Will Trump’s Return to Power Fracture Europe? Conversation w/Dr. Michal Krupa!

All right, hello everybody and welcome to Geopolitical Trends, where truth matters. Excited to be with you as always, of course, on this day before Thanksgiving here in the US for my, uh, uh, American viewers here. So, uh, today I am very excited because I have an interesting guest. I consider him a friend of mine. Uh, we shared the— or broke bread together back in Wrocław in Poland. So My guest is Dr. Michael Krupa. Let me bring him in on the studio here. Hello, Doctor.

What's up, Doc? Good to be back with you.

Good to hear you. Now, now, now I call you Doctor. You, by the way, guys, uh, uh, Dr. Krupa just earned his PhD recently, so officially you guys address him as Dr. Krupa. He's, he's, he's a low-key guy. I, I admire this about him. He goes by Mike, but just for you guys to know, we address him with the proper title. So let me first, to those who do not know who Dr. Krupa is, I'm going to provide you a brief, uh, bio. Go to the description in the video, you'll see everything there. I'll put it up, but I'm gonna just provide the brief, brief, uh, uh, bio on Dr. Michael Krupa. So he's a Polish historian and political analyst, commentator. So he has published many, many, uh, articles in various Polish and American media outlets, including the American Conservatives, Consortium News, Chronicle Magazine, and many, many more. So just make sure to check it out, guys. On the chat box, I do have his handle, Twitter, and I have his— let me share it with you guys right here. This is, this is @mgkrupa if you want to follow him on Twitter. And I would highly recommend that. Also check him out on Rumble. He has an account there, he has a, a channel there. I watch his stuff, I watch his interviews there. So make sure you guys log in over there and check it out. So, all right, we, we move through this and let's get in into the nitty-gritty of, uh, what we're going to be addressing today. So, so what I'd like to get is your assessment as a historian as political commentator, as an international relations observer, and so forth. Where do you see the future now moving forward of Trump's return to power vis-à-vis the transatlantic relations?

