Why the West’s Perception about China is Wrong| Conversation w/Dr. Hammond!

All right, hello everybody and welcome to Geopolitical Trends, where truth matters. Very excited to be with you because of my guest today, somebody you guys been asking about, and he was gracious enough to, uh, really, really carve out time for us here because it is about history, and not understanding history will always allow us to make more mistakes and so forth. So this is why when I reached out to my guest here, it was— I was, I was very excited. I was very excited when I got the email back, like, sure, I'll come up on a show here. So, well, it's an individual that does not need a lot of introduction, but I am gonna sort of say something briefly here. And let me bring in Dr. Ken Hammond right here. Hello, Doc, how are you?

Very good, glad to be here.

So very, very excited. By the way, guys, to those who might not know who Dr. Hammond is, I put, by the way, the full bio of Dr. Hammond, and it's a lengthy one. You might want to check it out. It's in the description. Suffice it to say, I'm gonna just provide you a brief, brief history here. Dr. Hammond is a professor of history at the New Mexico State University, and, uh, sort of, he's a, he's a, uh, he's been dealing with history forever because he was, uh, at Kent State State University, uh, from 1967 to 1970. Then later in 1985 completed his degree in political science, then studied modern Chinese language at the Beijing Foreign Languages, uh, Normal School in Beijing. And by the way, Dr. Hammond has traveled to China way back in 1982 to study the language and stayed there for about 5 years. So This is why, uh, and, and of course I can't go without mentioning his latest book. It is the latest book, guys. If you guys can check it out, which we will be talking about anyway because I had a chance to read it. So I'll be sharing some stuff with you from Dr. Hamid's book. So, and all this I put it for you guys in the description. You can go ahead and check it out. So, and to all of you guys, I say hello everybody. I'm gonna get in into the conversation with Dr. Hamid because We don't have a lot of time to waste and you want to pick his brain for all this. So, all right, let me start first, uh, Doc, with the idea of why, why is the West not willing to learn from history? It's something, it's just mind-boggling, especially if we are to look, for example, in Western Europe, in Europe right now, what's going on with the Ukraine conflict and so forth. Why aren't we able to learn from what happened back in World War I, World War II, or even before?

Well, why people are unwilling to learn from history, I think, is always a challenging question. I think perhaps it's because they don't want to learn the lessons that history offers us. You know, Europe, Western Europe especially, and of course the United States and its relationship with Western Europe, Uh, you know, these countries for a long time were the, the leading powers in the world, really kind of reshaped global relationships, uh, in the early 19th century and through the 19th century into the 20th century in ways that were centered on their power, their economic, uh, you know, production, their, their, their manufacturing capabilities. And, and the rest of the world was kind of, uh, subordinated and integrated in a system where they produced raw materials and they consumed the manufactured goods coming out of Europe, but they did so in a sort of secondary role, in a subordinated role, whether they were direct colonies like India or countries in Africa, or, you know, what are sometimes called semi-colonies like China, which wasn't the colony of a single power but was sort of collectively exploited by a number of nations. Yeah, and that gave, that gave the Western Europeans, uh, you know, a tremendous, uh, well, a tremendous amount of wealth, but also it gave them the power and, and created a lot of, uh, a lot of privileges for them in the world. That, that era has passed, that system is gone, uh, you know, and, and they're having a hard time coming to grips with a new world, uh, which is not sort of centered in one area, one region, but has many, many areas, many centers, many, many places that are on the rise, that are developing, that are economically significant. China, of course, is a very important one, but countries like certainly India, Indonesia, Brazil, South Africa— there's a whole, you know, list, and it's a growing list of other places. And we're no longer in a world that has one center and a lot of periphery., but rather a world that's much more complex. And I think it's hard for, you know, the elites in Europe and certainly in America as well to sort of come to grips with that. They see it as really undermining their power and their position. And so they're reluctant to accept those lessons. They're reluctant to embrace those changes.

Yeah, but at the same time, won't you agree, Doug, that the idea of repeating the same mistakes, it's almost like we haven't learned anything. We've seen it right now in Ukraine with the Europeans going blindly following US decisions as far as the sanctions and so forth. But it's not about just that, it's about the consequences, the long-term impact which we are pushing towards. It's almost over a cliff. And we think, haven't they really read, uh, learned from history what took place? It took one, one minor issue back in World War I to ignite the whole war. And we're seeing the same. And I mean, it's like, I am perplexed as to where is the, the sort of the competency of these Western leaders.

Well, I think that new leadership, to say the least, is, is desperately needed, uh, because it's not a world in which, you know, the, the Western European powers or the United States can't find, you know, great— a great future for themselves. You know, working together with other countries, working in ways that are collaborative and cooperative rather than confrontational and combative, it seems to me that that's a viable path forward. And I'll just mention, you know, examples, maybe just one or two of, you know, obviously the great existential crisis facing us all is— it has to do with the environment. You know, we have threats of war, we have threats of, you know, renewed threats of nuclear proliferation and things like that. But ultimately, it's these environmental challenges that, you know, may put all those other issues in the backseat. And yet, you know, leaders in Europe and America seem unable to come to grips with the idea that just because a technology or just because a way of solving some of these problems comes from a country that doesn't have a system just like ours or doesn't accept our leading role in the world doesn't mean that we shouldn't be working with them. Doesn't mean that we shouldn't be embracing the ideas, the progress, the technology that they're able to be putting forward. You know, and so we're locked into a mentality that really goes back to the Cold War or back to— back, as you say, back to things like World War I and World War II, those rivalries and those conflicts between so-called great powers. When what we need is the willingness to reach across and say, look, okay, we have our differences, we have different systems, we have different ideas, but we need to work together to solve problems. And that, I think, is a vision that sometimes gets talked about but often doesn't get put into practice.

