Vali Nasr: Iran's Grand Strategy, a Political History

So I want to welcome you to the Center for Middle East Studies. It's one of our— the places where some level of optimism and realism can meet over food, and occasionally we can agree to disagree. At CMES, we don't claim to solve the problem of the Middle East. We merely schedule them one panel at a time. So running a center of the Middle East is not for thin skins and easily discouraged, but every time we announce an event, something happens. A coup, a war, an election, an earthquake, or a sudden statement from Washington that forces us to change the title, the flyer, And sometimes even the guests, but this guest stayed. We are lucky enough to have someone who is intellectually flexible, who could actually adjust to whatever circumstances in front of him. So, just briefly, many of you know us. We are a community of scholars and practitioners who spend our days studying wars, revolutions, and peace plans, and our nights explaining to our friends that Yes, the region was, you know, calm last Tuesday. Oh, 2 years ago maybe, or maybe 3. But that was a different era. Today we are here for a real treat. And before I introduce you, and the dean will do so, about our guest today, I'm just going to figure out our— this work. I think I have— Yes, yes, I wanted to let you know about an event we have next week, and it's not working. Help! Okay, I'm gonna talk about this event next week, but meanwhile I want to just let you know that Michael Singh is going to be here. He's from the Near East Institute at DC, and he's going to talk about Syria, the Democratic Peacebuilding and US Strategy. So November 5th. And if you do not know about that event, and it's not appearing behind the screen, so you have to imagine it, there are leaflets. It is appearing? Oh, it is appearing. It appear— because I have this. Okay, so, so please come. I think that it's hosted and organized by the Hamilton Society, and, and it's a group of students who really got their hands on a very good Speaker and asked me to moderate it, and I'm very happy to do that and co-sponsor with them as well. So please make sure to register. There are leaflets with QR codes that are available at the desk and one conveniently displayed behind me, as I understand. So don't leave this event without registering. And needless to say that we will always accept any donations for our program. Tonight we are truly honored to host one of the most insightful voices of the region, Vali Nasr. Vali has spent a lifetime navigating the shifting sands of geopolitics, explaining the Middle East to those brave enough to listen, and occasionally even to policymakers. That alone would qualify him for an honorary peace prize or perhaps something like a hazard-paid One or the other. It's my great pleasure now to invite the person who really is going to introduce him properly, and that's Dean Fritzmayer, who will greet him, will greet you, and introduce our distinguished guest and gently remind you of a few house rules, because as we all know, every good Middle East conversation needs a few rules here and there. So thank you very much, Dean Fritzmayer.

Well, thank you, Micheline. Let me add my welcome to you all. It's lovely to see you this evening, so good evening. Great pleasure to welcome you to the Joseph Korbel School of Global and Public Affairs, still new name here, and tonight's event hosted, as you know and have heard from our wonderful wonderful Center for Middle East Studies. Ms. Linda's already begun the introduction, but let me add a few more things. We really are honored to have with us Dr. Vali Nasr. He really is one of the most influential voices on Middle East affairs and more generally on US foreign policy. He's professor of Middle East Studies and International Affairs at Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies, SAIS, a very fine program, not quite the Korbel School, but it's a truly outstanding institution where he has previously served as dean. So we were just discussing our time as deans at similar institutions. He's advised senior American policymakers, world leaders, businesses, presidents, secretaries of state, senior members of the Congress, and more. He's written for the New York Times, Foreign Affairs, the New Republic, Newsweek, Time, Financial Times, the Wall Street Journal, the Washington Post, and more, provided frequent commentary on major news networks. He is the author of several widely acclaimed books arrayed here, and you will have the opportunity, if you would like to purchase, afterwards, including The Shia Revival: How Conflicts Within Islam Will Shape the Future, and Forces of Fortune: The Rise of the New Muslim Middle Class and What It Will Mean for Our World. His latest book, Iran's Grand Strategy, offers a compelling analysis of how Iran's evolving foreign policy seeks to balance ideology, power, and pragmatism in a region undergoing quite seismic transformation. George, he is a a very distinguished scholar, policy advisor, public intellectual who has shaped global conversations on Iran, sectarian dynamics, and America's role in the Middle East. Welcome, Vali. It's so great to have you. And moderating tonight's conversation is Professor Michalini Shai, who you've heard from, director of the Center for Middle East Studies and professor of international studies and human rights here at the Korbel School. She is an internationally recognized scholar whose work bridges political theory, human rights, and Middle Eastern politics. Her publications include The History of Human Rights from Ancient Times to the Globalization Era, The Levant Express: The Arab Uprising, Human Rights, and the Future of the Middle East. Professor Ishai, thank you for all you do and for moderating the discussion. So let us now turn to Professor Ishai and Professor Nasr. Who will engage in a timely discussion on what is surely one of the most consequential regions of our time. After the conversation, I'll moderate a Q&A session. We'll conclude the evening with a book signing of Professor Nasr's latest work, Iran's Grand Strategy, and maybe others, I guess. So look forward to that. Stick around for all of that. Let me remind you, as Micheline advertised, about the ground rules for civil discourse that we follow here at the Korbel School. This topic, any topic, but particularly those in the Middle East, might, you know, are often contentious. So please listen respectfully even if you disagree with the speaker's position. Masks, flags, offensive signs, slurs, and personal attacks are not permitted. This is an academic forum, not a rally space, so freedom of speech does not extend to disrupting the rights of others to speak or listen. Heckling, insulting, or disrupting speakers or guests violates DU University policy. Anyone doing so will be asked to leave. I don't expect that, but there will be time for questions. Wait your turn, please, and you may approach the speaker afterwards for further questions after the program. And of course, and I expect, please ask your questions respectfully. So now, without further ado, let me turn the program over to Professor Ishai and Professor Vali Nasr. I look forward very much to the discussion. Welcome.

Thank you. Great to have you here. I had the pleasure already with some colleagues to have lunch at a Cuban restaurant. You told us a story. You said that you you were called to, by G.W. Bush, to discuss about the Sunni-Shiite discussions in Iraq. And the first thing he asked you was, and I don't know if I can emulate what you said, "Who are you?" So I'm going to just simply repeat what G.W. Bush said, but also ask you not only who are you, but how did you get to focus on the Middle East and Iran, aside from your background, what got you interested in, in the subject to begin with? Thank you very much.