Well, that's a big question because there's so many unknowns at this point. Generally, the impression that we were getting during the campaign, the presidential campaign in the United States, and some of the signals that were also coming from Trump's, I would say, very good VP pick of Senator J.D. Vance was that Trump would view Europe through the lens of a realist in the sense that Europe should stand on its own two feet, that as the United States draws back, Europe should stand up. Now, one of the most important components of that standing up is ending the war in Ukraine. And I would remind your viewers that I think it was in February of last year that Senator Vance, Vice President-elect Vance currently, wrote an article for the Financial Times where he wrote that, you know, the largesse, the sending of weapons and monies to the Ukraine regime under the Trump administration is going to end and Europe will have to find a way to live with Russia. Now, it's interesting because, you know, most of the American political elite from both parties, and I'm talking about the establishment types from the Democratic Party and the Republican Party, the fact that Russia exists under the current government is tantamount to heresy. But here we have Senator Vance writing that no, Russia is Russia, Putin isn't going anywhere. And I'm not quoting verbatim here, but the words were along the lines of, and by the way, after we stop funneling money and military equipment to the Ukraine, to the Kyiv regime, Europe is going to have to find a way to live with Russia. Now, Europe unfortunately doesn't want to find its own path to Russia. You know, there have been rumblings coming especially from such leaders as Macron. It began shortly after he was elected to the French presidency. He started talking about, you know, strategic autonomy for Europe, which sounds like a very good idea. You know, there were times when Macron even made such statements which today would make him look like a Putin apologist, as some would say, that NATO is brain dead, for example. Those were the words of Macron, I think, back in 2017 during the first Trump administration. He was pointing out two very important issues that, you know, Russia is Russia, whether we like it or not, and Europe has to sort of find its own way in coexisting with Russia. But the problem is, you know, when it comes to situations where you actually have to prove your words, they usually back down. And Macron is a fairly good example of that because time after time during the Ukraine crisis, we've watched him basically, you know, signal— I mean, he was— he visited with Putin just a few days before the start of the special military operation, uh, to where he is right now, where he's, you know, uh, giving the imprimatur to send SCALP missiles, uh, from Ukraine to the Russian Federation, which could trigger, unfortunately, a nuclear war, as President Putin made fairly clear recently. So I think going back to your original question, this could be an opportunity for Europe. However, as we know, personnel is policy. Some of the things that I've been hearing from, uh, Trump's future inner circle, for example, his nominee, uh, to be, uh, the National Security Advisor Mike Waltz or Sebastian Gorka, You know, Mike Waltz said on Fox News a couple of days ago that, uh, uh, we're hand in glove with the current, uh, Biden administration when it comes to Ukraine. And it's like, wait a minute, I thought the American people voted for something different, not to be hand in glove with the current approach of the Biden administration. Now, I— when I first heard that, it was more sound bites that I was hearing of people talking about that statement. When I actually saw it on Fox News, I think it was a little bit more toned down because what Waltz said was I think what he was trying to convey was not so much that we are going to pursue the same policy as the Biden administration, but that at this point in time, we want to bring America together and we are united in our sort of— I don't know, you could call it basic outlook into the world. And he says our adversaries shouldn't take advantage of that. But I would have worded it a little bit better. However, Sebastian Gorka, when he was talking to Times Radio just a few days ago, I mean, he went off the deep end because he said, you know, in that pretend thick British accent of his, that, uh, this KGB thug Vladimir Putin, uh, President Trump will tell him, you, you must negotiate. Well, I've got news for Sebastian Gorka, uh, this war, you, it will end on Russia's terms. And if anybody in Washington, including people around President Trump, uh, think that Vladimir Putin can be intimidated into anything, I mean Where were you the last 2 years? I mean, uh, you know, on Fantasy Island. So I think this can go 2 ways. If Donald Trump pursues a realist foreign policy, if he signals to the Russians, which I think he should be signaling at this point, that the policy of the United States under his administration is going to be predicated on the notion that Washington is not seeking the strategic defeat of Russia that will be a very important signal to Putin right now that reality and sanity will come back to the White House on January 20th. However, the more you hear of people like Gorka and, you know, and Waltz coming out and saying, well, you know, we're not so different from the current regime when it comes to Ukraine, that can only fuel speculation in the Kremlin that, you know, these guys are the same. So I think it's important for the president to come out with such a statement. And based on that, if the war in Ukraine were to be ended on realistic principles, which were laid out by President Putin, I think in June, which basically amount to, you know, Ukraine leaves the four oblasts that were annexed by Russia, Crimea remains with Russia, no NATO for Ukraine, denazification and demilitarization. So along the lines of what was almost established in Istanbul in 2022 before, you know, Boris Johnson was sent on a sabotage mission, uh, to Kiev to persuade Zelensky to not move along with those negotiations. Uh, that is the line that Putin is going to be pursuing. Of course, those demands right now are going to be more stringent because some time has passed since, uh, June, and the battlefield realities are what they are. Let's not forget the fact that Ukraine invaded Russia moving into Kursk. But, uh, there is no harm to the United States if they, you know, let go of Ukraine on Russia's terms, because there are no vital strategic interests for the United States as a nation-state in Ukraine. You know, the cabal of people in the deep state might have some interest there, you know, biolabs and things like that, but the American people don't have any vital strategic interests in that corrupt hellhole called Ukraine. So if the president pursues that kind of policy, it would force countries such as mine, Poland, I hope, to actually start thinking about more autonomous foreign policy devoid of, you know, diktats coming from Washington, and finally begin pursuing, uh, you know, a greater security architecture for Europe. The unrealized dream since the end of the Cold War, which, you know, George H.W. Bush, Reagan, Gorbachev discussed but never really came to fruition. We might finally see the beginning of that, and actually we should see the beginning of that because only a greater European security architecture with the involvement of a Russia that is feeling secure and an independent but neutral Ukraine can guarantee security and safety for everyone on the old continent and would, you know, forestall any deep state machinations in Washington by giving excuses that we should constantly be moving into Europe with military forces and so on. So I'm hoping that's the scenario that we'll see. But politics being what it is, unpredictable, especially American politics. I hope it's not same old, same old after January 20th. If it is, then we're just going to see more of the same. And any notion of European strategic autonomy will be dead on arrival.

Well, I am very concerned as far as when I see now, for example, who has been picked for the head to head the State Department. You have a very Russian hawk in Marco Rubio, which to me, knowing his policies vis-à-vis two countries, Russia and China, I don't feel comfortable enough that it's gonna be, it's gonna be now Trump trying to figure out a way possibility of resolving this issue while you have someone in the team that is pushing on the other direction. It remains to be seen, and we'll see once we get to that point. I would like to get one— I would like to get back to the point of Poland. It's of interest to me because I visit Poland regularly. Uh, there is this interest now into the conversation as to— with the arrival of Tusk, a lot of Europeans were happy with him coming back. However, when I look behind the scenes, for example, for the establishment of the US base in northern Poland, I feel uncomfortable saying to myself, does Poland— Polish government understand what it's getting into by expanding the presence of US military and what message it sends to the Russians? Where do you see those dynamics heading out, uh, Dr. Krupa?

