Middle East Crossroads: Is Turkey the next target? | Exclusive with Prof. Vali Nasr

Vali Nasr, thank you for joining us here today. It is a great honor to have you in Jumuriyet TV's platform today. We have a lot to cover.

Thank you. Thanks. Good to be with you.

Thank you. So I was going to ask you if there is a united stance in Washington because there were these maximum pressure hawks versus more moderate ones. And Trump was closer before to the moderate ones. And as you said, he said that the nuclear program of Iran was obliterated. And also, actually, the proxy is now a bit out of the picture, right, with the regime change in Syria and Hezbollah being targeted. So what happened?

We don't see any evidence of a policy process. In other words, let's say if you compared it to Iraq with 2003, 9/11 happened. Then they began to build a case for months and months about why Saddam needed to be removed. They made that case about alleged nuclear activity in Iraq. So you saw a process that was built from below and gradually became formal U.S. policy. And then it was only up to the president to basically execute it. Right now there hasn't been a policy process. The administration, and even at his State of the Union, the president did not make a case for war. He did not— yes, he said Iran is a bad actor, they do these things, etc., but they did those things before as well. Why all of a sudden the United States needs to go into an expensive, dangerous, risky war with Iran? The case has not been made. He personally, which put war on the table, and as a result, there is no policy justification. Now, it's possible that in his mind, he thinks that there are scenarios where war can be really easy, like in Venezuela. Or like when he bombed Iran in June, the total amount of America's involvement in the June war with Iran was 45 minutes. So the United States sent bombers, they destroyed Iran's nuclear facilities and went home. So maybe he thinks that something like that would happen, but he hasn't made a case for why the United States should risk a much larger regional war. I don't think it's even evident to the leadership of Iran's neighbors, Turkey included, the Gulf countries who are very close allies of the United States, what is exactly the case for war here. He has not made a case, made the argument about why such a risky war is necessary. What is Iran doing today compared to 6 months ago, compared to a year ago that necessitates the risks that he's willing to take?

You said that, you know, Tehran will not back up, and maybe the targets will not be empty buildings, as you said.

And I think the president has backed himself into a corner. And I think Iran has also now this time indicated that they're going to do everything possible to raise the cost on America, that they're not going to be responding by sending missiles into empty buildings in Qatar or in Iraq, that they actually will fight back. I don't know how much he knows about Iran, but Iran is about, is 92 million people. It's a very, very large country. Its capital city is 2 mountain ranges and about 2,000 kilometers away from the nearest port. And yes, the United States can bomb Iran from the air, but then if the Iranians retaliate, You know, there's going to be cost on the United States. And I think even the evidence from the June war suggests that you cannot dismiss Iranian retaliation as being irrelevant. Yes, Iran was battered much more by Israeli attack, but it did hit Tel Aviv and Haifa and many other, other sites, and it did incur damage. And I think the Gulf countries, American military, etc., are very worried about a much larger, messier war. And so the whole system is getting ready to fight. And I think they've come to a conclusion that the only way in which they will change America's calculations is on the battlefield, not at the negotiating table. Because at the negotiating table, they're not gonna get anything. Even if they sign a deal, even if they sign a deal, America is not going to lift sanctions on Iran. And even if they sign a deal, America is not going to, or Israel are not going to give up on attacking Iran anytime they want. And so the only way Iran is going to get out of the corner that it's in, in Khamenei's mind, in the leadership's mind, is now to change the calculation in Washington. And the only way you're going to change the calculation is by, is at the battlefield. So they're getting ready for war, not because they want war, but because they think war is coming anyway, instead. And I think they've concluded that this time, the only way they're going to get something out of this is that if the war also puts some cost on America, especially on a president who thinks that, you know, wars are cost-free. You could remove a leader in Venezuela, you could impose tariffs on countries, There's no cost to America, in a way. And so, I think that's the mindset.

So, what are the objectives?

So, he went from regime change, he went from nuclear to regime change, back to nuclear.

Back to nuclear.