Let me begin by thanking Dean Meyer and Professor Ishai for their generous introduction, also for inviting me to this forum. It's really wonderful being back at the Korbel School. I had the pleasure of being here once, once before, so it's really great coming back. I mean, to that question that President Bush asked, I was curious, what's the background of the person who was supposed to brief him on, on what was happening in Iraq at the time? Was, you know, I, I came to the United States age 17, 18. It was at the time of the Iranian Revolution. My family left Iran at that time, and then I pursued a career in academia in the United States. I got all of my undergraduate, graduate training here, given the circumstances in which my life changed and was upended. And when I was at school, that there was a lot of discussion about Iran, the hostage crisis, etc. But also there was a lot of curiosity about this phenomenon of Islam and politics and what does it mean. And this, what does this new wave of ideology mean? So my academic focus gravitated towards answering these questions. I did a lot of work on Pakistan at the beginning because it was a place that you could look at how Islam was entangled in politics and was influencing politics. And it was not really possible to do serious work on that topic either in the Arab world or Iran at a ground level. Over time, I focused on also how the United States was engaging the region, how it was reacting to this phenomenon of Islamism. And then increasingly I also began to look at Iran, its role in the region, and what was driving it. And that ultimately brought me to the point of writing this book. I have found throughout that often there is a gap between policymaking and what they need to know about the region. That was the circumstances where I wrote the book The Shia Revival at the time of our of US invasion of Iraq, and that's where it got me to talk to President Bush about, you know, we invaded a country without actually understanding the sectarian divisions and the sectarian lines that we were opening. And I had a feeling that, you know, we are arriving at a crescendo with Iran. Iran itself is arriving at a turning point after the revolution, but there is very little we know about what is driving the Iranian leadership in terms of their thinking about foreign policy, nuclear program, program, role in the region, attitudes towards the United States. And that's what got me to write this book, Iran's Grand Strategy, try to unpack what goes in the mind of Iran's leaders as they think about Iran's foreign policy.

Yes, let me just go back a little bit on the Shia revival. So 2006, you wrote that book, and you argue there that sectarian identity and the empowerment of the Shia community would reshape the Middle East, but with the US war in Iraq acting as a catalyst for Sunni-Shia conflict. But it seems that in Iran's grand strategy, by contrast, you are really emphasizing Tehran deliberate statecraft and pragmatic maneuvering, sort of moving away from this sectarian conflict. Was there a historical shift from sectarian conflict to realpolitik, to that form of pragmatism or greater security concern? And if so, when did that occur and why?

I mean, first of all, it's interesting you raise that because I think 2003 invasion of Iraq was the moment where the United States broke a dam that was containing Iran from the Arab world and opened the Arab world essentially for much greater Iranian influence. So all the talk of Iran's involvement in the region, use of proxies, presence in Syria, presence in Iraq, in Yemen, Hezbollah becoming much more important, these are really a consequence of the Iraq War and what followed the Iraq War. Now, at the same time also, this doesn't, just the fact that the sectarian element became very bold in Iraq and in the Middle East did not mean that this was all about religion and theology about Iran. In fact, one of the main themes of my book is that yes, Iran was a— Islamic Republic was a product of an ideological revolution, but even from that very beginning and over time, it is not driven by ideology. It is driven by a clear sense of national security threat, mainly from the United States. And in many ways, ideology served that purpose or worked in that purpose. But the revolution itself was an act of defiance against America's presence in Iran and America's presence in the Middle East. That the revolutionaries thought that during the Pahlavi period, Iran had been under the thumb of the United States, and the revolution was a liberating act of anti-imperialism. Of pushing America away. Now, this was all put in an Islamic language, but that did not mean that they read religious texts, therefore they were anti-American. They were anti-American because of the reading of Iranian history. And since then, they have been engaged in this continuous fixation of how do they protect Iran from the United States? How do they protect Iran from not inside Iran, but also in the region. And it's gradually got them into this prolonged 40-year decade of an unending conflict with the United States. Now, this conflict began with the religious revolution, but ultimately, the mindset that has got them here is a reading of Iranian history, that the US carried out the coup in Iran in 1953, My book argues this wasn't that simple, and it's questionable whether the US carried out the coup or just supported the coup, but that's besides the point. The revolutionaries believed that the coup was carried out by the US, and therefore everything after 1953 in Iran was an illegitimate, foreign-controlled political system, and that they have gained Iran's independence and they're going to protect it. And to this day, That's the way they see it, that they are up against a superpower who is determined to assert its hegemony over the region. And Iran is the sole country in the region that is resisting this. And so this is the grand narrative that is shaping the politics in Iran. And after Iraq, as you mentioned, and we can talk about this, that they saw Iraq as both the Iraq War of 2003 as both a threat and is also an opportunity to push the United States out of the region.

So in other words, that worldview just sort of got transformed or shaped or redefined after the war in Iraq. Is that what you—

I think it evolved. I think if you look at Iran's Supreme Leader, and Ayatollah Khomeini before him, but let's take Iran's Supreme Leader, who's now perhaps the third longest ruling Iranian ruler since the mid-19th century. In 2 years' time, he would've ruled Iran as long as the Shah did. In other words, the Islamic Republic, by and large, it's his creation. And he, in my opinion, is a child of the '60s. I mean, his vision of the United States and world order is more Berkeley 1960s than it is Shia theology. I mean, he's a committed anti-imperialist, he's well-read in the works of Frantz Fanon, all of that. He has a very sort of a cynical view of imperialism, and he has positioned Iran as committed to this war against American imperialism and American domination in the region. The first step was, how do you get America out of Iran? And that's what the hostage crisis achieved— eliminate any footprint from the US inside Iran. And then the question was, how do you get the United States away from Iran's borders. And so the Iraq War was a threat because if the United States was going to, if the United States successfully invaded Iraq and changed Iraq, then Iran would be next. I have a sort of an episode in the book where on the eve of the Iraq War, Syria's ruler Bashar Assad went to Tehran very worried And he met with Khamenei, and he said that, you know, if the United States invades Iraq successfully, Syria and Iran would be next. And Khamenei said that, yes, he agreed that this was a much larger project for re-engineering the region. And he said that this crocodile must not digest its bite easily. And the entire project of of supporting Shia militias in Iraq, Assad supporting the insurgency in Iraq, was a way of preventing the United States from successfully winning the war in Iraq. And they succeeded in that. I mean, their view is that use of proxies in Iraq successfully flummoxed the United States, and in 2011, President Obama left, decided to leave Iraq. And then similarly, when ISIS showed up, again, organizing militias in Iraq, militias in Syria was successful in countervailing that. So for a prolonged period, they saw this sort of expansion of what they did in Iraq as a way of now pushing the United States out of the Middle East altogether. And that ultimately got them down to, you know, the point where things begin to unravel after Hamas's attack on Israel and Israel's war in Gaza. Then, you know, things began to change.