Yeah, you mentioned the key word, confrontational attitude. And I would like for us to shift from Europe all the way to Asia because of that particular terminology, because that's what I am observing as a geopolitical analyst. I am seeing now the, uh, the West is ratcheting up this kind of approach to fomenting more tensions in Asia. And that begs the question as to, is Asia the next frontier as far as confrontation? And why is this? It's because tied to, of course, aimed at one objective and one country. And we all know, it's no secret, that country is China. Why is this? Why, in your opinion, Dr. Hammond, this is like— haven't we learned from history?

Well, again, I think that, I think that, you know, you're, you're, you're quite right that, that, uh, when we, when we talk about Asia, and really when we talk about global relations overall, the, the, the confrontation, the tension between the United States and China is at the heart of our— of many of our current dilemmas. You know, some of the conflicts that are taking place elsewhere in the world are not exactly proxies for that, but they're shaped by that. The fact that, for example, with the Ukraine crisis, that China and Russia have a close relationship. They have a close economic relationship. They have a close political relationship, even though they have really very fundamentally different systems, different leadership, different ideas about how the world works, but they have common interests, and they're able to set aside the differences in their systems, the differences even in their ideologies, in order to work together to achieve, you know, some common benefits. That's an approach that, you know, I think other countries, especially in the West, should be able to try to understand and learn from and maybe emulate. But obviously, that's, that's not happening. Instead, what we have is the United States in particular, with Europeans, many of the Western European countries following along faithfully, uh, uh, you know, the United States viewing China, viewing China's emergence as a significant economic power and as a, as a participant in global affairs, taking part you know, in, in developmental projects through the Belt and Road Initiative and in participating in international organizations, launching new initiatives in science and technology, having a space program. The United States sees all these things as, as displacing its leadership, displacing its dominance in global affairs, and they don't like that. They don't want that. They fear that. And that's really what's driving this current dilemma is fear. It's fear on the part of American elites of losing their power, losing their privileges. But, you know, they need to get over that. They need to overcome that and find ways to go forward in a more creative and innovative way. The confrontation with China isn't going to be resolved, you know, by— well, it's just got to go away. It can't be resolved because it's based on a false idea. Which is that China's— China's rise, as they call it. I like to think of it as China's re-emergence. China once again becoming the kind of powerful country in the world that it was for many, many centuries. That's not going to be stopped. That's just a deep restructuring of global relationships that's been going on for almost 100 years now and is going to continue. So trying to stop that, that's really a fool's errand. That's just not going to work. What— again, just, just to mention one brief example. Yeah, one of the things that China is doing so well right now is producing solar panels, panels for the generation of electric electricity from solar energy. They have the cheapest, the most efficient in the world, and many, many countries around the world are, are importing these from China as part of their efforts to come to grips with, with our climate crisis, our, our environmental crisis. But in the United States, we impose tariffs, and they're just about to increase those tariffs to keep those solar panels out of the United States. When Janet Yellen was just there, she lectured the Chinese on how they shouldn't have overcapacity, what she called overcapacity. What we need is infinite capacity to meet these challenges. And telling China to sort of, you know, wind it down, roll it back, don't be so efficient, don't be so effective, in producing these kinds of commodities. And she talks specifically about electric vehicles and solar panels. That's just crazy talk, you know, but it's because China's competitiveness, China's ability to do these things, is seen as a threat. It's seen— it generates fear in American elites rather than a sense of, wow, this is a really great opportunity that we should be linking ourselves to. We should find the way to work with that so that we can solve problems together rather than making more problems and letting the existing problems get worse because we're focused on these confrontational attitudes.

Yeah, I don't know who's advising the US officials. It seems like, you know, who's in their right mind will go and tell a country, hey, you need to slow down from your progress. And at the same time we're gonna be begging for money. That just doesn't— it's embarrassing to begin with. I did a video on this in which I addressed this because I put it as an American, I was embarrassed, really embarrassed. You are badmouthing a system or a country for that matter, and you are begging for money. Just doesn't make sense. So, and you're absolutely correct, Dr. Hammond, the idea of cooperation will have yielded a better result That's just fomenting more tensions, and I don't know to what end it's gonna be. Uh, I want to go back to your, uh, to your book because I had a chance to— very, very interesting. Just for my viewers, who's— by the way, guys, uh, for those who just joining me here, I'm having a conversation here with Dr. Ken Hammond, and please just prepare a question or two that I'm gonna ask Dr. towards the end. So just for you to know, In the book, Dr. Hammond, you wrote, and I quote, "Since the founding of the PRC, China has pursued its distinctive path of social construction, a challenging and often contentious process which is still unfolding today." And just fast forward to it when you talked about, for example, the new era or the new China that is through the era of the Mao Zedong leadership, the launching of the new reform under Deng Xiaoping, and the beginning of the new era under the leadership of Xi Jinping. China's use of market mechanisms to develop the productive economy has generated contradictions as well as dramatic growth, and China has achieved great things in education, healthcare, and the provision of other social services. Now, my question: could this work in progress moving forward Is this why the US sort of, or the West collectively, is trying to undermine China? And if so, why?

Well, yes, I think it is. I think it is. China, you know, China, China is a big country. It's got, you know, 1.4 billion people and it's a large territory and it's becoming increasingly an economic powerhouse. It is by some measures the largest economy in the world and certainly the second largest economy in the world, right behind that of the United States by other measures. And so, yeah, you know, it's playing a role in the world that is going to be quite influential and quite significant going forward. For a long time, starting all the way back in the 1980s, uh, really perhaps even earlier in the '70s, uh, and continuing up until quite recently, uh, political, you know, elites in the West looked at China and, and their hope, their, their dream, and in many ways their expectation was that as China developed, as China became more prosperous, um, that it would sort of naturally become a part of the global capitalist system, the system that, you know, the United States is at the heart of, and, and that of course originated in, in, in Western Europe back in the 19th century. Um, and that, that, you know, political transformation of some sort would take place in China, and they would, they would abandon this idea of building a socialist system, a system that sought to redistribute socially produced wealth basically among the people who were actually producing it, um, you know, which China has not fully achieved, but, but that's the project, as we talk about in the book, that they're working on. It's not a done deal, but, but that is, as, as you use the term, a work in progress.

