Will the EU Ditch the US & Join BRICS? W/ Dr. Warwick Powell

Hello everybody and welcome to Geopolitical Trends, where truth matters. Excited to be with you for second time today, but this time here I am even more excited because I have a dear friend of mine. And yes, I call him a friend, and you guys know me, I don't use the term loosely, uh, Dr. Warwick Powell. Let me bring him in right away. Hi, Warwick.

How are you, David? Good to be with you again.

Oh, it's, it's— I'm excited you're here, man, because I got— we got a lot to learn. That's why the whole community is very, very excited. So to those, by the way, guys who do not know who Dr. Warwick Pao is, I'm going to provide you a brief bio, but please go to the description under the video, and that's where you— I put the full bio of Dr. Warwick Pao. So He's an adjunct professor at Queensland University of Technology. You know, Warwick's work is at the intersection of digital innovation and technologies and international political economy. So, and this is very interesting for you guys to understand this particular background, and this also tied to the dynamics of distributed ledgers and blockchain Technology. He is the author, and I have a copy of the book, uh, I believe I put it up here. I'm going to share it with, with the community here, so bear with me, guys, here. I thought I uploaded it, but it's not a problem, it's right here. There we go. He is the author of the, uh, China: Trust and Digital Supply Chains, and this one was published by Routledge. Very, very, very interesting. So once again, glad to have you here, Warwick. So I'm gonna get into it right away because we got a lot to cover. So, and I would like to start first of all with your overall assessments of the 17th summit of BRICS that just concluded in Rio de Janeiro.

Sure. Well, as you say, it's the 17th summit, which already tells us something, um, for a group of countries that came together in large part informally and then progressively began to formalize a network to now reach its 17th year is a remarkable outcome, especially given that many in the, in the West have always looked down upon the, the, the group and the individual countries within it and, and has often talked down, um, to BRICS and dismissed it as something of an, uh, of an irrelevance. So first things first, um, 17 summits, uh, represents, I think, a significant success. Second thing is, is that BRICS itself has a group of, um, uh, collaborating nations, principally around economic matters, but increasingly broadening out its touch points has been expanding. So what began as a 4-nation, then 5-nation, uh, grouping, um, is now in a position where it has 10 members, um, or 11 members, and, um, and a growing host of partner members. So BRICS+ is now a significant, um, network within the world. And we understand this because not only is it quite a number of countries involved, but importantly, together they represent, um, almost half or thereabouts of the world's population. They represent, um, coming close to half of global GDP. And importantly also, these are countries that actually dominate the, the world of natural resources, whether they are in metals or energy or food production. So from a real economy point of view, these are all very, very important economies. So we've had continuity, we've had expansion, and we also have a group of countries that are playing an increasing role in the world. The fact also— and this is probably the last comment I'll make in relation to the summit for now until we dive into things a little bit more— is that the The summit also showed that this group of countries, as diverse as they are, is able to collaborate in ways that enable them to ultimately arrive at a consensus position. And we saw that in terms of the joint statement from the members, uh, broadly speaking, and also the joint statement from from the participating nations in relation to the future governance of artificial intelligence. So we have clearly an ability of the participants to undertake good old-fashioned statecraft and diplomacy to arrive at common understandings and alignments of perspectives and interests. And that's an important dimension to this group of countries because what it tells us is that They're trying to demonstrate through action that there is another way in which international relationships can be undertaken and to present to the world a very different ethos of how global partnerships can work.

Very, very interesting. Uh, we're gonna delve deeper into all this. Before we do this, Warwick, I want to ask one key question. And I usually, I had you in mind when I reached out to you for this conversation because I wanted the community to hear a different perspective. So I heard from our dear friend Aydan Tengen, and now I want to hear it from you. The absence of President Xi Jinping from this particular summit, what is the significance of his absence? Because we know he has not missed BRICS summits for the last 12 to 13 years. Is there something that we can read between the lines, or is it just one of those incidents where, you know, it's just his schedule maybe didn't allow it?

Look, I think the significance is actually not his absence, but the fact that in his absence, the organization continued to advance its collective purposes. Don't forget also that President Putin of Russia was also absent physically, which really says that from an institutionalization point of view, BRICS has reached a level of maturity that ensures that it now extends beyond the personalities of particular individual leaders. The second thing I'll say on this particular issue is that in fact the, the non-attendance and the attendance of different national leaders will of course have been, uh, well orchestrated and coordinated in advance with the host nation. Uh, and what this really speaks to is a recognition, uh, that the host nation, uh, has done an excellent job in curating and shepherding the issues and the different perspectives together to a point of the consensus outcome that I mentioned earlier, and also creates room for other nations, uh, in this case, uh, the hosts Brazil together with India and South Africa as the three other founding members to, uh, to, I guess, step into the spotlight a little bit. The truth is, is that the, uh, the China and Russia, uh, in the current political environment globally will tend to dominate the headlines and dominate focus from many people. And often that's— that, that creates an unfair outcome for other nations that are important in their own right but are unfortunately often overshadowed by virtue of the fact that the others are either substantial-scale nuclear powers or, of course, currently engaged in significant conflict with the West. So, so I wouldn't ever make too much of the presence or absence of particular individuals. I would really be looking at how the institutions are consolidating and how nations are harnessing their resources in a collective manner.