So just going back to the forward defense and how Iran is building this axis of resistance, and part of justification is, because it feels threatened by Western expansion. But here we will see also in your book, you talk a little bit about that, that it built the axis of resistance around a Shia crescent with Twelver clerics recognizing Alawite for legitimacy. Yet Tehran also embraced Hamas and later the Houthis, groups outside the Twelver folds. Does this eclectic coalition which was part of Iran's forward defense, reflects ideological coherence? Or rather, what you are trying to suggest in your book, and I'm trying— and please speak about that— a new pragmatic flexibility in pursuit of power rather than just simple defense?

You know, I think there was always a certain foreign policy pragmatism about advocating for the Palestinians. So let me go back to that because it's important to note. So Ayatollah Khomeini lived years of exile in Iraq among Arabs. So his, he was very sort of attuned to the way the Arab world, the Arab street thought about the Palestinian issue. And so when, and if you read his very first series of lectures, which was published as a book in 1974, is virulently anti-Israel. And I was surprised, even he uses language of colonial settler, which is something we came to much, much later, but he's already in his writings in 1974. And a lot of the young radical revolutionaries who were around him in 1970s, even before the revolution, had been trained in Palestinian camps in Lebanon and in Shia militia camps in Lebanon. Some of these would later on rise to be senior commanders in the Revolutionary Guards. So there was a sort of an Arabization, if you would, of the Palestinian issue in Khomeini's thinking. And he understood also very well that Iran is a Shia country and it's Iranian. And if he has ambitions of leaning into the Middle East and being the leader of the Muslim world, it needs a point of entry. And the Palestinian issue is the secular Muslim cause, if you would, right? Iranians will not be accepted as Iranians in the Arab world. Iranians will not be accepted in the Middle East because they're Shia. But nobody will quibble about them being pro-Palestinian. And it's a very telling point. Before 1982 also, and I bring this in the book, Iran was fighting Iraq in a war. Nobody would sell Iran weaponry because it was under sanctions because of the hostages. Its military was all, at that time, American-based. The only country that had spare parts to give Iran was actually Israel. And Iran bought war material in Israel, and there are episodes I narrate in the book Khomeini was asked specifically for permission to do so. And he basically gave permission of, under exigency, that you could do that. And there's now documents that have been released that actually the very first intelligence about Iraq's nuclear plant that Israel destroyed in 1985 was given by Iran to Israel. Because in early 1980s, Iran had tried to destroy that power plant as well. Then in 1982, Iran actually pushes Iraq out of Iran, and Israel invades Lebanon same year. Then Iranians decide that Israel no longer, now that Iran has the upper hand against Iraq, Israel views Iran as the greater threat than Iraq, and things begin to change. And at that point, the Palestinian issue now becomes much more important for Iran. When this is before even Hezbollah is born, when the Israelis go into Lebanon, the Shia villagers in the south of Lebanon greet the Israelis with flour and rice, Sharon's army with flour and rice. And Khomeini intercedes basically with the message.

That's in before '92.

I mean, no, in 1982. Sorry, in 1982, when the Israeli forces going to Lebanon. And Khomeini basically says, that we will not follow the Sunnis, but we cannot be seen as being pro-Israel in this region. And we have to lead the Arabs on the Palestinian cause, right? So I understand that you were angry with PLO being in your villages, et cetera. But, and this becomes the mantra of Hezbollah. Hezbollah was always, trying to be more pro-Palestinian and more active on the Palestinian issue than the Sunnis were. And this also became Iran's issue. So there was certain logic to this, logic of, you know, the point of entry for Iran into the Arab world is the Palestinian cause. But I would say that, you know, when they began to push into Iraq, et cetera, I think the Shia relationship was necessary for forging strategic partnership with people on the ground. You know, as you cannot organize militias in Iraq or militias in Syria unless there is an idea around which you build those ties. And those ideas were the Shia ideas, that the message to Iraqi Shias was that, "The Sunni Arabs will never accept you. We are your only friend. We will help you fight, you know, the sectarian war." And there's a relationship of religion that binds Iranians to Iraqis, not the Arab-Iranian one. But it's important to note, by the time we arrive at October 7th, Iran basically sets this aside in favor of the idea of Axis of Resistance. Which is much more of a, again, is a resistance as an idea of anti-imperialism is much more prevalent. It is not an Islamic or a Shia coalition. It's a coalition that is defined by a shared view of resistance to Israel and the United States. And you could even see throughout the Gaza War, neither Nasrallah nor Khamenei ever used terminology of jihad or Islamic struggle. It's all very, in very secular language of resistance and territory and pro-Palestinians. So in a way, I think increasingly from 1979 onwards, ideology is in the service of a particular national security strategy that comes from the top in Iran, which is about resisting the US, which is about fighting the US, And you need ideology in order to fight.

That's very interesting because thinking now moving forward with a ceasefire, well, a difficult ceasefire in Gaza and new uncertainty emerging, what will Iran do next? Because as you said, will it drop its role as a self-proclaimed champion of the Palestinian cause? And if so, how will it rally its people not just its people, but the Arab world, as you mentioned before, and preserve its regional influence?

It's a very good question. I don't think the Iranians have an answer. We're still in the fog of what has happened, and they're still digesting this reality. I mean, first of all, we're not at an end of the Gaza War. I mean, neither in Gaza nor in the West Bank, nor, you know, what happens ultimately to this issue, Palestinian issue is not clear. Even I don't think President Trump says things he doesn't know how this thing is actually going to end. And that's actually fairly important. I think Iran's reach in the Arab world has been cut in a significant way. So, and also in the war with Israel, we saw that, you know, the Iranians began to rely much more on nationalism, the language within the country, not just among the elite or the government, but actually among the people, is much more language of nationalism than any kind of ideology, which opens a whole set of doors going forward. Iran is not abandoning resistance. I mean, they haven't come out and said, our resistance to the US is over. It's not like Japan in 1945, right? They're not gonna come out and say that we don't believe in the Palestinian issue or we're now completely neutral in this. But the reality of it is that they're not a player in the Levant right now. They're not a player in Gaza because there's nothing they can do for Hamas or have any relationship with Hamas or haven't reached into Hamas. Hezbollah basically has been paralyzed and demolished many of its capacities demolished, their position in Syria has gone. Yes, the Houthis are still in the fight, and Iraqi militias are also hunkering down right now. So there's certain pragmatism there, but in reality, you know, we're not right now in a situation of talking about a future of Syria, future of Lebanon, future of the Palestinian issue. I think the Iranians are not part of that conversation. I mean, one reason, there are many reasons why they declined the invitation by President of Egypt to go to Sharm el-Sheikh for the peace meeting. There are many reasons, but one reason also was that they basically did not want to sort of have an ownership of whether this goes wrong or whether it goes right. But it's an acknowledgement that they're not part of the conversation about the future of Palestinians. They're not a part of the conversation right now about the future of Syria at all, and their role as a part of the conversation about the future of Lebanon is significantly diminished.

