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Hello everybody and welcome to Geopolitical Trends, where truth matters. I'm your host, Dr. Oualaalou, excited to be with you as always. Hope you had a, a relaxing weekend and you are, uh, geared up for the new week here. So, uh, interesting topic today. And as I told you last time I did the video about Iran, that I am going to keep my eyes open on the movements of the USS Abraham Lincoln, who which was moving, by the way, from the Indian Ocean towards the Mediterranean Sea, which towards the West Asia, rather the Gulf, to be specific, the Arabian Sea. And that's where it is as we speak. So this is what I'm gonna be providing you my analysis about. I will delve deeper into this topic because it's of great concern as to what lies ahead. But before I do this, let me say hi quickly to our wonderful community as always. Oh, first of all, I gotta say thank you so much to Noel for the Super Sticker. Truly, truly appreciate you, Noel, for your kind generosity and support for the channel as always. Hanging G, good to see you here and good afternoon to you as well. Phil from Ottawa. Barry Jones, I'm early to class. You know, good to see you, buddy. So, uh, happy to have you here. Say It Like It Is, good to see you here. Uh, who else is here? Uh, let me see. Um, Willie Holman, as always. Matt Becky, good to see you here. So, Athene Wu, as always. Uh, let's get into, uh, our talk. Before I'll do this, by the way, I need to give you some housekeeping— give you an idea about some housekeeping items here. Remember to join me tomorrow for my conversation with Inna Tengen and Warwick Pao. We will be having a discussion at 1900 hours Central Standard Time. I will post the timing and make the video public for everybody. It's private right now, but just I wanted to give you a heads up on that one. I'm also gonna do two main topics for you. I am working on it. One has to do with China and one has to do with Cuba. So for China, that will be one of the headlines I am going to be sharing with you here. Uh, this is, uh, not this one, rather this one here. This is an image of General Zhang Jua. I hope I pronounced it correctly. My apologies if I don't. Uh, this is the fi— the former vice chair of the China Central Military Commission, uh, CMC, he was packing up to leave at a meeting during the, uh, annual two sessions that took place in Beijing, March 2025. So what's going on with this particular individual? He's been investigated right now for some other issues, which I'm gonna do a video for you. I'm not gonna get ahead of myself of this. So, and, uh, because he's considered one of the top generals and one of President Xi Jinping's closest allies. Here is the thing that I'm going to tell you, and I was made aware of this about 2.5 months ago. Didn't want to talk about it. The reason I didn't want to talk about it, because I wasn't, I wasn't 100% sure of the reasons for why the investigation was launched. What I was aware of, what I can tell you I was aware of, I was aware of the tensions between him and other general, which I will be talking about too when I do the video for you, and President Xi Jinping. So, so, but I didn't want to come forward with that till I ensure that, as I always do with you, with the community, I like to fact and double fact, double check the information to make sure it is as accurate. But now it is confirmed And I checked from different resources, uh, that even from within Beijing itself, that indeed he and another one has been removed and under investigations, in other two, in other two other, uh, four, six other officers to my knowledge. So, and as I said, the other topic I will do for you is Cuba. Yeah, that is something development took place on a weekend. I will do a live stream for you about down. So now let's get into our topic of the day, and today we will be talking about, uh, uh, of course, uh, the, the brink of escalation. That's how I decided to put the title for the, the thumbnail to highlight to you: will Iran be able to outsmart the United States? We've seen this movie before. We've seen how the US some sort of flex its military muscles only to find out that it, it doesn't hold. The best example is what took place against Ansarullah or Houthis in the Red Sea. But better yet, historically speaking, and I'm going to be providing you facts about this because I was on the ground in Afghanistan. You remember we did the same by launching fighter jets and all that stuff to kill the, the head of the Taliban, and we couldn't. Because we were hoping he will sort of surrender, and it didn't work. Could Iran adopt the similar way? And this is again why I wanted to address this particular analysis for you, because whether the US is bluffing or not, especially under President Trump, it's a subject now of some sort of intense debate. Because you have, you know, many geopolitical analysts who have some sort of an in-depth understanding of how things work. They are split up between, you know, I'm one of those now seeing, okay, is this tactic of the US just a calculated maneuver? You know, a high-stakes brinksmanship, some will