Stripe Head of Americas Revenue & Growth Jeanne Grosser : Early Days at Google | Seed To Harvest Ep9

Hello everyone and welcome back to Seed to Harvest. Today I'm interviewing Jean Grosser. She's the head of America's revenue and growth at Stripe. Prior to joining Stripe, Jean was a CRO at Dialpad and spent over 7 years at Google prior to that. Jean, welcome and thank you so much for being here.

Thanks for having me, Paige.

Absolutely. So I would love to dive into it. When I was doing my research, I loved this tidbit that I found. So this is from Jean's perspective for our listeners. I was interviewing at Google for this to-be-launched product, Gmail. They literally had to send me an email invitation to my AOL account. And I believe often when people think of companies like Google or Stripe, they may think of massive enterprises, but you were there in the early days of growth at both. So can you give us a bit of context into what it was like to sell Gmail as a product in the early days? I heard there was a waitlist, but would love to hear more about what that process was like.

Yeah. So let me, let me take a step back and say one thing first. So I joined Google at 2,000 employees. I joined Stripe at 400 employees. And I think one of the things that a lot of people get wrong about startups is a lot of folks would have looked at those 2 companies and been like, oh gee, you joined those super late. You know, when I left Google, I had been at Google for longer than 99.6% of the current employee base. And I haven't looked up Stripe, but I, I'm pretty sure I'm also, I've been in these here longer than 99% of the company now as well. So that's like one quick plug I will make is that when you, you know, really world-class companies, it's often really never too late. And there's, you know, there's a ton of potential there, but sort of going to your, back to your question on Gmail. So I actually, I, I technically wasn't selling Gmail. That was another thing I learned on my first day on the job. So I had, I had meant to get into sales because my father had worked in tech and sales. But when I showed up to work on Gmail, I was actually working in the support organization and So it was my job to mostly reply to folks who were wondering whether or not Google was reading their email. Email at the time had launched the product without a contacts list. So imagine an email product with nowhere to store your contacts. So it was generally helping people understand that we didn't have that. And then actually, if you compare products today to back in 2004, when you launched a product in beta, I think it was legitimately in beta. So the number of bugs that we were troubleshooting was pretty significant. And so that was another big thing I was doing. Believe it or not, one of the top requested features, this would make probably a lot of people cringe at the time, was can I get my Gmail into my Microsoft? And so that was another big job of mine was when you got your Gmail piped into Outlook, it often broke. And so diagnosing why it was that, you know, your mail wasn't flowing through Outlook. So lots of fun times.

Yeah, it sounds like quite the experience. I want to dive a bit deeper into one of the instances where you had A massive Gmail outage and you were doing a postmortem and only engineers and SREs were invited to this meeting. You weren't invited, but you showed up and no one knew who you were. And 20 minutes in, you raised your hand and were like, hey, I would love to talk about what happened from a user perspective. And then that became part of the standard postmortem approach. And part of your advice to folks in Dalien's Operator podcast, which I'll link in the show notes, was don't let your job description define your job. And I would love for you to speak to other examples of this in your career, because as my understanding, this is a resounding theme for you.

