What You need to Know about China in the 21st Century! An Interview w/Dr. Hammond!!

Hello everybody and welcome to Geopolitical Trends. So excited to be with you as always. This time around it's gonna be very different. It's because I have a great, great guest, a good friend of mine. I have great respect for his knowledge and he's someone that if I want to get to the heart of the matter regarding The Chinese history is the one I will turn to. That's the only one I trust for me personally. So, so who do we have here? We have Dr. Ken Hammond. I'm gonna bring him on here. Here he is. Hi, Doc, how are you?

I'm great, glad to be here.

So, so, so excited to have you here. And for you guys, uh, who might not be familiar with Dr. Hammond, I'm gonna provide you a brief intro. By the way, I did put the full bio of, uh, Professor Hammond in the description. So, but I'm gonna share some stuff with you here, then we're gonna launch in into our conversation because I don't want to waste too much time here. So, uh, before I do that, quickly here, I want to acknowledge Patrick Lin. Patrick Lin, thank you very much for becoming a YouTube member. Greatly appreciate your support. So, so let me share with you guys briefly here, uh, a, a brief bio about Professor Hammond, then we're going to jump into, uh, the conversation. So Ken Hammond, Professor Hammond, Dr. Hammond, whoever you feel comfortable calling him, is a professor of history at the New Mexico State University. Dr. Hammond was a student and Students for a Democratic Society leader at Kent State University from 1967 to 1970. He later on completed his degree in political science in 1995, then studied modern Chinese language at the Beijing Foreign Language Normal School in Beijing. Uh, Dr. Hammond received an MA, Master of Arts, in regional studies East Asia, 1989, and a PhD in history and East Asian languages in 1994 from Harvard University. So he is the author of many books and articles, including his latest, uh, uh, book called China's Revolution and the Quest for a Socialist Future. Let me share with you guys a picture of that book because I had a chance to take a look at it, and we're gonna be addressing some of its content because it falls exactly where or with what we're going to be talking about. So, Dr. Hammond, good to have you here on the show.

Always glad to be here.

All right, let me start with, and I start from the book you wrote, and I quote, since the founding of the PRC, China has pursued its distinctive path of socialist construction, a challenging and often contentious process which is still unfolding today. This volume traces the crisis of Old China and the new, or, and the course of the revolutionary struggle up to 1949, and follows, follows the development of New China through the era of Mao Zedong's leadership, the launching of reform under Deng Xiaoping, and the beginning of a new era under the leadership of President Xi. China use— China's use of market mechanism to develop the productive economy has generated contradiction as well as dramatic growth, and China has achieved great things in education, healthcare, and the provision of other social services. But the process of socialist construction remains an unfinished and ongoing venture. And the future of the revolution is very much a work in progress, end of quote. Well, with this, Dr. Hamid, my question is to you: could this work in progress be exactly what the West, headed by the United States, is trying to undermine? And if so, how do you think they're going to do this, given the history of China?

Well, yes, I think that that's exactly what the United States and its allies are trying to do. You know, they see, unfortunately, the political elites especially see the reemergence of China as a significant participant in global affairs as a threat, as a problem. You know, they especially the United States, has become used to being the dominant power in the world, especially since the fall of the Soviet Union. But even going back to the end of World War II, the United States has played a very, very leading role. And, uh, and I think that they, they, you know, they, they, they're pretty used to that and they don't really want to give that up. Uh, but what's happening in China is, is part— it's a very important part, but it is really only part of a broader global reconfiguration of economic and geopolitical relations that, uh, that, you know, is— has been underway for a long time and is going to keep developing. China's progress, China's development, China's, China's struggle or quest to build this socialist future, um, is not something that is going to be derailed, uh, by things like, uh, tariffs or sanctions or restrictions on, on, you know, international trade restrictions on exports or things like that. The United States can put obstacles in China's path and has been doing so, and that causes, you know, frustration. It makes, makes it harder for China to pursue its goals, but it's certainly not going to stop that process or derail that process. And I think a good example of that, that we've just seen in the last, last couple of weeks has been this embargo on chip technology, on not only the, you know, selling chips, but even, you know, sanctions against companies that have any role at all in facilitating China's efforts to develop its chip production capabilities. And, you know, the goal, the pretty overt move there is to try to stop China from being globally competitive in this technology. And yet, just a couple weeks ago, we have the unveiling of the new Huawei Mate 60 Pro iPhone, or, you know, phone, which has, you know, is built with Chinese-produced 5G chips, has capabilities that exceed those of phones made in the West, and has been a huge success, has had a tremendous takeoff, not just in China but in global markets. And this has been developed just in the last 2 or 3 years during this period of sanctions and embargoes and all this. So it shows that China has the capabilities and the determination to forge ahead with its innovation, with its creativity, with its development, uh, in a, in a broad range of, of activities. But this particular example, I think, is very, very clear because it's exactly the technology that the United States has been trying to, to derail, that the development that the United States has been trying to derail. And I I think that that's— it's an object lesson that I hope leaders in Washington and other political centers will take seriously and perhaps get past this idea of trying to stop a really pretty inevitable tide of history and instead try to begin to think more positively about ways in which, you know, we all might try to take advantage of these new developments.