Well, I think a couple of days, or even on the same day that that, um, missile base, uh, the Aegis Ashore missile base was open in Redzikowo up there on the Polish coast, I think it was Maryasakhorov, or it might have been Peskov, they made a statement that, you know, that pretty much becomes a target right now. Because let's not forget that not only does the base in Redzikowo constitute a massive breach of strategic balance, which is you know, something that the old people like, you know, well, dead now, but Henry Kissinger used to talk about. Nixon used to discuss strategic balance, that you can't have one superpower taking advantage of another. And the base in Rezhikovo is tantamount to basically, you know, the missiles in Cuba in 1962. I mean, we almost went to war over that, but thanks to the sensibility and rationality of such people as President Kennedy and Chairman Khrushchev also, plus the intermediaries that were talking behind the scenes. By the way, I just watched 13 Days again, an excellent film which basically discusses and shows the tensions that were taking place in the White House at that time. I highly recommend it from 2001. Great acting by Kevin Costner, among others. But getting back to your point, not only does the base in Rezhikovo constitute a massive breach of strategic— of the strategic balance, but it also, you know, points a direct bullseye on Poland. Let's not forget, as the eminent MIT professor Theodore Postol has pointed out on many occasions, and not only him, that these launchers in Redzikowo ostensibly are there to intercept incoming missiles from Russia, but they could also be refitted with Tomahawk missiles that can carry nuclear warheads that can fly, you know, within 5 minutes and reach Moscow. So we're basically back to the 1980s, uh, arms race, a very dangerous time which was, you know, uh, ended at the end of the day, thankfully, by the INF Treaty, which unfortunately doesn't exist anymore, but that's a whole different topic. Um, but there is unfortunately a suicidal tendency among many of the Polish elites that came out of the Solidarity movement where they believe that The aim of Polish foreign policy is to be Washington's Rottweiler. I would actually call it Washington's Chihuahua if you consider the, uh, the potential of Russia and Poland right now. And not— I'm not even talking about nuclear weapons, unfortunately. Um, but there is this stupid notion that, uh, we should somehow become— we should be proud of the fact that we're giving Russia a middle finger and at the same time become a target of a potential Russian retaliation. Um, I remember when the first talk of the, uh, anti-missile— let's not forget that this base is actually a result of the George W. Bush administration moving away from the ABM Treaty, which was one of those first signs that Vladimir Putin took as, you know, bad intentions on the side of the West relating to Russia, because the ABM Treaty actually guaranteed Strategic Stability, and it was around for about, you know, 40 years, I think, at that time. They think they rescinded it in 2002. So after that, they started talking about the anti-missile, uh, anti-ballistic missile base in Poland and the radar which is going to be situated in— is situated in Romania. Um, I remember a talk I attended. I was still a student back then at the Catholic University of Lublin, and some guy came from the American Enterprise Institute I still didn't understand at that time that basically the AEI is neoconsensual. So basically the bad guys. And he gave a talk to us as students. He was sent by the American Embassy, by the way. And he said, yeah, this base is not directed at Russia. It's directed at Iran. So we can all feel safe because Iran is a major sponsor of terrorism and so on. Well, it'll be like Russia putting missiles into Cuba saying, don't worry, United States. These missiles are directed against Mexican drug cartels.

To the same thing.

Um, so, but you know, the more research I did, the more laughable that turned out. And actually, right now, nobody— notice that nobody is talking about the missile base being against Iran. That notion has become so ludicrous at this point that they're openly saying, yeah, it's against Russia, and it was always against Russia. Um, let's not forget that it was in 2008 that Vladimir Putin came out with a proposition that we can build a joint anti-ballistic missile system, Russia, the West, and we could use an old Soviet radar in Azerbaijan. I remember it was derided by Condoleezza Rice. She said, that's absurd, we're not going to do that. Putin said, well, why not? If this is not directed at us, why can't we do this together? So, you know, he saw through them, and that speech in Munich in 2007 was, I think, the summary of a lot of his thinking on many of these issues. A famous speech at the Munich Security Conference, which got John McCain so angry. You can see that on that famous recording. So unfortunately, right now Poland is in a very precarious situation because by opening that base, we become a target. And I'm hearing just a few days ago, a retired Polish general who unfortunately, sort of like the equivalent of David Petraeus or Jack Keane, they go around, they make their rounds on Fox News and CNN talking about stuff that makes absolutely no sense. Despite the fact that they're former military men and they know better. But General Skrzypczak literally said a couple of days ago that peace is a threat to Poland. Literally, peace is, peace is a threat to Poland. So that's the mindset of these people. We would have to do a course on Polish history beginning somewhere in the 19th century as to why the current mainstream Polish mindset is so set against Russia and where it comes from and how you know, Washington uses that to its advantage. That's a long story, but it is what it is, and people are taking note, and people in Moscow especially are taking note.

So, so the people in Poland, what about the, the, the young generation? I know there is some sort of— I talked to the older generation in Poland when I was there last time, and of course the views were completely different when I talked to the younger generation. And some of them is like, you know, the younger generation, the one I see, the millennials, those are is saying, oh, what, what do I have against Russia? Nothing. But when you talk to the older generation, it's a different, different, uh, conversation altogether. In your opinion, will the younger generation prevail in its thinking moving forward?