Progress.

And, and the hope was that, that China would, would let that go and just become, you know, a capitalist economy and, and a subordinate component of the global capitalist economy with the US and the West still at the heart of that. And for a long time, they nurtured that hope and that dream. And China, because it needed the assistance, the knowledge, the information, the technology, the experience that they could learn from the West, from the global capitalist system, China, you know, sort of kept a low profile, kind of, you know, went along, got along to get along, you know. And, and they accommodated themselves to, to a lot of Western, uh, interests, uh, things like joining the World Trade Organization and things like that. But more recently, especially since the global financial crisis in 2008, it's become clear that, that China is not going to integrate itself fully with the global capitalist system. It's not going to just become, you know, one component of that, of that larger American-centered system. But it's going to go its own way. It is still a socialist system. It is still— they're still trying to build this socialist economy, socialist society, and that's premised on, on a completely different basis from, from that of the capitalist West. So once leaders in the West began to realize that And I think perhaps President Obama in the United States may have been the leader in this area. Suddenly they changed their attitude towards China from, well, let's work with China, let's be patient with China, let's bring China along to, oh, whoa, China is taking this very different path and that's threatening to us. So let's try to slow them down. Let's try to derail this process if we can. And that's what the pivot to Asia back in 2011 was about. That's what Trump's tariff wars were all about. That's what Biden's confrontational policies of, you know, great power conflict, that's what that's all about. Trying to, you know, trying to force China in essence to change, to have, you know, maybe some kind of, I don't know, some kind of, what do they call them, color revolution or something like that. That's not going to happen in China. You know, all kinds of polls and other indicators show that there's widespread support, popular support for the Chinese government, for their policies, for the progress that China is making. You know, of course Chinese people like to complain about things just like everybody else in the world, but that doesn't mean that they don't recognize and understand what's happening in their country. They have the memory, you know, they, they can hear stories. Young people can hear stories from their grandparents about the tremendous changes that have taken place in China. They don't want to derail that. They don't want to stop that. They want to keep advancing towards the future, to a better future for all the people, you know. And, and I think that that's something that isn't understood in the West. You know, we hear a lot of references to how, you know, companies in China are, are, you know, connected to the state. Well, of course they are. It's a socialist country. It's a socialist economy. That's how that works. And the idea that that is in some way shocking or even inappropriate is it's a fundamental misperception, misunderstanding. You hear the, the spokespeople for the foreign ministry in China talk about how really the fundamental problem between the United States and China is misperceptions and misunderstandings on the part of the Americans. And I think they're right about that, that it— American politicians and American sort of, you know, mainstream pundits and stuff, they can't get— they can't accept in their heads the idea that a socialist economy, a socialist society might actually be possible, might actually be working in a country like China. And so they, you know, they, they can only look at it through their own, their own lenses, their own sort of blinders, and see it in, in ways that, that sort of reproduce the ways in which they have operated and they have sought to pursue their power and their interests you know, over the last couple of hundred years.

Well, you're absolutely correct. Like you mentioned earlier, we are having a hard time accepting this new reality of where China is emerging. And you brought up earlier, uh, uh, Russia and China, and I'm sure you're aware of the recent visit of Mr. Lavrov, which, by the way, he, he was granted an audience with President Xi. Which to me as an analyst, it says a lot and it sends a message out there to the rest of the world. Because, you know, you're usually in a world of diplomacy, head of state will meet with his or her counterpart. But this to me, it sent a different message. It was specific. I know Chinese did this for specific reason to send that message to the West, mainly the United States.

It.

In your opinion, Dr. Hammond, are you with— are you gonna— or are you seeing that— are you seeing what I'm saying, is that China and Russia will be the two that will be managing the new global order, which will be multipolar?

Well, I think that they're certainly going to play very important roles in that, and the alliance, the friendship that, uh, that exists between China and Russia Uh, you know, is, is going to be very, very important. I think that it is a multi-centric order, and I think that when we look at, uh, at organizations like BRICS, uh, you know, which is also an expanding, uh, a group of countries that are cooperating with one another in, in many ways, not necessarily in all ways, always, but what, what we see is a much more pragmatic, a much more realistic approach to sort of international relations and global relationships that, you know, as I, as I said earlier, China and Russia have very different systems, you know. Uh, Russia is, is not a socialist country. It's a country that in fact has a rather steep, uh, socioeconomic hierarchy. And, and, you know, these figures that, that get called the oligarchs and all that kind of stuff, they play a very powerful and influential role in China— in Russia, you know. It's very different from the system that exists in China. But those differences don't have to mean that those countries are antagonistic to one another. You know, they, they have common interests. Most, most importantly, you know, trying not to be dominated by the West and by the United States. You know, and it's those common interests that can help both countries to advance their agendas, to advance their, you know, their, their goals. That allow them to work so closely together. Of course, in the specific case of China and Russia, they share a huge border. They have interconnected economic interests. You know, China buys things from Russia, Russia buys things from China. You know, there's a lot of ways in which they're just deeply interconnected, and it's better, you know, for everyone that they have a friendly relationship, they have a cooperative alliance kind of relationship. And I think that, as you suggest, that's going to be very influential as a model, as a sort of an example that people can learn from and perhaps in some instances at least emulate. And I think that, yeah, that they're going to— in that sense, they're going to be a really important factor in shaping the, the, the, this new multi-centric world order that's going to be, that is emerging and is going to continue, uh, to emerge going forward.

Yeah, that's what I, uh, I recall when I wrote my, uh, my Russia book. I devoted an entire, almost a chapter to the Sino-Russian relations, and I argued back then that it will impact the trajectory of the global order, whether we like it or not, just because it's a fait accompli. To me, that's common sense. So yeah, let's, uh, let's shift to talk about really Asia, what's going on there, with the focus on the historical aspects of China, because it's gonna play a role. And, uh, there is no one else, in my opinion, other than you that I trust, first of all, because to me it's a, it's a keyword, and I usually don't use this term loosely, uh, and I mean it, Dr. Hammond, uh, it's because you are historically, uh, focusing— focused in your studies, uh, on China between the 14th century and all the way to the 18th, if I'm correct, right?