So will it be fair to say, Professor Hammond, that this policy of containment, if I may use the term, is doomed to fail, given how the history of China, which was always about— it was always, at least based on what I read, most of about sort of trade, most about cooperation, most about win-win, developing sort of— they can benefit from whatever trade they get involved But also the party that they are involved with also gets the benefit. And now when we see the US with this containment policy, where this is going to end?

Well, I don't know where it's going to end. I think that it is the containment policies. And of course, it's not just a passive set of policies. It's not just sort of building a ring around China to— that somehow constrain it. That's, that's part of it. But it's also a very assertive, if not indeed aggressive, approach to China, uh, that involves military provocations in the South China Sea, uh, the, you know, disruption of what should be, uh, a stable relationship between the island of Taiwan and the rest of China, uh, you know, in violation of international agreements that the United States has, has entered into. You know, it's— the United States is actively opposing China, demonizing China, trying to disrupt China's rise, China's development. But taking the historical perspective is very important because if we look back at certainly at China's long history, and always important with China to have that long historical perspective, you know, the recent period, in some ways almost the entire period of the existence of the United States from the late 18th century to the present, uh, is kind of an anomalous period in Chinese history because it's a period of the Industrial Revolution, changes in the West, the developments of new military and, and communication technologies. For a while, the West was able to maintain a monopoly on modern productive technologies, which allowed them to, to become the, the manufacturing core for the whole world. And everybody else was sort of subsumed in that as providers of raw materials and consumers of manufactured goods. But that is past. That ends after World War II. That ends as first the Soviets industrialize and then post-colonial countries industrialize. That's, that's what's going on, and that's a continuing process, and that is reshaping global relations. So what's happening now isn't, you know, China sort of emerging out of the wilderness and suddenly, oh, here's this new thing. It's a return to a multi-centric world, a multi-centric world in which China clearly plays a significant role, but, but there are other, many other centers, uh, that, you know, we've talked about the BRICS countries from time to time, uh, and, and other, other groupings, you know, and other individual countries that are on the rise, that are developing, places like Malaysia, India, uh, you know, there's just a lot going on. It's not just China. So trying to, to sort of focus on China, demonize China, make China the bad guy. It's, it's short-sighted and it's risky. You know, the, the, you know, American politicians are always in their election cycles. They're always watching the polls and the, and the sound bites and all this. And I think that they, they lose sight of the fact that, that there's actually a real world out there that involves dangers. Uh, and, and, you know, trying to, to trigger some sort of conflict over Taiwan is just— it's reckless and foolish. Because it would be devastating not just, you know, in the Taiwan Straits or on both sides there, but for all of China, for all of the United States, indeed for really all of the global economy. So flirting with that, you know, it's kind of playing around with that, is, is just— it's, it's ill-conceived. But it's the kind of situation that can get out of control, uh, you know, that would not be— would not be good for anybody involved.

Well, just for those who just joining us, uh, just for you to know, I'm having a conversation here with Dr. Hammond. He's a historian and professor at the, uh, New Mexico State University and with the specialization on the Chinese history. So you mentioned, Professor Hammond, you mentioned Malaysia and you mentioned India as far as, you know, evolving or emerging economies and so forth. What I am seeing as geopolitical analyst, what I'm noticing is that countries in the region, be it South Korea, be it Japan, be it Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia, India, and so forth, all of them seems to now embark on a policy that is formulated by Washington aimed at encircling China. So if you will be kind and just explain to our viewers as far as the historical ties of China with those regions, with those countries in the neighborhood, and why all of a sudden they are taking this stand of trying to embark on a policy that, you know, it's doomed to fail.