Well, I'm glad you clarified this, Warwick. And for you, for the community, this is why I wanted to keep this question for Warwick, so for you guys to hear a different perspective versus what the narrative And I'm going to get into it, Warrik, as far as the narrative emanating from Washington stating that the absence of, uh, President Xi suggests that the BRICS is in disarray as it expands, which means there is lack of consensus because there are now— there's this, those voices coming here in the West, uh, uh, suggesting that the expansion of BRICS is going to create this problem of lack of consensus. How true that statement is?

Well, clearly we've been able to achieve consensus at BRICS, um, and so that's the first thing. But the second thing is, is that I think it's a fairly juvenile observation from many in the West trying to shape a narrative, because it tends to imply that these national leaders aren't in touch with each other in between summits. And we know that President Lula, um, and Xi Jinping have met at least twice since the last BRICS summit, where they went through many, many issues together. And, and of course, we know that, uh, that President Putin and President Xi Jinping maintain close and regular communications, um, between Russia and China. So again, the, the idea that, um, that that, that, that there's a make or break because someone attends something or doesn't, uh, is, is probably a case of overreading it. Um, it's a bit like, um, you know, President Trump turning up, um, to the G7 and then leaving earlier. Now clearly he left for a very particular reason, and we saw the aftermath of that, um, subsequently. But, um, in many regards, his attendance and his leaving earlier didn't make or break that particular institution. Um, that institution is, is what it is at the moment, which is a largely dysfunctional and economically increasingly less relevant institution. But whether or not President Trump attends or not and how long he attends for doesn't actually make or break that.

Very, very interesting. Thank you for that one, Warwick. Truly appreciate you sharing that perspective because it's really— pardon me— it was sending the wrong message to the audiences around the world that while BRICS is expanding, because now you start to look at— and I'm going to bring Europe into this conversation here because there is now the, the thinking. I was in Europe recently, I just got back about a week and a half or so ago from Europe, and there is this conversation in Europe as to we don't know where things are headed, especially with the Americans, you can't trust them. Well, then you have the Chinese expanding, growing, you got BRICS moving forward. So What must Europe be thinking right now, in your opinion, given this recent summit?

Well, like you, I was also in Europe recently, about 3 weeks ago. I was fortunate enough to spend 3 days in Budapest, in Hungary, at a conference where I was able to interact with many friends and colleagues from Western Europe, as well as Central Europe and other places. And I think that there is, as you suggested, a heightened degree of disorientation amongst particularly the Western European thought leadership, trying to think through firstly, I think, the question of Europe itself and the extent to which Europe in the 21st century actually has a foundational and constructive raison d'être. Beyond, um, beyond being a bulwark against Russia. So, so there is a question of, of Europe as a project in and of itself, and that question, uh, is, is something that can't be divorced from a multiple centuries-old question, which is the Russia question and how that relates to the European project. The idea of European identity and the idea of European institutional and political leadership. So at an elite mainstream thinking level, there is, I think, considerable disorientation about what's happening in the world. The response to date has been to at least rhetorically muscle up in relation to, to the question of Russia, um, and, uh, and of course talk a lot about Europe increasing its spending on defense procurement and military development. Um, so, so that— so the Russia question of course remains fundamentally unresolved. Whether or not any of that becomes real beyond rhetoric is a different question. But, um, but coming out of the recently concluded NATO summit, the Europeans at this stage have settled on some basic formulas, which is they're going to work towards increasing military expenditure to 5% of GDP by 2035. In other words, they keep that can down the road by a decade, and hopefully they won't need to actually deliver on that, I suspect, is what many of them are thinking. Um, but, uh, but where do they go from here? What, what is the European project? Um, both institutionally, politically, and economically, um, it is struggling to find a pathway forward, um, and struggling to develop, I guess, uh, a European identity and a European political autonomy that enables Europe collectively, but also at the level of individual nation states to, to address the many challenges that, that part of the world now faces. It's in a difficult position, without a doubt.

And in your opinion, is there any chance for that identity independence per se? Because here it is, I'm going to share a screen with the— with you guys. Just take a look and we'll have Warwick comment on it. There is a statement by Ursula von der Leyen, and I quote, China must limit cooperation with Russia if it wants to develop. I am like, I am shaking my head reading statements coming out of Ursula von der Leyen, not realizing where China is economically. And this is what I want to ask the bold question here, uh, uh, will the EU join BRICS for, for this matter, given where the current economic conditions are?

Well, on that question, I don't think EU will join BRICS, but, um, I think that there's a few issues here that are worth unpacking insofar as the comments from the President of the European Commission are concerned. I think it's just a sign of the legacy hyperbole of the European mentality, that it still believes that it's in a position both with obligation and right to lecture others on what they should and shouldn't do. I don't think anyone takes it particularly seriously anymore, and certainly I doubt that anyone in Beijing takes any note of the, the advice and the instructions that Ursula von der Leyen cares to dish out from time to time about what others should or shouldn't do. Europe has deep-seated problems, and those deep-seated problems go to whether or not in fact there is a European project at all. Can Europe as a project, meaning a unified project, be held together over the next generation when we are now at an inflection point where nation states, member states, are experiencing domestic political and economic instabilities that are creating centrifugal forces pulling the union apart. So the European Union, which emerged after the Second World War largely as a, as a post-colonial colonial project, underpinned largely by ideas of European racial supremacy and a desire to maintain firstly economic dominance over Africa, um, and in time also to have a collective voice to counterbalance or to hedge against the growing influence of the United States. You know, is that project coming to an end? Um, can that project sustain itself, um, when, uh, it's failing its fundamental mission, which was, uh, to, you know, deliver economic prosperity, um, for at least its participating members, and through economic perspective deliver a, a level of geopolitical clout that would enable Europe as a whole and its member states to act with a certain degree of independence and autonomy. I don't know whether it has the capability of doing that. Clearly, um, there are many political forces at a social level and at an organized political level across many countries in Western Europe that, um, and also to some extent, um, on the fringes of Western Europe, and I mean Slovakia and Hungary and those sorts of places, uh, where that particular European project is, um, is, is really not capturing the imaginations of the public. And as that continues, and as the, and as the Russia question remains unresolved, the economic circumstances and the living standards of people across Europe, and I include in this also the United Kingdom, continue to decline, and those circumstances really create conditions that are ripe for political upheaval. Um, you know, is, is Brussels going to be able to contain that? Can Brussels' tentacles, through its networks of political institutions at the nation-state level, be able to keep a lid on simmering tensions in individual nation-states, as well as hostilities towards Brussels? I don't know, but from my trip to Europe and talking to various people, I think that there is a significant degree of disorientation about exactly how to move forward at the moment. It's almost like a deer caught in the spotlights, and there is a desperate need for a new political and social settlement imagination that can cope with the realities of today, as opposed to, in a sense, trying to invoke the the imagined, the imagined superiority of the past.