Yeah. So, you know, I think one of the things that's been true about how I approach my job is the job I'm given has a lot of, you know, problems in order to do it well. And a lot of times I don't own necessarily the solution to that problem, but that doesn't mean I can't pretty aggressively influence it. So in the example you gave, when Gmail would have a massive outage, 10,000 people would write us in the support organization in a matter of 15 minutes. And there were 15 people on that team. So you could imagine what that would do to you. You know, we would literally, we wouldn't be able to get back to these Gmail users for days because the backlog was so bad. And so part of the reason I showed up at that meeting was I figured that it was possible that no one in the engineering team understood what was actually happening when we would have a Gmail outage. And so the only way that I was going to run a support team effectively was if we could stop that type of stuff. And so, so yes, I've, I've done a number of those things throughout my career. Another example, it's probably one of my prouder moments at Google. It's also related to Gmail outages. So, you know, backend infrastructure has matured a lot since the mid-2000s. But, um, Gmail went through a phase where, you know, we were scaling rapidly and it did go down relatively frequently. And as we launched Gmail for Work, that became a real problem because now it was wasn't just Gmail's— Jean's consumer account, right? It was, it was her, you know, her work email. And, and it's— this is gonna be crazy to people 'cause it's so standard now, but there was no such thing as system status pages back in, uh, let's call it 2007. Um, and so, you know, I thought, hey, wouldn't it be nice if we could just have a page on the internet that when Gmail went down, we would tell people we know it's down, you know, like you don't have to let us know. We actually do know. And we're working on it. And like, maybe here's an ETA for when it might, might be back up. And, and then this was actually a novel concept in 2007. And so I went and I pitched it to the SVP of engineering. He thought it was a great idea, but there, there was no one to work on it. And so I went and I, you know, Google is known for 20% time at the time. And so I found a passionate designer. His name is Braden. He and I are still in touch. And, and a long-tenured Gmail engineer. I just sent Would you use your 20% time to develop this status page, you know, prototype with me? Um, and so we all went and did that. And now, you know, that's a standard at Google. And I think there's actually an entire company that does nothing but that.

Yeah, I was going to say there's an entire, like, massive company that does that. That's super cool that you were involved in the earliest days of that. And then you have a couple examples from Stripe as well.

Yeah. So at Stripe, you know, maybe I'll give you, I'll give you 2. So one, one was, again, so I run sales. But if I'm going to help Stripe make as much money as possible, you know, we need really good demand. So marketing needs to be done and done well. And at the time I joined, we had one marketer who is awesome. She's actually still at Stripe. She's been here even longer than I have. And, you know, but I don't think we were like used to bringing products to market. And so again, not really my job to do marketing, but I could see a lot of holes in our launch process. And so I showed up to a meeting. I think I might have been invited to this one and just I brought a launch checklist with me and said, you know, hey, based on my experience, like these are typically the 40 things that you would do if you wanted to launch a product effectively. You know, would you all be on board with maybe attempting, I don't know, at least 32 of them? And for a while that spreadsheet became sort of our standard for product launches. Um, Krithik is that marketer I was referencing. And I think she actually, she mentioned that she randomly stumbled across it sort of 6 years later, a couple of weeks ago. And then the other example I would give was similarly, so again, if you want to help drive revenue from a sales perspective, You probably want really well-optimized pricing. So I don't want to spend 6 months selling to a company and then leave a bunch of money on the table because we haven't priced effectively. And so similarly, Stripe at the time didn't have a pricing team. And we actually were having a situation where customers of ours were wanting to be repriced, basically have their, their fees lowered. And when we would investigate them to figure out whether we could offer a discount, We figured out that in a lot of our cases, we were actually paying them to use Stripe because their underlying fees were super, super high.

Oh no.

Yeah. And so, you know, we kicked off this major investigation that ultimately turned up that actually Stripe just didn't understand how a lot of things worked in our, in our payments industry. And there were a bunch of things we weren't appropriately taking into account in the way we priced our core product. And we made a bunch of changes that, you know, Not only drove a lot more revenue for Stripe, but also let us price the broader user base a lot more fairly.

Yeah, I think that's so interesting what a dramatic shift that just changing the pricing strategy of a company can have. You're not making any changes to how the sales org is structured, literally just the pricing. It can have a dramatic impact on the business. Was that the switch to kind of like per transaction, like more aligned to that? No.

So Stripe actually had that out of the gate. So they were always, that was a core innovation, sort of like 6 lines of code, self-serve signup, and then super straightforward pricing. This was more, there were certain, it's sort of like payments geekery, but there were certain underlying costs that we probably needed to pass through a little bit better in some cases to, to better optimize for everybody else.

Cool.

Yeah.