Well, I think that the geopolitics of the region from Japan sweeping around through Southeast Asia all the way over to India and South Asia, Uh, it's— these are extremely complex, uh, relationships among those countries, between those countries and the United States, between those countries and China. Uh, I don't think that there's a— there's not a consistent, um, approach, uh, uh, you know, or, or consistent sort of state of play across that region. Countries like South Korea and Japan are of course very closely connected to the American military establishment. You know, we still have tens of thousands of troops in both countries. Uh, you know, the, the South Korean Army, in the event of conflict, comes under the command of the U.S. military. So it's a very, very close relationship. Uh, and I think that, that the pressure that the United States is putting on those countries to become, you know, uh, even more deeply integrated into America's sort of anti-China campaign. That's one thing. We go down to, say, Southeast Asia, and, you know, there's a range of, of opinion, a range of variation in policies, uh, between different countries, uh, in part dependent upon, upon their history. Southeast Asia has always been very important for China. Chinese trade with the region, you know, goes back millennia, not, not not even just centuries, but thousands of years. Um, and, and, you know, there have always been many of those areas— not the current governments, the current countries, but, but people's states in the past— were always bound up in political and economic relations with China. And, uh, and, you know, and those were, those were often mutually beneficial. China provided, uh, uh, you know, trade goods. It provided political legitimation. Other countries had goods that they traded to China in exchange, you know. So there were, there were ongoing relations. Today you have some countries, the Philippines being one example, where the particular politics of the moment, uh, are beginning to position the Philippines more closely with the United States. They seem to be aligning themselves more closely with the United States. U.S. is re-establishing military bases there, has been vocal in supporting the activities of the Philippines, for example, in maintaining their own buildup on some of these contested locations in the South China Sea. You know, while the United States condemns China for, for, you know, developing situations on some of these islands, they're supporting the Philippines who are doing exactly the same thing, you know, maintaining a military presence basically on a ship that's been grounded on a reef. You know, it's not, it's not really a very developed place, but It's part of the Philippines' effort to establish a territorial claim, and that's an ongoing dispute between the Philippines and China. Okay, you know, that'll get resolved, but it should be resolved by the Philippines and China. The United States doesn't really have— shouldn't really have a role in that. You have other countries. Laos, for example, is very closely engaged with China in economic development. They've just opened a railway from Southwest China into Laos. That's very important in Laos's plans for further development. Cambodia is cooperating with China, developing some port facilities, things like that. Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, they have complex relations with China. They don't want to throw themselves wholeheartedly into the arms of the United States, but they want to maintain their own autonomy, their own independence, pursue their own interests. And that's, you know, that's as it should be. Vietnam is kind of a special case because On the one hand, you know, there's a history of China, you know, Vietnam, what's now Northern Vietnam was part of Chinese empires for 1,000 years, but that ended 1,000 years ago, you know, and so there have been sometimes close relations, sometimes tense relations. I think the Chinese are very sophisticated and the Vietnamese are very sophisticated about that relationship, and both sides are, you know, positioning themselves vis-à-vis one another. But again, you know, Vietnam certainly has its own history with the United States, and I don't think anybody there is likely to forget that, uh, that the United States is not necessarily operating in the region as some sort of, uh, you know, unbiased benefactor, but has its own agenda. Uh, and I don't think that Vietnam is likely either to, to throw itself wholeheartedly into an anti-China, uh, coalition. India, you know, in some ways is another story. But even there, although there are ongoing frictions, uh, some of the border, uh, contention between India and China— India and China, you know, are, are now the two most populous countries in the world. India, you know, trying to find a way forward for its economy. They're struggling with that pretty significantly. But even though there are those tensions and rivalries, India is part of BRICS. It has cooperated, uh, it has been part of this coalition, uh, if we can call it that. It's not a formal organization, but this sort of functional alliance of countries that have refused to support American positions in the United Nations concerning the war in Ukraine. They understand the problematic nature of NATO expansion and things like that. They don't want to be incorporated in something that's an American-centered international order where everybody just does what the United States says. So although, again, although there's tensions and frictions, that doesn't mean that India is going to line up in some anti-China coalition. They want to pursue their own agenda. That's, again, that's as may be. So I think that the United States clearly has an objective of encircling China, containing China, trying to constrain its growth and development. They're getting some traction in some places. Certainly, of course, Australia has wholeheartedly involved, even though Australia trades tremendously with China. It's not really in their interest, but, you know, they're, they're out there doing their thing, and there's a whole history and legacy behind that. So I think it's a, it's a, it's a, it's a, a very complex checkerboard that we're seeing, uh, but, uh, but, you know, by no means— I, I certainly don't see the United States as, as sort of, you know, sweeping, uh, sweeping the table, as it were, uh, with, uh, with with diplomatic success over there. I think that they're pushing an agenda, but I don't think they're necessarily getting a lot of traction for that.

You mentioned India, Professor Hammond. As you know, they're going to be hosting tomorrow the G20 summit, and President Xi made a decision not to attend. Now, the Chinese delegation, by the way, is going, but not President Xi. How should we interpret this decision? Is this a reflection of the new global governance? Is this a reflection of the— what the term I may use— the disillusionment with G20? Is this sort of a message to the United States? What do you think was behind President Xi's decision, knowing that he hardly ever missed a summit since 2012, if my memory serves me well.

Yeah, I mean, it's important to note that, that of course there will be not just a Chinese delegation there, but that delegation is, is headed by Li Qiang, who is, you know, he's the Prime Minister. He's, he's, you know, he's the number one, uh, official after Xi Jinping. So it isn't— it's not that China is sending, you know, some, some junior flunky or something like that. This is a high-level delegation going to going to, uh, New Delhi. And, and in some ways, it's, it's a reflection of kind of almost the shallowness of American understanding of China, that, that they want to make a propaganda point out of the idea that Xi Jinping isn't going. You know, on a certain level, I almost feel like what Xi Jinping wants to do is avoid a photo op with Joe Biden, you know, uh, just, just, you know, he just doesn't want to give any, any credence to the idea that the United States has been pushing, that somehow it's the United States that's trying to improve things. It's the United States that's trying to resolve these unfortunate tensions with China, when what we've seen over and over again is someone from the United States, let's say Secretary of State Blinken, goes to Beijing, has a meeting, you know, they have some discussions, and there are statements issued about how, well, you know, we're pursuing, you know, new initiatives, and we're trying to upgrade the relationship, and get back to a more productive interaction. And then Blinken is, you know, on his way home. Joe Biden goes to California, gives a speech there to a group in which he characterizes Xi Jinping as a dictator and says that, you know, China has all these problems because that's what happens when you have dictators, you know. Uh, yeah, it's just that has happened over and over again. Uh, uh, one of the other government officials, I can't remember, it wasn't Raimondo's visit but one in between Secretary of Treasury. Janet Yellen, I think it was Janet Yellen's visit. She goes over, she meets with officials, it looks like some good conversations are held, and then she gets back. Next day, what happens? There's an announcement of further arms sales to Taiwan, right? And more saber rattling about, you know, America and its military defense of Taiwan. So, you know, the Chinese must be like What the heck are these guys doing? You know, they, they pretend that they want to improve the relationship and they, and they come over and we have this, these words, but then we look at their actions and their actions— we send a nuclear-armed submarine to South Korea, you know, as a, as a demonstration of that's a threat. You know, we, we're, we're rearming or urging Japan and South Korea to upgrade their arming. South Korea's army, of course, as we know, goes under American command in case of a conflict. So this is all, this is all just military posturing, while at the same time there's this diplomatic, uh, sort of dance of, oh, you know, we'd really like to, to talk and get things straightened out. But actions speak louder than words, you know, and, and it's a matter of watch what we say, or watch what we do and not what we say. And I think that that's— those are good, good words to live by when you're dealing with with the United States. So I think that, you know, how this will be resolved, whether any American politicians are going to be able to figure out a way to sort of dial it down, you know, let's get things— God knows we have so many serious problems in the world. You know, we're facing these incredible heat waves. We're facing ongoing problems with rising sea levels. You know, we have an existential crisis for humanity. And instead, the United States wants to— he wants to, you know, embargo chips going to China and keep Chinese solar panels, which could help Americans to address their energy concerns, keep them out because it's a trade embargo. You know, it's just so, so short-sighted, so, so narrow-minded on the part of, of American elites. They're not pursuing the kind of win-win agendas that, uh, that, that, you know, we see coming out of China. They're very much intent upon holding on to the power and the prestige and the perks they've had in the past. And, and that's just a— it's just a— it's a fool's errand in many ways.

