EJSP2009 Laetitia Peter David
This paper (Mulder, Verboon & De Cremer, published online 5 March 2008, DOI:10.1002/ejsp.506) investigates how sanction severity affects people’s moral judgments and social disapproval, and how trust in authorities moderates these effects. Three studies: Study 1 (N=60, lab raffle task) found severe (2.50 EUR) vs mild (0.20 EUR) fines increased moral condemnation; Study 2 (N=139, vignette about cheating) found a sanction severity × institutional trust interaction (B=.45, p<.005) such that severity raised moral disapproval only when trust was high; Study 3 (N=55, lab allocator task) manipulated sanction size (0.50 EUR vs 5 EUR), measured general trust (α=.81) and found sanction × trust effects on moral judgment (α=.93) and social disapproval (logistic interaction B=.88, p<.05); moral judgment mediated the effect on social disapproval for high-trust participants (bootstrapped indirect effect z=3.45, p<.001). Authors conclude severe sanctions can strengthen moral norms when authorities are trusted; they propose sanctions are interpreted as retributive vs compensatory, and acceptance depends on perceived legitimacy/trust.
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DOI 10.1002/ejsp.506; published online 5 March 2008.
Study 1: N=60; fines: mild €0.20, severe €2.50. Study 2: N=139; sanction described (low vs high) in vignette. Study 3: N=55; sanction values: mild €0.50, severe €5.00.
Study 1 moral judgment α = .78. Study 2: sanction check α = .77; trust in institution α = .71; moral judgment α = .78. Study 3: trust in authorities α = .81; moral judgment α = .93; perceived experimenter disapproval α = .75.