And as you progress through your career, you mentioned in previous interviews that you aspire to be ultimately a global leader. And when you looked at global leaders or role models, one of the things that you were surprised by is how few of them actually had international experience. So You thought it was really important to go and have that experience so that you could have appropriate empathy for what it means to work outside of headquarters and internationally. So can you touch more on your experience globally? And specifically, I'm curious to hear more about how you learned to adjust to operate across different cultures.

Yeah, I, I really can't encourage folks more to go have an international experience. So I, I spent a year and a half in APAC. While I was at Google. So, you know, good example. So while, while I was out there, there was a, uh, we actually ran all the bulk of Australia, New Zealand, and then Asia sales out of Sydney cuz it was an inside sales team. And then we had a team up in Japan. And when I, I went up to meet the team in Japan, um, it was, you know, like super obvious to me that it just wasn't functioning well. And, you know, so I talked to all of them individually, sort of like trying to figure out what exactly was going on. I think I got good insight into some of the problems, and then I decided to solve them in a very American way, which was basically like, I'm gonna have an intervention. We're gonna lock everyone in a room. I'm gonna be like, here's what I'm hearing from you all. Like, let's, let's have it out, you know, let's discuss it, get it on the table, and let's problem solve. So I go to do this and it's just like absolutely crickets, you know? And I'm like, oh God, I don't know what to do. Like, oh no. And I just like, I keep trying to like Get people to say some of the things they'd said to me. I tried to frame things differently. I tried different prompts to like make it a little bit, you know, gentler to have a discussion. And it just, it went absolutely nowhere. And so finally, you know, we, we wrapped this meeting up early and one of the, the guys on the team comes up to me afterwards and pulls me aside and he's like, I think I know what you were trying to do there. He's like, but that's not how we're gonna do things in Japan. You know, we're very much more indirect about these, and so if you really want us to have that heart-to-heart type of conversation, you need to take us out to dinner and we need to go drink together because that way—

Oh, wow.

There's actually a word in Japan that means like communicating while drinking, which basically like enables people to like more directly say what they think because you, you can always blame it on like, oh, I had one, one too many beers. And so, you know, that was like just a massive learning of like, okay, my, my style isn't gonna work here. And, and I've gotta be, be different if I wanna be a So, so, so that was a big insight. I think the other things I really like gained good perspective on, um, was, you know, one, particularly for the APAC region, but like the time zone stuff is just real rough, right?

Mm-hmm.

So you're either gonna be left outta the room or you're gonna take meetings at times of the day that are, are challenging, right? So I, for a year and a half, every Wednesday did a forecast call at 5:00 AM and every Thursday did a staff meeting at 4:00 AM. And I did that because I refused to be left outta the room, but I only had to do that for a year and a half. A lot of people, that is actually their life, you know, to take meetings at 10:00 PM or at 6:00 PM, 6:00 AM. And so now I do a really good job. I'm on a global team. So I have a counterpart in EMEA, I have a counterpart in APAC. And as an example, you know, the 3 of us did our one-on-one and I take that call at 6 o'clock in the morning so that I also shoulder the burden. It's not just, you know, everything revolves around headquarters. And then maybe the last thing I, I took away from that experience is hike There's just nothing better than ultimately having people experience things firsthand. So, you know, I could set, write up, you know, a zillion-page analysis of, you know, what's different about APAC, why things would be a certain way, or I could have like my boss come out for a week and go meet a bunch of customers and actually experience it. And so that was one of the other things I, I feel like I took away too, is just sometimes people have to experience it for themselves.

I love that. I think it's been interesting, like being in COVID, I, my professional life has basically like started and continues to be during this period. And I'm really excited for the period where things are more opened up and I can get a sense for that. But at Dialpad, you were brought in as the CRO and you helped them grow 4x year over year. And you also had the opportunity to participate in driving the Series C investment there. So one of the things that I think a lot about as an investor is the immense effort to translate what a business is building to employees, investors, and customers, and how fundraising can be helpful to hone that vision since you're repeating the pitch to so many folks and you kind of have to pick which pieces work and throw out the ones that don't. Can you speak a bit to what you learned during that process specifically?

