example, for, for spice trade and for, uh, for trade with China in, in essence, and to monopolize or control that trade. This is the beginning of, of, uh, world trade, of global capitalism. Was here. So it's a, it's a, an absolutely kind of indispensable part of the world, uh, growing more important. Um, and, uh, it has, it continues to have an important role in, in socializing these, uh, these Western, uh, countries into a multipolar order, to the extent that they, if they wake up, right, if they don't have their head completely in the sand and realize they're in the multipolar world they should work with ASEAN, they should work with Southeast Asian countries. Now Australia is not, you know, Australia is now under this really anti, uh, yeah, it has under especially the previous administration insanely kind of xenophobic policy, but it hasn't always been like that. There were times when it tried to be linked to Asia, you know, it tried to be part, to be seen as part of Asia. Yeah, so it's— yeah, it— there are other potentials.

Yeah, but, but John, John, they never wanted to be identified as Asians. That's to me, that was the problem.

Yeah, yeah, Paul Keating actually tried, and there are a few more enlightened Australians, uh, yeah, perspective, you see its future with Asia. But yes, it's, uh, you know, it does quite appear quite irredeemably identifying itself with a receding, uh, Anglo Empire. Yeah, that's correct. No, it has its— it's, uh, it can't escape it, the structure of settler colonialism, quite frankly, the way in which it came to be a polity at all. So, so there are kind of deep structural issues there.

Yeah, well, now it's getting even worse for them. So yeah, uh, I, I need to get your take on two other aspects before I turn it over for final word here and turn to my, uh, viewers here. Guys, prepare your questions please for John. Uh, uh, I need to take your— I, I need to have your input about the two other entities: RCEP, the Regional Economic Comprehensive Partnership, and the SCO. Now with these two, if we put ASEAN and— SCO? Yeah, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.

Oh, SCO.

Yeah, SCO. Where do you see those two going, moving forward within this landscape of the new multipolar system, uh, multipolar order.

Let me start with the SCO, which just had a quite, quite a dynamite meeting. Yeah, quite an important meeting. Um, they, they are maturing as an organization. Uh, it was started by the Chinese in Shanghai, um, to really to to have Russian involvement, to have everyone's involvement, to have multilateralism around China's growing influence and economic expansion in Central Asia, right? If you look at any Chinese history, it's always had a very important relationship, a critical relationship with Central Asia, through Central Asia, with ancient polities like Persia on one side, right?, with, uh, in, in the Islamic world, uh, it's always in the so-called Silk Road. So it's very, very important. But as, as, uh, its relationship with the 'stans, uh, become— became more important, these were traditionally seen as Russia's— Russia sees them as his own backyard, something like its, its sphere of influence. They were, after all, part of the, uh Soviet Union. Um, so this— the SCO is a way to do this with— in consultation, to develop the region, to grow the region. And it's, it's going very well. It represents the revival of, of Eurasia. It's extremely important in geopolitical terms. It's the end of a world dominated by maritime fringes. The North Atlantic fringe dominated by, you know, naval power that could blockade and extort and extort and basically do gunboat diplomacy. You know, it doesn't work anymore if these guys can shift, move goods across Eurasia. So, so it changes geopolitics in a fundamental way. It's an extremely important organisation, and it's also part of the cementing of the relationship between China and Russia. Which is a very important strategic relationship, as you know. Now, RCEP is actually an ASEAN-originated effort. People like to talk about it as this sort of Chinese thing. It originates in ASEAN, let me tell you, uh, and driven by ASEAN. And Chinese participated. India was in it at one point, uh, but what— withdrew, uh, because it was very difficult, frankly, to get the, uh, agreement with the Indians on the early set of of agreements, but it includes everyone in Asia-Pacific, including Australia, Japan, and so on. So, and it's one of the world's largest— it will be the world's— it is the world's largest sort of trade arrangement. I think it's coming along, but slowly. I think there are issues with adoption of some of the trade liberalization, and they're trying to figure out how, because over something so large, it's necessarily difficult at core of RCEP, let me say, are some regional free trade agreements that are already there. And that's, that's the foundation. Once again, ASEAN, which has an ASEAN Economic Community, a free trade zone, so to speak, arrangement between themselves and with China. The China-ASEAN Free Trade Area actually came into place even earlier, in 2010, earlier than the ASEAN Economic Community. So, so trade liberalization is already there. At the core of RCEP. You see, again, if you're Australia, if you're Japan, if you're Korea, South Korea, you want to be part of this, you have to relate to the guys, you have to relate to Southeast Asia. You either do that or you freeze yourself up and pretend you can transport yourself to the North Atlantic, and they are going to find out that they can't. So there's an adjustment process, I understand, to go back to the earlier question, for for these countries in terms of their political culture and their strategic culture. But there's hope that if we survive the next few years without going to World War III, that can happen. Yeah, there's a massive job in terms of education, in terms of people understanding one another.