argue. On the counterargument to that, or is it just an erratic empty threats. We've seen it before. And this is why when you consider the idea of— not the idea, but rather the statement of Donald Trump said about, oh, annexing Greenland, you know, which turns out to be nothing but a noise or just a desperate distraction, no more, no less. And this is where you have this back and forth. Among analysts that they contend with his actions as just noise, no more, no less. Because when you consider where Donald Trump is making the noise, on two things: trade wars and military threats. You know, on the other hand, you cannot minimize this as just a bluffing, because what if And this is exactly where we ask the first fundamental question. What is the objective of the American buildup in the West Asia or Middle East categorized? Why? And why it is categorized as unprecedented? This is a picture of the USS Abraham Lincoln. And I'll give credit here, not to this one, this one here. I give credit to the US Navy. That's their picture here. So you think about this particular buildup and what's in it, and I'm gonna detail for you what's involved in this. So as of now, what the region of the West Asia or Middle East, uh, is witnessing is some sort of this unprecedented operational and strategic situation. There are two going hand in hand, and this, of course, It comes against the background of the escalating American military buildup and of course the expansion of the deployments and so forth. Remember, just by bringing this to the Arabian Sea, you bring in an additional 7,000 US troops in addition to the 40,000 that exist in the region. And of course, we're gonna have to think in terms of where Iran's— how Iran sees this. And by the way, I thank you to the community for those who participated in the survey when I asked the question: with the ongoing military buildup in West Asia, has war become now Iran's only option? 76% of you said yes, 16% of you said no, and, and 8% of you say don't know. And I appreciate you participating in this. We had about almost 1,700 participants on this. So the American mobilization goals, because when you have sort of military readiness level reaching this level here, we didn't see the same in Venezuela. Do you remember? And I argued back then, you're not going to see any ground forces going in or even an invasion of— because the numbers don't support that. 10,000, it's not enough. Are we seeing this? Are we seeing the opposite of that here? And this is where, for me, looking from outside in, I will look at this first as a maximum, an instrument of a maximum pressure that the US is doing to Iran. But at the same time, this could turn into potential escalation. And that escalation, where my fear is, can go beyond the framework of deterrence because the whole reason the US is doing this is nothing but deterrence. Because why will it be, it will go beyond? Because if it fails, this so-called deterrence fails to impose a new political equation on the other side, which what I believe it will not succeed in doing so. So the buildup in itself, the military buildup with all the, the US assets and so forth, it's, it's, it's sort of helps us at least understand that any future offensive He will be at least prepared, but it could also be perceived in terms of as a defensive measure because you are not going to underestimate Iran. You can't underestimate anyone in a fight, especially now when it comes down to Iran in West Asia, because the military presence So is it about the US or is it about defending Israel? And of course, protecting US forces in the region. And one will say it's for both. So if we look at the scale and the context of this and compare it to what we saw in 2025. So here is the harsh reality as of the last event that took place in June. 2025. There are about 40,000 service members in West Asia. So many of them are on ships at sea. There are troops on the ground in Qatar, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Egypt. You know, those are the— especially in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan, those are small units. But there is military presence on the ground. Of course, these countries is not gonna wanna disclose this to their population. So when you look at the buildup, that includes now the deployments of the carrier strike groups, that's the Abraham Lincoln, the aerial refueling aircraft, you know, the transport planes, all this. This to me looks not only from a military perspective, but also from a strategic aspects on it. And this, we— I will not treat it as a routine. If it were a routine, you don't need this many or this many assets, Daddy. Because the way I see it is that Washington wants to send the message that it wants an immediate ability to subdue not just Iran, but the entire theater in the region, which is not going to work anyway. Of course, the clear focus remain on Iran as the central target for this particular mobilization. So when you think about the nature for the deploy— of the deployed forces, you know, especially— let me put the picture once again. Especially the USS Abraham Lincoln, which, by the way, represents