And in your assessment, Warwick, since you were there in Budapest, did you get a sense, or did you notice, for example, the mindset for the Eastern European versus the rest of Europe? In other words, is there a split in thinking vis-à-vis China within Europe?

Yeah, yeah. And there's a split in thinking really about the future of this question of the European project. And I think that that's what's at the heart of all of this. The nations towards the east of Europe, and again I mentioned Hungary and Slovakia, have adopted, I guess, or tended to adopt, a more of a an open perspective to the realities of the world. And that really means a willingness to accept that you need to be able to work with those that you may actually have fundamental disagreements with and not seek solutions that are kinetic and destructive. And, and both Hungary and Slovakia— and I spent some time talking to leaders in both of those, um, from both of those countries, there's just a pragmatism about how to advance the interests of the living standards of people who live in those two territories. The frustration that they find is that their efforts to be pragmatic and grounded in their priorities is not matched by the, uh, their their counterparts, um, in the European Union, particularly from the larger, um, dominant, uh, nations of, you know, France and Germany, um, and to an extent Poland. But even talking to some Polish interlocutors, um, whilst there's absolutely no love lost between them and Russia, uh, there's certainly no desire to, uh, to to proactively enter formally, at least, into any hostilities with Russia. They don't really want much to do with Russia, of course, but at the same time, they're certainly not beating their chest wanting to go to war with Russia. Quite the contrary. They just want to move on, and their way of thinking through the Russia question is to, in a sense, almost turn its back on Russia. In much the same way that I think clearly is happening in Russia, as far as Russia and Russian leadership and its sort of broader cultural institutions is now turning to the East and drawing a line under what was in effect Peter the Great's great European adventure.

Very interesting. So let's, uh, let's shift back to— pardon me— to BRICS. Uh, just I'm thinking the big picture here, and, and, uh, uh, given your background, Warrick, uh, as far as you work at the intersection, uh, of the digital innovation and technologies, I'd like to get, uh, your insights, especially for the community, because I care for my community, as you can tell, because I want them to be well informed and educated about the issues. And what I want to highlight here is the future of AI moving forward, given what BRICS is aiming at and given what the US is doing vis-à-vis China, the tech war, if I may use the term. So what I would like to know is that I, I know I read recently that Huawei took a deep plunge into the AI sector. How is that now going to shape the future moving forward?

Yeah, look, the BRICS summit did issue a joint statement concerning the governance of AI, and I think it tells us some important things about the way that the BRICS nations are thinking about artificial intelligence and how it is to be addressed and governed going forward. Um, in very, very broad terms, and it's a short statement, it's about 7 or 8 pages long, um, but in very, very broad terms, um, the, the statement in effect says AI, uh, needs to be governed as a public good, um, at a global level. It needs to be accessible, uh, to nations around the world, and it needs to contribute to, uh, to the ability of these nations to improve, um, you know, their own circumstances and to support each nation's own ambitions as far as modernization is concerned. On the downside risk, obviously there are concerns that AI can be used for destructive purposes and that therefore there needs to be the development of global rules, if you will, or a consensus at a global level about how the downside risks are to be identified, quantified, and ultimately governed going forward. You can contrast that, um, in effect with an American approach, which JD Vance has articulated on a number of occasions, which more or less says, um, American AI is the global leader. It needs to remain the global leader. Um, countries that seek to regulate artificial intelligence are stifling innovation, and the United States will not brook any effort by third-party countries to introduce regulations that may limit the capacity of American AI to pursue what American AI seeks to do. At a technology level, we also see, I think, a significant contrast as well. So the AI industry in the United States has emerged in large part through the intersection of the military-industrial complex and Silicon Valley, and we saw a few years ago, uh, the, uh, the development and the launch of, you know, the first large language model publicly by OpenAI. And interestingly, that model is premised on a proprietary technology, uh, business model, uh, with the aim of charging users a significant amount for accessing the model as a foundational layer. That got turned on its head earlier this year and continues to be undermined as a foundational business model by the release of comparable models, um, as open-source technology. So we of course had Deepseek, um, earlier this year, and Huawei and a number of other Chinese companies have since released their own foundational AI models as open-source technologies. Now what that means is that anybody in the world can download a copy of the model and then run that model or run an instance of that model on their local devices, meaning that it's got nothing to do with, um, the originating source of that model. It's now entirely your own, and then you can exploit that capability and, um, and build your own applications and other resources on top of that. That is a transformative move, um, from an accessibility point of view, because it ensures that there are very, very few pricing barriers now for organizations anywhere in the world to access this foundational capability. The, the reason why this matters also is because it, um, it in effect contrasts directly with the American proprietary business model and undermines that business model, because there is no way that you can compete with free. So the ability to download and run these models free of charge, other than your own operating expenses, basically has shifted what people in technology would call the moat from being the, the, the, the deep moat or the, or the barriers of entry around the models themselves to forcing value creation to turn attention to the areas of actual applications themselves. So instead of continuing to commit large resources to develop your own models. You're able to exploit the models that are being developed by others and then build your own applications on top. I'd hate to be the chief financial officer in an American proprietary technology-based enterprise at the moment when you're in effect having your entire business model undermined by transformations in in open source technology capabilities globally.

