What Will Happen to the Philippines Under Trump's New Asia Policy? Conversation W/Anna Malindog-Uy

In this Geopolitical Trends interview, host David Oualaalou speaks with PhD candidate and economist Anna Malindog‑Uy about the Philippines’ precarious trajectory under President Marcos Jr. and the incoming Trump administration. Anna outlines the country’s domestic crises—widespread corruption, rising crime, and volatile political rivalries—while criticizing Marcos’s pivot toward a heavily US‑centric foreign policy, highlighted by the expansion of EDCA bases near the Taiwan Strait and South China Sea. The discussion turns to two newly enacted statutes, the Archipelagic Sea Lanes Act and the Maritime Zones Act, which legally assert Philippine claims in the South China Sea but risk contravening UNCLOS, provoking China, Vietnam, and Malaysia, and creating enforcement dilemmas. Both guests argue the Philippines is being used as a proxy in US‑China strategic competition, with the United States’ hawkish defense, state‑department, and national‑security appointments under Trump likely to deepen militarization, despite Trump’s “America‑First” rhetoric promising de‑escalation. Anna further examines the Philippines’ strained relations with ASEAN, the country’s marginalisation within the bloc, and the missed opportunity of joining an expanding BRICS, which could offer economic and technological benefits. Throughout, Anna stresses a shift from high‑politics, zero‑sum sovereignty battles to low‑politics, cooperative resource management, and urges the United States to respect Philippine autonomy. The interview ends with reflections on regional examples (Indonesia, Thailand) and a hopeful yet cautious outlook for the Philippines under the looming US policy shift.
Chapters
All right, hello everybody and welcome to Geopolitical Trends, where truth matters. Excited to be with you once again. I know just had a conversation last night with, uh, Warick Powe, Dr. Warick Powe. Uh, very, very interesting insights. I always enjoy having Warick here, and next time we'll have Anna Tengel. But today, or this morning that is, it's, it's 0800 hours my time, but it's evening time in Philippines where my guest is. So, so I have an interesting guest and I am sure you're gonna learn a lot from her. I'm aware of her work, very excited about her. So we're gonna bring her in right away and we're gonna start getting into our conversation. All right, good evening, Anna.
Good, good morning in your side, good evening in my side, and thank you so much, David, for inviting me into your program. I'm very excited and I hope I will be able to answer your question to the best of my ability.
Oh yeah, it's so— we are so excited to have you here, so excited to have you. As I said, uh, just guys, for you to know, I'm gonna post all the links for Anna's articles and so forth in the description. I'll do a brief bio and we'll get in because she's a wealth of knowledge, so we don't want to waste too much time. So let me, let me just do a brief, brief intro here. Uh, just for those who might not know who Anna is. And, uh, so let me get to the bio right here. So Anna, Anna Maldonado, is a PhD candidate, which means what, guys? Soon she's gonna earn her doctorate degree, and we'll call her with the proper title as Dr. Anna Maldonado. So she's a candidate at the Institute of South— of the South South Cooperation and Development at Peking University in Beijing, one of my favorite universities. I'm going to be looking into that university. She's also economist, uh, a writer for the Manila Times, and I just read one of her articles yesterday, and also economist writer for the Lobbyists of Publicus Asia. So I'll put all this link for you guys in, in the description, and we'll go from there. So All right, Anna, I would like to start pick your brain and for my community here to learn a lot. We all know what's going on with Philippines, but before we delve into this, I like to have your insights into where do you see Philippines going forward.
Okay, um, under a Marcos Jr. administration, to be very honest and frank with you, David, it seems like the future of my country is a little bleak and not so bright. I at this time. Yeah, I'm sorry to say that, but I'm just being honest and frank, especially to your audience and even to everyone. It's precisely because at the moment, if you really look at the administration of President Marcos Jr., domestically there's a lot of problem. One of the biggest problem right now in the country is, um, the Latin corruption in government, and it's, it's really there. A lot of projects are not being implemented, a lot of money is wasted. So corruption is one. The other one, I think, is the rising criminalities and even the rising drug problem in the country. That is another problem that we are facing as a country, and that's domestic. Aside from that, we have also— well, as far as I'm concerned, I don't agree with the foreign policy of the current administration of Marcos Jr. Before him, it was Duterte's time. Was an independent and quite a balanced foreign policy. Now it's very much leaning to the United States. It's— I'm not saying that we should not have relation with the United States, but I think it's very important for a country like the Philippines, a small one, being in, in, in Southeast Asia, and in being in, in, in many ways we are at the center of geopolitics between China and the United States, to have a— to have a balanced foreign policy. But Under Marcos Jr., it's not a balanced foreign policy. It's leaning to the United States up to the extent that our so-called independence, autonomy, and even sovereignty are now compromised. And how would I— what are the manifestations of this? First and foremost, you have an additional EDCA/US bases in the country. Before it was 5, now it's already 9, and there's even some kind of rumors that it's not Necessarily 9 only, it's around 17, but the only one declared are 9. And if you really look at where these US EDCA bases or military bases are located, they're located in sensitive areas. And what are the sensitive areas that I'm talking about? It's near Taiwan Strait or facing the South China Sea. And we know that the Taiwan Strait is a very volatile region, and you have, you know, a contestation between Well, China, of course, Taiwan, as far as China is concerned, is part of China. But you have some elements in Taiwan that are pushing for independence, and it's being some kind of supported by the United States. The United States still claims that it adheres to the One China policy, and we're kind of, you know, in the middle of all this. And the South China Sea, you also know that, you know, there is a dispute in the South China Sea, but the dispute is not just between the Philippines and China, it's between other claimant states, like for example Malaysia, you have Vietnam in there, even Brunei. So, and you know, and the South China Sea is being used to a greater extent by the United States, uh, China. So what happens to the Philippines is we become like a proxy of the United States. So if you really look at the foreign policy of my country, it's, it's not balanced, it's not independent, and in some ways it gives us, um, it's really put us in a very difficult position in trying to balance you know, China and the United States. And that's under the administration of Marcos Jr. So if you really look at the country at the moment, both foreign policy-wise and domestic— wait, before I proceed, domestically also, politically speaking, my country is not stable in that sense. There's political instability. There are two families, strong political families, are to certain extent have this rivalry and also competition. And now you can— to the bridge of having quarrels, you know, the Dutertes and now the Marcos on the Romualdes. So you can see that there are a lot of political chaos, and to certain extent it's an instability because we don't know what will happen anytime soon. There's a threat to the Duterte faction that it— like, for example, the former president will be arrested by ICC, and the vice president, who's a Duterte, the daughter of the former president, will be impeached. So if this happens, happens, the whole country is like a ticking bomb. It will explode. There would be chaos, politically speaking, in my country. Maybe people will go to the street, because at the moment, to be very honest, the Dutertes are very much powerful. Uh, powerful in a sense that they have the support of the Filipino people, majority. Though you will see that, you know, the Marcos administration is in power. They have the money, they have all the politicians on their, on their side, but At the end of the day, we're a democracy, and in a democracy, real power lies on the people. So that is pretty much the general picture of my country at the moment. So if you ask me again, how do I see it? How do I see the future of my country? A bit difficult, a bit bleak, but I always— I'm the kind of person that always have this hope that, you know, things will be all right in a matter of time. But I think There's a saying that before it gets better, it gets worse first. I feel that's the case of my country at the moment.