That's how our politicians are, so no, no surprise there, Professor Hammond. No, I want to go back to Philippines. It's because I don't find it very interesting, and I've been following, of course, what's going on, uh, with Philippines. Uh, but I had one of, uh, my viewers here in the channel sent a very, very interesting post, and I'd like to take you to have your, uh, your take on it. So he wrote, and I quote, in the 15th century, the Sultanate of Sulu, one of the three kingdoms of the Philippine Islands, requested the Ming Dynasty to accept it as part of China. At the time, Emperor Zhu Di politely declined this offer proposed by the Sulu King during the latter's visit together with his family to China. So why am I bringing this up? It's because I wanted just to get your, uh, perspective from a historical aspect, how the relationship has always been between China and Philippines going, let's say, 200, 300, 400 years ago. And all of a sudden we are noticing— I mean, I could— I remember when Duterte, uh, the former president of Philippines, went to China, had a conversation with the, with the Chinese, and sort out the issues of the islands and so forth. Marcos Jr., who took over, went to China the next day, met with the US Secretary of Defense, and signed the agreement to open up a new basis. So basically, it was saying one thing to the Chinese and doing another. Where do you see the relationship between Philippines and China moving forward if you put it within the historical context?

Well, that the story about the Sulu Sultanate is part of a long, long history. China for centuries maintained something that, that is often referred to as, as the tribute system, which is a little bit of a misnomer, uh, but it was a, it was a, a sort of state-regulated system of international trade where countries, uh, especially in Southeast Asia but as far away even as, as India and the Persian Gulf, would on either on a regular basis or just on a more occasional basis would send official missions to China, and they would go to the imperial capital, and they would bring goods with them. And, you know, there was this sort of diplomatic protocol of presenting goods that basically represented the local economy at home. But they also brought a lot more stuff. And after this sort of official presentation, they could sell all that other stuff in, in the markets of the capital. And this was often a flourishing trade. And then of course they would buy Chinese things and Chinese commodities that they would take back with them. So it was a, it was a mechanism of both diplomatic interaction but also international trade. And so, you know, a gesture like, like the Sultan of Sulu saying, you know, oh, we'd like to, you know, offer our, our, uh, our integration into your celestial empire. That's the diplomatic and political side of that relationship. But the economic side really was, was in many ways the driving, the driving force. And, you know, this, as I say, this went on for hundreds of years until, of course, in the specific case of the Philippines, from the late 16th century on, the Philippines is progressively colonized by Spain. They, they establish Manila as their colonial headquarters and then, you know, fight to take over many of the islands. Eventually, everything that today constitutes the Philippine state was, was part of, of the Spanish colonial empire. That eventually gives way in, in 1898 to the struggle of the Philippine people to establish an independent country. But as part of the kind of inter-imperialist war, if you will, between the United States and Spain, you know, which spans everything from the Caribbean to Southeast Asia, you know, the United States acquires its last sort of major colonial possession, the island of Puerto Rico. It, you know, drives the Spanish out of Cuba, and it, you know, intervenes in the Philippines, where instead of supporting a new Philippine Republic, an independent Republic in the Philippines, which was the aspiration of the Philippine people, the United States makes the Philippines— it takes them away from Cuba and makes them its own colony. And, and the Philippines are, are, you know, colonized and governed by the United States for the next 50 years. There's major resistance to that, uh, you know, a huge number of Philippine people die either in in fighting or in, like, concentration camps. It's a terrible, terrible moment, and it leaves, of course, a lasting legacy. You know, during World War II, there were elements in, you know, amongst the Philippine nationalists who, you know, frankly were supportive of the Japanese just as a counterforce to American imperialism. There were socialist movements, communist movements in the Philippines. In the Philippines, which were suppressed with American aid in the late '40s and '50s. So it's been a turbulent and complex history. And of course, China, all through all this period, is going through its own turbulent and complex history. I think today, you know, the legacy of the fact that the Philippines was an American colony in the 20th century, a great base of American military operations during the Vietnam War, for example. Uh, eventually, uh, uh, nationalist forces in the Philippines did, uh, get the Americans out for a while, but now they're back. And I think that, you know, the Philippines is negotiating or navigating a, a, a, a complex, uh, geopolitical environment. Um, they want to— of course, as any country, they want to preserve as much of their own independence. And I'll talk economy as they can. It appears that at least the present leadership is calculating that, you know, by subordinating themselves to American interests, they may be able to, you know, get a more favorable resolution of these disputes in the South China Sea, or simply, you know, have a better negotiating position perhaps with the Chinese. It's hard to, of course, know subjectively what's going on in Marcos's head. But, you know, the indications are that they're trying to kind of play the two sides against one another, and that may or may not work out well. But I think that that appears to be the path upon which the current leadership in the Philippines has embarked.