Well, hopefully, hopefully. We're seeing more and more younger politicians, uh, my generation, you know, late millennials coming into the fore, into the parliament. Unfortunately, I have to say though that the influence of their parents are still fairly strong. But I think generally speaking, if you lay out and depending on the questions that are and how they're formulated in polls, uh, on public opinion. But if you ask the basic question, uh, do you want to die in a war? Are you willing to sacrifice your life for Poland? Uh, actually, you know, a lot of young Polish people are saying hell no. Not only do I not want to die in a war, but also I don't want to fight for Poland. That's another factor. So that's, you know, a discussion about the level of patriotism in Poland.

Yeah.

Um, but I think the more, uh, you see demonstrations like we saw last week of that big-ass missile, the Oreshkin, which struck Dnipropetrovsk— pardon my French there, but it was a pretty amazing display of force on the part of the Russians, and it surprised a lot of people. Um, people were stunned in Poland. People were stunned, uh, just thinking that, you know, that's one. Imagine, you know, 10 falling on Warsaw or on military bases in Poland, reaching us, you know, in 3, 4, under 5 minutes. Um, people are slowly coming to the conclusion that war with Russia might not be such a good idea. However, uh, the sort of, uh, the black hole that I see is that Polish people don't seem to connect the dots that such things as following Washington's lead on everything in this proxy war could contribute to a war with Russia. So the thinking is We don't want a war with Russia. Putin is bad, bad, bad, but we shouldn't be poking him. But everything else, you know, the American presence in Poland, the American base in Poland, that's all right. So the fear is there, but the fear arises from other factors that I would prefer, for example, where you see, for example, that NATO provocations, that Poland has basically become a hub, as Newsweek wrote, over a year ago, the CIA's hub in Europe, basically. Uh, you know, there's— I was reading an interesting article a few days back. It was about the, uh, the torture program which took place in Poland, uh, 2002-2003. Uh, we had Abu Zubaydah and Khalid Sheikh Mohammed. They were, uh, taken to, uh, a base basically located right next to the school where Polish intelligence officers are trained in Stare Kajkute. Uh, they were waterboarded there, um, and there was a huge investigation after by the European Parliament and so on. Uh, and the Washington Post article that talks about this, uh, there's an interesting line where it says that, uh, the CIA contributed to Poland's transformation from a Soviet satellite state to an American ally. Now, it's interesting how they frame that because— so if you're in the Soviet camp, you're a satellite. But if the CIA helps you transform, you become an American ally. You would think if the CIA helps you transform, that means you become— you come from a Soviet satellite to become an American satellite. But, you know, that's propaganda for you. That's jingoistic rhetoric. So that's where I would see the source of a lot of our troubles, that the CIA helped us transform from a Soviet satellite state to a quote-unquote American ally, a de facto American satellite state. So I would hope that in the future, and as things evolve, Poles will be able to make that connection, um, because that's the only way that we can leave, uh, the sad state that we are in today and start, you know, at least thinking about formulating an independent and sovereign foreign policy that is not consulted at every angle, uh, with that beautiful little building on Alej Wiazdowski, which is the United States Embassy in Warsaw.

Oh, very interesting. Uh, uh, let me shift to one aspect regarding the transatlantic, uh, relations here, and this one will be vis-à-vis the decision. Of course, you and I know that it's not Biden. Biden doesn't know day from night, uh, but he's the president as he stands now, so the, the, the buck stops with him and the responsibility with him. So as far as greenlighting the ATACMS missiles to Ukraine to use. The— some Europeans are pushing back against saying we are not going to take part in sort of providing long-range, uh, missiles like what Germany— however, I just found out that Germany might be reversing its position. What does this mean in the big picture, geopolitically speaking, in your opinion?