Yeah, that's true. I remember when I was in China about a month ago or so, and I run into some Filipino people in Shanghai. That's where it was.
Yeah.
And I knew they were Filipino because I could hear that they were speaking, and I asked them, and I mentioned Philippines, and I could just tell they weren't happy with the current administration. And so, but speaking of that, uh, uh, I gotta go back to when Marcos Jr. took over. And I remember his first trip was to China. And really, when he did— when he made that trip, I got a sense that, you know what, maybe Marcos Jr. now is gonna pursue an economic policy vis-à-vis China because You know, China is your largest, biggest, humongous neighbor. It will make more sense to embark on, on ventures. Only to find out after he returned, signed the agreement with, at that time it was still the current Secretary of Defense, uh, uh, Austin, Lloyd Austin. And I was like, what the heck is he doing? Why is he playing? Will I be fair? In my assessment, if I say that it's not Marcos Jr. in control, it's the military establishment in the Philippines, will that be a fair assessment?
I think it— in my opinion, it's— I think it's not necessarily 100% the military control of the Philippines. No, I don't think that's the case, though I would say that the military, the Armed Forces of the Philippines, or many members or generals that we have in our country, Filipino generals, many of them are very much close to the United States because most of them were trained in the United States. So in a way, when you talk about defense, military, and even personal relationship, I think there's that element, that there's that strong element that, you know, they are very much close. But however, I would say it's really in the hands of the president. The very first place, based on our constitution, the sole author of our foreign policy is the president. I mean, whatever he wants, the whole establishment, including the military, will follow him. So I, I would not, I would not consider it as 100%, um, like, you know, coming from the military, but it's much more really Marcos Jr. Uh, I, that, that's what I see in, in, in that situation. There may be personal reasons to why he had that 180-degree pivot, no, from a very independent— from an independent foreign policy that we have during Duterte's time. We have very good relation with China economically speaking, even politically speaking, and we benefited from that good relation. And now we really have a challenging political and diplomatic relation with China, and it's impacting our economy. I am not sure what's really the deal between Biden and Marcos Jr., but I, I would presume there is But I'm not— I don't want to speculate, but of course I have my own perception. We discussed this domestically speaking, and there's a lot of, you know, speculations about this. And I even read one of your— I mean, I think you were interviewed before about the case of the Philippines, and you have mentioned that it has something to do with, um, what you call the freeze, the frozen assets of the Marcos Jr. Yeah, I have read one of your— I've listened to one of your interviews And that kind of speculation or some kind of perspective actually is not just your perspective. Many in my country also think that way, and even they have this perspective that it's actually the reason why, you know, because— yeah, yes, to a certain extent. So I would say that it's really in the hands of the president and the people around him. So, and if you really look at the current administration, it's surrounded by pro-American people, not the— not, you know, not people who are balanced in their perspective and who really, who really have the interest of the country at heart. Because for me, I believe that if you want your country to flourish economically speaking, you cannot ignore China. Cannot. Impossible to ignore that for sure.
Well, the, the reason I said that one, Anna, because during my days in Washington, DC, I was deep down inside the government. So you kind of— you get the idea. I had— yes, yeah, I had an access. That was the reason why I stated what I stated. If, if I wasn't sure about that, I won't say something like that, but I was aware of his case.
But now, anyway, but David, before that, it means that our speculations as well, to a certain extent, is kind of correct. Yeah, it is indeed.
It is indeed. Yeah, yeah, yeah, because again, no, you're right, you're absolutely correct. Now speaking of that, while we are on this topic of, of the US-Philippines, of course, and, uh, now with Trump being elected the president, we all know Donald Trump's hawkish, or president-elect Trump policy is going to be towards Asia in general, but specifically towards Philippines. What do you see coming regarding whether President-elect Trump is gonna pressure Philippines, or what, what do you expect him to do in Philippines specifically, in your opinion?