Interesting, interesting. You mentioned World War II, Professor Hammond, and this brought me to think— I've been reading some literature, uh, pertaining to the socialism with the Chinese characteristics. I'm sure you've heard that expression being, uh, you know, thrown around here. So, uh, what I believe many do not know, especially for us here in the United States, uh, many of us do not know that before China was colonized and divided, it was one of the most powerful economy in the world. That's something we almost forget. So, so today, in the way I see it today, China is re-emerging as a leading force under that socialism program that works for them. So my question is, what path, or paths for that matter, has China taken since, let's say, the end of World War II, since 1949, which marked the a revolution there, this country has taken on and where it is headed vis-à-vis socialism.

Sure, sure. Well, of course, you know, the revolution that takes place, the establishment of the People's Republic, is explicitly a socialist communist revolution. Communist Party of China is the leading force in the revolution. And since 1949, they have— they've been embarked, you know, the second half of the title of my book is The Quest for a Socialist Future. And I— and, you know, when we were putting the book together and talking with people about it, you know, I chose the term quest very, very deliberately because, you know, on the one hand, it's not a done deal. This is still— it's still an ongoing process, an ongoing work. And as, you know, you read in in the opening quote, you know, I characterize it as very much a work in progress, right? So thinking about the long sweep, you know, since 1949, it's important to approach that as, you know, that's all part of this effort to develop a modern industrialized socialist society and economy, right? But the way that that has been pursued has— there's been significant variation and, and change, uh, along that path. In, in the first 30 years, from say 1949 to '79, certainly to '76, the period where Mao Zedong was the, the primary leader and, and sort of the, in some ways, the center of gravity, that was a very tumultuous period politically. Um, the economy grew, you know, once they stabilized the economy immediately after liberation, they got inflation under control, and they got, you know, they got a system up and running again. China was devastated by 1949 from years of, of civil war and Japanese invasion and all this kind of stuff. Uh, but once they got the situation stabilized, they started this process of development that involved new, uh, you know, land reform, the transformation of agricultural production, a sort of incremental process of nationalizing and transforming manufacturing, industry, finance, things like that. But there were significant differences of opinion, to say the least, amongst the, the leadership of the party and, and people in the party and in society more broadly about the best way to pursue the objectives of socialist development. Some people primarily centered around Mao Zedong, advocated an approach that relied more on what we call mass mobilization, if you will. Others viewed the process as something that was more challenging, required more sort of technological expertise and sophistication, and really needed to be pursued in a more— I don't know, a more managed way, I suppose you might say. But those two positions were, were both dedicated to the ultimate goal of, of developing this modern socialist economy. After Mao dies, there's a couple of years of, uh, of transition, uh, and then Deng Xiaoping emerges as the principal leader, and he, uh, puts China on a different developmental course. But it's important that we understand that those first 30 years, that's not just a write-off. China— China's economy grew an average of 3% each year. Uh, they achieved tremendous, uh, development. Uh, you know, people's lives were stabilized, they were more secure. Uh, there were— there, you know, housing was provided, healthcare was provided, educational opportunities were provided. But all of that was done, you know, in a fairly minimalist or low-intensity way. China in '76, '77 was still a very poor country. Great things had been achieved, but it was still— it was sort of an egalitarianism of poverty, if you will. And what Deng Xiaoping's point was is that socialism isn't about poverty. It's not about an egalitarianism of poverty. It's about prosperity. It's about achieving a level of material development which allows people to live fulfilled lives, not just to be able to survive and get along, but to, to realize themselves, to fully develop themselves. And that's, that's what socialism should be. And in order for China to achieve that, their view was at that point that they needed to massively develop the productive economy. The decision was to, as again, as, as was in the, the opening discussion, to use the mechanisms of the market to develop the productive economy, to use market forces which historically had been clearly demonstrated. Marx and Engels talk about this in the Communist Manifesto, clearly demonstrated to be powerful forces for the development of economies, the development of productive forces, capabilities. So let's use the methods, mechanisms of the market. But it wasn't a matter of just throwing the economy and the country open to sort of free market dynamics. The idea was to use those— who was going to be the one using those mechanisms? It was going to be the Chinese government under the leadership of the Communist Party. And that's critical because the party is in a position to buffer, if you will, the, the problems that are attendant upon markets, right? Markets develop productive forces, absolutely, but they also generate other contradictions: inequality, opportunities for corruption, and as we know, environmental stresses and damages, right? And other problems. So they understood that using market mechanisms was going to entail these contradictory developments as well. But the determination was that if the party stayed in place, became the guiding force, or remained the guiding force, it could contain that process, constrain that process. And then when a sufficient level of development had taken place, when a, a level