some sort of a floating air and naval base. And that in itself allows for the targeting of the entire Iranian territory and any other target from within. So of course, why would you want to do this if you are the United States? Of course, you want to confuse the calculations of escalation to leave a blurry picture to the opposite side as to what might happen. But at the same time, this, in my opinion, pushes towards an open path for confrontation. This is why I believe Iran this time around will have no other option, in my opinion. So, and this, if you are to analyze it this way, it will have to be based on this, uh, sort of the aspects of this accelerated US military, uh, moves. So when you move, for example, the transfer of the squadron of F-15 Eagle Strike Fighters, you move it from Bahrain from Britain, I'm sorry, from the UK into the West Asia or Middle East. When you move the supporting refueling aircraft, when you move the military cargo planes, all this in my opinion reflects some sort of a wide-ranging operational readiness. But again, is it for action or is it just for flexing and posturing. So, and this is again where you have to think in terms of the size of the mobilization. Yeah, we can all say the US did it before and we did. You remember last year when we were talking about the Red Sea and the US sent the Harry Truman? All we thought, oh my gosh, they're sending this one and they end up having to flee. And I use the term very carefully here. Yeah, they end up having to flee north under the pretext is that the aircraft carrier needed some maintenance. It was no maintenance on that. So, and this is why in this scenario what you're going to have, you're going to have the inability of the opposite, uh, party, Iran in this case, its inability to predict the outcome. But there is also another reason to all this. As of now, there is no clear stated political objective to all this. That in itself leaves the door wide open to many interpretations. So, so because military power, however great it is, or it might be. It's only a tool. That's the only reason for it. And that cannot be replaced— the ultimate or the objective goal for why this is all had to happen. So, and this is exactly where you are seeing, you know, the contingencies now that Iran will have to embark on. And I am going to detail for you as to what Iran has in the cards that it can play. So, so when you think about in terms of this idea of this movement, and again, I am finding myself going back to history and thinking in terms of this buildup is described as unprecedented.— but in scale relative to recent history as to what took place. Yet, yet the exact objective shifts. It depends again. Why it shifts is because the regional tensions tend not to stay constant. Because Iran-Israel dynamics are shifting on a daily basis. And this is where I use history as my guide, thinking that this ambiguity is compounded by the fact that past experiences— and that's why you have to always go back in history and see if there is any precedent to something like this. So past experiences have shown that the United States has repeatedly resorted to sort of display of force without engaging in a direct confrontation. And that in itself leaves the current scenario open between options of some sort of cohesive or coercive, rather, strategies, deterrence, or the option of sliding into a war with no clear limits or objectives. And that is one of the greatest concern about this in itself. So the amassing of this massive number of forces is in itself part of the battle, if I am to argue that point. Because why you want to do this? You want to do this to force the opponent to rethink its strategy, to go back to the drawing board, and reshape the calculations and pushing the opponents to modify its strategy, its behavior, its response. And all this is done without firing a single shot. And but again, we can't be thinking in these terms just this way. We have to consider the risks involved with this type of a strategy. So. Because here is the thing, the objective of this strategy is to achieve something, but if there is a failure, that changes the entire nature of the setting. So the deployed force, like what we are seeing right now, will become ready for use in case there is some sort of a miscalculation. And that in itself will open up a door to gradual escalation that is very, very difficult to contain, especially when it comes down to dealing with Iran. And that's again why I'm saying you have to put this into the context. When you're seeing these massive movements of Iran's deployments of certain types of missiles, all this, coincided with this heavy US naval presence in the Gulf and the Arabian Sea. You know, when you see destroyers, you see warships, permanent bases, and so forth. The Fifth Fleet in Bahrain, which by the way will become a target for Iran, will become a target of Iranian missiles. Al Udeid base in Qatar will become— locations in Saudi Arabia will become targets as well. I don't know about Egypt and Jordan. That's so small. It doesn't make sense to waste missiles on those. And that in itself, the setting complicates now