Well, it's, it's really interesting that Trump won in the election, and to be very frank with you, David, and, and to your audience, um, many in my country especially the political opposition. I would say the political opposition or the side that supports Duterte at the moment, or the Dutertes at the moment, were really happy that Trump won in the election. And even I, to a greater extent, um, it's not that I like Trump very much, but you know, it's weird that I was in some ways relieved that Trump won in the election. But it's a weird feeling, really. I'm not kidding. I was— I feel like It's weird for me to say like, okay, Trump won, and I think this is good, you know what I mean? But to be very— I mean, but in terms of when you talk about the Philippines, now that there will be a change of administration in the United States, Trump will be the president by January 20th in the inauguration. I think there will be a change in trajectory, especially when you talk about military and defense. As you can see, the Biden administration has this foreign policy of extending its you know, extending itself too much in different countries. Usually when you talk about military and defense, putting so much— prepositioning assets in different countries, especially in my country in Southeast Asia, deploying troops, creating these military bases, and even deployment of mid-range missile in my country. So that is the Biden foreign policy approach to my country, making us like a proxy. But I think in a Trump administration, given his philosophy of America First, and at the same time he is very transactional as a leader. Everything is based on transaction. I think a little of change, a little of change, especially when you talk about defense and military and military financing in the Philippines. I think it would be a little bit— I am, I'm not sure, this is what I think, and I hope, I hope this will happen, that it will be downgraded to a greater extent and also it will be reduced And I think many of this militarization of my country by the United States will be stopped or less listened to or reduced to a greater extent. That's my expectation. Because I believe that during the campaign, Trump have said that, you know, like for example, in Ukraine crisis, in Gaza, he wants it stopped. He doesn't want to spend America's money on wars that it does not generate revenue for America. It actually bleed America to a greater extent. So given that kind of pronouncement, I hope that in my country too, they will, under a Trump presidency, all of this defense and military, too much of militarizing my country vis-à-vis China, will be reduced or de-escalated. But I expect, though, on another note, I still expect that the military alliance, the MDT, the Mutual Defense Treaty, would still exist. I think Trump will be recalibrating our relationship, and I think economic ties will be there. And when it comes to the South China Sea, I think Trump will, will base his decision how we— how he will support the Philippines under Marcos administration with regard to the South China Sea based on what— if America, if America benefits from it, or if the geopolitical situation would benefit America or not. So it's not the same as the Biden. I, I think there will be a shift, uh, some— to some extent, some from the Biden approach to the Philippines when you talk about foreign policy, defense, and military, as compared to the incoming Trump administration. I really hope Trump will be more— would be true to his promises that he wants, you know, all of this conflict in different parts of the world stop or de-escalate, because that is good for the world. And many people, and I think even some Filipino Americans, supported him because of this. And we expect that in the Philippines he will try to de-escalate this too much, um, geopolitical, um, maneuvering that our country, my country, is being used against China defense-wise and military-wise. I really hope that he will follow through with his statements during—
well, well, Anna, I'll be frank with you. Usually, as one, as I said, worked inside at Washington. I understand how that system works. Uh, there is one thing with American politicians, you know, Trump is not a politician. So there's one thing in general term with politicians, uh, they'll say one thing and do the opposite. That's the norm here because of the domestic consumption. That's all reason for why Trump will say, well, I gotta, you know, end wars, whatever. It's nonsense. I'll tell you this because I know exactly what is going on. But the way to look at it, Anna, you look at it just by the nomination of now the 3 key positions in the upcoming administration or cabinet: Secretary of Defense, Secretary of State, and the National Security Advisor. 3 hawks. What do they share in common? They share one thing in common. Yeah, they are Chinese hawks, which means what? That all the assets military-wise is going to be pushed by using Philippines. That's the way I read it. This is why I'm concerned about— yeah, I'm concerned as to where Philippines is headed because they are not in position to extend and say to the Americans or push back. They just can't. And if you really— big concern for the Filipino people. I care less for the— I mean, we are always aware of the senior officials in Philippines and the assets they hold overseas. So it becomes the question for the average Filipino person. But, but nonetheless, yes, we hope that Trump will embark on that policy, except that the hawks inside Washington Beltway—
yeah, actually they let it happen because now I— sorry, sorry to cut you. Um, um, I agree with you. Um, when I found out and I, I read the news that the 3 important position and the people being appointed to those positions were almost confirmed. Of course, I mean, he is still gonna assume office. I was like worried about it, and we discussed it among our friends in the Philippines and also trying to understand why he chose these people and what would be the implication of that. Because as far as I know, the Democrats and the Republicans have a consensus It's like a bipartisan consensus that most of them are anti-China or they have this strong policy against China. But I was thinking that Trump, to a greater extent, as a businessman and in a way transactional, would always think of what's good for America. And I don't think decoupling or de-risking or having too much strategic competition with China or even a trade war would benefit America in the long run. So I was thinking, like, okay, maybe Trump Trump will, you know, will have a different and a little bit of shift in foreign policy and even economic policy towards China and even to the world. But at the moment, with these 3 people being appointed, I was like, oh my God, this is not good news. But at the end of the day, I'm hoping that, you know, he will be— so one friend of mine told me that if Trump— I don't know about this, you know more, I think— that if he decides on a policy and his subordinates has to follow, if they don't follow he will remove them from office. Someone told me about that, but well, I'm just— well, I don't know about it.
Yeah, there are rules for— he can't just do whatever he wishes because, for example, if he wants to remove the Attorney General because he doesn't like it, uh, there, there, there are, there are legal breaks in the Constitution that would prevent him as a president from doing so. Now, does he have the authority? Yes, he does., but he has to also have the justification for removing a senior, uh, uh, individual from the government. But yeah, Trump has that tendency of doing this. And this is, again, just to tie it back to Philippines, this is where my big concern, because I'm aware of the presence of the US missiles, you know, in the Philippines, the one that they are not declared, by the way. And second is you ask yourself is why will be his interest in fomenting more tensions in South China Sea using Philippines, using South Korea, using Japan, and now Australia also is being carved out militarily speaking. So, and this is one of the reasons why I had to think about the, uh, President Trump and ask you that question. So let's move on to— yeah, go ahead, go ahead.
Thank you for giving also that perspective because we've been thinking about this, um, I think the last 3 days already that we're really looking at the 3 people that has— that are about to be appointed by Trump, especially Rubio, you know.