Well, in the big picture, it means a big nuke, the potential for a big nuclear cloud. Now, I was listening to a discussion recently by, uh, I think it was on Judge Napolitano's channel with Colonel Lawrence Wilkerson. Colonel Wilkerson says something interesting, that potentially the Oreshkin can be a game changer in the sense that, uh, you would not have to use nuclear weapons to make your point. Now that could or could not be true. However, it's an interesting point because we know that from the late '70s the Soviets, uh, were working on methodologies and weapon systems that would actually, uh, have the effect of a nuclear weapon without the consequences of a nuclear weapon. So if you think about the Oreshkin as, uh, and I would defer people to Scott Ritter's analysis, uh, Professor Postol, I am not a military expert by by any stretch of the imagination. I'm basing my analysis on what smarter people say. But if we see the Oreshkin as a development of Soviet thinking whereby initiating a nuclear war does not have to be necessary to make your point and to defeat your, uh, your strategic enemy NATO, the collective West, uh, we should be thankful that this weapon system exists. But the problem arises that let's say a couple of these missiles are lobbed into Poland, for example, as retaliation for, you know, F-16s taking off and firing Storm Shadows or Scalps into Russia, and an Oreshkin lands, for example, on Yashchanka Air Base near Rzeszów, which is basically the logistics hubs, the logistics hub of NATO for the proxy war in Ukraine. Uh, NATO can only respond with nuclear weapons. The United States can only respond with nuclear weapons. And if you read Annie Jacobson's interesting book, Nuclear War: A Scenario, I think it's 72 Minutes: The End of Mankind. So people should take that into consideration where this could lead. We are, you know, it's become a cliché to say basically we were in a more dangerous time even than in the Cuban Missile Crisis. But I think just like we've sort of become accustomed with the genocide in Gaza. You know, you hear 10,000 children, 15,000 children, you just hear it now and it doesn't take effect on you, which is sad, but that's the way, you know, uh, the information cycle works. But stop and think for a minute that in 78 minutes, uh, the entire— well, a good chunk of the human race could be eliminated in nuclear fire, and the rest that stay alive, uh, would be envying the dead. Uh, that's where this is going. Um, I really don't understand— I'm, I'm trying to understand the thinking behind people who see this current escalation in Washington as something sensible. I'm hearing rumors that people are— they're doing this, uh, to make it harder for Trump to become president. Obviously a possibility. I wouldn't put it past them. Um, then there is the option that they truly mistook Putin's patience for weakness. And I wouldn't put it past them either because, you know, the IQ level of these people— I mean, Jake Sullivan, Antony Blinken— I mean, their knowledge of military technology, geopolitical dynamics, foreign culture— I mean, zero, less than zero, minus 5, minus 10. Um, I mean, if ever, ever there was a team that was incompetent in dealing with foreign affairs. I mean, whatever you can say about George W. Bush and the neocons, at least these people had experience. You know, they, they saw the big picture. They were experienced. Uh, they, they took part in major, uh, foreign policy initiatives. These guys were basically lackeys of their bosses. I mean, Antony Blinken was what, a staffer in Congress? Then he was, uh, VP Biden's National Security Advisor. Sullivan was basically working for Clinton the whole time. Um, I mean, they're lawyers pretty much, right? They're thinking about foreign policies based on a completely different methodology than the one that should be applied at this point. Um, and I'm just talking about Russia right now. I'm not even talking about, you know, Israel and the whole influence of the famous lobby in Washington. Um, so yeah, going back to your question, this is all moving actually not slowly anymore, but fairly fast because, uh, we're gonna see why I don't know if today or tomorrow, why the Russians closed the airspace over Kapustin Yar missile range in the past few hours. Apparently, a response is being prepared to the latest attacks, uh, by the ATACMS, which the Ukrainians fired off. Um, so this is going to a scenario where it could end in nuclear war, but not necessarily initiated by Russia. There was a lot of talk in the beginning that Russia is going to use a tactical nuclear device. They don't need to. They have the Oreshkin.. But NATO, the United States, they'll have no other option because they don't have such weapons, and they will be forced to respond in a nuclear way.

Well, I, I mean, I, I, I concur with your assessment as vis-à-vis making the presidency— for making, making it hard for the upcoming president, president-elect Trump, to, you know, uh, govern and so forth. And this is where I see that the fragmentation of this transatlantic alliance is going to become more evident, more clear to anyone, whether he, meaning President-elect Trump, is going to push harder against NATO and what the response is going to be from Europe. It remains to be seen because I've heard Europeans always talk about, well, we need to stand on our feet. Since I was a kid, when I would go back home to Paris, there was always that conversation in France. We need to establish our own military, uh, units per se, or security. It was nothing but a bravado, no more, no less. So, and, uh, now if we are to use history, and since it is your background, Dr. Krupa, if we are to use history, won't you agree that, for example, not only Poland but the whole Europe haven't learned anything from history? Given what's going on with these developments that's taking place?