Yeah, yeah, yeah.

And, and this is what I need to— for my— for the whole community, uh, to get a better understanding of how The historical past shapes the present and influences the future. And we'll tie it all this to what I'm gonna be referring to here. Well, my reference here right now is to the Philippines and Japan. They are both of them, meaning Fumio Kishida, the Prime Minister of Japan, and Ferdinand Marcos Jr., are both of them in Washington for the trilateral summit. What I found very disturbing and perplexing is the speech that Fumio Kishida just gave to Congress, by which he said, and I paraphrase here, we need to prevent Russia from using nuclear, which to me was very disturbing statement because who used the nukes on Japan? It was the US. My point in all this, we're seeing Philippines pivoting away from China to the US. We see in the US trying to woo Japan into AUKUS, Australia, uh, uh, the UK, and, and the United States. And the last statement, uh, recently last weekend, the quadruple military joint ventures between 4 countries: the US, Philippines, Japan, and Australia in South China Sea. How do you see, how do you read this from a historical perspective, Dr. Hammond, knowing that in the history of China it has never had intentions or even the aspiration of invading countries or establishing bases or what have you?

Yeah, I mean, China's China's relationship with, with the wider world, of course, has, has a tremendously long history, and, and it has, it has not, you know, included, uh, uh, going out and trying to take over other countries and trying to, uh, establish, you know, a, a, a, a, a vast military or naval, uh, uh, network to, to control other parts of the world. There's one brief episode in the early 15th century, back in between 1405 and 1433, where China does send out these amazing exploratory fleets under an admiral called Zheng He. And they, they, there's 7 voyages. They go as far as East Africa. They go to India and the Red Sea, the Persian Gulf, all this. But, but these are not colonizing missions. They're not out there to try to establish, as you say, military bases or anything like that. Um, and, and, you know, they're basically kind of showing off how great China is and, and gathering knowledge and information. China traded with all of these, uh, uh, places. Uh, it had, it had relationships with many of these countries. Uh, and they were, you know, they were the, the— there was a new emperor who was kind using these to show off the greatness of his empire and of course of himself. But that's a very brief episode. And other than that, China has never maintained much of a navy until the modern period because now it has to defensively. But, you know, China's never been that kind of power. In contrast, of course, with the West, which, you know, since the 15th century has, has reached out all over the world, taken over other countries, created this vast network of colonialism in the 19th century, and sought to subordinate the rest of the world to its interests, you know, with greater or lesser success at different times. But, you know, that has certainly been a characteristic feature of the West. China's culture has been very much a, you know, I mean, it's a big country. I don't want to call it excessively localist, but it's been basically within a a pretty stable set of geographic parameters for a long, long, long time. Nonetheless, it's, it's also the case that there are parts of, of, uh, of the world close to China which historically have, have had close linkages with China. Um, there's a, there's a fascinating map from the early 17th century. It's called the Selden Map. It's held in the Bodleian Library at Oxford. That shows basically China and Southeast Asia, including of course the South China Sea, not as a sort of what today we would call a territorial claim, because that whole idea of a defined, you know, national boundary extending out into the maritime realm and all this, this just wasn't part of the conceptual order of Asia or most of the rest of the world. That kind of idea arises also in the 17th century with what's called the Westphalian system after the Treaty of Westphalia, 1648, of creating this rigid system of international, you know, nation-states and all that. That's a Western construct that then gets projected on other parts of the world. But the Selden map clearly shows that the South China Sea, including places like the Pratley Islands and, and these other, uh, you know, uh, locations scattered around the South China Sea were, were integrated into China's sense of its relationship with the wider world, that this was a sphere within which China had significant interests— trading interests, economic interests, overseas Chinese populations, people who had emigrated from China to places like the Philippines, Southeast Asia, uh, the island of Java, or, or on the mainland of Southeast Asia. This was a world that was part of China's sort of conceptual order, if you will. And that's a very different thing from the modern idea of, of, you know, the nation-state and all that. But that just— that gives us an idea that, that China's claims in the South China Sea today are a modern expression of, of a consciousness, of a, of a sense that has deep historical roots. You know, um, you know, China, China— I, I think the Chinese must wonder why it is that countries like the United States, located thousands of miles away, think that the South China Sea is an area where they get to call the shots, where they get to say you know, do things this way, do things our way, or we're gonna, you know, give you a hard time. Australia, that's also thousands of miles away. What are they doing up in there, you know? Uh, China, China's right there. Uh, and China, you know, Hainan Island is in the South China Sea. Other islands that are out there have this long historical connection to China. They also, some of them have connections to other areas in Southeast Asia. To, to Vietnam or to the Philippines, you know. And those are issues, you know, exactly how that should be delineated, those are issues that those countries should be discussing and negotiating about and resolving amongst themselves. The problem is, is not China and the Philippines and Vietnam and like that. The China— the problem is the United States. What is the United States doing, you know, carrying out war exercises in the South China Sea? Other countries in, you know, in ways that really are not advantageous for their own interests. What's up with that? And, and of course, as we've talked about already, the answer is that the United States is doing everything it possibly can to encircle, to contain, to constrain China— China's development, China's modernization, China's enhancement of the livelihood of its people. Because American elites fear that as disrupting the world that they want to continue to run. And they think that they can do that. And the irony, one of the ironies of course, is that, you know, at the very early stages of American history, the United States proclaimed that they were going to exclude other countries from the whole Western Hemisphere. The, the Monroe Doctrine, Monroe Doctrine, yeah, said Europeans, stay out. This is our sphere of influence. And now, you know, China's not saying that. China's not saying other countries need to stay out of the South China Sea. They're just saying, let's keep this, you know, the way it's historically been. Let's keep this as, you know, there's a reason it's called the South China Sea. It's not called the South America Sea, you know. Yeah, you know, so they're just saying, let's let the countries that are here have their relationships with one another without outside interference. But the United States continues to think that it has the power and the right to go anywhere in the world and tell people how they should live, what they should do, that they need to toe the American line and forget about their own self-interest, you know. And that's obviously not realistic, and it's no longer a world in which the United States gets to do that. But America hasn't learned that lesson yet, and that's part of what we opened talking about. Why can't they learn these kinds of lessons? Because they don't want to, because they don't see it as being in their self-interest.