Yeah, I mean, exactly what you said about you have to, you know, hone things after every single pitch. And the same is true in sales. So I remember the first meeting we went to, you know, we'd practiced before we went to any of these meetings and I felt like we had a really tight narrative. The objections that we got, I did not anticipate. And in particular, so the Dialpad, the product. So when we raised our Series C, we had just brought the main product, which was a cloud-based communication system to market in beta, like a couple weeks. And we'd had This it was really interesting. So we you know we launched what we thought would be an S and B product, and in the first couple of days had ten thousand person companies calling like our inbound phone number. And so just like super caught off guard with like wow okay turns out there's a total unmet need in just like enterprise cloud computing. And so we rapidly adjusted the pitch actually to incorporate that because it was pretty compelling. But you know it turns out a lot of VCs are you know once upon a time were operators at companies that sold. Into large enterprises. And so like the level of sophistication of questions I got around like, you know, oh cute, you know, you got some phone calls from some enterprises, like what's your actual enterprise go-to-market, you know, and really wanting to click multiple layers deep. I think in the first, you know, first meeting, I probably like was reasonably credible on like, okay, the first set of objections, right? But then when you got the second and third, you realize you rapidly were going to have to try to start anticipating some of these and get a good answer and not just think on your toes. So that was really useful. So, you know, Craig and I, the, the founder, after every, every call or meeting, um, you know, we'd debrief, we'd always change a slide or two. You know, we, we'd let each other know which question we'd handled ineffectively. You know, we'd role play the next one, et cetera. 'Cause a lot of 'em, you had to go back again, right? Like they'd be interested conditionally and they'd wanna meet with you a second time. And so, you know, you go tighten up the story around those. Same thing's true in sales too. You know, rarely do you nail a pitch the first time.

Yeah. Yeah, it's super interesting, especially coming out of the gate of the beta and like having all of this excitement around what you're building and the inbound interest you are getting and coming to investors who are ready for the pitches and like dug really deep on that third level of questions about enterprise sales, which was probably a bit further off in, in your vision of the company. I, I think that's like really interesting. What were like some of the other common rebuttals that you heard and had to adapt to?

The other one was like, we built a pretty robust like revenue model. And so people would really dig into the assumptions cuz like, you know, they, they weren't data-backed at that point, right? And so, you know, really trying to figure out the degree to which that was credible, why you picked that number, you know, did you have any other proxies or reasons to believe that that might be true? So, so that was a big one. I think the other thing On some level, I think we did, maybe did ourselves a disservice by having a relatively strong point of view on our go-to-market out of the gates, because then there was a little bit more to like poke on rather than being like, here's our super compelling product with a large market opportunity. So, you know, we actually, it was interesting because a lot, a lot of the questions were pretty darn deep on the go-to-market piece, you know, which I think was trying to like disentangle whether there, there behind our enterprise thesis.

That's so interesting. Even at Series C, I feel like it's a theme that I've seen in investing is it's more like if you present traction numbers, folks will dig really deep into those. And if you are focusing more on like the long-term vision of the business and like the massive opportunity, then folks will spend a lot more time there versus like digging into the traction numbers. It's interesting that that carried like all the way through different, different stages of, of fundraising. I wanted to touch on something. One of my other favorite stories that I had read or heard about, so one of my favorite learnings as a developer success engineer at Workwest is that people actually respond really well when you let them know that your product won't be a fit. In fact, they often evangelize it to other companies who they think it might be a better fit for. And you had a similar experience. So in your second week on the job at Dialpad, you flew to Schaumburg, Illinois, and tried to sell a 20,000-person global company On literally Slack. And probably a month in, you had to sit down with them and say, you know, I'm, I'm really excited. You guys are excited about our product. I think we'll never sign this contract. We don't have the legal and security constructs that I know you're gonna want as a traditional enterprise, and we're not gonna be able to have them. And we should talk about that now because it won't change. You're either gonna have to get past that or we should probably call it a day. And I really respect that choice of yours and that that was the story that you told. Can you speak to what happened in the process after that? Yeah.