So on that point, how likely are Hezbollah in Lebanon under Michel Aoun, or Syria under Ahmad al-Sharaa, endure, will endure with the break with Iran? What would it take? For them to survive?

So, no, actually, very good. I mean, one of the reasons I was able to write this book, or wrote this book, is that actually over the past decade and a half, and particularly since the Syria war, there is a wealth of archival material in Iran on its foreign policy decision-making that has come out. I mean, it's a peculiar thing about Iran that it's a closed society, but yet there's a lot of information about a lot of things. There's a lot of war memoirs, interviews, recountings, oral histories that I've written about Iran's foreign policymaking. And one of the clear themes is, I mean, you have to sort of think about the mindset of the people that are decision makers. All of Iran's main security decision makers with the Supreme Leader got their, on-the-job training during Iran-Iraq War. Those of you who are old enough remember, Iran went through an 8-year grueling war with Iraq. It was a catastrophic war at many levels, very costly, probably upwards of 750,000 Iranians may have died. A large number were maimed. You know, vast areas of the country was devastated. Social profile of the country changed. The character of the country changed. And that, you know, Khamenei was president, war president during that war. Most of Revolutionary Guard commanders basically joined the Iranian security forces as 17, 18-year-olds. And if they survived the war, they rose through the ranks. So that's their military training. And one of the biggest lessons they learned in that war is that the first battle doesn't decide the war. Iraq occupied Iran's territory for 2 years. It was after 2 years that Iran basically was able to push Iraq out. I think the way they would read the Levant is that this is like the period where Iraqis occupied Iran. Let's see how this turns out. Let's see what happens in Lebanon, what happens in Syria. Israel may overreach. None of this stuff that actually started with October 7th has been settled. Settled yet. And until they're settled, and settled in a way that you could see a future to it, then everything is still open, right? And Iran, since the Iraq War, but also during the Iraq War, often has taken advantage of outcomes rather than actually necessarily impose those outcomes. And so I think their inclination is to wait and see, how things turn out. And perhaps the read of things is that the mood in the Arab world as a whole is angry, it's unhappy that there's no right now peace that you can actually sell to the public. And so I don't think they have made a decision about necessarily we're going to close all the doors on the Levant. It's just to wait and see. Right now, they don't have a card to play.

Well, which brings me to this next question, and perhaps a bit speculative. And would you say that Iran's perception of external conflict today is now— could be only shaped by internal unrest? Because we don't know what's happening. There is a collapse of the Axis of Resistance. And so maybe the unrest will come from within. And if so, does this release Iran's belligerent posture against its Sunni Arab neighbors? The United States, Israel, and could it even open— now this is really hopeful— for a different path with these countries?

In the short, in the very short run, I would say no, because I think everything that's happened in the 2-3 years has also opened major debates in Iran that are not, that are not yet settled itself. So on the one hand, Yes, they've lost all of these proxies, but the loss of the proxies has made their relationship with the Arab world much more open. So for the Arab governments in the Gulf, really Iran's quote-unquote nefarious behavior in the Arab world is no longer as big an issue. So Iran is not a big player in Lebanon. Saudis, Israelis are playing a much bigger role. Those three are much more important right now in dictating the fate of Lebanon. They decided on the president, and they decided on the prime minister, and now they're deciding on the dismantlement of Hezbollah. Syria is occupied by two countries, neither one is Iran. And actually, the fate of Syria is again in the hands of the United States, Saudi Arabia, Israel, and Turkey. These are the four players over there. So the Gulf countries cannot really complain much about Iranian role in Syria and Lebanon, which were the biggest sort of sore points. Yes, Iran is still in Iraq, but you know, that's hunkered down. And then there's the issue of the Houthis. Yes, that's an open wound, but Saudi Arabia and Iran basically arrived at an agreement where the Houthis are shooting outwards rather than towards the Red Sea, rather than northwards towards UAE and Saudi Arabia. On the other hand, also the Gaza War has given the Arab countries much more concerned about Israel and what Gaza may mean for them than just about Iran. So there's a lot more diplomatic engagement between Iran and Arab countries than was the case before. I mean, even with countries that Iran doesn't have diplomatic relations with, like Jordan and Egypt, there's a lot more interaction. So that picture is a little bit more complicated. Iran's relations actually with its Arab neighbors has improved compared to before the Gaza War, but there's still, you know, issues to be settled. Iranian public seemed to be much more aggressively critical of Iran's foreign policy before Iran was directly attacked, when Iran was much more vested in the proxies. Now that Iran is more directly at war, and war is not something that's happening far away, it's not a given that you will necessarily see the kind of public unrest that we saw. There's also been tremendous change in Iran itself. For instance, there's almost like a complete abandonment of enforcement of of veil on women. I mean, it's amazing how quickly that issue went from the massive protest that it generated by literally a woman dying in police custody for just a minor infraction of her head not being properly covered, to actually women no longer observing it at all. And people say they can go into an Iranian embassy or into the airport without veil, and it's not an issue. So that transformation also has accelerated since the war. Where it will take Iran is an open question, but there's no question, there's no doubting that there's significant change also at the social level that is unfolding. And then there is massive debates, I think, in foreign policy environment about where do we go from here. So Iran followed the policy of neither war nor negotiations with the US. And follow the policy of investing in Hezbollah and all these groups as a way of avoiding a direct attack on Iran. That policy has failed clearly, right? But still the imperative of defending the country is there. So the key question is not whether we arm Hezbollah or do we have, you know, still a Shia bond with Iran. The real question is how do you defend this country given the current reality? What are your capabilities? What is your strategy about avoiding another attack or deterring another attack? And that is a very, very open, public, and I would say difficult debate in Iran between those who are advocating as far as, you know, you should even abandon the nuclear program altogether and arrive at a deal with the US, to those who are saying that, you know, that is treason and and we actually have to double down. Even a segment of Iranian public favors building a nuclear bomb now. It's no longer just a regime issue. And so there is more questions in Iran than there are actually answers.

So that's very interesting. Let me just talk about some of the potential obstacle or the transformation of the Revolutionary Guard. And I would like to engage you a little bit on this. We know that the Revolutionary Guards with vast military and economic power, you talk about a state within a state, but could easing sanctions, weakening proxies, or even Khamenei's succession erode its grip? One could argue that the nationalist economy of resistance, which is really monopolized by the IRGC, stands somewhat in opposition to economic opening with the West they have that monopoly. And so if that's the case, what would be the future of the IRGC facing in this context? So just speak about if there is any changes within the Revolutionary Guard and if it's more of a challenge than a possibility for change.