Let's hope, let's hope. And speaking of that, John, I don't know if you're aware of the conversation that is taking place now between, uh, the possibility— let me, let me rephrase this— the possibility of the building of a port, uh, that will between North Korea, Russia, and China.

Uh, yes, that's very important.

Now, how—

I wish you could bring up the map when you talk about that, because I didn't have it. It's extremely significant.

Let me see here.

Uh, it's little known that Yeah, if you know the map, while you're looking at it, I can describe it to your— to your— okay, viewers in your community. Uh, China now resembles a kind of a, you know, has a shape of a cockerel. There's a— the northeast part is actually gigantic, is sort of the cockerel's head. And the northeast region, I don't borders Siberia, Russian-controlled Siberia, and North Korea. Uh, this is an extremely important nexus of, of 3 countries, 3 nuclear powers. Let me see here. Okay, but no, not this one. Yeah, going further north, if you get a map of Japan, you're going to see it, and that's actually important. That's Malaysia, the Strait of Malacca, right? As you see, it's in between East and West. I should have told you about maps. I like to talk with maps because—

yeah, I did. Yeah, I didn't. Yeah, yeah.

And anyway, and, uh, so, so anyway, in that part, China— the key thing that a map will reveal It's in the very far north of China. China has no ocean access, no access to the Sea of Japan. That's because the coastal areas were taken by the Russian Empire, where Vladivostok is, for example. It's Russia's semi— sort of all-season port. Um, the port that doesn't— doesn't— supposed to not freeze over in, in winter, uh, and, and Russia has access, uh, to that, and the borders is right across from Japan, and China does not. But the three countries— China, China, Japan, China, Russia, and North Korea— they border a river through which China can have access to the sea. If China does have that and, and access to the port, it's extremely important. Let me, let me get it up as well. Um, let's see, if you look for— you can always sort of look it up on, on Google Maps, right?

Yeah, um, yeah, this one they have them separately, like each country on its—

yes, yes, yes, um, North Korea map in, in the, in, in the world, and you will see that It provides that sort of access, and the three of them could collaborate on developing— the important thing is, uh, Siberia, which has massive resources and the ability to grow food. So with all that, uh, again, the question is, does Japan want to be frozen out of this? Can Japan afford to be frozen out of this? By not, you know, yeah, it's blocked out there. But if you see, if you look in the corner with Russia, North Korea, China, you just miss it there.

But, um, so yeah, okay, yeah, those maps are not detailing much here, John. Yeah, yeah, that's why.

So Google Maps would do it, um, which I don't have right now. I don't have— let's see.

Yeah, no, not a problem.

So, so anyway, so you have, you have, um, you have China, you have Russia, you have North Korea. North Korea and Russia like this, and and a river in between through which China has access to the, uh, to the sea.

Very interesting.

And, um, their collaboration, the settling of this relationship, because it's always been a little bit, uh, dicey also between China and North Korea. While they are kind of allied, uh, North Korea is very, very fiercely independent. And feels more comfortable with Russia in the mix. It's that it's able to balance China with Russia, and the Chinese are happy to do that. It's the same arrangement with Vietnam, with Russia as a friendly balancer, and a similar relationship with India. Now, that China is able to manage diplomacy like this is really quite interesting. It doesn't demand vassals. So long as you can relate peacefully, it's fine. Okay, so that, you know, the West should try this actually. Um, so, uh, but what's at stake here is the development of, of that massive, uh, region. And Japan, a resource-poor, energy-poor country, uh, needs that. So they're either going to have to come to terms with Russia and therefore also with China and North Korea. Yeah, if they're going to do this, what's in the way of that? What's in the way of that is its vassalage, as you— which, as you rightly put it, in the U.S., uh, security system that has been with us since the San Francisco Treaty. This is really out of date. The bases have no business being there in the 21st century, neither in Korea nor in Japan. It permanentizes the, uh, post-war situation. It permanentizes an incomplete resolution to World War II and holds the entire region back. So there's enormous potential to the region, you know, to— if, uh, if this could be sorted out. It sounds extremely radical, and it shouldn't be, to say these, uh, these bases should be gone. Yeah. And, and Japan should be— and South Korea, uh, should be free to, to relate to, to their neighbors in a civilized, uh, manner without, without a kind of, uh, adversarial relationship.