Oh, his, his, uh, I had one and I'll share this with you and I usually I don't talk about my, my work, you know, back then I had an opportunity to assist him with something specific he won't be able to do because we were, some of us in the government, we were inside government, but we are independent of sort. And he backed down to the last minute. And I knew about his background in a sense of how he's pushing the foreign policy because he served on the, he's still serving on the US Foreign Relations Committee in the Senate. But also you have to understand where the backing, the funding of his election or reelection is coming from. AIPAC is very, very strong backer for Marco Rubio. He lives in Florida. What is Florida known for? There's a lot of Jewish communities, well-to-do in Florida. That's how, you know, his hawkish policy towards China— because two main things I do foresee is going to manifest themselves on the geopolitical landscape. And two countries only, Iran and China. But for this, you're gonna have to use countries like Philippines in the case of China. And that's to me where the concern I, I have about this one. Let's move on to, uh, I like to address one particular, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, development that just happened in Manila. And I'm gonna share a picture here with the audience, with our community here. Let me get the picture, guys, just to show you. Anna will know this one here for sure. There's the picture here. Marcos Jr. just passed a maritime law, angry in China, and even now Indonesia is reacting to this. It's like, what the heck is wrong with you? What is this maritime law all about, Anna? And any, any, any objective.
Okay, um, there are two new enacted laws, um, in the country. Um, the one, the, the first one is the Archipelagic Sea Lanes Act, and the other one is the Maritime Zones Act. So these two laws basically, because we don't want to have to discuss the technicality, it's too legalistic, that, but What I'm saying is that the laws basically is a manifestation of a legal assertion of the claims of the Philippines over the South China Sea. But the problem with this— well, as a Filipino, I think if you really— if you're not objective, you know, and you don't think of the whole region, you will be— you will say like, okay, yay, we have these laws and it's good for our country because we're asserting our rights legally speaking. And, you know, and when it comes to diplomatic lobbying or negotiations, we can use this. That's, that's pretty much being nationalistic. But, but if you put yourself in a situation where you look at the region, you care for the region, the whole South China Sea and the Asia-Pacific and the Southeast Asia, you will, you will understand that these laws risk many things and have geopolitical, economic, and some kind of risk that it— that they carry. The Archipelagic Sea Lanes Act and the Maritime Zones Act, these two are an assertion of our claim, the Philippine claims in the South China Sea. However, the problem is if you really look at the South China Sea issue, this dispute, the claims of China overlaps with our claim, and the claim of the Philippines is also overlapping the claim— it overlaps as well in with the claim of Vietnam. So it's a very complicated situation.. And even you have Malaysia on the other hand. So these laws, if you really look at them, it in certain extent encroaches— it encroaches on the claims of China. That's why China gets angry about it. And even with Vietnam. And I know Malaysia is actually protesting like China, and they declared their protest already. And it's a big headline in my country today, this morning actually. It was in a big newspaper. Malaysia is protesting like China. So there's an to a certain extent. So basically, when you talk about regional implication, what are the regional implications to this and how it, to a certain extent, it conflicts— these laws conflict with what you call UNCLOS, um, the United Nations, um, Convention on the Law of the Sea. The Marcos administration claims that these two laws are based on that. However, if you really read the laws it actually has, um, it contravenes— these laws contravene with the, with the concept of what you call freedom of navigation and overflight, because, you know, because of the overlapping claims. So in a way, other claimant states may contest this one in arbitral, uh, in international, um, courts like the ICJ or the ITLOS. So that is the situation that we have, but As you can see, these are domestic laws. The problem with this, how you gonna enforce these laws? Because if you enforce these laws, China will react, Malaysia will react, Vietnam will react. You cannot really enforce this. If you enforce it forcefully, there will be conflict in South China Sea. I don't think China will allow it, and I don't think Vietnam will allow it. So you will facilitate some kind of conflict that it may lead to a military or confrontation between different claimant states. And China is really asserting that this is not good. So now the thing here is there are two challenges to these laws. First is enforcement. Second, would it change the situation on the ground? No, it will not, because I don't think China will allow— even Vietnam or Malaysia I don't think so. So now the question is, what is the reason why the Philippines enacted these laws? I think it's much more two things that I can see. First is, it's like a confirmation or some kind of strengthening the claims of the Philippines over the South China Sea. On the other hand, you have to look at the context of the domestic situation of the Philippines at the moment. Um, President Marcos Jr., because of the so many domestic issues and so many, um, like corruption, um, rising criminality, his, his alleged— there's an issue against him of alleged that he is a drug user to a certain extent. There are this kind of issues being thrown at him. And then you have also, um, issues that regards to he is not capable or competent in being a leader. There's a lot of these issues being thrown at Marcos administration. So when you talk— when you look at him domestically, in terms of trust rating and approval rating, it's going down. It's really going down. So that is a fact. On the other hand, of course, he wants to assert himself that, you know, and he wants to boast that kind of trust rating amid so many domestic problems. So I think one reason why they push for this, the enactment of these laws, is you know, to, to, to put himself in that position that he is a strong leader, that he protects the country and its claim on the South China Sea, and he— and the territorial claims that we have over the South China Sea. Because why? Because, um, Filipinos sometimes don't understand the dynamics and the intricacies of the South China Sea issue. So when you say South China Sea, all Filipinos will rally behind someone who always— who would say like, we are protecting our territory, our claims on the South China Sea. So it's like a nationalistic, some kind of sentiment. So in a way, that's a political strategy on the part of the Marcos administration to push these laws ahead, push these laws now. And if you really look at the situation domestically also of the Philippines, we have a midterm election upcoming. It's, it's on May 2025. May 2025 is the midterm election. And, um, so in terms of campaigning, in terms of issues that by which, you know, voters will be drawn to you if you're running, or you have candidates that you're supporting, by which that Marcos administration have their own slate, especially the senatorial slate. Yeah. Um, it's just like the South China Sea is, is a very, um, popular issue that If you say like, you know, I'm running for senator and I fight China over the South China Sea, everyone will, you know, be drawn to you and would look at you as if you're nationalistic without thinking much, you know what I mean? So this is the other side of the story, I think, from my perspective. But basically, according to some of my friends in Congress, these laws were— has been the bills before it became a law. There were They were bills. So these bills were in Congress for the longest time, but that's why I debated with them. I said, yeah, so you see, this, this were in Congress for the longest time as bills, but why is it that it was not pushed? Precisely because there are reason why it was not pushed to be enacted into laws, precisely because the dispute is there, you know. And, and if you push this creates a lot of complication and it added complexity to the already challenged bilateral relation between China and the Philippines. And also it creates some kind of commotion in the South, in, in this, in Southeast Asia. And to a greater extent, it challenges the role of ASEAN as, as a mediating body to manage the dispute in the South China Sea. But well, now it's laws, these are already laws in my country, domestic laws. So now they're just waiting for the implementing rules before it could be, you know, enforced. But that is my worry, enforcement, because the moment my country, the Marcos administration, enforced this, I'm afraid that something will happen in the South China Sea, you know, because you will put restrictions like archipelagic sea lanes. You, you impose restrictions, so it means Like, for example, China's ships cannot just pass through as before, or, or Malaysian ships, because it imposed a domestic law and restriction. However, it's disputed area, so it's so difficult, you know. So these are my worries at the moment. And, and you can see in the South China Sea, the American forces, military forces are there, of course.