Yeah. Uh, so the reason I did that also was, you know, you're at a startup, like burn rate matters. And so, and this was sucking up all of our resources. Like I was flying there, you know, our, our founder would fly with me sort of like every other time. So I couldn't go spend 9 months trying to sell this deal, 'cause that's how long selling a 20,000-person company was gonna take to ultimately not get a deal done, right? Like, This was gonna like make or break. We need to move on with our lives and go sell a bunch of mid-market companies, right? Or we need to land it, land this thing and have it be, you know, trajectory changing. So, uh, one of the things I got taught early in sales is yeses are great, nos are great, maybes will kill you. And so I just wanted to get myself out of maybe land as fast as possible. And cuz even if I got told, you know, no, you're right. Like it, there's no way we'll sign this deal without this specific security, you know, agreement, then I could at least get the security addendum upfront. Right? And we could take that back internally and say, how much of this can we meet, you know, et cetera. So, I basically wanted to try to get every possible objection out on the table so that we could rapidly determine whether or not it would be something we would wanna do about while we were still at sort of the 50-yard line rather than being at, you know, the, the goal line. So, and then similarly what happened was exactly what you said, like basically the, the guy in IT that we were working became our evangelist and he was like, you know, I'll get, I'll get you through security, right? Like, and I'm not gonna say we didn't build a bunch of stuff along the way. Like we ended up having to build out all of the like executive assistant transfer functionality as an example, was like a total deal breaker. But there are a bunch of things that like we really had no business doing that deal that we got done. And then, you know, it takes a while to implement so you could continue to build things while they were working on going live. So, you know, I definitely, for folks in sales, like always encourage you to, to be upfront, get the yes or get the no, cuz then you have something you can do, you know, you can do something about rather than, you Yeah, 100%.

My journey in fundraising has been very similar. The maybes will definitely kill you, especially if you think that they're leaning towards yes and you've invested a lot in that and then it ends up being a no. So I, I think like one of the dynamics at play there is I think a lot about input metrics and from listening to past interviews with you, it seems like you have a deep affinity for funnel math. And one of the guys on your team jokes about the gene that you have. version of conjoined triangles of success. So can you talk a little bit about how you built out that funnel math from scratch when you joined Stripe? Yeah.

Um, yes, people like to give me a hard time with this. So I presented a slide at our kickoff that was basically like a, an equation, but with, you know, highly memorable graphics. Uh, but that's where people started giving me a hard time about conjoined triangles. But anyway, you know, basically my, my point of view on funnel math is You, if you want to hit your goal, you probably need to know what needs to be true in order to get there. And so if you've actually done the math or filled what I call an operating model, so basically if you want $10 million, you know, how many leads are you gonna need? At what rate are those gonna convert to opportunities? At what rate are you gonna win them? How long is it gonna take you to win them? What's gonna be the average deal size? Like all that math. Then you can lay that out and upfront ask yourself, what's the probability that this this would be true, where are you most likely to be me within that equation? And then as you go start executing, you know, you can start to backfill real data and figure out where it's diverting from what you thought might be true. So this was actually one of the first things I did at Stripe when, when I came in was go and build that out. And one of the things that helped me realize actually was, you know, Stripe had very strong growth aspirations and that the organic inbound demand that we had was not going to grow at the rate we were going to need to support sort of the top of funnel of that equation. And so about 4 months into the 10— my tenure at Stripe, we started figuring out, okay, how do we go about doing more outbound prospecting? You know, and also if we can't change that dramatically, then what can you do to increase your average deal size, et cetera?

Mm-hmm.