the theater of operations. And that also paved the way for rising the risks. And this leads me to ask the other fundamental question: what is Iran asymmetric warfare? Consist of. So when you think about Iran, asymmetric warfare consists of some sort of different strategies, and this is nothing new. Iran has been working on this for a long, long, long time, during the time of Qasem Soleimani, who, by the way, credited for creating some sort of really good strategy for Iran in the region. This is why Iran has the geopolitical upper hand in the region than the United States, despite forces of the US. Because this strategy that Iran developed over decades, but what Iran has is you combine this with the unconventional tactics, then you add the modern capabilities also. And I'm not denying all this because remember, we don't know what the Russians and Chinese are doing behind the scenes in supporting Iran. Iran will not come forward and disclose that. Don't ever expect that. So let's start first with Iran's naval asymmetric warfare. I don't know if you're familiar with swarm boats. Let me see if I have a picture for you. No, no, I don't— sorry, I don't have a picture. But anyway, swarm boats, boats, what are they? Those are small unmanned surface vehicles, and those are designed to operate autonomously— I can't even speak— autonomously or via remote control in coordinated groups to overwhelm, to intercept and to protect against threats. This is what Iran, you know, mind you, one thing is that those can be equipped with multi-rocket launchers and heavy machine guns. Then you add to this Iran's special operation forces that includes about, to my knowledge, about 1,500 special operations teams, which has deployed throughout the Persian Gulf. No, I didn't say throughout Iran. I said throughout the Persian Gulf. And that can attack targets below the surface, above the surface, from the air, from the shore, using sophisticated equipment. For example, limpet mines. I don't know how many of you— and I'm not going to get into the details of all this or technical aspects of. You have the shaped explosive charges. You have submersible delivery vehicles. And this is exactly why I mentioned, could Iran outsmart the United States? We've seen it in Afghanistan with the US military might, and they couldn't defeat the group over there. We've seen it in the Red Sea with, again, aircraft carriers firing jets and all. They couldn't defeat Ansarullah. We've seen it in Somalia, you know. And that's, again, you have to think in terms of Iran's greater strategy. And the greater strategy goes way back into the early '80s. This is where you have the groups. Yeah, some would say, well, are you talking about Hezbollah, Dr. Mao? Yes, I am. But they are not in a position. We don't know that for a fact. Just because certain groups don't react doesn't mean they're done. Have you ever heard anything about the Houthis recently? No. They're taking a step back, watching from a distance. And when time comes, they will get reactivated or do whatever. My point is that these groups like, for example, Hezbollah, like Badr Corps, which is in Iraq. All this, this just as an example, all this was intended when it was established at some point to challenge the military superior foes or enemies, whatever term you want to use. And this is again what the Iraq era the Iraq-Iran War has taught the Iranians. They learned big deal from that. So, and that's again where the importance of it. Then you bring in the new technology. I'm talking about the missiles, I'm talking about the drones, uh, uh, uh, capabilities that Iran has. And I'm going to detail, uh, some of the examples of this missiles you are looking at here. So to know exactly what is for— Iran has deployed advanced cruise missiles now. For example, you take Qadr 380. Qadr 380— I'm going to leave the picture here for you so you can see— Qadr 380 has a range of about 1,000 kilometers. And here is the interesting thing about it, is using AI. You think about the Shahid 136, not Shaheed. Matt Backe, thank you for correcting me last time. It's just because when I read the translation, it was spelled as Shaheed. Shaheed means, uh, uh, uh, uh, martyr. Shahid 136. So, and Iran has mass-produced also a guided munition capabilities. So this is when you consider the idea of what is known as the gray zone activities. In, in terms, to those who are familiar with military setting, gray zone actors are usually conducting activities that fall between diplomacy and open war. And this is where Iran is going to be playing. To me, it's a smart strategy to move in that direction. But, but, but, but, but this time around, Iran is put really under the real test because it's now or never. If Iran doesn't respond in case the United States attacks, then it's over. This is why the US is rethinking and rethinking and rethinking. Of course, Israel wants the US to go ahead forward with this. And that's when you have to consider some sort of the— what am I looking for? The balance of power. Of course, when you look at it logistically, the US has far more superiority to Iran, but that doesn't guarantee victory. History