Very, very, very, very interesting. And I'm glad you explained it this way, Warwick, just for at least my community here to understand exactly where these things are headed. Because we already seen, like you mentioned earlier, about the threats that's coming out of sort of Donald Trump's mouth in sense of, you know, We want to maintain this technology. The same argument he's making, or the threat he made to BRICS countries if they ever steer away from using the dollar as, as a currency. And we will get into that as we move forward. Liking this video so far? Don't just be a watcher, go ahead and hit the like, share, and subscribe button. And don't forget to tap the bell so you will not miss any of my videos or our live streams. This way you will be supporting a channel that stands for the truth and objective reporting. The choice is yours. Thanks for your support. By the way, guys, uh, I will take later on— I will take a question or two for, uh, uh, my friend Warwick. He'll answer one or two for you. Just put it in the, uh, Super Chat later on and I will we'll take care of that. Uh, just to go back, uh, Warick, to the idea of this technology here, because I am very, very interested in, uh, in, in seeing where this is now is going to lead to. And, and what I'm referring to here, uh, I'm taking the example, for example, of what took place in Iran by shutting down GPS and moving into Beidou system. You know, you're looking at over 140 countries now are having their eyes on the Beidou system, the Chinese model for that. Is this like the, the Sputnik moments for the Chinese when it comes down to this kind of technology advancements which the US now is struggling with?

Look, I think there's something to that, David. The, the global technology ecosystem that has evolved over the last 40 years from software applications through to fundamental hardware capabilities has largely been dominated by American big technology firms, whether they're the ones who are rolling out undersea cables, implementing data switches, rolling out the hardware for data centers, wireless data transmission, fiber optic cabling, etc., etc., at the hardware level, and all the way through to the operating systems that have dominated the world as we know it from a technology point of view. All of that's changing. It's important to sort of note that that infrastructure, much of which we sort of just think of as the internet, was for quite some time accepted globally as a, you know, for want of a better term, a global public good. Even though it was being, uh, operated and implemented and governed ultimately by American firms under American law. But that public goods status of this infrastructure has been slowly but surely undermined over the course of the last 25 years. The— there's actually a fantastic book called Underground Empire which members of your community might be interested in getting. It's by a couple of American researchers, and it looks at the evolution of American control over the, the back end of the technology systems globally, and how as time went by, that control evolved from being an operator of global public goods to being, uh, to being a weaponized system. So we can go back to when the, um, when, when the American intelligence agencies ultimately, um, compelled Swift, which operates a data center in Virginia, to hand over the data of Iraqi transactions, and eventually compelled Swift to intervene in transactions between unfriendly parties to essentially put an end to them. So we've seen over the course of the last quarter century a progressive salami slicing of that public goods character of the internet, and countries have been alarmed by that from a security point of view, and, um, but arguably couldn't do much about that until more recent times. In recent times, and I'm meaning really the last 5 or 6 years, yeah, an alternative possibility is now available. And I've described that in terms of Digital Westphalia, which is the idea of nation-states being able to implement and operate their own distinct technology ecosystems, but at the same time participate in a cross-border interoperability by virtue of accepting and agreeing to a series of global standards and rules. And this is underpinned by the development, um, not exclusively but in large part by technologies in China at a hardware and a software level, but also the expansion of the role of the open source world. So open source has been around for a long time, and in many regards it acted as a, um, as a pushback against dominance of proprietary technology systems. But, uh, all of that notwithstanding, open source tended to be largely the domain of technology enthusiasts. You know, you needed to have a certain level of skill and capability to make use of it. And ultimately, open source technologies, whilst they've existed and operated have tended to be overshadowed by proprietary systems. But over the course of the last 6 years, or 10 years perhaps, uh, open source technology communities, um, have really been given a shot in the arm, in large part because, uh, significant Chinese enterprises have committed resources to the development of the open source ecosystems themselves. And by doing that, a lot of the, the nascent technologies that existed in the open source environment have now reached where they are robust enough to operate as genuine alternatives to the systems that have been made available in a proprietary business sense. So, so the world is changing as a result of that. And the, the Beidou satellite navigation alternative to GPS is just another example of this.

Yeah, and that's, that's a very— I've been, I've been reading about it. I mean, it's very impressive. When I looked at the, I read some specific specificities about the Beidou system, and it's just, you know, its accuracy is within 1 meter. That to me was because especially when you considering the guided missile stuff, 1 meter, it's kind of, that's almost that accurate for that. So now let me ask you this, Warwick, and that's the basic question that I know so many have this question. What factors that have contributed to China's technological developments?