Yeah, but they won't have the political will to ask the US to leave. They just— I don't see that.

Well, that's because their, their governments and their system are a result of this long occupation. Yeah, they are elites who have been held up by U.S. patronage over this long period. It's not an accident that Japan has essentially had one party in charge for all this, for these 7 decades. So those are the costs of having bases there and of this relationship.

And the same thing we did in Japan. Otherwise, if Okinawa gets its independence, then that's it. Yeah, it's over for the U.S.

It's all for the U.S. And, and that's a live issue, Okinawa.

That's true. All right, guys, I'm gonna, uh, prepare some ques— if you have some questions here for John, let me first say thank you to Noel. Noel, an avid supporter of the channel, thank you very much for your Super Sticker, truly appreciate you. Uh, Francis Tango, as always, appreciate your support for the channel. And question: can BRICS dismiss members from organization?

It's, it's so new that it's trying to figure that out itself. That is why Lavrov— the Russians have asked for a slowdown of BRICS, uh, expansion or BRICS growth. You know, I don't think they expected to be this popular.

Yeah, well, you gotta know, half the world wants to join them.

So, uh, so they, they're figuring out the rules. As you know, not only that, they want to avoid situations like, uh, Argentina, who join, and then because you have a different president come in, another type of government come in, withdraw from it. So that doesn't help anyone.

Well, we forced him, you know that, John, behind closed doors. We forced him to take that stand.

So yeah, well, this, this, this is the sort of pressure that everyone wants to avoid. And we hope will be a thing of the past. Yeah, this, this essentially very colonial behavior.

Indeed. Uh, Speaking the Truth 2, thank you very much for your super sticker here. And we have a new member, that's Ronald Shaw. Good to have you here becoming a channel member. Appreciate you here. So let me see some questions here, guys, and just put Q so I know it's a question because The— we got like, uh, almost what, over 1,000 live here or something like that. So I can see, yeah, now there's very engaging community here. So, uh, Timeline Dunkley, good to see you as always. Dr. O, this question is for you. I just have a thought. Is America scared of leaving Germany because another Hitler may rise up against? Same thing with Japan.

Yeah, that's the excuse they have. Yeah, that's, that's, uh, you know, they tell the Chinese, yeah, their allies during the war, uh, we're there to hold the Japanese down, make sure they don't, uh, you know, come up again like that. And then they tell the other Europeans that they're all— so it's a kind of, uh, protection racket. Yeah. Uh, and, uh, this, you know, this can't go on.

Yeah. Your camera.

Yeah. My camera has gone off, has it?

Yes, it's off, but I can hear you. Okay, uh, it just probably— yeah, yeah, I did that. I did this too, John, one time I hit by mistake. So it is another question from Chess. Question: would US Western interference in the region, meaning in Southeast Asia, that is, affects diplomacy between ASEAN neighbors? Some are leaning or very dependent on Western grace. Good question.

Could you repeat that? Would US—

um, sorry, question: would the US or Western interference in the region, meaning in Southeast Asia, affect diplomacy between ASEAN neighbors? Some, meaning some countries are leaning or very dependent on Western grace?

Um, well, you're seeing that with the Philippines, I think. Yeah, but nevertheless, I think the others— Malaysia, for example— maintain good ties. They try not to let this get in the way. And like I said, there's an ability to compartmentalize things. We may not agree with what you're doing And we will talk behind the scenes, but it's diplomatic ties, full diplomatic ties, and whatever trade ties there are remain. So it doesn't affect it as much as people might imagine. I mean, classic case, the really difficult case is the one with Myanmar, for example.