proved it. Go to Vietnam, Gulf War I, Gulf War II, Afghanistan, Iraq, Red Sea. Doesn't guarantee. So because Iran, beside the whatever conventional weapons it has, it has the geopolitical power element, and that in itself plays a major role in moving the trajectory of the conflict one direction or another. So because what am I referring to here is I am referring specifically to Iran's influential position on the security of maritime routes, especially the Strait of Hormuz. That is what I'm referring to here as one leverage that Iran can play and it will play. And I know I asked that question from the community and thank you for participating on that. I think 80% of you said, yeah, Iran this time around will shut down the Strait of Hormuz. And that's again, you have to think in terms of how this is going to shape this particular escalated confrontation. This influential position will play on maritime level, play, was going to play a major role in this. And this leads me, and by the way, this is happening as the situation is becoming more sort of confused or murky, if I may use the term here. Because you have on a tactical level on one side, and you have the political and security indicators on the other. And my reference on the latter part, the political and the security, has to do with the visit of the US Central Command General Brad Cooper to Israel. He's in Israel. So the idea is that also you take into consideration the cancellation of flights to the region by major international airlines. That in itself should reflect to you the fears and the concerns of an uncontrolled escalation. That's again where my concern is. This time around, I believe this time around we will see a different— we will see a different Iran. I know some said they should have finished it last time, maybe. But if I am to go back just quickly here, because I need to highlight a key aspect about the Strait of Hormuz. What about the Strait of Hormuz? What will, what will become of it in case of an attack on Iran? So because this, in my opinion, the Strait of Hormuz could face serious disruption, which are going to be, even though some analysts are arguing, well, you know what, a complete closure remains some sort of debated. I don't think so this time around because Iran has the capacity to disrupt that. The coastal defense of Iran network, because this coastal defense is equipped with anti-ship missiles that include Khaleej al-Fares. I have pictures of these particular missiles here, so I'm going to share them with you right here. Khaleej al-Fares. This one is about 300 km range. Then you have Hormuz 1 and Hormuz 2. I do have a picture of the second missile right here. No, this is a C-802. I'm sorry, here is the Hormuz 2. This is the Hormuz 2. Same range, 300-kilometer range. Then you have the Sea-802 cruise missiles. This is about 120-kilometer range. And by the way, this particular elements, those are in addition to thousands of unmanned aerial vehicles, and all this will threaten shipping You saw what happened in the Red Sea. How many companies sent their ships through the Red Sea once Ansarullah declared a blockade on ships? So, and in addition to all this, Iran has also concentrated sort of on acquiring and acquired naval mines. Those are In addition to armed speedboats, powerful anti-cruise missiles positioned along the bottleneck of the Strait of Hormuz. And like I said, when I asked the community, will Iran shut it down? 85% of you said yes, 8% said no, and 7% said don't know. And we had about almost 2,400 participants in that. Thank you for participating in that. And that's again when I have to go back in history and see how Iran can play a role into this. Suffice it to understand that the idea is that during June 2025, by the way, At least for us here, the IC, the intelligence community's assessment, what they have detected at that time, of course, wasn't made public till later on, that Iranian military forces loading naval mines onto vessels in the Persian Gulf. And what is that for? That's usually your indication for preliminary steps to blockading the strait because Iran has also other alternative. For example, Iran could lay mines, use the IRGC Navy to strike or seize vessels. Of course, the US will retaliate, and if retaliate, things will escalate. We all know where this is going to be going. But think about also the economic impact, not only in the region, but on the global level. The stakes are enormous. It was an analysis that I had chance to read it one time by Goldman Sachs. And their analysts predicted that a blockade could push oil prices over $100 a barrel. This is what you're going to be seeing. It will be a nightmare here in the US if those prices go to that level. Others have estimated— some other, uh, entities also suggest that it could go even to $150 a barrel, and that in itself will affect Asian importers China, Japan, South Korea, and the likes, which collectively imports about 10 million barrels of oil a day through the Strait of Hormuz. That is why that card is also going to be played out, and I am certain of it. Liking this video so far? Don't just be a watcher. Go ahead