It would seem that the only two nations, possibly three depending on the second round of the Romanian presidential elections in two weeks, um, but it looks like the only two nations that have really learned something from history are Slovakia and Hungary. Uh, Robert Fico, the current prime minister of Slovakia, just said a few hours ago that he will go travel to Moscow. He will accept Vladimir Putin's invitation to take part in the Victory Parade, which was a big middle finger to Brussels, as I wrote on my X account. But the rest, I think, you know, the major players, Great Britain especially— I mean, Albion seems to think that they still have to make up for their imperial future by pretending they mean something vis-à-vis Russia, which they don't. France, uh, you know, divided, trying to be a good American lackey and trying to think of some smart way of approaching Russia. But at the end of the day, and these two clowns which you're showing right now, oh, they've learned nothing of their history. Uh, you know, I heard a joke recently that those T-34s that are located, uh, close to the Bundestag, uh, as monuments, as tributes to Soviet liberation of Berlin, are going to be soon replaced with T-90s. They'll have to go back to Berlin again. So hopefully that doesn't happen because that'll mean they'll have to travel through Poland. But anyways, no, history, this elite, if you combine the ideological ferocity of a lot of these people and their enmeshment in late-stage liberalism and its mutation of woke politics and identity politics transplanted on the international scene, that gives you a lot of blind spots where referring to history can be seen as, for example, fascist or racist. Uh, you know, we don't look to history. We're going to a new frontier right now. We're going to make everybody democratic, we're going to make everybody liberal, everybody's going to be flying the, you know, LGBT flag, and that's the only course that history can take. Well, Vladimir Putin said no. Uh, we are a civilizational state, and while we respect your internal politics, we are a completely different worldview in that regard. Uh, speaking of values, speaking of traditional values, thinking of modes of thinking, the influence of religion, and so on. Uh, this is in reality a civilizational state, just the same as China, just the same as Iran, for example. We can basically say that a majority of the BRICS core, uh, is composed of civilizational states. Now, the West is also in a way a civilizational state, but a civilizational state that uh, unlike the core BRICS nations, uh, is committing suicide and finds that committing suicide is the way to go. And it's not calling it suicide, it's calling it progress, uh, it's calling it democracy, it's calling it our democracy, it's calling our shared values, and so on and so forth. So, uh, no, unfortunately— and there are some people who I, I would say they're establishment historians who, you know, they go on news channels like Timothy Snyder, for example, and others, and they basically distort and manipulate history. And Applebaum is another one, the wife, by the way, of our current, uh, uh, Foreign Minister Radek Sikorski. Um, history is being manipulated in a way, uh, you know, there's an interesting book out a few years ago, it was written by a French fellow, it's called Russophobia, The Making of Russophobia, I think is the title, where he traces in a fascinating way the caricature of Russia as it was presented first and foremost by the British, where it came from, you know, this displaying of Russia as this barbarian, the bear, this savage that is out to get Europe, all in the interests of imperial British advancement. Now, a lot of people unfortunately bought into that. We're seeing that seeping in The Cold War only ingrained that even more in the minds of many Europeans. But even in the Cold War, I mean, you had rational pushback from such people as, you know, General de Gaulle, who always believed that Russia was a European nation, that despite the deficiencies of communism, that you cannot kick Russia out of Europe. We should actually, you know, have a dialogue with Russia. And he was actually one of the real proponents of an independent European foreign policy. Um, and I think that is the history that we should be looking to, the history whereby we understand that European security can only be guaranteed if Russia feels secure. And I don't care what you think of the Russians, whether you like them or you hate them, whether you like Putin or not, whether you like vodka or you don't like vodka, the reality is what it is. Same goes for China. That's sort of a more distant story, but the Russians are here in Europe and they're going to be here whether you like it or not. And the imperative of sane statesmen, diplomats, and historians who actually, uh, present history as it really was and not cherry-pick to fit the current political narrative, yeah, is to understand that without a greater European security architecture, no one at the end of the day will be safe. Because if the Russians don't feel safe, we're not going to be safe. It's going to be an endless cycle, um, manipulated unfortunately, uh, by people who live far, far away and mostly work on the Potomac and are very happy of what they're doing.

Interesting, interesting. Just to remind you guys, uh, I'm having conversation here with Dr. Cooper. If you have any question for him, I will answer— I will have him answer super sticker questions if you have one. Towards the end. So while on this, uh, note, Doc, on, on the history aspects, uh, I am noticing, you know, I have family in Europe and we talk and so forth, uh, and, and one, one of the conversation I had was about witnessing now this movement we move in. Of course, for us in, in the US, we call it the just the left or right, but now you having even the, the centrist liberals and Greens and so forth, all of them being for office in Europe. Is this a hint to where the European population came to the conclusion that it's now or never? I mean, we're seeing now the conversations going on in Germany. We're hearing conversations even inside Poland, some countries in Eastern Europe, France, Spain, Portugal, Italy, and so forth. How do you assess this kind of change politically, whether it's going to take Europe into a different direction altogether?