Yeah.

And it continues to— we continue to have Myanmar as a member of ASEAN, although they no longer— they don't attend ASEAN meetings because of what has happened there. But they're still, you know, uh, as Pascal Lottas reminded me the other day, when you have ASEAN meetings, they insist that a chair is there for Myanmar.

Yeah.

So, so they try not to let these things get in the way of relationship between countries because, as I said, the relations are about far more, um, than, say, you know, how you relate to the West. Interesting. Yeah, it is, it is not getting— I don't want to minimize the difficulty because I think one, one thing people should— one thing I want to say is that it's getting more difficult. The pressure is growing to conform. So NATO-style, US-style policy of you're either with us or against us, that kind of world, very Western binary worldview, uh, they're, they're ratcheting it up in Southeast Asia. And everyone is against this. Everyone is against this, you know.

And as the world shifts, I'm sure, uh, the, the, the whole Asia region, I ain't gonna care about what Americans think.

Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. The main reaction is not to get— the main reaction actually is to plow on and do our thing, not to get too, uh, not to get too caught up in this. To the extent possible, ignore what these guys are trying to— are talking about. Like, for example, I think NATO is eminently ignorable in, in Southeast Asia.

Yeah, interesting. I'll take a last question here from JS, a last one here, John, for you. Uh, the West and India believe China wants to dominate, rule the world. Does ASEAN countries share that view, or do they believe in the win-win scenario that John Banks said? So basically, your opinion on that, on what the statements from the West—

as far as they absolutely do not believe that China wants to dominate the world, and they have the experience to back that up. Yeah, they have about 2,000 years of experience, some of them at least. I— we had trade from Java to Southeast Asia, to Java and Sulawesi, to southern China, from about the 7th century. We're not talking about new relations, as Malaysian leaders have often repeated. Previous Malaysian leader and the current one, the current prime minister, they both said, look, we have had a couple, you know, we've had hundreds, centuries of, of relationship with the Chinese. Never once have they tried to to conquer us, as they say. China's way with Southeast Asia is definitely not military conquest, and those relationships are characterized by trade, uh, and, and cultural exchange, uh, you know, religion, for example, the movement of Buddhist monks through Southeast Asia and, and, and China, that kind of thing. No. So, so no one believes that. It's absolutely ludicrous, uh, and everyone's seeking win-win. And as they seek win-win relationships with the West, they are very interesting. So yeah, these are not countries that can have any interest in adversarial relations with anyone.

Yeah, well, that's very interesting. Where can my people, my community find you, John?

Uh, I'm not, uh, just on my Twitter account. Yeah, which you can put up. For now, I'm getting my stuff together. Yes, yes, please, uh, hit me up there. Um, I write in Global Times and Beijing Review, so I've quite a few pieces there, um, and I'll collate all that and Substack it. But, um, I've been doing that, and I comment on CGTN occasionally, on RT. Um, so I've not put, put things out on my own channel very much, but, uh, yeah, I spend too much time on Twitter. And, uh, well, you gotta like—

I follow— by the way, guys, I do follow John on Twitter. So if you can just, uh, uh, get to his, uh, Twitter handle there. And as you see—

yeah, thank you for the—

thank you. It's very, very interesting one. Well, John, I can't thank you enough on behalf of the entire community here. We say thank you for coming on time for us here, sharing your knowledge, your insights. And I love—

thank you, it's nice to meet your community.

Yes, of course. And I will look forward to having you again. Thank you. You take care, John.

My pleasure.

Bye-bye.

Thank you. Bye-bye. Bye-bye.

All right, guys, I hope you find this very informative, interesting. John is very, very insightful. I mean, you don't get to advise a government if you don't know what you're talking about. So John is very, very insightful, and we will have him again on, on the channel. Just to let you guys know, tomorrow, remember to join me at 12:00, uh, uh, 12:15, like at the regular time we do. I'll be talking about the recent developments, uh, regarding the Yemeni group targeting Tel Aviv, and, uh, also we'll be talking about, uh, uh, Russia's decision to arm the Houthi group in Yemen. So I'll be talking about this one tomorrow. So, and, uh, look forward to seeing you. And as always, guys, remember, your politics impact your daily life in more ways than one. Till next time, guys. Bye-bye.