level of material prosperity was beginning to be reached, the party would be there to guide the implementation, the, the development, the movement towards socialist modes of distribution— from each according to their ability, to each according to their work, right? So that was the vision. And, you know, it's been in some ways a rocky road. The, the '80s was a time of experimentation and, and, and some ups and downs. There are some missteps, some bad calls leading to the upheavals of 1989 and, and the trauma of that, which was not something that I think anybody feels particularly good about. But, but, you know, the determination was that the system had to be protected and had to go on. And that unleashed in the '90s and the first decade of this century this tremendous wave of growth, 10% plus a year for 20 years. Unprecedented in human history, you know. And it did, it radically transformed the, the material lives of the Chinese people. Much greater development in terms of housing, in terms of healthcare, in terms of science and technology, educational opportunities. China, you know, achieves great things. And as it did so, it retained what I call the, the socialist core, right? The core of the economy, the state-owned enterprises, the banking and financial system, things like that, but also the legal system, and most importantly, the system of social provision. And we can see that, I think, in, in two important instances. One, the 2008 financial crisis, the global economic crisis. China takes a big hit, you know. China is not the, the epicenter of all that, of course. That's the United States and, and its attendant other, other big economies in the, in the, in the capitalist West. But China's hit— 20 million people, maybe a little more, lose their jobs because, you know, consumer demand in the West kind of evaporates. And so these companies cranking out goods for the, for the export market, people get laid off— 20 million people. But they don't just get dumped on the streets, dumped into the, the the free market because China has this socialist core. Everybody in China has what's called a household registration. Uh, it's called a hukou in Chinese. Um, and that means that they have some place to go, some place to be where they get housing, where they get, you know, healthcare, where their kids can go to school. So people went back to the villages from which they had come to work in these urban factories. Factories, and, and they were taken care of. They're not living in the lap of luxury. It's not, you know, going to some 5-star hotel, but their basic needs were cared for by the socialist core of the economy. And the government acted actively to intervene, to reorient the economy to more domestic consumption so that, you know, the job market would reinflate. And within a year or so, most of those people were back at work, either back in the jobs they'd had or in new employment. So China survives the, the 2008 crisis much better than the Western economies. You know, we're still suffering the aftereffects of all that. China moves on, right? And the other, the other instance in which we can see the qualitative superiority of this socialist core, of course, is, is the pandemic, is COVID, where You know, in the West, all we hear about is, oh, you know, these harsh measures of COVID regulations and everything. You know, the government, the party, the people came together, worked together. There were massive numbers of volunteers involved in, in all this to control and contain the pandemic so that millions of people didn't die. Right? If China had approached the pandemic with the same free market attitude as the United States, they would have lost between 5 and 6 million people. As it is, even now, even after the lifting of the stricter policies, there have been fewer than 100,000 deaths from COVID in China with a population 4 times that of the United States where there's been over 1.1 million deaths. So, you know, it's that— it's the socialist core, the socialist culture, if you will, that allowed China to weather the storm of the pandemic, literally saving millions of lives. And I think that people know that, people understand that. Of course, people were frustrated and sometimes angry during COVID because of the restraints, the regulations and all that. Anybody would be. Naturally, there were— there, people expressed their frustration. That's just normal, you know. Of course that's the case. But, you know, when, when you look at the polls, you look at the data, and I'm not talking about Chinese government, you know, statistics or something, but things like the Pew Foundation, uh, you know, the, the centers at Harvard that do international polling, things like that, you know. Do you support the government's policies? Do you Do you support the system in China? You get 80, 86%, 85% people saying, yeah, you know, we basically do. Are there criticisms? Of course. Are there frustrations and tensions? Of course. It's a real system. But overwhelmingly, people think that they're on the right track, and that track is, you know, this quest for a socialist future.

Very, very interesting. Well, this is something we are not able to understand. As to how China, for example, today, the way it behaves today, because I believe we are lacking the understanding its history. So, and this brings me to one point, Professor Hammond, is the idea of the— and I'm going to mention some periods of history just for the sake of knowledge here. So China's political, social, and economic landscape and their For example, the, the, the, the Zhou Dynasty back in 1046, I believe, to 256 BC. Then the Qin Dynasty, uh, that's 221 to 206 BC. Then the Han Dynasty, then the Jin Dynasty, then the Qin Dynasty. So the purpose for highlighting this period, uh, to me, the way I'm thinking outside the box Uh, just to see if this can provide us an understanding as to where China was, is today, and where it's headed. And do you think, in your opinion— and I'm going to share here a map, just I have it, I put it here— uh, do you think, in your opinion, uh, lacking this understanding of China's history, is it what prevents us from understanding China and come to an understanding of sort of fixing the problems or the challenges we have with China?