Yeah.
And also the Chinese forces, the military forces are also there. And America is backing this loss. They already made pronouncement that they are happy, and they're kind of— they backed up the Marcos administration in enacting these laws. So you can see, like, it, it's, it's a very tricky kind of support that America is putting on this loss. I think it's more about their strategic interest in, in, in, in, in the— in Southeast Asia, especially in in the South China Sea. That's why they are supporting, you know, the enactment of these laws recently.
Yeah, well, when I read it first, uh, the first thing that came to mind is Marcos was pressured to move forward with this initiative. It's because not only it will serve— it'll hit two birds with one stone, basically. One is to— for domestic consumption, so that some Filipinos will stay, like you suggested, rightly so, that here I am defending Philippines territory and so forth. And the second one is to sort of serve U.S. interest into this. What I find very troubling, very troubling regarding Philippines approach— Manila, that is the government approach to this kind of issues— is that when you look at Vietnam, when you look at Malaysia, for example, those countries, while they do have also some conversation with China regarding these territories, they have not come up on the global surface the way Philippines did. And makes me just wonder, wouldn't diplomacy and dialogue between Manila and Beijing be a better way than flaunting these laws and so forth? I don't know what Philippine government is thinking.
Um, that, that's also another shift in our— for an— in the way we approach the South China Sea issue in terms of strategy. During the Duterte administration, if you really look at it, Duterte was very clear, okay? And he was saying, okay, we have an independent foreign policy, we deal with all major countries in the world. The United States is our friend, China is our friend. And with China, what we do is on, on certain issues that we have, or certain sectors, especially economic front, that we have agreement, we don't have conflict, we pursue and we strengthen that. On the side of the South China Sea, it's a separate issue. We will try to do it quietly, peacefully, and diplomatically. We will not escalate tension, okay? We will not provoke. That's, that's the, that's the foreign policy and the approach before under Duterte administration. When Marcos Jr. came in, it shifted into something else that becomes topsy-turvy. Now their, their strategy to the South China Sea dispute visibly China. It's more really like China, it's a China-focused kind of strategy, when in fact there are other claimant states as well that overlap with our claim. But it's really as China-centric precisely because of the strong influence of the United States under Biden administration. The, the strategy is megaphone diplomacy. Everything has to be out in public, everything has to be noisy, everything is out there out of proportion. Just to elicit some kind of nationalistic sentiment domestically, and even to paint China in a bad way, as if like, as if China will bow down to us or bow down to our, you know, our strategy. No, of course not. I think China absorbs, and I think other countries doesn't want to meddle with this problem, so they are just quiet, you know. But us, we're very noisy, really, because the strategy of the current Marcos administration is megaphone diplomacy. Instead of having it a peaceful diplomacy, quiet diplomacy, back channeling— I think that's the best way to resolve a dispute— Marcos Jr.'s strategy is megaphone diplomacy. Everything has to be escalated, everything has to be out in media and very noisy, which is very different from the way Vietnam approaches its, its, its dispute with China in the South China Sea and Malaysia. And if you really look at it, we're like an odd country in Southeast Asia, really, under Marcos Jr. administration. If you really look at Vietnam and China, they have the dispute, they talk about it, I think, and they try to resolve. There are differences, I would presume, but if you really look at the economic cooperation, it's very good. Vietnam benefits from China's investment in many respects, in the same manner that Malaysia also benefits from that. Very good economic relation. On our side, we're very noisy, megaphone diplomacy. Our relationship politically, diplomatically is very bad with China. I'll be very frank about this, and it impacts our economy because the Chinese— we don't have Chinese tourists that much in my country. No one goes to— I mean, no Chinese, I think they are not interested to be tourists in my country because there is, there's this sense of, um, there's this anti-China sentiment and even sinophobic kind of atmosphere in the Philippines. Really, it is true. And also everything, if you're a Chinese or a Filipino-Chinese, you are being coined as a spy of China. That is the kind of mentality under, and it's the kind of atmosphere in, in the Philippines right now, which is not good. Look, we are the main importer, um, we're the main exporter of banana, of durian. I think durian, to a certain extent, we have good export to, to the Chinese market. Um, banana, apple, I know Mango. Now we're not. Banana is one of our good export in, in China with fruits. Now it's not us anymore. You know why? Even China is already getting bananas from Laos. Imagine that. So we're losing market. And not only that, it's precisely because of this very challenging diplomatic relation with China. China is not investing much anymore on our infrastructure. Digital, uh, structure, a physical infrastructure, not too much business. Chinese businessmen are discouraged to, to invest in the Philippines precisely because of the atmosphere that they're xenophobic, the xenophobia in, in the Philippines. So yeah, at the end of the day, if you really is wise enough and, you know, you think carefully about all of these things, is it— is the Philippines that is losing in this whole dynamics? It's not China. It's not the United States, really, because the United States has its own interests. We are being used by the United States and the Biden administration as a proxy against China. But United States tries to talk with, with China and deal with China, and they're trying to have this economic benefits still from China, accessing its market. But us, on the other hand, what happened to us economically? So we are really like I mean, to be very frank, common sense-wise, we are the loser in all of this dynamics, to be very honest. So I, I really don't like it as a Filipino, you know, but what can I do?