Well, a long— firstly, um, a long-term commitment to development of science, um, and, uh, science, science research and science learning. And we've seen that, uh, manifest really in, uh, the ongoing expansion of the graduate numbers coming out of China's science and technology, um, programs at university level, number one. But it goes back into the schooling system too, where the, the standards that are being set in terms of science, technology, mathematics are at such high levels now that many outside of China are struggling to understand how it is that high school students are actually required to deal with these sorts of questions. So firstly, it has been a long-standing commitment to education. The second one is, is I guess a parallel commitment to the development of an R&D, research and development ecosystem. That is institutionally grounded in China's leading research and teaching universities in particular, and which is substantially resourced. And we are now starting to really see the results of that in terms of research publications, as well as the, the number of patents and other forms of intellectual properties that are being registered globally. So human resources teaching, learning, creating a culture that actually is supportive of educational excellence rather than a culture that sneers at educational excellence has been, I think, quite foundational to where China is today. Of course, China has also committed its own research and development and technical capabilities in areas that perhaps are a little bit out of the limelight, but which nonetheless are foundational to this digitalised arena. And that is the work that, that continues to be done in China in the areas of material sciences and chemical sciences, which ultimately feeds through into the development of either new materials or improving the ways in which old materials can be applied in new contexts. So material sciences, chemical sciences, and chemical sciences and material sciences are fundamental to enhanced battery technologies, right? And enhanced battery technologies is key to the explosion in the electric vehicles sector, but ultimately is also fundamental to the transformation of energy systems that are necessary to support the digital revolution, right? You know, there's no digital revolution without an energy revolution in parallel. So they're, they're the real drivers. That has all been accelerated by the, uh, the sanctions and the export restrictions from the United States, which in many ways just forced Chinese industry and Chinese governments to commit resources and, and turn their attention in a concerted way to overcoming historical limitations and barriers. Um, you know, prior to all of that, um, you know, from, uh, Trump 1.0 all the way through to the Biden term and now Trump 2.0 Um, Chinese enterprises have consistently purchased many of their technology requirements from outside of China, semiconductors, etc., etc., and didn't really have a problem in doing that. There was a recognition that these products from firms outside of China were amongst the best in the world, if not the best in the world, and Chinese firms wanted to work with the best in the world. Um, the, um, the shoot yourself in the foot, yeah, policies from Washington ultimately forced China to develop its own capabilities. And, um, and we're going to see the, the consequences of that actually over the next 5 years, you know. I mean, we've already seen a few little examples of it, which is, you know, Huawei coming back into the mobile phones, for example. But, um, but the real industrial scale implications of American technology policy towards China will actually become incredibly manifest and obvious over the next 5 years.

Well, that's why, that's why, Warwick, I'm starting to think in terms of the idea of this trade war as far as the US and China concerns. To me, from the perspective of the US, and again, I am trying to, uh, put myself inside Washington and think with their mindset, how they think. So to me, it becomes clear that it is more of a war for control over the rare earth, the control over metals, the control over atomic materials. You know why? Because that's the one that, uh, sort of power fighter jets, AI chips, quantum computing, electrical vehicles and so forth. And we came to realize, this is what I believe, one of part of the BBB, the, uh, Big Beautiful Bill, uh, that was, uh, enacted there recently by, uh, both houses. Uh, that one in itself has to do with one particular aspect, and that aspect is we couldn't compete with the Chinese regarding the technological domain, and that is why they put whatever the restrictions they put in. That, that becomes clear. Will I be wrong in this assessment, Warwick?

I think there has been a realization that, um, uh, that the United States is no longer the unquestioned leader in many of these fields. There have been many reports, of course, that have sought to estimate the extent to which Chinese firms and supply chains, or American firms and supply chains, are leading in one technology domain or another. But I think broadly speaking, there is a sense— and again, like you, I'm trying to get inside the mind of the folk in Washington— but there is a sense inside the Beltway, um, that what was once an unquestioned ability to dictate terms unilaterally, um, is no longer there. And there is a, uh, an analytical determination that one of the reasons for that is, um, the absence or the insufficiency of domestic capabilities in material supply chains. The, uh, the interesting thing about all of this is that in some ways I would suggest that Washington is fighting yesterday's war. There is a tendency for politicians to to turn their attention to actually what was an issue yesterday, as opposed to focus on what the prospective issues are going forward. And many of these technology and material sector frontiers are at a stage where the United States is unlikely to be in a position to catch up particularly quickly. Number one, it will be costly in terms of an effort to do so, number 2. But thirdly, the target is continuing to move, right? You're not chasing a static target, you're pursuing a target that is already running at a, you know, 1,000 kilometers or 1,000 miles an hour. All of this makes it incredibly difficult for Washington to ultimately achieve what I suspect it wants to achieve, which is an ability to dictate terms again. The second thing to bear in mind, again broadly speaking, is that— and perhaps this is an intended consequence, or, or maybe it's just an unintended consequence— but the likelihood, the trajectory of many of Washington's policies is towards what is in effect a higher cost fortress American economy model. So as the United States seeks to rejuvenate its own capabilities in industrial manufacturing, raw material supply chains, you know, the latest one being, you know, copper mining and downstream processing, and more recently also we've had the ambitions around steel production, as it seeks to do all of that, it ultimately is going to, uh, lead to a much higher cost economic model. Uh, but that's the price that, in a sense, Washington seems to be willing to pay, uh, maybe, um, because it might not be explicitly recognized, but it's a price that they're willing to pay for what is, in effect, a geographical comfort that we do these things within the confines of our own territory. And, and we are able as a result to in effect firstly develop a fortress, and secondly the ambition— though I don't think it's possible— but the ambition is then to project from that fortress back onto the rest of the world to reassert Washington's own comfort zone of being the global hegemon.