Well, I mean, you know, the Revolutionary Guard is now sort of an open-ended concept because, you know, it is people who are actually in command or in the Guards whose day job is, you know, addressing, you know, what usually militaries do, defense, war making, planning, et cetera. There are former Revolutionary Guard commanders who are either in politics or in business, et cetera. There are allies of the Revolutionary Guards who are out there. There are institutions that are very close to the Revolutionary Guards that own or are involved in vast areas of Iran's economy. In that sense, the Revolutionary Guards is just like the Egyptian and Pakistani militaries who are similarly, I mean, you know, 45% of Egypt's industrial GDP is Egyptian military. And this number is actually a number of years old. It's a huge part of the economy, owns the private sector, is in partnership with private sector. The Revolutionary Guards is in, is similar to that. And yes, it's thrived under sanctions, but even if sanctions were lifted, even if the regime were to sort of change, I don't see it going away. Military forces like this don't disappear unless there's a foreign invasion like it happened in Iraq and you actually physically dismantle them. They will transform. You know, a lot of these guard commanders, are either currently or will be future oligarchs, right? The economic networks that they own sort of are the now sort of part of the fiber of Iran's economy. Right now they function in a particular way to sustain an economy under sanctions. In the future, they could be basically would be partners that you would actually be dealing with when you go into the country. I mean, the US found this out about Cuba, that similarly in Cuba, sanctions basically made the Cuban military part of every sector. And when there was some degree of opening under Obama administration and businessmen went to Cuba, they found that they have to meet Cuban generals, right? General businessmen in some ways. And if deals were made, they would be the billionaires, millionaires, heads of companies, et cetera, that would be there. It's no different than the story of the PLA, let's say. In China. So in reality, it has become a behemoth that already is basically running Iran. I mean, my own theory, and I say it in the book, I don't look at Ayatollah Khamenei as a cleric. I don't think he sees himself as a cleric. He sees himself as the supreme commander of the Revolutionary Guards. I mean, he's more comfortable with generals than he is when he meets with clerics. And so, yes, he's obviously a particular kind of person, which is simultaneously cleric, statesman, and military, although he didn't serve in the military. But he's not that different the way the Shah saw himself. He loved wearing uniforms and see himself as the commander-in-chief of the imperial military. That's the way Khamenei sees himself. So in a way, he has already facilitated the IRGC's takeover of the country. So it's not a question of, you know, an IRGC man staging a coup and taking over. There might be circumstances they may do that, dispense with the civilian apparatus. But for all effective purposes, they basically are within the fabric of almost all institutions, economic, civil, et cetera, syndicates, non-governmental organizations in Iran. The key question is, what role would they perform?

And is there a possibility of a fracture?

It is possibility of a fracture. It is also possibility of them never wanting to change fighting it out, but there's also possibility of a Deng Xiaoping being there. Deng Xiaoping was Mao's chief military general. I don't know. I mean, the top leadership has now been eliminated. We don't know as much about the one coming up. We know about some of the ones who are outside, but we don't know that in a, let's say, in a post-Communist environment, how would the IRGC behave? And whether it actually will decide that it is the moment of change. I mean, it's actually instructive that when the hijab issue happened in Iran, IRGC was not at the forefront of opposing, of wanting this necessarily be reimposed. It was something that the right-wing government police forces forced. And right now they're not a voice for actually resisting the lifting of hijab. So there is a certain pragmatism that they think that the most important thing is defense of the country. They don't want to be fighting girls on the streets. They think the population is their strategic depth. There's no point in fighting on both fronts. So there's a pragmatism that they are putting forward. Leave them alone. Like, leave the women alone. This is not a priority. Hijab is not a priority for IRGC. Perhaps many of their daughters— it was a video clip a week ago of this general actually that the Israelis tried to kill about the wedding of his daughter. Now, the issue is not whether there was any other men, it's just the way his daughter and his wife are dressed, you would not put that and IRGC in the same sentence, right? Which tells you that there's a massive discrepancy between the public face of the IRGC and actually where those people are in their own minds, right? And so I don't see it as impossible that one morning, just like all of a sudden we saw hijab disappear in Tehran, that the IRGC may actually adopt a very different posture.

But that will speak to the decline of family laws and the clerics if the hijab was lifted the next day.

Well, I think hijab was the first line of defense that fell because the fall of the hijab basically speaks to two truths. Is that the Islamic Republic itself understands that ideology is no longer valuable to it, and that its position in Iran, and particularly defending Iran, et cetera, is contradictory with enforcing ideology. And I think secondly, it tells you that the Iranian public is no longer willing to sacrifice for ideology or even observe ideology. And so hijab is the first line, but then comes, you're right, it comes all the misogynistic patriarchal laws that are in place. That might be a more difficult battle because that's not just about religion, it's also about social attitudes, et cetera. But I see that over the horizon. I mean, the next demand of women will be that they want equality of pay at work, or they want more public role in public sector, or that, They want changes to divorce law. I mean, there's also some other pragmatic, you know, understanding, like Iran's demography is much more like Western Europe. Well, average age in Iran, I mean, everybody keeps talking about young people in Iran. Average age in Iran is right now 31. By 2030, will be 37. Actually, the main workforce in Iran are Afghans. Just like in Europe, and the same kind of attitudes towards migration, racism, et cetera, exist. The government really wants women to be more, have larger families, marry earlier, have kids. One of the main obstacles to that is divorce laws and marriage laws, right? So there is an intense debate, in fact, within Qom among the clerics that we need to change these laws. Because you can't have your cake and eat it too. You cannot force them into a marriage where they know from now that they're gonna have a short end of the stick if they need to get out, which is in a country which has a very high divorce rate, more and more women are deciding not to marry unless you change these laws.

So it's interesting because you started saying there was a move beyond ideology, more towards security concerns. Over time, but no authoritarian theocratic, not even democracy, can sustain itself without some form of legitimacy. If it's not religion and if it's not anti-imperialist, then what?

Well, this is a good question because I think there isn't one ready out of the box. So the war brought the population and the regime around defense of the country, but there is no sort of understanding of what does Iranian, where does Iranian nationalism go? What form of nationalism could bind the state to the people? There has to be a new social contract between the population and the government. The social contract cannot be economic right now because the government's economic situation is very dire. The social contract has to be cultural and has to be political. If the Islamic, Republic cannot produce it, then it will face a serious crisis. Or that it will, as it's sort of, it's actually experimenting with ways to arrive at that, right? We don't know what the end product would be, but, you know, where we are with Iran is that we're in the middle of a moving, of a picture being formed. We're looking at a single frame, in a moving picture, right? But so I don't think Iranians know what Iranian nationalism will be. There are different definitions of it. But it is very clear that the Islamic Republic right now is in the middle of going from being Islamic Republic to being an Islamo-nationalist republic, whatever that might mean. And so, That is, that again is a profound transformation that will change the character of Iran.