and hit the like share, and subscribe button. And don't forget to tap the bell so you will not miss any of my videos or live streams. This way, you will be supporting a channel that stands for the truth and objective reporting. The choice is yours. Thanks for your support. And indeed, there are those who are saying, oh no, no, no, Iran won't be able to do that. And I ask them why, and they say because of the Fifth Fleet in Bahrain. What makes you think that Iran is going to wait and not attack that location? It will be stupid of Iran not to consider that while doing what it needs to do to shut down the Strait of Hormuz. It's common sense. And that's why I don't entertain that idea of that, oh no, no, no, the Fifth Fleet presence in Bahrain will deter Iran. I don't think so. I don't think so. This time is different because Iran already made the calls to those countries where the US is present, where the bases are. Hey, we are calling to let you know, should an attack occurs and we found out that it's launched from your territory, that particular location is going to become a target. Because remember one thing, and I kept a picture of this for a reason. Take a look here. Those are Iran's ballistic missiles. Yeah, all this is good and great, but if Iran doesn't act, it loses credibility completely. Except that for me, and I speak for myself, I feel this time is different. And this is not about emotions, no, no, no, no. This is about the reality of where things are going. And I'm talking about the global order. And to Iran, it is now or never if it wants to play a role into this new global order. Because if it gets shut down, then it's over. And I don't think so they're gonna allow it. And this leads me to ask the other fundamental question. Hypothetically, should the US get involved into it? Will the US be entangled for a long time in the region if it launches an attack on Iran? And remember, why will the US do this? They will do it on behalf of Israel. So this, you can ask any well-informed geo— well-informed geopolitical analyst and will tell you the answer is yes. Because any attack on Iran of this magnitude will entangle the US. Vietnam War started just by, oh, we're going to just wipe them out. Iraq, Iraq invasion started from that premise. And I remember I argue against it because I said, it's going to take longer for you to get out. Oh no, we will get in, liberate Baghdad, and get out. It is 20, 18 years later. And this is again, if the war turns into protracted, yeah, if it becomes protracted conflict with some sort of the US involvement, because US is going to be dragged into this, not only involvement, but also casualties. This, in my opinion, the outcome of this could drawn towards regime change, which what the US will want. As the only way out, but I don't see that happening. So, and of course, Bibi Netanyahu will be positioned as an enabler for this direction, like he did with Baghdad. You all remember the invasion of Iraq was because of what Netanyahu pushed behind closed doors the Americans to do. And this is the key risk, in my opinion, is that the United States could get bogged down in another military quagmire. I'm gonna use the term carefully here in West Asia. And of course, we all know the strategic implications to all this, especially when you consider not just the region West Asia, but the Asia-Pacific theater as well. And that in itself will lead to some sort of not escalating, but cascading instability. Because if the conflict persists or if Iran becomes destabilized, which by the way, most of the countries in the region do not want that, including those that host US military installations or bases. Saudis don't want it. Qatar doesn't want it. United Arab Emirates doesn't want it. Bahrain, they all don't want it because they know what it means. And the stability on the Gulf Arab countries, it's not just about the refugees because this is where it's going to become very tense, especially when you think about the Shia population. And again, I am not focusing on the religious aspect because you're going to have to think about how do Shias going to feel. Could it become radicalized, like, or sort of strengthen their position like what happened in Iraq? Which by the way, in Iraq, as of today, the US already warned the government about the president of Iraq. They're gonna have election soon and they want one that listen to the US. That tells you Iraq has never been free. So, and this is why when you think about places like Iraq, Lebanon, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and so forth. This is why the region, countries within the region certainly have this massive fear of the consequences of a war between Iran and the United States, or even Iranian military sort of reprisal. Against US bases in Persian Gulf. And if this is not enough, you think about the strategic complications. And that in itself remain— this is why you have right now US bases in those, in those countries, you know, Bahrain, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Egypt. Jordan, Egypt, you don't hear much about because it's small presence. So, and this is why you have now