Yeah, which we know, Warlick, that train has already left the station, and Washington is not willing to come to grip with this reality. This is why I didn't understand literally the logic of why Mr. Trump will be sending letters to other countries, including allies, as far as the tariffs. He just It's mind-boggling that no advisor with some pragmatism to tell him, listen, man, this is now how you approach and deal with countries. That era of bullying, if I may use the term, is over. So I just don't understand it. I don't understand it.

So, David, you know, Good. I was just going to say old habits die hard, and, um, and we see in Washington, I think, um, these habits of thought and habits of behavior, um, continuing to persist, um, even though at a different level there is a, a deep-seated— if so far unreconciled recognition that reality has moved on. As you say, that train has left the station. I think people know the train's left the station, but there is a desire to perhaps stop the train and change its direction, and that's not going to happen.

Yeah, I do remember one of your talks, Warwick, from way back, and you used one term That really resonated with me. And, and, and, and now this is a perfect opportunity to ask you even about that. Can you see a world, a globalized world without the United States?

Look, it's conceivable and it would be, I think, um, for both the United States and for the world, a little bit unfortunate if the United States, um, de facto or de jure ended up building itself into a fortress, um, with no interest in what was happening elsewhere. The world is, um, you know, it is one planet, and countries and people are, like it or not, connected to each other with shared common interests in terms of, um, you know, the, the public commonses. And those public commonses are things like the atmospheres that we share, the oceans that connect us all, And, um, and without an ability to find ways in which different nations and different civilizations can interact with each other, uh, recognizing that they are different and doing so in a way that does not presuppose some desire to shape or mold the other. You know, if the United States wants to take itself away from that table, remove itself from that kind of global engagement, then I think it would be, uh, deleterious for, uh, for the interests of America as a nation, but also I think harmful for the interests of working people and the middle classes of America as well, who um, depend upon the ability of America to access, uh, cheap products that make life affordable in the United States when real wages for the bottom 50% have not been growing at all for the last few decades. And, um, and where countries as a whole need to find ways of sharing research and development in areas such as healthcare. You know, I mean, the germs and diseases, viruses, they don't consciously select national boundaries. You know, these are things that affect people wherever they are. And the, uh, the, the loss of the ability of leading researchers around the world to essentially share their research with others in those areas, I think, would be deeply disappointing.

Wow, very, very insightful. Once again, thank you so much for sharing this perspective here because it's mind-boggling as to how our policies are moving in wrong directions. And there will be no individuals that can take courage to stand and tell the president, sir, this is wrong. This is wrong because It's impacting the livelihood of the average citizen and also the issues like you mentioned, the healthcare, the education, infrastructure, you name it. And it's just, it's just mind-boggling. So I want to, I want to go back to BRICS, uh, uh, uh, Warick, if you allow me here. And the reason I want to go back this, because I want to talk about something that you know a lot about, and this one has to do with supply chains. And this particular aspect has to do with Vietnam. Because, you know, Vietnam's been invited as an observer. But also we know that Indonesia officially joined BRICS and Cambodia, some conversation between China and Cambodia. What I want to get your take on this one here, Warwick, is the idea of the supply chain and the role of BRICS into this new dynamics of supply chain.

Yeah, sure. Look, supply chains, of course, is the processes by which goods and services from different organizations. Some of them are in the same country and some of them are not, ultimately come together and are coordinated through processes to create things that are useful at the other end. Sometimes supply chains are very long, you know, they involve many moving parts and many different organizations and sometimes from many different countries. Supply chains sometimes are also not linear, they'll often double back on themselves, particularly at a national level, as different parts of complex processes go backwards and forwards to find organisations that are best equipped to undertake those tasks and to provide those either resources or the services necessary. The— and of course, once you start doing this across national boundaries, we in effect create what we call trade. The, the situation with these supply chains, particularly in Southeast Asia, because you touched on Indonesia and Vietnam in the context of BRICS, is that over the course of the last 10 years, uh, the ASEAN, which is the Association of Southeast Asian Nations comprising 10 nations in Southeast Asia, of which Vietnam and Indonesia are two important ones, Uh, ASEAN itself collectively has become China's largest single trading partner, uh, passing the European Union about 4 years ago. So Asia, loosely speaking, and I don't include North Asia for the time being, which is, um, Japan and Korea, um, has emerged as, um, as China's largest single collective trading partner, both from an import and an export point of view. The second thing to bear in mind is that intra-regional trade, which is trade amongst the countries of Asia— and I'll broaden the sort of footprint a little bit now to include, uh, Korea and Japan and also Australia and New Zealand— trade within that network of 15 countries, uh, is now over 50% of total trade that those countries are engaged in. So we are starting to see the geographic consolidation, if you will, of the ways in which goods and services flow from or between countries, where we are getting tighter, shorter, geographically shorter supply chains consolidated in the Asia region. The situation also then lends itself, and to the flow of investment and the transformation of productive capability. And this is particularly noteworthy in the context of the ASEAN developing countries and their relationship to China. The, uh, countries like Indonesia, Malaysia, Vietnam, Cambodia, and others, um, have not only expanded their trade relationships with China, but have also expanded their investment relationships with China, in large part as Chinese firms have invested in the establishment of production capabilities in these countries, in part to meet the growing needs and opportunities of those markets, of the countries themselves, but also, as we all understand, in part as a strategic move to address any restrictions that may arise from particularly American tariff or non-tariff barriers for goods originating out of China. Vietnam has been an important beneficiary of that dynamic. It's developed its own industrial base together with investments from others that will bring in capital goods, raw materials, and importantly know-how. And, you know, a lot of people say that Vietnam's a transshipment market for Chinese production. I think that's a bit unfair on, uh, on Vietnam as a country, but also misreads what's happening. What's happening is Chinese firms are investing in Vietnam, and Vietnamese firms are also developing their own capabilities to a point where there is substantial value-adding being done in Vietnam itself. Uh, the, the dynamic here is actually one that I suspect the United States would rather not happen. So as the United States put barriers up for products from China to get into the US market, uh, they're not just routing through Vietnam because it's convenient to do so, but they're actually establishing long-term capabilities in Vietnam and in Malaysia and other parts of Southeast Asia. And that will actually consolidate the investment and trade relationships right throughout the region. And in a geopolitical, uh, point of view, um, will deepen the connectivity, um, between these places and China. I'm not exactly convinced that that's what Washington had in mind.