I think the cracks are definitely showing. I mean, the Scholz government, the Greenlight Coalition, has basically collapsed. It called for elections. The shocker was a couple of days ago, the first round of presidential elections in Romania, where one, Georgescu— I forgot his first name— Colin, I think. Colin Georgescu, uh, a so-called pro-Russian candidate. So basically a sane candidate is going to make it in the second round. And he's been hammering NATO, uh, and American hegemony very hard, saying, you know, all the things that need to be said about the proxy war in Ukraine. Uh, if they don't assassinate him before the second round, it's very possible that Romania is going to have a new president, uh, in a couple of weeks, which is a good thing. And let's not forget, Romania just as Poland, uh, is also a very important hub in NATO's operations, uh, vis-à-vis Ukraine. So that whole thing might be turned around very, very quickly. I've also noticed recently that Giorgia Meloni, who was considered moving sort of towards the establishment in the last couple of months, all of a sudden became fairly positively radical. I know the Italian defense establishment is not gung-ho about supporting Ukraine anymore. I think it was even Meloni who said after the ICC ruling that obviously in the theme of Israel, that she would arrest Netanyahu if he landed in Italy. That's a surprise considering that not too long ago she was considered very pro-Israel. You have Le Pen in France. She's obviously a big figure right now and is showing her presence very clearly. So things are cracking up. And you obviously have Slovakia, you have Hungary, Orbán. Things are cracking in Europe. I noticed that even after Trump was elected, there was a sort of toning down of the anti-Trump rhetoric from our liberal ruling elite. Datusz tweeted out that, you know, congratulations to President Trump. He forgot to add that I no longer consider you a Russian agent, even though a couple of months back I called you just that. But I guess he was betting on Kamala. He bet wrong. I think It's, it's Great Britain that finds itself in a really, really tragic situation. I think, you know, the Britons have lost their minds because there is no real— maybe with the exception on, you know, on this particular issue with, uh, of Nigel Farage, uh, but I mean, it's a twiddle-dee and twiddle-dum when it comes to Labour and the Conservatives, who are all gung-ho on Ukraine. I mean, Starmer has been even more, uh, radical on this issue than Rishi Sunak was. Plus, if you throw in there the tyranny against free speech, which is taking hold in Great Britain in a very totalitarian fashion, as Elon Musk likes to point out on X. Even though I love British humor, I love British culture, I don't see any hope for Albion. It's really a mess, uh, and to consider that they would be making any noises in relation to Russia, that, you know, there's been rumblings that they're going to deploy, uh, forces, uh, to, uh, to Ukraine, I mean, it's laughable. So, uh, I think Britain is, is the outlier here, the, you know, the, the, the most nutty of the nuts in the nuthouse, so to say. Um, but I think continentally speaking, things are moving in the right direction. I mean, if Volkswagen is closing down plants in Germany because of energy prices, you know something is wrong with the German economy. I mean, that should be a sort of, you know, uh, a bellwether, sort of criterion of where things are going. I mean, Volkswagen, the, the mark of Germany, the pride of Germany, right? And where are they moving? Well, they're moving to the United States. So That's, uh, you know, and I'm not even talking here about the fact of who blew up Nord Stream, uh, because I think we all know who most likely blew up Nord Stream. And the fact that the German elite has been so quiet and so questing on this issue that, you know, they're not, uh, they're not making a peep. They're making these ridiculous claims that it was Ukrainian divers that blew it up. I mean, it's laughable. Um, here in Poland, we'll see where things go. There's a presidential election scheduled for May. Currently, I think the ruling parliamentary coalition, even though there's some internal cracks showing, which I predicted a year ago that it would fall apart before the presidential election, it still might happen, we'll see. But they were shocked that Trump was elected. I think they're trying to feel out right now what the next moves are going to be. But I have to tell you, there was a lot of unease, positive unease from our point of view, of the people who are all gun-ho for this proxy war, that things might start to change. And as J.D. Vance wrote in that article in the Financial Times, we're going to have to learn to live with Russia, which is, I think, a thought process that not too many people in Warsaw, if any, have come to realize. And I think the quicker they do it, the better for all of us.

Yeah, well, I, I do know, I don't know, Doc, that one of your friends who is a politician, uh, became a member of the parliament, I believe. He's the one who stood up to, uh, uh, uh, Tony Blinken when he visited. And he was— to me, that's courage at, at the height of it. When he looked at Tony Blinken's eyes and said, go home, you don't need to be here. You know which one I'm talking about, right?

Yes, uh, Grzegorz Braun.

Uh, exactly, I can't pronounce the last name because I don't want to fuck it up.

Fresh member of the European Parliament. Indeed, firebrand.

I mean, you admire the guy, you admire the guy for taking a stand and right there straightforward. And that's to me what gives me hope about maybe the next wave of the politicians coming in Poland, which usually will be like a wave. You start see them in different countries here and there But because Poland's been used by the US, now you're seeing this pushback politically. So I am hoping— I couldn't agree more with your assessments that, uh, uh, uh, they will learn from history and things will change, uh, moving forward. So I give you the last word, Doc, about the trajectory for the next 5 years, just if you are being a king for the day.