Um, and so, you know, at my, at my kickoff, basically some of this would be like, here are our levers. Like as a sales organization, you wanna own your own destiny. And what we're going to do to pull each of, you know, each of the levers along that funnel.

Love that. Um, and one of the risks specifically with enterprise sales is that you can create this bifurcation between the sales organization and the product organization where the product team gets annoyed basically that sales is signing these super attractive deals and you don't actually have the product for them. So how do you ensure that you're pursuing the enterprise market together?

Yeah, you need, on this, has to be in the same boat. So when we started looking at this from a Stripe perspective, there were a couple things that we did that I think worked well. So one, you do need, you know, the leadership team to be bought in. So, you know, we made sure that John and Patrick saw the opportunity with these large deals and they themselves wanted them. You know, in the case of Stripe, at the time, companies like Shopify were rapidly growing up on Stripe and becoming public companies. And so we didn't want to turn them as customers. So frankly, you know, the product strategy was going to have to evolve anyway to support them effectively. And if you're building more product for Shopify, you might as well sell that to others. And then the other thing we tried to do was we did a fair amount of work to analyze where are we strong today and where in the enterprise space do companies look most like that so that you're going to sell something that maybe has 80% of today's functionality rather than only 20%. And so what we tried to do was basically pursue companies that were sort of like, you know, one concentric circle from where we had product market fit today rather than being, you know, totally left field. And, and that way you would always be pushing the envelope on your product roadmap, but you wouldn't necessarily be needing to go out and build an entirely, you know, separate product side by side.

I love that concentric circles idea. I think that it can be very Exciting to pursue opportunities that are outside of focus areas. And I think that the focus on like one concentric circle outside of the existing product is, is really great. So there's a lot of products like growth companies out there building sales teams. And one of the other challenges that I've seen is educating a sales team, especially if there are large enterprise accounts that require ripping out existing software or very like complicated systems already in place. So how do you think about educating a sales team, especially, I mean, specifically at Stripe, there's so many available ways that Stripe can help businesses grow. So how do you think about educating a sales team? Because I think this is an area that not a lot of folks really invest time in, but it is super important.

Yeah, it's, it's incredibly important. And I think it would be fair to say like at Stripe, I think we feel we underinvested. So what we did in the early days was we basically had an expectation within the sales org that everyone sort of took a page outta the Google book on like 20% time. So everyone was gonna spend 80% of their time, you know, doing everything in their power to drive as much revenue as possible. And then in 20% of your time, you were gonna do projects to sort of raise the tide for all boats. So build the foundation for our organization. So some of our best sales You know, would go out, spend 80 to 100% of the time hitting their number, and then 20% of the time actually taking all the amazingness that was in their head and turning that into training materials or being spinup buddies for new hires, et cetera. And so that got us pretty darn far. And then, you know, we had last year as an example, we doubled the sales organization in a single year. And now we've moved into, you know, basically sell into every segment from startups all the way to, you know, Global 2000 companies. And then we've also, you know, Stripe's Stripe's product suite is a lot broader. So we've got payments, we've got SaaS products, we've got banking as a service products, etc. So when that happens, there there are a couple ways you solve for this. So one is, as you mature, starting to increasingly specialize in terms of both function and segmentation. So from a function perspective, when I first joined Stripe, we only had account executives. There weren't sales development people, there weren't deployment folks, there weren't solution architects. AEs did it all. And then now, you know, we probably have 10 different types of functions across the sales org that are really good at the one part of the lifecycle for that customer. Or similarly, right, when I first started, people would sell to a really big company in the morning and a small one in the afternoon. And we now, you know, segment companies based on how big they are, but also maybe their business model or vertical so that the conversations that you're having start to be more similar and you get better pattern recognition.

Mm-hmm. Yeah. Sounds like, like less context switching.

Exactly.

Yeah. Cool. Yeah, I, I think that's really interesting both on the horizontal and vertical as well as the aspect of, uh, well, yeah, yeah. I guess I'm curious if there's like specific training materials that go along with those different vertical or horizontal segments, or sounds like spin-up buddies was a tactic, but would love to hear more about strategies that you've seen be Yeah.