Wow. Yeah, well, it makes perfect sense because, as you said, the world has changed and we need to change with it. Simple as that. So you brought up— they mentioned about the— I need to look up that Selden Map, uh, Dr. Hammond, uh, the one in Oxford, because I wasn't aware of that one. I need to check that out.

There's a very good book about it just called The Selden Map, S-E-L-D-E-N. Okay, so you or viewers, you know, if you want to check that out, it's a very good history of all that.

I'm gonna check it out. It's because the reason I'm mentioning this, because the recent maps, yeah, the political maps that, uh, we all are familiar with when we write books and so forth I can see the sort of the highlighting of certain aspects within a geographical area to make a political point. That's what I always was always careful about using certain maps because it deflects from the truth. So, and the reason I want to mention this one because now comes to mind about Spartley Island. So what is— why, why all of a sudden This come into the forefront as far as the claim from the Philippines that it belongs to the Philippines. Why all of a sudden Philippines and China getting into some confrontations in the, on the water? I'm sure you heard of the incident by which some Chinese died in this incident. Why all of a sudden we seeing the emergence of these problems?

Well, I think that the Philippines You know, the Philippines have gone through a lot of, uh, uh, how shall we say, uh, weaving back and forth in terms of, uh, their, their relationships, uh, trying to position themselves in, in a world which realistically, uh, you know, the, the relationship between the United States and China, uh, is something that, that they have to take into account. Uh, when, uh, when Marcos Jr., you know, was first elected He went to China early on and, and had very, you know, warm meetings there and, and said some very positive things. But since then, you know, he's obviously sort of recalculated or recalibrated his sensibilities in a way that has had him drawing closer, uh, to the United States. Uh, and, and, you know, whether that is itself a strategic calculation and he's trying to you know, maybe elicit some sort of concessions from China or something. I, I don't know. I don't understand the, the depths of, of what he may be, uh, you know, trying to, trying to do, what his, what his goals or his perceptions or his objectives might be. But I think that, that there's no question that, that the, the more confrontational attitude that the Philippines has been taking in the South China Sea has certainly been, uh, to say the least, encouraged by the United States. They would love to have, you know, a, a, a, a stronger confrontation, a clash, a conflict between the Philippines and China. That would, that would serve American interests, uh, that would advance their agenda. And I'm sure that they're doing what they can to push the Philippines in that direction. So, uh, you know, I think that, uh, that that's, that's just That's just, you know, sort of the, the practical realities of American— I don't even know if we want to call it diplomacy, but American policies, uh, in that area. Uh, they would love to, they would love to, you know, try to, to manipulate Vietnam into a more confrontational attitude with China. There have been a number of gestures in that direction, a number of visits by President Biden and others, you know, that have tried to do that. Vietnam's not buying that. They're not, they're not, you know, going to get on board with that. But the Philippines is a very different case. And frankly, uh, Ferdinand Marcos Jr. is a somewhat volatile political figure. And, and, you know, his, um, his calculations, his, his policy stances, the, the actions that his government carries out, uh, may not be based on, on, you know, the, the real interests of, of the Philippine people, uh, uh, you know, to, to a significant degree. So I think that, that they're pursuing— the Philippines right now is pursuing a, a rather dangerous course. I don't think, you know, China is not going to attack the Philippines or something. I don't know. But these, these, these clashes that have taken place, these conflicts that have taken place, are basically around a spot where there's a, a Philippines ship, a ship that was a Philippine ship that ran aground, and it's, it's, it's a wreck now, but they've been using that as a platform. They've got some people stationed on it. They're using that as a platform to try to maintain their claim, their territorial claims in the South China Sea. And, you know, China of course doesn't see that as legitimate. They see that territory, including where that ship is, as within their territory. Um, and, and that's, you know, so that's led to these, these, these encounters. Yeah, but I don't think, I don't think China is interested in escalating this in some way to turn it into some, some military confrontation with the Philippines. And I want to mention just one thing that, that goes a little bit outside of this, but I think it's important to understand. You were mentioning maps of, of this area, and of course one of the, one of the things that, that we hear about, uh, from American a spokesman. It's not— it's interestingly not shown on this map, uh, but is what's called the Nine-Dash Line, which is a line on maps that you can buy, uh, anywhere in China. It's the— it's the— the Chinese map of the South China Sea that has a, a, you know, a dashed line sort of demarcating the areas that China claims as, as being their legitimate territorial concerns. What's interesting is that while the United States condemns China for that, for the use of the Nine-Dash Line, if you were to visit Taiwan, Taiwan Province, and go to a bookstore and buy a map of the Republic of China, uh, it would show Taiwan and the rest of China as a single country, which of course it is, and it would also include the Nine-Dash Line. The political authorities in Taipei, the, the, the government of, of the island of Taiwan that has been embraced by figures from Nancy Pelosi to, you know, everybody else in Congress, and, and, you know, we send all this assistance to, and we have this, this basically inappropriate military relationship with— that government makes the same claim, the same territorial claim. But we never hear about that. We never hear that Taiwan also claims these same territories, these same islands, you know. So there's a level of hypocrisy or doublethink in some ways in American attitudes and propaganda about China that we don't notice a lot, you know, but it's there. And I think we need to pay attention to that, that that the, the, the, the rejection of the situation in the South China Sea is entirely a political gesture, has nothing to do with legality, because the, the regime that we supposedly support on Taiwan makes exactly the same claims. So I just wanted to mention that as a, as a sort of sidebar to, to the discussion about what's going on in the South China Sea.