Yeah, because nationalism is a thin ideology unless there is really a substantive argument about what glued together people. And if it's not targeted against its neighbors or the United States or Israel or etc., then it has to posit something that is different, right? And so that is really a question that I think is going to potentially could create a crisis. What do you think?

No, you're right. And again, part of the debate in Iran, there are those within the system who argue that much like it was under the Pahlavi period, although they don't mention it that way, or much like it's in a number of Arab countries, nationalism has to be anchored in development, in a vision of development. And you can't have a vision of development unless you lift these sanctions, and you can't lift these sanctions unless you make peace with the US. Which then means that you have to be a completely different entity. And there are those who basically say there is no there there, and we shouldn't throw in the towel, and that we basically defending our independence and what we fought for, et cetera, is much more important. There is no, there's no, I mean, I would say, for instance, the advocate of development is, first of all, the current Iranian president talks about that, but the former Iranian president, Rouhani is actually a firm believer in that. Even before he became president, he wrote a book called Economic Development and National Security, even arguing you can't even have national security unless you have economic development. And this already was laying the groundwork for an idea of nationalism that is developmentalist, which is a hearkening back to the Pahlavi period in a way, which is something Iran gave up on when he carried out the revolution. When Ayatollah Khomeini famously said, "Economics is for donkeys, and we didn't carry out a revolution to change the price of watermelon," right? Now, exactly what price of watermelon is what the Iranians want to change. And so there is this wing of this debate who's saying that. And I think everything about this war, this 12-day war with Israel, has telescoped this issue, because the fundamental question about Iran is, You know, where do we go from here? And how are we going to defend this country? And how are we going to protect this territorial integrity? And I don't think there is a clear sort of answer.

Thank you. So US foreign policy, just for a second. Looking back, what were the roads not taken? You mentioned that after 9/11, Iran briefly cooperated with the United States in Afghanistan. You know that. And, but what was the missed chance for broader US-Iran cooperation? You imply that the war in Iraq and Bush Axis of Evil speech really hardened Iranian foreign policy. That was sort of a pivot, a threshold. Were those the only roads not taken by either the Iranians and/or the United States? And what would be the new one potentially moving forward?

Well, I mean, all along, you know, given the way Iran and the US have ended up is that, you know, there's not a silver bullet agreement that would've got them to open up. Maybe now there is a chance for sort of a grand bargain kind of an argument, but all along it always was a question of, can there be a single successful engagement that could be a building block to the next level. And if there is one, then there is next. And ultimately, the issue of opening up Iran would be contingent on successful negotiations. So there were a number of opportunities along the way that could have basically created a success story. So one was around Afghanistan. I mean, Iran was, ironically, was the only country that actually opposed 9/11. Iranians were the only people other than Shias in Karachi who went into the streets on a vigil condemning 9/11. Ryan Crocker, Ambassador Ryan Crocker, has recollected in a documentary that he was on the very first flight that was allowed to fly out of the United States to go to Geneva to meet a diplomat that was sent to Geneva by General Soleimani to meet with him. And this envoy came with a map of Afghanistan with all the locations of the Taliban and advice about where the United States had to attack. And Crocker said to him, "Can I take notes?" He said, "No, I brought this map for you." And then Iran, and in fact, it was Soleimani that argued with the Supreme Leader that Iran should open its airspace to the United States to do rescue mission. Iran facilitated connections between CIA and the Northern Alliance. And some American diplomats, they say they were in meetings that perhaps included Soleimani and the current head of the Quds Force, whom nobody knew then who they were. But definitely the current head of the Quds Force was in charge of liaising with Americans on Afghanistan. So now this wasn't an opening, but it could have led to somewhere better. It could have led to saying, okay, we cooperated, they cooperated, there was some goodwill, there's some way forward. But what actually happened is that Israel announced that it had captured the ship in the Red Sea that was carrying weapons for the Houthis. Now, it was a decision the US made to make more of that ship than the cooperation in Afghanistan. And so President Bush decided to put Iran on the axis of evil, speech, which then in Iran meant, look, we're not gonna get anywhere with these guys. They're gonna pocket whatever you give them, but we're in the doghouse regardless. That's not gonna change. And I'm saying it the way they would've thought. I'm not saying that they're not responsible for some of the way America thinks, but their conclusion was that there is no out here. And so when the Iraq War happened, there was not a similar moment in Iran to say, let's help the Americans. It was the opposite. The same Soleimani, which was in charge of helping the Americans in Afghanistan, was sent by the Supreme Leader to set up the resistance in Iraq to Afghanistan. So you would say 9/11 was an opportunity, right? But the US was not in the mood. The US thought it's going to defeat everybody from Afghanistan to Iraq. And then the mother lode is Iran because this whole, things started in Tehran and you have to topple them. And my point was to say that, look, I mean, there has always been an opportunity to have that first win and then build on it. Obviously, the most important was a nuclear deal that both sides signed and Iran did implement what it had signed. And President Trump decided that he, He just would move away from it. So this is where we are right now, is basically a road littered with opportunities not taken. I can't say, but let's say if US and Iran had built on 9/11 and gone down a different road, I don't know what the outcome would've been, but it might not be the same thing for Iran today, or might have not been the same thing for the Middle East or for the two countries at this point in time.

So, couldn't we say that shouldn't Iran, if pragmatic, now abandon its race to the bomb since it's been so isolated and it, you know, any Iranian enrichment would be detected and could likely result in devastating future attacks? Wouldn't that be the pragmatic path?