The Filipino people, that— yeah, and that is the big concern about— for me personally, when I saw who is gonna be headed for the Secretary of State and Defense and National Security and so forth. Now, now, China— thanks, Anna. We're gonna shift to another aspect, talk about ASEAN and BRICS in a minute here, but I want just mention something as far as China's strategic thinking regarding this part of the South China Sea. And you are absolutely correct that when we, uh, compared, for example, to how Vietnam is approaching this or Malaysia approaching this diplomacy and conversation with the Chinese— but the Chinese also have to think strategically about, especially when it comes to Malacca. That is one of the reasons I'm gonna share a map here quickly. Why is this important for China economically speaking? That is one of the reasons also why stability is at most important for China when it comes down to the South China Sea. So, uh, but for us in Washington, we are looking at the Philippines using it as a— our— sorry, as a pawn. Yeah, it's, it's unfortunate, and I know it's not gonna bode well for the Filipino people. You know, the elite— yeah, the elite in Philippines, they have their own assets outside Philippines.
And many of their assets, David, I'll be very frank with you, are connected with the United States. Many of their investments, many of their assets, the elites are in the United States. They have houses and all of these things. And so if in any case something happened to my country, if there's like a military outbreak in Southeast Asia because of the South China Sea issue being pushed and be— we are being used as a proxy by the United States. What will happen to the people, the general population? Many of them will just fly to the United States and they will have good life. But what about the general population? Because that is really the case. And, and this Edgar Basis, to be very honest, when there is a military outbreak, may it be over Taiwan, maybe in the South China Sea, the first strike will be on our side. Why? You have the EDCA bases in there. Of course the Chinese would, would strike them first before even going to the mainland United States, because we are actually the one who will be fighting for America. That's, that's how it is really. Well, and that is a very bleak situation, and I hope that it will never happen, because for me, if you really look at the South China Sea issue The only way— I don't believe this is, this is just what I'm, I'm thinking, and even be based on studying it. And I, my dissertation is all about the South China Sea. It's a comparative study between Philippines-China, Vietnam-China, and Malaysia-China. It's economic approach, but at the same time it's geopolitical because my PhD is in economics. So, but my background is politics and international relations. So what I see in the South China Sea, I don't really see it that the dispute will be resolved in 10 years' time, even in 20 years' time. I don't see it, to be very frank. But how are you going to manage it? That's the most important. The only way for all claimant states to maintain the peace and stability and security in the whole region, the Southeast Asia, the South China Sea area, and the Asia-Pacific, is to cooperate, change the mindset from a zero-sum game. Because now the Philippines is pushing for a zero-sum game. This is ours, this is not yours. But China would say, that's ours. Vietnam would say, that's mine too. So it's zero-sum game, nothing happens to it. The only way is win-win cooperation. And how you gonna do it? Focus on low politics. This maritime laws that was enacted recently Maybe I'll be accused of not loving my country, but that is wrong because I love my country very much. It's high-level politics, and this is very hard to bridge. This, this high-level politics about sovereignty, territorial, it's very hard. It cannot be bridged easily unless you go to court, ICJ. Now, how are you gonna address it? Personally, I look at it, focus on low politics. Joint cooperation. Gas and oil, you benefit both of both sides. Fishery management, you benefit both sides. Marine exploration, scientific exploration, how to take care of the environment, of the marine environment, you all— everyone benefits. That's how you look at it. You look at the South China Sea as a regional public good, as a regional area by which everyone benefits, because it's a regional public good. Everyone benefits from the resources. It's a win-win cooperation, not like, um, not a zero-sum game. And one more important thing though, David, from as far as I'm concerned, does the United States should not intervene in this dispute because the United States is not part of the dispute. It's not part of the dispute. If you're not part of the dispute, do you— you don't have business interfering in another country, against another country that is a claimant state as well? I don't think so. On the very first place also, it's very hypocritical for the United States to claim that it has some say because even it is not a party to UNCLOS. It did not sign and ratify UNCLOS. So why do you use UNCLOS in pushing for your agenda using the Philippines? Like, for example, they say we support this maritime laws precisely because it's based on UNCLOS, but in the very first place you're not even a signatory to UNCLOS. That's hypocritical for the United States, really. I'm very, very honest and frank here because there's an upcoming Trump administration. I really hope President-elect Trump will have that wisdom that, you know, we need more— you know, we don't need more conflict in this world. There's already Gaza, there's already Ukraine. We don't want to add more in the Asia-Pacific through over Taiwan or even the South China Sea. I really hope he listens to the voices of other people, not necessarily in government, but people like us, you know, that we're real people. Anything happen, we are affected directly because we are not politicians, you know. We are affected by any decision coming from leader of the United States or even leader of China or leader of my country. So I really hope that this message would be listened to because I'm not talking as a politician, I'm not talking as an academic, I am talking as a real person who, who, who experienced all of these things. It's like my country is like the battleground of the competition, rivalry between China, this strategic rivalry and competition between China and the United States. Really, it's, it's, it seems like it's a battleground, you know. I mean, like an And the United States, if you're— if the United States really is a friend, it claims to be a friend of the Filipinos and of the Philippines, you should look at our situation not in— not like a user-friendly kind of friend, but really a friend who have compassion of how for us that we will be able to define our own destiny as a country and not be dictated by any country. At all. So that's my, that's my sentiments, okay? As a person, I just want to think out because you are in America, so maybe—