So they probably miscalculated for that. So they didn't expect that outcome, I guess. So precisely, very, very interesting. There is one last thing I want to address with you before I let you go, Warrick, and I am very, very grateful you allocate a whole hour for us here, for the community to really learn from you. So the one thing just to guys let you know, give you background on it quickly here. Warrick and I, we talk offline and we exchange ideas and so forth. And one of the things that came up And I wanted to ask him about this one because we, we, we, uh, I read it when he sent it to me here, is that here is a, there is a petition circulating now in Australia calling for neutrality in the Pacific realm. Now I want to get your take on this, Warwick. Is there any possibility that would happen given when you consider, for example, if that will extend to Southeast Asia, for example, when you consider the role of Japan, South Korea, Philippines, or even Australia, New Zealand to a degree. Is there any chance for this neutrality to take effect?

Look, I don't think in the short term there's much of a chance at all. Um, the petition you mentioned was initiated by an Australian peace activist by the name of Bevan Ramsden. And it's actually a global petition, um, which, uh, seeks to, I guess, provoke at a minimum a conversation or a public discussion in the countries of the Pacific Rim about where they ultimately stand and how they should stand in relation to the other countries of the region. And this idea of neutrality, I think, is an important one because it partly draws on the rich traditions of the Non-Aligned Movement, which have of course been very prominent in Southeast Asia. But they also, I think, draw on a rich intellectual tradition both from the West but also from the Eastern or Oriental or Asian context, which looks at security not so much through the lens of blocs, which is us versus them, but much more through the idea of indivisible security whereby, you know, the interests of one are intimately intertwined with the interest of the other. And this petition, I think, is a great initiative to initiate the kinds of conversations that I think people need to have across the region. And I think it will contribute to growing public awareness of what is at stake. I mean, I noticed recently, for example, that in Japan there is a growing discussion about, about Japanese independence and autonomy. Now, this is in many regards unheard of, particularly in the post-war period when United States and Japan have had their relationship and where there remain, you know, tens of thousands of American troops located on Japan. But for Japan itself to actually raise these sorts of questions in the public domain, I think, says something about the, um, the zeitgeist of the, of the period. Similarly, I think we're starting to see people in the Republic of Korea ask the question, which is, is Korean security, um, best advanced by maintaining the current configuration, which is, uh, dependent on the United States, when many in the Republic of Korea are actually doubtful that the United States is actually a particularly dependable partner at all. Um, and, uh, and so again, these questions of independence sovereignty, indivisible security, and of course this wider issue of neutrality, I think, will play an important role in thinking about what a 21st century positive peace can look like. And that's a positive peace which sees prosperity peace and security as really a symbiotic nexus of considerations rather than as either-or choices.

Very interesting. It's because, I mean, that will be wonderful if this will take hold as far as having that part of the world stand for that neutrality and move forward away from what the US is. So I am very, very grateful to have you. I'm going to give you the last word. Eric, before I'll take one question or two from the audience here. And, uh, just, just your overall— where do you see things moving forward, given, for example, the tensions between the US and China, which you all know, uh, how it is and how it's moving, uh, the tensions in West Asia, the, uh, for example, the statements by the Prime Minister of Singapore, which indicates the shifting towards China Uh, what— where do you see things moving forward?

I'll focus a little bit on what's happening in, uh, the region where I'm located, which is of course Asia. And, uh, and I think that, uh, countries and people in Asia are looking at the events in other parts of the world really through a lens of shock and horror. The idea that a country could seek to enforce or pursue regime change, such as recently took place in Iran, and via unprovoked, you know, dropping of bombs on places, I think continues to shock people in the Asian region. And it is causing questions to be asked. Um, you know, how these issues ultimately unfold, I think time will tell, but it's causing the big questions to be asked, as I touched on, you know, the, the issues of neutrality and, and, and peace and prosperity, of course. But at a very practical level, it's compelling countries to recognize that the world has changed. Um, it changed actually before Trump 1.0, but perhaps, uh, Trump 1.0 was a symptom of those changes that have been unfolding for quite some time. And the world today is already a multipolar world, but the question is, is whether multipolarity as it unfolds contributes to intensified instability, chaos, and violence, or whether countries can find their way towards establishing the institutions and the practices of statecraft that will capitalize on the possibilities of multipolarity, which comes from a recognition of difference and a tolerance of difference whilst pursuing common objectives. I think some of those dynamics are starting to manifest themselves in the Asia region, and perhaps, um, those parts of the world that are currently in the middle of intense conflict, um, uh, may hopefully pause, stop killing each other, and perhaps reach out to people in Asia to explore ways in which, um, more peaceful ways of solving conflicts and problems can, can be developed. The United States, having said all of that, I think is in a very difficult position at the moment because in some ways it deeply recognizes that the world has changed, but at the same time it's refusing to adapt its behavior in a way that is conducive to a non-chaotic, non-kinetic response. On the contrary, it's, uh, it's responding by lashing out in the hopes of asserting a, um, a long-lost position of primacy. Um, you know, one hopes that as time goes by and as nations react to American— oh, really, American violence. Yeah, you know, in a steady manner, that the United States will eventually realize that it needs to find other ways of engaging with the world.