Well, there is a debate about what pragmatism here means. Like, people like former Iranian President Rouhani are publicly saying pragmatism here means abandoning the nuclear program altogether. There are others who would say exactly as you said. But the problem Iran has is from where it is now to actually having real nuclear deterrence is not from today to tomorrow. It's going to take some period of time in which the country is quite vulnerable. But one thing I think is very clear, the Iranians have come to the conclusion that their entire nuclear doctrine was wrong. Because if they had wanted the bomb, really wanted the bomb, they should have done it the way Pakistan, Israel, India did. In other words, dash for a bomb underground, and one day you announce it with a nuclear test. They built the program above the ground. They built it at industrial levels. They spent billions of dollars. But the way they spend money is that actually has become integrated in many ways into Iran's industry. There are hundreds of companies, thousands of employees across the country that are connected to manufacturing that supplies the nuclear industry. There are thousands of scientists associated to it. It's not just a secret program. It's a, and it's an above-the-ground program. And Iran always vacillated between, well, you know, my program is up for negotiations. If you're interested, you could lift sanctions. And I'm willing to negotiate on it. Well, it didn't work. First time, the US negotiated and then pocketed the benefit and then walked away. Second time, middle of the negotiation, President Trump said, you know what, I'm just going to take away your leverage altogether. Now what are you going to negotiate with? So they decided that, you know, their nuclear doctrine of being above the ground, technically for industrial purposes, but with a potential for, for a bomb open to negotiations was a wrong strategy. It didn't prevent war on Iran and it didn't bring the US to real negotiations. So they didn't get either a real deal, nor did they get deterrence. So the key question is, this cannot continue. This is pointless of spending money on an above-the-ground program that neither produces a bomb nor produces negotiations. So either the United States actually goes to real negotiations with Iran and says, and you know, there's a real outcome that then you basically arrive at a point, or that the Iranians will decide that, you know, they need to do something with what they have, and they may end up moving towards a bomb. I don't think that decision has been made in Iran. And partly, they're waiting on President Trump, and see what comes next in terms of where the previous negotiation was left off and where they go. But I think that door is open, and I think that's very dangerous for the region.

While I address my remaining questions, I would like to ask the audience to take their pen and write little cards with your questions. So please don't forget to do that because after we will have people coming and just collect your questions and that they will be read. So just take the time to do that. And so let me throw a bomb. Okay, so if the Iranians are not agreeing to stop nuclear enrichment and pursuing the bomb, then Trump's maximum pressure policy will continue. In that particular scenario, Just walk this route with us. Do you think a regime change is desirable, feasible, viable?

I mean, the adjectives you used are all no, but there might be other adjectives we could use.

I know you would say that, but I let you.

No, no, because I actually don't think— I mean, look, there is a scenario that people think that you could bomb your way from the air to regime change. And I'm not sure that that actually will get you there. It could get you to a regime change that you don't want, which is another kind of regime change, like a much more, you know, fierce, hardline, singular group that would take Iran in the exact direction that you don't want. The regime change that we're used to has involved US troops. We changed regime in Afghanistan, we changed regime in Iraq. We were able to do it and bring whoever we wanted because our tanks were in the capital city, right? Our troops were in the capital city. Or in Iran in 1941, there was a regime change. The British came in, they occupied Tehran with American and Russian forces. They dictated that the monarch had to leave. And then, you know, there was a change of leadership. Short of that, you cannot do it from the air. And so I don't think, so then the question becomes, is the United States actually willing to put boots on the ground in Iran, right? And you know, you look at how well we did in Iraq. You know, Iran is a country of 90 million. Its capital city is 2 mountain ranges and about 2,000 kilometers from the nearest port. The logistics of occupying a country that large, the number of troops it wants, how long it takes, how many trillions of dollars are basically daunting, right? So at some point, you know, there's a game of chicken going on between President Trump and Iran. In other words, I'm gonna pressure you to saying yes. And the Iranians may basically decide that we're gonna pressure you By forcing you to choose between a deal or war, right? In other words, and then I think it comes down to who blinks first, if you would. But I think it's very dangerous because the Iranians, the way to pressure the US is exactly to start enrichment, to force the US to play this game of cat and mouse, maximum pressure on Iran. It's pretty drastic, but there's not much more than it can go other than sort of boarding ships. And then what if the Iranians actually attack ships? I mean, look, they decided right now not to sort of retaliate against US attack, but that's not a given that they may not in the future. And so we're in a very risky period. And I think still the best, The only way out of this, at least in terms of avoiding a much larger catastrophe, is a deal that is not— you should not think of a deal as giving the regime money. You have to think of a deal that actually opens that private sector that we're seeing in Iran, that social civil society that we're seeing in Iran, opens it to the outside world and actually releases its energies. You have to craft it in that manner.

So in fact, the carrot could be that the United States and the Sunni Arab world would be offering a pathway for potential economic integrations, some deal, I don't know, joining an Abraham Accord, joining—

No, joining an Abraham Accord, I don't think it's a sell.

Joining IMEC corridor.

No, no, I think you're right. I think, you know, in the least, that will aggravate the debate inside Iran. I mean, you know, there is a part of the argument that, look, the United States is not serious about a deal. Let's not think about a deal. They're not, you know, we were at the table, they bombed. The last time they pocketed whatever they got. There's not a serious deal. But if there was a real serious prospect, particularly for the Iranian population, of what they want, which is integration, into the global economy, to have a more normal state and more normal economy, I think that will make it much more difficult for the Islamic Republic given where it is. I think it actually, and even encourage the fracturing of the elites themselves because elements of it already are there, that there are voices in Iran who are very strongly are looking for a way out that is not a bomb and is not war. But there is nothing on the table that they can actually latch onto. Because even the Iranian foreign minister went to New York with the authorization to meet face-to-face with US envoy Steve Witkoff. He said that there was a meeting that the Europeans organized. That they would meet and Whitkopf didn't show up, right? So he went there with an authorization to sort of start the process. So I think, you know, you have to sort of think of negotiations with Iran, a deal with Iran, not as a gift to Iran, but actually as putting a sort of a gene into their DNA, putting a red herring in their system, forcing them to, debate aggressively. And then whatever the deal is, you know, you cannot invest in Iran unless Iran changes its laws. Iran can always say, I don't want your investments, but that's not what it's saying. I mean, if you said to Iran that, okay, you can absorb $20 billion of investment with Saudi Arabia, but you need to change these laws, these laws on property ownership, these laws on varieties of things, then, you know, the ball is in Iran's court. Do they accept or do they refuse? And if they refuse, then they would be much more trouble with their own people.

So in other words, what you're telling us is Iran is at the crossroad and it needs a new grand strategy.

Well, yes, but you see, we have to force that grand strategy on it. Right now, the way the United States has gone to war and won't talk to Iran is only confirming the grand strategy that's there, that, you know, we still have to resist them. There's no option other than that. And I think, you know, if the United States really believes that it has weakened Iran, that it has changed the calculation on Iran, the question is how does it use this moment to force real change in Iran? And that's not gonna be with bombs. Likely it is with actually forcing Iran to have a serious debate on its future because there is something solid on the table.

Wonderful. We're going to continue these conversations by taking questions from the audience, and I want to invite here Dean Fritz Mayer, and he's going to just handle this segment. Do not go after that because there's a book signing and you can all come to visit. Did I say book signing and you all stood up? You don't have to buy.