Oh, I think so. I think that, you know, knowledge of, or more importantly, even understanding of China's history is pretty thin on the ground in the West. You know, obviously China has several thousand years of history. And several thousand years of a history that is in some ways more continuous and more coherent than any other country on Earth. I mean, obviously Egypt has a very long history. Persia has a very long history. But those histories are marked by significant dramatic shifts in language, in you know, in who's in charge, who's controlling, you know, what, what's the population. I mean, the very, very significant differences. China, by contrast, has a, a continuous written history, continuous use of, of the, the, the written characters. This is something that gives a lot of coherence to China, a lot of political continuity, which is not to say that there aren't great transformations that have taken place across this sweep of Chinese history. Um, you know, I, I don't want to go too, too deep into the, into the weeds on this, but, you know, ancient China had like a warrior elite and, and, and a society that in many ways, especially for example during, during the Zhou Dynasty, especially the latter parts of the Zhou Dynasty, looked a lot like European feudalism. Right? It had significant differences, but, but it might be useful to, to have a sort of comparative sense of that. But that comes to an end by the time you get down to the Qin and the Han and, and all the way down to the Tang Dynasty. You get a very different situation, a centralized state, um, you know, a, a bureaucratic administration, but also an aristocratic landowning elite that is very distinctive. It's, you know, I can't say it's entirely unique to China, but it's quite distinctive from European history or history in many other parts of the world, Indian history or something like that. Then beginning more than 1,000 years ago with the fall of the Tang Dynasty, that aristocratic order goes away. It's destroyed in rebellions and upheavals and warfare over almost a century. And a new order, a much more modern order, emerges. Uh, it's a, it's an order, it's a commercial capitalist economy where, you know, there's, there's commodity production, it's a heavily monetized economy, there's a division of labor, there's regional specialization, long-distance trade, international trade. This is when China becomes this economic powerhouse, you know, shipping goods out all over the known world. All, you know, all to East Africa, the Persian Gulf, Europe, Japan, Korea, Southeast Asia, India— every place is buying and consuming Chinese goods. Silks, textiles, other kinds of things, ceramics, tea, other, other products. You know, China becomes this, this economic engine, and it's driven by an economy which has all the features in different specific forms, but all the features of a capitalist, of commercial capitalist economy. Not— it's not a modern industrial factory economy. That doesn't happen anywhere until the, you know, basically 19th century. But it is a vibrant commercial economy in which both urban-centered manufacturing, craft manufacturing, textiles and other goods, and— and this is very important— and the agricultural economy are heavily commercialized, producing for the market, not just local self-sufficiency, but really the whole empire integrated into market exchange and, and banking and finance and all this kind of stuff. And that, that reality, I mean, if you read, you know, economic historians writing about China, they, they understand this, they talk about this. But as far as, as, you know, outside of a fairly narrow academic niche. There's not a broad understanding of this, but it's imperative that we realize that because it helps to explain why China is able today to have such a dramatically powerful economy. You know, they're drawing on a legacy that isn't a legacy of, you know, backward feudalism, but is a legacy of a vibrant capitalism that went on with its ups and downs, periods of expansion, periods of disruption, over 1,000 years basically, until it's derailed and hollowed out by Western industrial imperialism in the 19th century, right? Now China is recovering from that. It's back. It's, it's innovating, it's creating, it's producing, and it's doing so with a very complex relationship between economy and state. But if we look back at Chinese history, we can see that that's how it worked for a long time. So China's— it's different, it's other than our experience in the West, but it has a history that if we could— if more people, especially including, you know, some of our political leaders, could understand it and really appreciate it, I think it would help them to have a more— at least a more nuanced understanding of the realities of China today.

Unfortunately, Professor Hammond, they haven't narrow vision. Washington has always been that way. So I used to work there, so I kind of been in the thick of all that.

So, well, certainly all, all indications are that, uh, that division is, is pretty narrow. That's certainly—

oh yeah, yeah. This leads me, of course, to talk about, because we can— I cannot let you go without asking this question as to what lies ahead for US-China relations given the changes on the geopolitical landscape. I mean, you and I know, I'm sure the rest of the world knows, that the, the, the unipolarity, it's over. Gone the era where the Earth used to be the sole property of a sole superpower. That era is gone. So where do you see, how do you see the future relationship between the United States and, and China when thinking about Thucydides' theory. I'm sure you know Thucydides' theory as far as when an emerging power is going to unseat the sitting power. Are we looking at a conflict here or what?

Well, yeah, I mean, there's a lot of discussion and debate about the Thucydides trap, and I'm not sure that that's as relevant or applicable as some, you know, some serious-minded people obviously propose that. I think for one thing, you can look at plenty of examples of rising powers and fading powers in history where that didn't happen. There are certainly prominent examples where it did, but perhaps most recently, of course, the United States displaces Great Britain, and, you know, there's not a dramatic conflict in that instance. But I think that, that the future of U.S.-China relations is, is a problematic one. Um, I think that, you know, so long as the United States remains so narrowly focused on trying to maintain or re-establish its position as the global hegemon, uh, that it's going to pursue these policies with China of trying to, to thwart its development, trying to derail its development, and that it is apparently willing in that context to pursue these military provocations across a broad spectrum from the South China Sea to Taiwan to South Korea, you know, in what I think have to be seen as very reckless ways. So I'm, you know, I'm optimistic that the Chinese will continue to exercise the kind of restraint and maintain their long perspective. You know, they don't get as swept up in the sort of froth of the moment. They're much more focused on the deep structural changes that are taking place. But, you know, these kinds of fraught relations can go astray, and I, you know, I do have fears that outright conflict could erupt and that that could become very devastating, not just for the participants but for the broader global community as well. And of course, what one would hope, my hope for the future of U.S.-China relations would be that more more sober and, and more, uh, farsighted leadership in the United States might be able to see that by working together with China to pursue the development of better technologies, more sustainable technologies, a more eco-friendly, uh, future might be possible. You know, Xi Jinping talks about China becoming an eco-civilization, that that's got to be not just a policy or a program. That's got to be the heart, the core of what you're building. And many people these days advocate what we increasingly talk about as eco-socialism, the idea that capitalism can't fix the problems that it has generated because they're structural to the system of capitalism itself, you know. So only a socialist transformation can do that. I don't know, maybe, maybe in order to have a viable relationship with China and one which would allow us to save the planet, we need fundamental social change and political change here. Certainly that's a position I'm comfortable with, uh, but I don't see, uh, that that's something that's immediately on the agenda here. Uh, if anything, we're trying to prevent things moving in the opposite direction. Uh, so I, I think that, uh, you know, I, my hope is, uh, largely based upon my, my belief that the Chinese will take a longer perspective and be more restrained is that we're not going to face catastrophic military conflict. But I don't rule it out, and, you know, I think that it's something that those of us hoping to have some effect or some inflection on this, on the relationship, need to be very conscious of and need to work very hard at.