No, it's, it's very interesting because to me it says the idea of— you would think that this in Philippines and even with the provincial or those responsible for the policies in Taiwan will think twice. And this is where we came about the history, learning from history. You will think they will learn from what's going on right now in Ukraine. I'm referring to that. Yeah, I'm referring to this, Dr. Hammond, that the US ain't gonna come to their defense. We're not gonna go there. Yeah, we push them first in front line, but that's how the same will apply to Australia, same will apply to Japan, same will apply to South Korea, and now soon it's going to be applying to New Zealand as well. This is how I see it going. And you will think they will learn from the lessons of history, uh, apparently it's not the case. So, so I hope they can think twice before they force forward with whatever policy they are moving towards. So, uh, I want to get your input on, uh, to go back a little bit to those, uh, 17th, 18th century, if I may. And I had a chance to read up on, uh, one particular aspect. I know it go way beyond that to the Shang Dynasty, which is— was one of the earliest ruling dynasties in China, uh, and, and at least based on the historical record that I checked, it was established in recorded history as the first or the earliest ruling dynasty in China. And, and what I found very interesting is that the Shang ruled from about, uh, 1600 to about 1046 BC, and that was during the era of the Bronze, the Bronze Era in China. What I did not know, Dr. Hammond, is that during this era, which was very surprising to me, I did not know till I found out because I did the reading on it and all that stuff. I found out that during this period of time, there were so many advances in mathematics, in astronomy, artwork, and military technology. To my surprise, and I just was like fascinated when I found, uh, this, this idea of, uh, the Shang Dynasty. So what I wanted to ask you is, based on the historical record, let's say we just go from 14th century all the way to the 19th. Well, it is just for, for the sake of, uh, of conversation here, for the historical record of China Does anything suggest to you today that China will act differently from what it did during this period? I know things have changed. I know the world, the stages, the technology advancements and so forth. But historically speaking, does anything indicate to you that the behavior of China in this new global order will go far away or move itself from its historical record as far as not going for sort of invading countries, not getting into international conflicts, not expanding and so forth?

Well, the short answer, of course, is no. I think that the sort of geostrategic posture of China today going forward, uh, is, is, is going to be consistent with, with the long historical experience of China in terms of, you know, China being a, a, a sort of self-contained, if you will, uh, uh, political space that, um, you know, isn't interested in territorial expansion. One of the foundational principles of foreign policy of the People's Republic all the way back in the early 1950s, articulated by both Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Zhou Enlai at that point, was respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all countries, uh, you know, and, and that is a principle that China has maintained, uh, ever since, ever since. And, you know, there's been variations in the specific policies, but But those, those basic concepts have underlined Chinese foreign policy and continue to do so today. I think that today, perhaps more than at some earlier periods in the People's Republic, but certainly under the current leadership, under Xi Jinping and others, there's an interesting consistency, and we hear this in, in, in relation to things like, like the Belt and Road as well, that in, in, in traditional Chinese political culture, one of the values that's, that's very important, um, I suppose, uh, uh, I, I would use a term like is, is emulation, or perhaps, uh, leading by example, right? If you go all the way back to, to, to early classical texts like, like Mencius and, and Confucius and others, they talk about the idea that, that, uh, in a government, the ruler, the leaders, they can, they can use laws and they can use punishments and they can, they can regulate people's behavior. But doing it that way, uh, means that people, people might behave, but they won't have their own sense of what's right and good. They'll only know, you know, what gets them punished and what doesn't, right? But if the— if, if you lead by, by example, if you lead by being the kind of, of people, the kind of leaders, the kind of individuals that you want people to, to be like, to emulate, to follow, then, then people will learn from your example and they'll have a sense of righteousness, a sense of what's right and wrong. You know, they'll have their own sense of justice and morality and things like that. And I think that today, you know, there have been periods under the People's Republic when China was, was more actively engaged in sort of promoting revolutionary movements in other, other places, whether it was India or parts of Africa or wherever. They don't, they don't do that anymore. You know, they, they, they may extend political support. They may say, yes, we think your movement is a good thing. You know, we'd like to see you do better. But they're not, you know, shipping advisers or money or cases of rifles or something, anything like that. That's, that's just not something that's going on. Because what they say today, and, and as I say, this is often articulated in connection with things like the Belt and Road Initiative, is we China, we're engaged in building, you know, seeking to build this socialist future. We want to improve the livelihoods of our people by creating a more just and equitable system where the fruits of labor are, you know, socially distributed in ways that come back to the people who have produced those— that value, that economic value. And to the degree to which we can be successful at that, to the degree to which other people can look at China and say, wow, look how well they're doing. Look at the advances they've made. Look at the progress they've made. Look at how they've lifted people out of poverty. Look at how they saved lives during the COVID epidemic. Look at how they, you know, buffered the effects of the financial crisis in 2008. If people can look at that and say, that might work for us, Why don't we try that? Why don't we see if that would be good for us? Then that's how, that's how we'll— that's how we lead. And I think that when we look at China's relationships with the world, that's, that's more their model. And it's both a sort of modern building socialism model and a very traditional Chinese political culture model that says we respect your sovereignty, we respect your territorial integrity, you've got to respect ours. We're not going to try, we're not going to try to intervene and change your system. So you shouldn't intervene and try to change ours. But if you or other people find our example to be inspiring, great, we're happy with that. And if you want our help in developing, we'll be happy to provide it. But we're not going to come in and tell you how to run your country. We're not going to come in and tell you how to structure your economy. We, we do it our way. It's working for us. If that works for you, we'll be, we'll be happy, and we'll be happy to help you. And I think that's, that's a very different model, obviously, from Western imperialism that's gone all over the world trying to make people get in line with their interests, you know. Yeah, but I, I think that that's consistent with China's recent experience, and it's consistent with their, you know, both their theory and their practice today.