I know what you mean. No, no, you are absolutely correct, Anna, because if you look at it, for us, you know, even for, for me as a citizen here, you know, do I really trust the government? No. Do I uphold government to some standard? No. No, because they are corrupted to the core. You know, I was there, I saw. That's the reason why I left after a few years. It became clear to me I can't be part of this. In clear conscience, I couldn't. And this is nothing new because it started from early '50s forward. That's why it was Asia the way it was, and, and we maintain those kind of tensions. By the way, guys, just to let you know, I'm gonna post a link for you for Anna's article on the Manila Times It's titled Implications of Philippines Archipelago Sea Lines Act and Maritime Zone Act. So I'll post it for you. Now there is one thing also that I noticed. YouTube usually takes down certain links because it happens to me once, and I'm gonna find out with this one here because, uh, I have this gut feeling that they wouldn't want that to be posted there. But nonetheless, I'm gonna I'm gonna put the reference for it for you guys in the description so you can go and read it for yourself. So let's move on to our last segment of this conversation, Anna. And by the way, Anna, when we're done here, don't leave. Wait till I talk to you offline, please. Let's, let's talk. I want to talk about something that's— this might be shocking. It's not shocking, shocking, but surprising to me. And I already voiced my opinion on it, you know. This one has to do with BRICS, and there's some conversation was that, well, how about Philippines joining BRICS? And I was like, first one say, hell no, Philippines needs to get its infrastructure in place, needs to get its act in place, needs to take a stand for where it stands regarding this push of the US interest at the expense of the Filipino people. Then You think— you take this position and you think about Philippines' role in ASEAN, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. So, and it becomes the question: what role does Philippines play, even though it was a founding member for ASEAN? Will it be, in your opinion, Anna, will it be a good fit for BRICS as BRICS now expands?
Actually, BRICS is one of the issues that many academics, especially the well-intentioned academics and even intellectuals in my country, are discussing at the moment. As you can see, in BRICS there are 4 Southeast Asian countries who are applying for membership, and they're now considered as partners. You have Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand, and Vietnam. And when we heard about this in the last BRICS summit in Kazan, Personally, I was like saying, like, why is it that the Philippines is not trying to apply for BRICS? We need to be part of BRICS. Why is that? Because BRICS is like, um, it's not necessarily a formal organization, but the composition of BRICS, it includes emerging economies, and even, um, in terms of population and geopolitical, uh, geo— geography, it's, it's the biggest, I think, in the world at the moment. So If we will be part of it, we will benefit from technological transfer of knowledge, may it be in different fields, may it be in health, medicine, or even infrastructure, digital, green technology, and whatsoever. Even oil, we can probably negotiate because many of the BRICS country members now include Saudi Arabia, Iran, Ethiopia, Egypt, and, you know, the oil-producing countries. So we were like— I was like thinking, and also in terms of market, it's— I think BRICS represents Expanded BRICS represents a huge— one of the— it's a huge market for products and exports. So I was thinking like, okay, so the Philippines should apply for membership. But the question is like this, but this is under Marcos administration. I have said earlier, the Marcos administration is heavily under the influence of the United States under Biden. I, I'm not sure how it how it will change under a Trump administration. There was even a joke in, in the discussion that, oh, come on, Anna, we will not be a member of BRICS. Why? Because the United States will not allow it. I was like, what? How come? I said, are we still a sovereign state that we cannot apply for BRICS just because the United States will not allow us? And then my friends was telling me, of course the United States will not allow us because If you look at BRICS, it's some kind— the conception or the idea or perception of BRICS is like it's China and Russia orchestrated. And if you, if you mention Russia and if you mention China, the Americans are a little bit not so happy about it, or, you know, something to that effect. So I was like, but come on, this is not about geopolitics. And my thinking is more about economics. The country will benefit, my country will benefit from being part of BRICS. But that is the joke right now. We will not be allowed to be part of BRICS because America will not allow us. On the other hand, what if that's the case? So I feel like we're losing a lot from this, you know, from, from not even thinking or not even trying to be part of BRICS, which is a very big— if you put them together, the expanded BRICS, including the members and the partners, not yet the members, it's really a huge opportunity when it comes to economic cooperation. Okay, that's just one thing, and even, you know, many things. On the other hand, when you talk about ASEAN, now the question is, what is the role of the Philippines in ASEAN? And we are, um, we're a founding member actually of ASEAN. And what is the relationship of the Philippines vis-à-vis ASEAN countries? To be very honest with you, this is not based on government pronouncement, but I am very much in touch with my ASEAN counterparts in terms of think tanks and people-to-people relations. So every now and then I talk to many intellectuals and academics and even some government officials from different countries in ASEAN. They are not happy with the Philippines. They're not. Why? It's precisely because of that South China Sea issue that it, you know, the decisions, the strategy of Philippines toward the South China Sea. It's, it's very much leaning foreign policy to the, to, to, to the United States. All of this military, um, militarization that's going on in the Philippines, which everyone in ASEAN knows that it's against China, or we are being used as a proxy against China by the United States, it's creating a lot of anxiety in, in, in, in Southeast, in Southeast Asia., and among ASEAN member states. And even then, we're asking for support from ASEAN countries for our claims and our vis-à-vis China, you know, trying to say like, okay, you'll be on our side against China. This is also making them a little bit uncomfortable. They're not happy with the Philippines, to be honest. So the thing here is that is a very sad reality for my country. Because we're supposed to be closer to our counterparts in ASEAN. If only the president of my country will think more about forging regional cooperation, closer ties with ASEAN, consulting ASEAN member states when you talk about the South China Sea issue, the strategy, and also trying to have this multilateral, you know, using ASEAN as leverage against China, when you talk about the South China Sea, it would be better, I think. But the more— at this time, there's even this proposition coming from some members of, um, or, or some parts in the staff, the political establishment of the current administration of Marcos Jr., that we should be out of ASEAN because ASEAN is not supporting us in our claim over the South China Sea against China, that we should— you should— we should— we should not be any more part of ASEAN. There was even some kind of proposal being proposed to Marcos Jr. on this. And I was like, why? That is weird, and that is really crazy. I said, how can you be out of ASEAN? When the Philippines will be out of ASEAN, then you lose leverage when you talk about regional diplomacy. And even you lose, um, the— in terms of trade, because there are ASEAN free— we have some kind of, um, agreements when it comes to free trade or concession with other ASEAN countries. When you talk about trade, we lose— we will lose it, and we will be the loser of all of these things. So that is really the situation that we have as a country vis-à-vis ASEAN and even vis-à-vis BRICS. And that is not a good— the good— how do you call that— a good situation that we have. So if you ask me again Um, what is the direction and what is the future of my country under a Marcos Jr. administration with all of these things? It's not that positive, but it's not hopeless. As you can see, the Philippines changes its leadership every 6 years. So yeah, yeah, and I hope— but you know, sometimes it's, it's, it's hard, you know, to, to endure such kind of leadership for the next, what, 4 years more.