Yeah, well, I hope they do because, uh, As one who works in Washington, I tell you, people do not want to— like the saying goes, when Washington doesn't like a message, they tend to shoot the messenger. When you tell them the truth as to what needs to be done, you kind of like, no, we need to maintain whatever. But so anyway, uh, let me take, uh, one question or two. I have one here from, uh, Army with Harmony. Thank you so much for your continued support for the channel. Truly, truly appreciate you for for that. Uh, the question for Warwick was, should the West adopt a new monetary model?

Well, I think the global monetary system is evolving and changing anyway, and, um, the centrality of the US dollar as part of the system that has evolved over the course of the last 80 years is diminishing, and it's diminishing for lots of reasons. I won't go into them today and bore people with the sort of technical details, but basically the change is happening in large part because the real economic capabilities is, is shifting around the world. As far as payment systems are concerned, part of the problem for the West is that I don't think the West, you know, meaning the transatlantic economies and perhaps including countries like Australia, will find it very easy to evolve from the current system to one in which they will be more likely to use national currencies for trade settlements. But, you know, time will tell. It's not really a question, I think, for the West to choose at this point in time, but it is something that other nations in the world have been forced to, to develop and evolve. And how that interacts with the existing system remains uncertain, and how individual Western countries will respond is also uncertain. I will just mention one last thing on this particular issue, and it's an interesting one to the extent that we touched on Europe earlier. That is, the European Central Bank sees the current instabilities in the United States as an opportunity to try to promote the use of the euro as a, as a global settlement currency.

Interesting. Just on that, on that note, uh, If the Europeans want to see an opportunity for that, can we see a currency in Asia that will emerge?

I doubt it, in large part because I think the countries in Asia have learned the lessons of Europe, and that is having a transnational currency tends to bring more problems than it solves.

Interesting. Interesting. Last question from Kevin Baptist. Once again, Kevin, thank you so much for your continued support. For the channel. Uh, you wrote, Dr. Warrick, being an American, I believe only way that US will respect BRICS nations' sovereignty is ending US hegemony. Your thoughts?

Yeah, look, this is, um, a period of significant displacement for the United States. The global economic and political economy system has been changing. The centrality of the US in the global system, um, has been diminishing. It's been decentered in large respects. Uh, its ability to function as the global hegemon has also diluted a lot, despite the fact that, um, it does still seek to assert primacy, um, as often as it can. And it continues to have an outsized influence in certain institutions, whether they are the, the International Monetary Fund or the World World Bank. The, the trajectory of these changes is clear, and that is that American hegemony will continue to diminish over the course of the next 10 to 20 years. The issue that's not clear is how the United States will react and respond over that period of time. Its current response is to behave almost as if it's suffering deep grief. You know, it's grieving the loss of its primacy, it's grieving the loss of a system that delivered it centrality. And as we know from psychological studies, the grief experience is manifest, um, through a combination of denial and anger. But at some point, we hope that, um, that the United States— and I mean by this the sort of political culture, really will move to a level of negotiated acceptance that the world has changed. And if it can do that in a relatively peaceful way, as opposed to a kinetic and violent way, then we will get through this period of global transition. Otherwise, we're going to see a lot more lashing out in multidimensional terms, whether it's militarily or economically or culturally, in fact, as the United States seeks to, you know, react to and perhaps delay and maybe even try and turn around this trajectory of global evolution. But look, the one last little comment on this front is, uh, sure, I was looking to somebody in Budapest a couple of weeks ago about about this question, and a very well-known person— I won't mention who they are— but, uh, I sort of made the offhanded remark that perhaps the only way the United States will actually come to grips with changes in the world is if it got a very bloody nose. And the response was, well, you know, that's probably true. The question is, is, um, is whether or not a bloody nose is enough. Wow, interesting.

Yeah. Yeah, well guys, I hope you learned something from Warwick, uh, sharing his perspective, his knowledge with us here. We are very, very grateful, and on behalf of the entire community, uh, Warwick, I want to say thank you so much for carving out time for us and sharing your perspective and knowledge with us all. So we truly, truly appreciate you, and we look forward to seeing you next time. You take care, my friend.

Thank you very much.

You're welcome. Uh, to you guys, uh, remember, I'm gonna put the link for tomorrow. Remember to join me tomorrow at 12 o'clock on the other channel on geopolitics and money. We will be addressing some economic issues there regarding what Trump did with tariffs and so forth. So remember to join me tomorrow. And as always, remember, geopolitics impact your daily life in more ways than one. Till next time, guys. Bye-bye.