some sort of bases remain on a high alert now. Why? Because they are expecting that, that some militias in Iraq could attack U.S. positions near Erbil and Baghdad. That's what they still have in there. You think about Ansarullah or Houthis, because they have renewed their sort of strikes against Red Sea shipping in case. So you see where this is going. And as to the diplomatic challenges, that I don't think so it will be there because Iran will shut down the door to diplomacy. I've argued this months and months, wasting their time on negotiating with the West is futile. Fruitless. They don't need to. Because you still have the IAEA, the International Atomic Energy Agency, still saying about Iran needs to be monitored as far as its program and so forth. Because here is the harsh truth that I'm gonna tell you, and I'm gonna ask you here. Do you think after 30 years of working on a nuclear program, Iran couldn't develop the bomb? I mean, literally, North Korea came after Iran by so many years and they developed it. You think Iran will not develop this over period of 30 years? Food for thought. I just want you to think. Because here is the harsh reality, especially when you tie it to this nuclear program. A military action, in my opinion, cannot definitely resolve Iran's nuclear program. So, and this is where you're going to have— should the US go that route, this is going to be leaving the US now potentially committed to sustained military presence. And engagement for years. Exactly what happened in Afghanistan. And what was the outcome? How did we leave Afghanistan? With the tail between our legs. It was very embarrassing. I mean, we shouldn't be there in the first place. I went there the first year after 9/11. So literally, and I argued What are we doing here? You know, there was a chain of command, and you know, when you have a general, well, we can tangle it this way, Mr. O. Yes, sir, but you know, if I am to use history as my guide, I tell you that no, no empire was able to conquer this country. What makes us think that we could? That's just hubris. Respectfully, sir. So you know how it is. And this is again paved the way for— to go back to that key point about US bases in Qatar, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and so forth. Will Iran attack them in retaliation of the US? It is, to me, it's a relevant question. We cannot ignore it. Yeah, relationships are good between Iran and Saudi Arabia. But don't fall for that. Don't fall for who— why the Saudis will always look at Iran with suspicion, because they fear the influence of Iran in the region. And it's not like Iran wants to take over the Muslim world, as some have said, which I pushed back against that narrative. Iran was never ever interested in dominating the Muslim world. They don't care for that. That's not their forte. And this is why I believe the evidence that suggested in June 2025, when Iran launched missile on Al Udeid, you know, and it was short-range missile, by the way. I think they were medium-range involved. I don't recall. I do know for a fact it was a short-range because When I looked at the types of missiles that were used, you know, those will be a short range. And that in itself, so, because what Iran wanted to do is just to send a message. And that is why, of course, Qatar said that the intercepted the missile? I don't think so. I don't think so. Iran calculated the distance and so forth and the coordinates and so because they didn't— they just want to send a message. They didn't want to kill anybody. That's why there were no casualties. But in comparison to what Israel did inside the capital in Doha, so And that's why Iran has already taken the initiatives of a formal warning to regional countries. So, because to my knowledge, Iran already informed Qatar, Saudi Arabia that it will hit American targets in those countries if the US attacks Iran. And these two regions, these two countries, because they do have some sort of good relations with the US, except that the US has the upper hand in that relationship. So it's not an equal footing per se. So that means still Iran thinks in terms of these two countries can convince the US not to do so. But when you think in a bigger picture is that from Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates, to Turkey or Türkiye, you know, the US bases in those countries will be attacked. Interesting that Iran didn't mention Türkiye because Türkiye are NATO member. If NATO member is attacked, Article 5 will be activated and that will give justification. Iran is smart enough to know what to use. And this is where, and I'm coming closer to an end here. Just to highlight to you the idea of lessons from history. If we are to think about Iran's great strategy. Now there are those, there are some scholars here in the U.S. they're arguing, oh, this strategy is collapsing and so forth. Maybe, maybe not. So if it was collapsing, you know, how come Iran is still standing on its feet after almost 39 years of sanctions. Yes, the economy is not doing well. Yes, you saw the recent protests and so forth, which was fueled by foreign intelligence services, you know. So, and