But I think the Iranians believe that the objective is regime change, because the nuclear argument right now does not make sense, given that Iran's nuclear program was massively battered in June. Where we are is the end of a 47-year period of animosity and antagonism, right? In the early years, it was anti-Americanism, the hostage crisis, conflict in Lebanon. Then it was Iraq, then it was Syria, then it was Iran's nuclear program. And so partly the issue is not that Iran is not pro-US, but Iran has positioned itself as being anti-American. And also the other important issue is that at least in the past two decades, it has become increasingly— it has always been anti-Israeli, but its competition with Israel, its confrontation with Israel has become more aggressive and more accentuated. I mean, before the start of the October 7th and Gaza War, Iran and Israel were emerging as the main opponents in the Middle East. If you said there was a great power rivalry in the Middle East, it was not between Iran and the Arabs. It was not between Iran and Turkey. It was not between Turkey and Israel. Not that relations are— but it was— but the great power rivalry that was dangerous and the two sides were poised against each other with no relations and talking war and killing and cyberattacks, et cetera, was Iran and Israel. And Israel is a big part of American foreign policy. And therefore, you know, the escalation of tensions between Iran and Israel has also contributed to Iran and America's escalation as well. And then there is a question of opportunity. The Gaza War at the beginning to be putting pressure on Israel. But after the first year, by 2024, the tables were turned. Israel not only destroyed Hamas for all practical purposes, uh, uh, but also destroyed Hezbollah, or, or downsized Hezbollah massively. Then Syria fell. And so Iran basically was eliminated from the Levant, by and large, or at least his position in the Levant was greatly weakened. And for Iran, its position in Syria and Lebanon were aggressive towards Israel, but they were also defensive lines of battle. In other words, Hezbollah's missiles, Iran's position in Syria did not allow Israel to attack Iran directly because there was always possibility of retaliation. But once those threats to Israel were removed, the balance of power between Iran and Israel shifted drastically. And then Iran's skies were open, basically, to Israeli attack. And Israel took advantage of that in June to basically start an outright war, not cyber, not shadow or hidden war, but an open war with Iran. And that has changed the Middle East in very, very important ways. And so what we're dealing with is the continuation of that June war, because the June war, in the end, was very important, but was not decisive enough as far as Israel was concerned. It destroyed a lot in Iran, but not everything that Israel was hoping to achieve. And so we're back at war, in a way, largely because of all of these changes that have happened in the past 2 years.

Well, you are saying really very interesting things. Now I understand that Actually, the 7th of October, the attack of Hamas actually gave leverage to Israel. It helped Israel in the end, right? And it started, it triggered the reshaping of the Middle East.

No, you're correct. I mean, wars themselves have results that maybe was not planned at the beginning. I mean, first of all, Hamas's attack on Israel, you could say, was a catastrophic success. In other words, the fact that they were able to do so much damage inside Israel, so, you know, angered Israel and Israelis, changed the mindset in Israel. But Iran's proxies were never in a position to actually have an offensive fight with Israel. They could position themselves defensively to prevent Israel from attacking Iran. But there was no scenario in which Hamas would win against Israel. There was no scenario in which Hamas plus Hezbollah plus the Houthis would win against Israel. So ultimately, Hamas started a war that forced Iran and the other proxies into a situation they couldn't defend. And whatever morality we deal with in Gaza, which is very problematic about how many Palestinians have died and what has happened, but just in purely strategic terms, Israel has emerged from the Gaza War as a military superpower. Right. So we see it totally confident in its own military capabilities and sees itself a much more powerful regional actor than before October 7th. So this is a consequence of the war. In other words, You know, now they're occupying— not only that Hezbollah is not a threat, they are occupying territory in South Lebanon. Not only Syria is no longer a threat, they are occupying territory in Syria and they're trying to dictate to the government in Damascus about terms of an agreement between them. And so, and then, you know, they hit Qatar when And for whatever reason they chose, they attacked Iran. And so you've ended up with a— with a— the October 7th war created a vacuum in the region. When Iran collapsed, its position in the region collapsed. And the country that has filled most of that vacuum across the region is actually Israel, although to some extent Turkey's position in Syria has also benefited. If you put Syria aside, Israel has now emerged as a much bigger force in the region. Now, we couldn't have forecast that at October 7th, but that's something that Hamas started. And you know, you can start wars, but you cannot necessarily control how they end and what comes out of them. And that's also the danger that President Trump is playing with. He doesn't know what this war, where this war will go and what consequences it might have for the Middle East.

So, but you think that Israel's influence over Syria is far more than Turkey's influence in Syria?

No, I don't think that's correct now, because I think when there was a change of government in Syria, when Assad fell, there was a situation you would say that Turkey and Saudi Arabia on the one side were competing with Israel in terms of who will decide the shape of of the government in the future. I think Israel's preference for Syria is that Damascus would be very weak, and you would have these powerful autonomous regions in Syria, kind of like the Kurdish region of northern Iraq. There would be the Kurds in Syria. There would be the Druze, the Alawites, and that these groups would be looking to Israel for protection. Against the Sunni government in Syria. So you would have a weak, divided Syria. But since then, there's been much more centralization of power under Ahmad al-Sharif. Damascus has basically now succeeded in breaking down the Kurds, their military position, etc. So that's not— that was not a preference of Israel. That was the preference of Turkey and the preference of Saudi Arabia. But having said that, you still have the Druze situation, you have the Alawite situation, and you have also a situation of Israel sitting on a much larger area of land inside of Syria. So the final shape in Syria is not clear, but I would not say that Israel has been more influential than Turkey. In fact, it looks the other way around, that the combination of Turkey and Saudi Arabia has so far been able to help create a more strong centralized government in Damascus, and at least integrate the Kurds. We'll see with the Druze and the Alawites. But what we're seeing in Syria is the competition. Competition of regional great powers for deciding the shape of Syria. And the one country whose name is— we don't hear in Syria at all is the one that was the only power broker before, which is Iran. And that is basically symbolic of the rest of the Middle East as well.