Yes, well, I have, I have a proposition for you, Anna. A run for president.
I'm an ordinary— if, if, you know, I'm a, I'm a Christian, so if, if, if God's— if, if, you know, the universe out there will, will use that and it's my Destiny, why not? But at the moment, I'm an ordinary person, and I'm— it's just that I, I, I care for my country and my people and our people. And sometimes, sometimes I'm being misunderstood, you know, that some, some people in my country or some pro-Americans in my country and even outside of my country would say that I'm pro-China. I am a friend of China, that one I can say. I, I can say that honestly. But I am for my country. At the end of the day, I don't have any other country but the Philippines. Yeah, you know, yeah, that's the, that's the truth about, about all of these things. But I believe that China is the second largest economy. In a matter of time, we don't know. I'm sorry to say this, you're from the United States, you're a citizen of the United States, but probably in a matter of time, 10 to 20 years from now, China will be the largest economy and It will be number one in terms of economy.
It will be.
Yeah, and, and the United States will be number two. Do you really think for a country like the Philippines, which is small, it has a lot of economic problems, that having a very challenged or a very bad relationship with China is beneficial to us? I don't think so. Yeah, so that's, that's the thing. And you know, that's, that's the, the, the basic premise that what I'm saying always, it's not about being pro-China, it's about being wise and being, you know, being able to know what's good for your country and what's not good for your country, and at the same time being friends to all. I really like the mantra of the last, of the previous president, um, Duterte. Um, we're friends to all and we're enemy to none. But now we're creating an enemy out of China and Russia because of the mid-range missile that was deployed in Lawag, and, and we don't even know when it would be removed. And it seems that it will not be removed anytime soon.
It won't. I got bad news for you, Anna. It won't.
Oh my God. So it means my, my assumption is correct?
Is correct. You're right. You know, sad to say it, it won't be removed. So, but anyway, I hope that Philippines at least learn from two main things that just took place recently. One of them has to do with the visit of the Indonesian president, Prabowo, to Beijing, where he received the red carpet treatment. That's for economic— I talked about this yesterday with, uh, Warwick, and it's like on two tracks. One economics, one is political, because Indonesia understands You know, you live next to China, why would you want to lose out on economic opportunities? Second thing that, uh, Indonesia, uh, Philippines can learn from is the recent meeting that just took place this morning between President Xi and the Prime Minister of Thailand. So you will think Philippines can see all those dynamics because, as you know, there's the APEC summits in, in Peru. And, uh, you will think that Philippines is gonna, you know, see where the things are headed and, and get their head together for the sake of the Filipino people. That's what's important about it. So I'll give you the last word, Anna. I'll give you the last word.
Oh, thank you so much. Um, thank you so much, David, for this opportunity, and I really I really hope that, you know, I will— I just hope that the incoming administration of Mr. Trump would, to a greater extent, follow through with his pronouncement and statement that he wants a more peaceful world, you know, and he wants what's good for America. His philosophy is America first, and I think what's good for America is not to spread too much conflict, or would— that America should not be the cause of many conflicts or fuel conflicts. Conflict. And I hope really that his foreign policy approach to my country will be more of something that helps my country economically speaking, and would not make my country like a proxy against China. Because to be very frank, if America is truly a friend of the Philippines, of the Filipino people, you will not put us in a compromising situation that will threaten our lives, that will threaten our country and will compromise our independence, autonomy, and sovereignty. I really hope President Trump will, you know, President-elect Trump will, you know, see it this way, in a more, with more wisdom, and he will take control of his administration, not necessarily being advised by Hook or, you know, those people that we're afraid of.
Yeah, well, let's hope, let's hope. Yeah, fingers crossed. So, well, I can't thank you enough, Anna, for being here. Literally appreciate you sharing your insights, and, uh, I, I'm sure I will have you back here on the channel, uh, and next time we'll address more, more of the issues. So once again, thank you so much, and truly, truly appreciate you carving out time for me here. So you take care, and please wait for me after. I'll talk to you in a minute. All right guys, I hope you find this, uh, very informative, you know, insights from Anna. It's very insightful. And again, I've been reading her, her work, uh, you know, somebody who talks logically, you know, you put the, the, the emotions aside and you think what's pragmatic. So this is why when I get the opportunity— and by the way, I sent her an email, she was graciously enough to respond right away and said I'd be happy to come on your show. So So we're so glad to have Anna here shared her insights with us, and I look forward to having her again. Uh, to all of you, I say thank you for being here. I want to just give a quick, quick shout out to a new channel member by the name Charlie Ong. Thank you very much for becoming a channel member. So appreciate your support. And to all of you, I wish you a safe and good weekend. Chill out, enjoy it, and I look forward to seeing you next week. As always, remember, geopolitics impacts your daily life in more ways than one. Till next time, guys, bye-bye.
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