Trajectory for next 5 years. Well, I think, for example, NATO. Let's take NATO. I think the decomposition of NATO, which is an important element in this entire equation of, you know, the proxy war in Ukraine, uh, NATO is going to become more divided. Uh, countries such as Turkey, which are forging their own independent line in foreign policy, Excuse me. Let's not forget that Turkey is signaling constantly that they're interested in the BRICS formation. Turkey wants to become a new energy hub, uh, for Europe, connecting Russian gas with Europe. Uh, they bought the S-400s. Uh, Erdoğan and Putin are talking on a regular basis. There's a stability in that relationship. Um, and I think other countries such as Orbán, Orbán's Hungary. There was a speech actually which Orbán gave, I think it's called the Eurasian Forum, a couple of days ago where he made some positively shocking statements. He basically said the era of Western dominance is over. He outlined the ideological trajectory of the collective West after 1989 about pursuing the Americanization, the liberalization of the entire world, of this entire Fukuyamish idea that there is no alternative to liberal democracy, to the era of progress and so on. Um, you know, I was in Hungary in May of this year for the May Long Weekend, and I only hoped I could have stayed longer because a few days after I left Budapest, uh, you know, Xi Jinping actually arrived in Budapest for an official visit. And I could tell you the amount of preparations that were seen in Budapest and the amount of— I could see the Chinese advance teams that were coming in to prepare the, uh, the official state visit It really looked like they were, uh, you know, uh, going to greet the new emperor of the East. Uh, Hungary takes its relationships with China very seriously. Hungary's interests are multilateral, and I think Europe's interests should be multilateral. Um, we don't have to be dominant. We could be prosperous and talking to the entire world. But I think if I can make one prediction for the next 5 years, going back to, to my original thought, is you're going to see more and more crackups in NATO, which is a good thing because, I mean, that is an institution, as President Trump said in the original campaign in 2016, which he was berated for by all the right people, by all the smart people, wink wink, that it's an obsolete institution. It has no reason for existing. It only fulfills the hegemonic fantasies of a cabal of people in Washington and their lackeys spread among European think tanks, parliaments, governments, uh, intelligence agencies, and so on. So this entire imperial edifice called NATO is going to be showing fissures. It's going to be cracking up, uh, the more the better. And I think the coming— and even Stoltenberg said this, he said it outright— that should Russia win in Ukraine, that would be a loss for NATO. And a loss for NATO is a good thing. It's a good thing for Europe. It's a good thing for Europe's security, for the sanity of our politics, and it's a good thing for the United States. Uh, you know, boys in Kansas shouldn't be dying on the fields of Donbas, for example, right? I mean, America First should mean America First, uh, and NATO absolutely doesn't serve the interest either— excuse me— of the European, uh, of the American people or of the European people, and it is only a threat that forces Russia to reactive actions that are seen by the West as offensive, but in reality are defensive, but nonetheless dangerous.

Yeah, well, I do remember when I— my trip before last to Poland, I crossed into Ukraine, and you know who I ran into in my way? British SIS. And I was like, what are you guys doing here? And, and, and, you know, the guy was kind enough talking. So listen, let's cut through the chase here. Okay, what are you doing here, man? Well, we're just coming here to aid. And I said, yeah, well, you're fueling the tensions. You do, you know what you're doing, right? Well, it's just, good luck to you. That's what I said to him.

You should have asked him that question that Robert De Niro asked Sean Bean in the movie Ronin. What color is the boathouse at here?

I wish I would have remembered. I wish I would have remembered that. So it was, it was very, very interesting. And, uh, yeah, I know, just shocked to see like, okay, we're fueling this. And I even saw, uh, even my own old unit was one bringing new trainees from some other Eastern European country. I was like, okay, what are we doing here? Why are we fueling all this more. So, but it is what it is. So, so, well, Dr. Krupa, I can't thank you enough for really carving out time, uh, for us here, for the community to learn, to hear from you. Uh, I do know one of my avid supporters, he said, hey, thank you, Dr. Krupa. I wish I can get it here. It's— I don't know what it is. I got a lot, a lot of viewers here. So, but I'm very, very grateful. I appreciate you, and I look forward to having you again. I will keep you posted when I plan my trip to Poland, and you and I will get together for dinner and just chat a little bit.

So once again, looking forward to it. That evening was an evening to remember. Looking forward to it. Uh, thank you for inviting me and hope to see you soon again.

Of course, of course, of course. Well, thank you so much. On behalf of the entire community, we say thank you. Once again, guys, I'm gonna put the link for you here just for you to Follow Dr. Krupa on X. He's @MJKrupa. And follow him and/or subscribe to his channel on Rumble. There are very some interesting guests over there. I watch the stuff. I listen. Sometimes I don't comment, but I do listen to the interviews he brings in. And if you like, I always tell you guys, and I'm not saying this to be Mr. Nice, you all know me by now. When I bring in some guests here, because I want you to learn something. Dr. Krupa is a historian by training, so he's not somebody who talks on the top of his head. If you got a knowledge that you are not going to get anywhere else, so we're grateful, we're grateful to you, and we look forward to seeing you again. Thank you, my friend. Hi guys, hope you all enjoyed this conversation. You learned something from Dr. Krupa, very, very insightful guy. We'll have him here back on both channels here and the other ones. So, and I look forward to that conversation. Again, uh, just a reminder, remember to join me on Saturday at, uh, actually no, on Friday at 1900 hours for my conversation with Carl Zah. He's going to be in Bali, Indonesia. And on Sunday it will be for our monthly, uh, community conversation. I look forward to just chatting with you about everything else but geopolitics. So as always, remember, geopolitics impacts your daily life in more ways than one. Till next time, guys. Bye-bye.