Yeah. And on this, just to follow up on this particular point, what can we anticipate now that we in the United States come into an election, presidential elections, that is? So what should we expect now that we know already what we've been doing for the last I would say a decade or so. I was in Washington in 2011 at the time when that pivot to Asia. And I remember, I remember I had an encounter with a rear admiral in one of the functions I was in. And we talked, he found out that I wrote a book at the time. We were in the process of writing a book about Iran because that's when I was doing the research. And I mentioned about this idea of us sending our fleets to the Pacific theater, it's not going to bode well in the long term. And he was looking at me like I'm speaking some foreign languages because it didn't sort of, didn't register for him that what I was saying is straightforward, is that this kind of tactics will no longer work because the world is changing. So where do you see the upcoming elections here in the US vis-à-vis the relationship between China and the United States?

Well, I have to say that I don't, I don't think that whatever happens in November is going to have significant impact on American policy towards China. I think that, you know, both the mainstream parties, both the Democratic and Republican parties, and, and their kind of geriatric leadership, uh, uh, you know, are, are pretty dedicated to hostility, uh, towards China. Uh, I, I think the prospects of, of either of those candidates, the presumptive candidates, uh, you know, Joe Biden and Donald Trump, I don't see either of them as having any kind of realistic or practical approach to relations with China or to American conduct in the world. I think they're both dedicated to an outdated, antiquated, dysfunctional vision of the United States in the world, uh, that, that doesn't bode well, uh, you know. And I, and I, I, I, I'm not, uh, I certainly won't be voting for either of them, uh, same here with a different party, you know. But, uh, uh, I think that if, you know, people, people talk about holding your nose and going for the lesser of two evils. At some point that's got to stop, and at some point people have to, to step outside of that, that revolving door between the two, you know, major parties and just say, you know, we got to do something else. Uh, I, I'm not sure that this November will be that time, but I know that there are other parties, the Green Party, the Party for Socialism and Liberation, which is the group that I work with, you know, that have candidates. You know, there are alternatives out there, and maybe it's time for people to hold their nose and, or, you know, open their eyes and vote for something other than just another round of warmongering and hostility. Shared by both the mainstream parties.

Oh, very, very interesting. I have a last point here before we— I open the floor for a few questions. I know you're busy, Dr. Hammond, and I don't want to abuse— I gotta be respectful of your time. So the last thing I want to address with you and like to have your insights is about the recent pivot And this goes in the other direction, from ASEAN countries, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, that they are almost in a subtle way pivoting away from Washington towards China, except you have the two main countries that are always personally, that's my personal opinion, I've always had a question mark on them, Philippines and Singapore. What does it signify? What does it tell you about this pivot? How significant is this in your opinion?

Well, I think it's very significant, and I think that it's only logical, it's only reasonable. I think that countries across Southeast Asia, the countries in ASEAN, you know, most of them, you know, have the interests of their own people at heart. Certainly countries like Vietnam and Laos, that have, you know, socialist governments. But countries, you know, Thailand as well, which has, of course, a lot of political turmoil domestically, but they're pretty pragmatic and pretty practical on the international level. They've had a long and close relationship with the United States, and it's encouraging to see a little more, you know, practical approach to things emerging there. Of course, Malaysia, uh, you know, has a large ethnic Chinese population, as does Indonesia. Uh, so it's perhaps not surprising that maybe they're reevaluating, reappraising some of their situations. And of course, over, over all of that is, is economics, which is that for most of these countries, China has, uh, has been and, and continues to be their major trading partner. Uh, their economic futures are are closely tied up with the prosperity that, that China's rise, uh, is, is fomenting in, in much of East and Southeast Asia. Uh, so I, I think it's very encouraging. I think it's a good thing. Um, I'm not sure that, that this is the final stage in that, you know, there may be further, further vacillation. Certainly the United States has been pouring, uh, political capital into Southeast Asia, uh, trying to, to wean countries away from a closer relation relationship with China. But I don't think in the long run that that's going to prevail. I don't know how long it will take the United States to achieve a more, a more rational perspective on global affairs. Doesn't seem to be on the horizon at the moment, but hopefully in the future, as the world continues to evolve in these new directions, uh, maybe a new generation of American leadership, uh, can find a way to, to adjust to these new realities and not just continue to live in a fantasy world of the Cold War and American global hegemony.

Indeed, indeed. Well, hey guys, I hope you found this very, very informative because this is kind of information you are not going to find anywhere else. And I'm not saying it to be Mr. Nice. That is not my personality. You know me, guys, by now. I call a spade a spade, and, and that's how I look at it. So I hope you find this very informative. Let me take, uh, one or two questions for Dr. Hammond before I let him go. I'll take the first one here from Matt Becky. Question: why is China lagging behind in soft power and narrative the same way the West has almost monopoly, uh, of the airwaves?