Well, let's hope we have leaders who can at least at least understand this basic historical facts about China before they embark on policies. Even though, sad to say, Professor Hammond, I just don't see that in Washington. I just don't see because we don't have good leaders, straightforward. It pains me to say this.

No, I understand.

But it is the reality of it.

So it is rather a bleak prospect at the moment. Yes.

Yeah, it's the reality of it. One final, uh, question I would like to have, because, uh, most of my viewers will want to know about this one here, and I'm talking about the, the reunification of Taiwan with the motherland. There are those who are saying peaceful reunification will make perfect sense, and I am in favor of that. There are those who said if Taiwan ever declare independence that becomes a serious problem. Given the historical ties of Taiwan part of China, where do you see the process going forward?

Well, you know, the Chinese position on this has been clear all along and remains unchanged, which is that the question of the status of Taiwan is a question that comes down from history. It's a legacy of the revolution, the civil war, all that. And it's a question which needs to be resolved by the Chinese people on both sides of the strait, right, in their own way, in their own time, without outside interference, without outside intervention. And that's, that's the policy, that's the principle, that's the practice that China has followed. China reserves, of course, It reserves the right to, you know, preserve security, shall we say, within its territory. You know, the United States talks a lot about respect for sovereignty and borders and all this, and yet it routinely violates that principle in its relations with Taiwan. Taiwan is part of China. Uh, if you buy— if you go to Taipei, you buy a map of China, it shows the whole country. It shows the mainland and it shows Taiwan as one unit. The difference of opinion is where's the capital, where's the government based, but that's something that can be resolved, you know, diplomatically, negotiations. There have been moments of great advance, right? Right now we're in a very difficult period. There's elections next February in Taiwan. The political landscape could shift once again. It's clear that there are forces, perhaps a coalition that could emerge that would be much more favorable to rolling back these tensions. The issue isn't, you know, should Taiwan be immediately fully reunified, reintegrated into a central administration. China is very clear Taiwan will retain its own local system. It's that one country, two systems policy. You know, they're very clear about that, uh, and, and, you know, nobody's talking about any kind of necessity of intervention or taking over or something like that. The best policy, and the policy that of course through most of the time that, that I've been traveling in China, working in China, observing things there, has been to just muddle through, you know, let the situation remain unresolved, but let's build closer links. There's trade, there's tourism, you know, there's a lot of investment from Taiwan in the mainland, and now investment from the mainland in Taiwan. Let that process of integration go forward in a more organic way. If that could be allowed to happen, I think that would be in everybody's best interest. But it's the United States that tries to intervene to stir things up as part of this foolish campaign to try to derail China's development and re-emergence. And, and that's the destabilizing factor, you know. So we should just shut up and get the hell out and let the situation there resolve itself over decades if that's what it takes.

Let alone we signed the three communiqués recognizing that—

oh yeah, absolutely, our position is entirely inconsistent and indefensible.

Yeah, that, that's so unfortunate. So, well, Professor Hammond, I can't thank you enough for really carving out time for me here to share your knowledge, uh, your insights about the history of China with, with my viewers here. They were very excited, and I will look forward to having you back here. So I thank you so much.

It's always a pleasure to come on, and, and these are, these are really excellent conversations. Your, your questions are, are so thoughtful and so penetrating. I think that it's, it's fun to, to be able to, to respond.

Okay, well, I'm greatly thankful to you, and I look forward to having you next time here. So to you folks, all of you, uh, as you, you know, this is something you're not gonna hear elsewhere. This is something you're not gonna find elsewhere. And this is not about just promoting the channel here, whatever. It's the idea of why I decided to do this kind of conversations, because this knowledge is very, very crucial. So, and I want you to understand, you know, for somebody like Professor Hammonds It's kind of him to really carve out that time. He's a busy person. I understand what it's like to be a full-time professor and so forth. So I'm so grateful to him, and I will invite him back in a few months here. After— I think he's traveling to China or something. After that, I'm gonna invite him again. So I hope you guys find this very informative, and I am always open to your suggestions as far as guests. Because that's how we learn. The learning process goes both ways. So as always, remember, geopolitics impacts your daily life in more ways than one. Till next time, bye-bye.