Iran is being taken out of the picture in a sense. I mean, that is the plan, maybe. And Turkey—

well, it's a consequence. It's a consequence. I don't think anybody could have planned it on October 7th, 2023. But now, yes, Israel wants Iran gone from Lebanon. The Saudis want Iran gone from Lebanon. So the consequence of the Gaza War was not just the destruction of Gaza and what has happened to the Palestinians. The consequence of the Gaza War was the elimination of Iran's position, or at least the severe weakening of Iran's position in the Levant, and a massive shift in the balance of power in the region. So the consequences are much larger than the Palestinians themselves. Even this war with Iran right now that we're talking about is an outcome of the Gaza War. There would not have been an Israel-Iran war in June of 2025 if October 7th, 2023 had not happened. And there would not be right now a war with America if October 7th had not happened.

It led to the reshaping of the whole Middle East, I think, the 7th of October.

Yes, absolutely. I mean, and just to add to this, we're even talking about change of borders, right? In Syria, in Lebanon, in Gaza Strip, with the West Bank, or when you listen to American ambassador in Israel, He's basically saying that, you know, there could be major changes of border in this region. Right. So, yes, this is almost a generational moment for the Middle East, once in a generation moment for the Middle East. And when Hamas attacked Israel, nobody could have forecast that this would be the consequence.

So where does Turkey stand in all this equation? Could you also comment on Turkey's position? Because it had a different relation with Iran, one, yeah, both a rivalry but also cooperation in the region.

Right. I mean, every country in the region at this moment is looking at what is its national interest. And Turkey's national interest, and I don't want to speak for Turks, etc., but at least Turkey does not benefit from a collapsed Iran. For some very obvious reasons. Whatever rivalry and problems they have with the Islamic Republic over Azerbaijan, Zangezur corridor, other sets of issues, they have disagreed in Syria in the past, they've disagreed in Iraq. These are all there. But a collapse of Iran under a war threatens large numbers of refugees going to Turkey. Right? I mean, and that's not to Turkey's benefit. I mean, Turkey's still dealing with the Syrian refugee issue politically, economically, just strategically. Secondly, it opens questions about the future of Iran's Kurdish regions. And if there is some kind of a change in the status of Iran's Kurdish regions, Iran's Kurdish provinces, it will impact Azeri politics because there are large lines of tension in Iran between the Kurds and Azeris, which then, you know, has obviously implications. But it will impact Kurdish politics regionally, right? Since 2003, Turkey has been dealing with the fallout of the Kurdish issue in Iraq, then in Syria. And now it will be in Iran as well. And also, you would say that who most in the region will benefit from the disappearance of Iran from the power equation? That one country who has most to gain from Iran's disappearance is right now the rival of Turkey and Saudi Arabia and most of the Gulf. And that's Israel. And that's why we are hearing conversations like a Pakistani-Saudi strategic defense alliance, which Turkey for a period of time talked about joining. But this suggests that every country in this region, major powers, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, also have to react to the new reality. You know, the Islamic Republic with which they had a problem is the old Islamic Republic. Policymakers don't continuously look at the back, in the back, to try to, you know, build policy based on what was yesterday. They have to build their policies based on what is tomorrow. Iran of today is not the Iran of 2003, '23. And so for Turkey, There is a lot at stake in what happens between U.S. and Iran at the regional level and at levels that impact Turkey's own policies in very direct ways.

Netanyahu talked about radical Shiite elements, against the radical Shiite elements, and emerging radical Sunni elements. Why emerging radical Sunni elements, I don't understand. And why radical, already radical Shiite elements? Why is Iran such a big threat for Israel, and why Sunni emerging threat?

Well, Iran's been the old threat. And this use of the word radical is more political than strategic. In other words, what you're hearing from Netanyahu is that Iran is a declining problem. It's not finished, but it's a declining problem. Turkey and the Sunni world are a rising problem, right? Because Israel also understands, as we were saying, that who fills the vacuum that Iran is leaving behind in Lebanon, in Syria, across the region? It would be either Israel and its allies, or it would be a combination of Turkey and powerful Arab states. Turkey, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, right? So already the Israelis are pivoting to how do they deal with this Sunni alliance that is going to be more important and more powerful than the declining Shia alliance. Now, for their part, the Turks and the Saudis want to bring Iran into a Shia-Sunni alliance against Israel. And on the other side, Israel is trying to build alliances with the enemies of these Sunnis. India is an enemy of Pakistan. So if Pakistan is part of this picture, then, you know, India comes in. India is also very close to UAE. So India, UAE, you know, Israel, and then, you know, the Cyprus-Greece part of it is very clearly directed at Turkey. So essentially, again, as I said, we're seeing a once-in-a-generation change in the geopolitical reality of the region. And so these powerful countries are trying to position themselves for how do they deal with it.

Anything else you would like to stress?

I want to thank you for inviting me to this conversation. I very much enjoyed having this, this back and forth.

I mean, your analysis It provided the clarity very much needed on this complex region, I think. And thank you for your time, and thank you for your expertise for sharing it with us.