That's a very interesting question, and, and, and I, I appreciate it because last, last year, last summer, I was, I was in Paris at, um, at a workshop, and, uh, one of the speakers there, uh, is a fellow named Roland Boor, uh, who's written a number of wonderful books on China, uh, uh, is teaching at, uh, at Renmin University in China these days. Uh, from Australia originally and has a quite remarkable, uh, sort of academic and intellectual history. But, um, he's, he's working in China and, and, uh, of course is very much in touch with the situation there. And I think that he, he made a comment which, which took me a little bit off guard at the moment, but, but in retrospect, certainly I think he's, he's entirely correct, uh, and, and in some ways, um, uh, I, I kind of wish that it wasn't as true as I think it is, uh, but he said that basically in China now they understand that, that the United States, the political elites, the, the media elites, the, the people who control, or at least endeavor to control, the information, uh, that we get here are so dedicated to an anti-China posture. They're so willing to, to demonize China and, and, and promote this, this hostile narrative about China, um, that, that there's not a lot that, that China can do about that. China can't come in and control the media in the United States, uh, uh, you know. And, and so that's one aspect. But he also said, and this was the part that, that caught me off guard, he also said that there's an understanding that the United States, as far as, as world affairs goes, the tide's going out. And so on a certain level, who cares? Who cares what American propaganda says? Uh, that, that, uh, you know, the Chinese aren't— they're not worried about that. Uh, now of course, as an American, as, as someone engaged in political activity here, I care about it. And I'm, I'm, I'm very concerned that, that we need to do everything we can to, to give the American people better access to knowledge and information about China. Yeah, uh, that's been, that's been tightened up quite a bit by the American government in, in recent years, as, as the, the questioner says, the last 5 years especially. Um, but I think that, uh, you know, it's an uphill battle here. Um, and, and, and on some levels, it's not China's job. China's, China's created its example. China's created its experience. China's, you produced its reality. The problem is that Americans are largely isolated and insulated from awareness of that reality. I've traveled to China many times with groups of Americans, um, and as soon as they're there, they look around and they're like, what the heck is going on here? Uh, because, you know, it's prosperous and people are happy and it's a relaxed and comfortable place, you know, it's completely different from this terrible vision of an authoritarian dictatorship and an oppressive society. But until you're there and you see it, for Americans, it's very hard to get that message. So that's our job. And, you know, that's what I try to do and other people working in all of this. So I guess that that's the best answer I can make to that question.

All right, I'll do one more question. One more here from Johannes Dharma. Question: who has real allies, China or the US? Well, I think that's kind of interesting.

Countries that choose to ally themselves with China, countries that choose to have a close relationship with China are doing that. They're making that choice, you know, whereas a lot of the countries that that we talk about as our allies are in positions that are largely subordinated to American interests. You know, countries, even a country like France, which has sought to maintain a significant degree of autonomy in its foreign policy, when push comes to shove, France subordinates itself to American interests. Certainly Great Britain, Germany, Italy, Spain, You know, most of the European countries, NATO, the European Union as a whole, uh, you know, these are countries that, that, you know, to, to a significant degree just toe the line, especially when it comes to something like, like the war in Ukraine, when it comes to something like, uh, like, like policies towards China. So I think that, you know, both countries have allies, but I think that, that In the case of China, it's countries that choose to be allied with China, whereas in the case of the West, it's often countries that don't really have a choice.

Choice for that, yeah. I know, Dr. Hammond, I know I said the last question. I have to go back on my word because this question from an avid supporter of the channel, somebody truly I, again, I trust his opinion because I've been, we've been communicating. And he is from that part of the world, but he lives in Europe. So that's just to give you an idea. This is from Boone. Question: Can countries, especially the number one and number two countries, be able to convince each other about their peaceful intent? Not that I think the current number one is able to do that, but the next set.

Interesting. Yeah, I think so. I, I, I would I would have a sort of, I don't know, optimism of the will, I suppose you might say, in the sense that I don't think— there's the old saw of the so-called Thucydides trap, that a rising power and a declining power are inevitably going to have to have out-and-out conflict. First of all, I don't think that that's a historically accurate model. But I also don't think that it's an inevitable possibility. I think that the United States and China could, could find common ground. They could find ways in which, uh, you know, they could cooperate and collaborate, uh, on, on confronting, you know, global warming and climate change, on solving problems of, of poverty on a global basis, on technological innovation to enhance, you know, productivity and, and, and allow people, ordinary people, to have to work fewer hours and still maintain a viable, uh, you know, economic life. I think that they could, they could find ways to do that, but they both have to be interested in doing that. China talks a lot about a common future of prosperity for all humankind, you know, and I think that that's a realistic vision if, you know, the existing powers, the existing— the countries like the United States, especially the United States, that have been the predominant powers, could look to the interests of their own people and to people around the world rather than just to the interests of, you know, the political and economic elites. Whether that can actually happen, that's a challenge that we're engaged in. You know, we have to fight to make that happen. It's not going to happen by itself. That's something that people have to demand of their leaders, of their governments. We don't have a lot of choices, as we were just talking about, in this year's election. There's no real difference in terms of these issues between the two candidates, the presumptive candidates. But maybe people can express themselves in other ways, vote for other candidates, other parties. You know, not that that's going to be the outcome, but it could make a difference. It could have an influence. The people in the primaries in places like Minnesota that voted no preference to try to put pressure on the Biden administration over Gaza, you know, had a significant— you had what, 20%? That's a significant impact. If people did that kind of intervention in the elections in November, maybe, maybe that would shift the needle just a a little bit, but I think that it is possible for great powers to find ways to get along. History doesn't give us a tremendous number of examples, but it gives us some, and I think that that's something that we need to advocate for and agitate for.

Yeah, well, if I were a king for a day, Dr. Hammond, I will have your advice to the White House about the US-China relations. So, all right, guys, Well, Dr. Hammond, I can't thank you enough. Truly, on behalf of the entire community here, we say thank you for your time. Thank you for sharing your knowledge. It is always, always an honor and privilege to have you here, and I look forward to having you next time.

Well, I'll be happy to, to return. I've always enjoyed our conversations, and it's, it's great to be here today.

Thank you so much. All right, you take care. Bye-bye.

Yeah.

All right guys, I hope you'll find this video informative. That's what I always say. Uh, this is why the type of guests that I like to bring here, because anytime I do a live stream with a guest, I have always to ask myself before I do that, is there something else for you to learn from this? I am not here to just sit in front of a camera here. I got other things to do. But also, this is also the way for you to acquire knowledge that you are not gonna find elsewhere. And the likes of Dr. Hammond, you're not gonna come across that on a daily basis or hearing that news from the mainstream media. Ain't gonna happen. So, so this is why I hope you find it very informative, and I look forward to seeing you next week. I'm gonna have a guest, uh, once I'm working on it. He's a, he's a former CIA. There are some, uh, interesting dynamics that you need to know. I am working on that, uh, setting up that interview, and we'll have it for you next week, guys. So as always, remember, geopolitics impacts your daily life in more ways than one. Till next time, guys. Bye-bye.