So I think there are 2 things is like we'll do core sales skills training. So arguably this training is totally transferable. You know, we'll Stripe, Stripe-ify it, right? So it's sort of like Stripe's methodology, but most of it is just core skills. And so you do that type of training to just up everybody's game, but also establish a common language for how you talk about a deal, the things that are going on in the deal, et cetera. Everybody's on the same page. And then you've got sort of much more Stripe-specific content where I can teach you how to sell these 5 products to a fintech versus selling, you know, these 4 products to a marketplace. And so that's also where, you know, as you scale working with your marketing organization, right? And you really build out a solution and then the end-to-end playbook of what are the discovery questions you should be asking? What's the first pitch deck versus some of the deep dive workshops? What are common objections and how can you codify and train people on that? So, you know, now, now when we launch something, we'll do sort of like a full bill of materials, which is, is that all of that versus, you know, when, when we used to bring these to market, you, you'd be lucky to get a pitch deck.

That's awesome. Yeah, definitely really great context to see as a sales organization develops and also doubles in growth over a year, how those training models shift to onboard great folks. So one of Patrick Collison's particular academic interests is progress studies. And as outlined in the Atlantic op-ed, which I'll link in the show notes as well, progress studies seeks to get better at knowing how to get better. And I have an inkling that you share this interest as well, and I'm curious what books or people have guided your learning journey along the way. Oh, that's a good question.

I don't know if there's like a specific one. I'm more of kind I just pluck little things from different places. So, but I, I feel like both, you know, Google was a very analytical company and Stripe is as well. And one of the things both companies did well on, on this topic is being very hypothesis-driven. So I think the best way to learn is to start by having had a point of view on what you think is likely to happen. That way, when something actually happens, you can go back and be like, well, how similar or different is that from what I thought was going to happen? Why is that similar or different? And what does that imply for what might happen next? So, so I think that's how, you know, I always think about constant improvement and iteration is like, you can't really iterate if you don't have a strong sense of where you were coming from to begin with. And so, so that's very, you know, I think Stripe continues to be very hypothesis-driven.

I love that. Very like scientific approach to company building. Yeah. Um, well, Jean, thank you so much for making the time. I really appreciate it so much. And to close this out, do you have any additional things that you wanna touch on? And then where can people find you on the internet?

Um, additional things. I mean, there, there are tons, like all sorts of stuff, you know, I'm, I'm having fun chatting about with folks. I actually just met with 12 startup founders about an hour ago to talk go-to-market. So that was It's always interesting to talk about how you hire your first sales lead. You know, how as a founder you get comfortable with no longer being the person doing the bulk of the sales. You know, there's, there's a lot of talk going on right now, you know, consumption-based business models and how that impacts, you know, pricing and sales motions, et cetera. So mostly maybe I, I'd lead by saying I think it's like a super exciting time to be in go-to-market cuz there's so much change happening. And then where to find me on the internet? Well, I mean, people can also just like email me. I always am happy to be like, if you need help, you know, Like Stripe's like, we're very focused on helping startup founders. So I'm just Jean. I'm not a big Twitter person, so you can find me, I think it's JadeWitt29, but I wouldn't recommend DMing me. Uh, so maybe, maybe I'm, I guess from my Gmail days, I'm probably a little bit email-centric even now. So feel free to shoot me a note.

I love that. Well, thank you so much for coming on. I really appreciate it and it was great to get to chat with you today.

Yeah, likewise, Paige. Thanks a lot for your time.

Thanks so much for tuning in today to Seed to Harvest. If you enjoyed this episode, be sure to subscribe wherever your favorite podcast listening platform is. I'll be releasing new episodes weekly, and if you have any questions or comments, feel free to let me know on Twitter. That's Paige Finn, Paige and then Finn with 3 N's. Thanks, and see you again next week.