this, when you think in terms of— if we are to look, like I argued in my Iran book when I did the, uh, I think the history part of Iran, I said we cannot understand Iran today if we don't understand its history. It's the past. It's important. It's very important to understand this, but also will give us an idea, an opportunity to place the strategy of Iran within its proper context, how it intends to deal with the US. That's why I disagree with the scholars that saying, well, it's completely— it's going to collapse. No, it's not. Yes, it's a— is it in a difficult situation? Yes, it is. And this is why I believe this time around Iran will have to respond in case the US engaged in something like this. And this could also be, after all, it's just posturing on part of the United States. We tend to do this a lot, a lot. We had the many forces in the region to begin with. It's not like those 40,000 forces just deployed to the— no, no, no. Some of them are already there. That's no different than what we have in Europe, like in Germany. How many we have in Germany? How many we have in South Korea? Think of it that way. The troops are already there. And this, the idea of where the IRGC, sort of publicly stating that US bases in a region are not strength, but rather vulnerabilities. And I couldn't agree more with that assessment, because when you have a target like this in an open sea, yeah, it is some sort of a symbol for strength, but at the same time it is a target. That was the reason why Harry Truman aircraft had to move north back then when tensions started against the Ansarullah and they moved it up north because they knew that if it stayed there, it would become a target because we didn't know what Ansarullah were getting from the Russians. The same argument I will make as to what the IRGC stating. And that in itself signals that Iran views these installations as the primary retaliatory targets. And I can see why. I can see why. So the question becomes for us, before I'll share the conclusion here, an excerpt from my book, the question is how much Israel will really lobby behind closed doors to push the U.S. for another war with Iran. But does Israel understand the ramification of that? Israel will not be spared this time around. We saw what happened last time. Yes, I read a white paper from Washington, and the argument was that the Israelis have strengthened their Iron Dome and all the air defenses. Uh, this time around, the way I see it, how Iran is going to play it, Iran is going to have to launch everything it has, overwhelming the systems completely. So it behooves Iran to think, really think strategically, because what Israel will end up doing if it is seeing its demise is going to resolve to the nukes.. And if it does that, we all know what two countries did— North Korea and Pakistan— to threaten the retaliation if they ever use a nuke against Iran. And if that gets to that point, well, it's, it's, it's over. We all know what it means. So let me share an excerpt from my Iran book, and I'll conclude with that one. It is what I argued back then. Of course, it was the big picture of what was taking place. While the 1979 revolution in Iran created some sort of change and threw the country into anarchy, because it was, Saddam Hussein made a strategic mistake by attacking Iran thinking he could take advantage of the chaos. He discovered that the attack allowed Iranians of all stripes to join in defense of their country. By 1982, Iran regained some of its lost territory. This conflict marked the beginning of the involvement of different players, regional and global, one that shaped the outcome and changed the region geopolitical calculations. So the question is, will the US be making the same mistake? Anyway, hope you all enjoyed this, uh, analysis here, uh, and I just wanted to— I'm gonna keep my eyes open on this, uh, and we just go from there to see. I'm concerned. It's just my, my sense is this time, or something is different about this time. This is not what happened in June. This time is going to be different. Now, I hope some cool head will prevail. But again, to Iran, this is it. You either prevail triumphant or you're going to be defeated once for all. To the US, you think we will learn from history? That military might doesn't cut it. Vietnam was able to defeat the Americans. Afghanistan, Iraq, Somalia— those are harsh realities. We cannot ignore this. Anyway, hope you enjoyed it. Remember to join me tomorrow for my conversation with Anna Tengen and, uh, Warwick Powell. I look forward Looking forward to that conversation. And the following day, I'm going to be making a livestream for you about Cuba, what is going on. Some development took place. And by the way, I'm going to start doing recorded brief analysis for the community. So be on the lookout for that one. I will be doing that soon. I'm going to start that one. Once again, I want to say thank you to Noel. For the Super Sticker. Truly appreciate. Let me see that one. There is Noel. Uh, once again, thank you Noel for the Super Sticker. Truly appreciate you for that. 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