Well, look forward to— thank you for this wonderful discussion. We want to continue it, bring you into the conversation as well. It's such a rich and thoughtful conversation. I have a lot of questions here. Maybe what I'll do is read a couple of them at a time. We can You can answer them, sort of combine them and answer them together, and we'll get to as many as we can. I know we have some online as well, so we want to give a chance for some of our online audience to ask as well. So let me start with one which references our alum, George Sharif, who's a Korbel alum who has played an important role in Iran for a long time. Foreign minister and other roles as well. So the question, this question is, why don't liberals, I'm not sure if he is, move the country towards giving up its imperialist fantasies? So that's one question. Another question has to do with what do you consider the likeliest faction inside Iran to produce Khamenei's successor? So what does that look like? We were talking a bit about that. Before. And let me just read one more. With Hamas likely coming under the Turkey-Qatar fold, what is Iran's influence in the Middle East going to look like going forward? So 3 questions that are somewhat disparate, but see what you can— if you can answer those and then we'll come to some more.

So on the last point, I think Iran's influence on the Middle East, in the Levant, on the Palestinian issue, it all depends on where does this issue end. Right? We're not at an endpoint. It's not clear what is going to be the ultimate verdict of the Gaza War. Right? And that will actually decide whether Iran will have any role to play or not. The second is that if Iran actually has successful negotiations with the US, implicit in it will be that it perhaps will no longer seek to have that role in the region. So I think there's a lot of open questions right now. Secondly, on Iran's imperial fantasies. First of all, Iranians have had imperial fantasies going way back before the Islamic Revolution. It goes back to the Achaemenid period. But that aside, Iranians don't see their involvement in the Arab world as offensive or imperialist. They've seen it as defensive. In the sense that every threat they feel will come to them from the Arab world. It was the Iraq invaded Iran in 1980. And then the United States being in Iraq was a threat to them. They believed that, you know, Hezbollah's value to them all these years was that Israel did not attack Iran. So why didn't Israel attack Iran 2 years ago? Why did Israel not attack Iran even a month before Hezbollah collapsed? Why did Israel not attack Iran 10 years ago? And the answer in Tehran is because of Hezbollah, because Hezbollah's missiles and capabilities were a deterrence factor against Israel. So Israel spent 10 years planning the dismantlement of Hezbollah.

Why?

Because it was its path to attacking Iran. I mean, Israeli generals say that right now very openly. That the biggest win of the war was the dismantlement of Hezbollah because then it was very easy for them to take Iran, attack Iran without fearing retaliation from Hezbollah. So look, with every country, there is a thin line between offense and defense. One country's defense is another country's offense, right? In other words, you could say it about many countries in the Middle East. That they take a position in another country or vis-à-vis another country, and to the other country, this is offensive. To them, it's defensive. Now, I'm not saying this as a judgment call here. I'm saying if you want to think how they see it in Iran, the way they justified it, they justified funding on it, they organized their national security, the way they made decisions about what to build and what not to build, was all premised on this idea of defending themselves against the US and Israel. Now, you might say they should have made peace much earlier, then they needed not have had defense. But that's a fair argument. But given where they were, they saw Iraqi militias as absolutely necessary in making sure the US does not contemplate invading Iran. They saw the Iraqi militias absolutely necessary in defeating ISIS in Iraq. Or in defeating ISIS in Syria, which they saw as a mortal threat to Iran, or they saw Hezbollah as an important pillar of their defense. Now, that's no longer viable. So that actually has gone. But for decades, that's the way they saw their involvement in the region. And of course, the Arab world saw this as, we're not here for you to set up anti-missile systems against Israel. On our territories, right? So it was unacceptable to the Arab countries that Iran would treat the Arab world as basically a base for defending itself against the outside. Now, in question of what faction would replace Khamenei, we really don't know right now. I mean, you know, there isn't, as I said, there is intense debate about the direction that Iran should go in. And he's still there, so he obviously is keeping the system together and the system still revolves around him. But it will depend on a number of things. Let's say if Iran is at war when Khamenei dies, if Iran is at a deal with the US when Khamenei dies, or if, you know, varieties of other things may happen that will decide which faction may have the upper hand in Iran. I think that debate about what comes next has started, but the debate is still in progress and it's not settled yet.

So a few more questions here. So a couple of them related to Israel. One question here, has Israel done enough, presumably in the war, from Israel's point of view, or might Israel invade Iran once it is not tied down by Gaza? That's one question. This question is, it's very interesting that Iran would think to use Palestine, the Palestinians, as a strategy to connect with, enter into the Arab world, the Arab circle. What is most evident is that Israel is not seen as part of the Arab world. And not Iran. Could you talk more about this? So those two questions, and then the third one, a little orthogonal, and the premises may or may not be correct, but why is Iran not getting closer to China?

Well, I mean, on the Palestinian issue, for varieties of reasons, has resonated with Arabs and actually the Muslim world like no other issue. Like there's a lot of scholarship, there's a lot of public debate has gone into this. I'm sure it's a source of frustration with Israel. Why do Arabs all over the place, or why do Muslims in Indonesia care about the Palestinians? But they do. And Iran has understood this from very early on, as I said, that no other issue resonates with the Arabs more than the Palestinians. And by Iran being at the forefront of this issue, it believed it would get political capital in the Arab world and would actually get legitimacy for being part of the Arab world, right? Now, and it led Iran to sort of supporting Hamas, creating Axis of Resistance, et cetera. And this was a significant part of the issue, part of the reason why they supported the, Palestinians to the extent that they did. Now, whether this has any more legs in it will largely depend on how the Gaza War ends. I mean, the Palestinian issue is still an open issue. And so long as it's an open issue, I think Iran would see there's value to championing it. So it is a question of opportunity. I mean, the Iranians didn't create the Palestinian issue, but they definitely saw benefit in championing it. And so although they cannot do so the way they had done before, because there's no access way for them to Gaza, they're not relevant to the future of Gaza right now. They're not relevant to hostage exchange, to peace, to ceasefire. That, as mentioned, was in the hands of Turkey and Qatar and the United States right now. On China, Iran and China have been close in many ways, but China is also close to Saudi Arabia, is also close to UAE. And it's not like Iran is China's only Middle East partner in a way. And also China is important to Iran more economically and technologically than it has been in terms of military, which Russia has, played a more important role. I mean, the question of why don't they get closer, I mean, there's pragmatism in both places. Yes, they see certain camaraderie in resisting the United States among both of them, but both of them also have their own pragmatic decisions to make. I mean, Iranians have to consider what is it that China can give them or is willing to give them at what price, right? And similarly, for the Chinese, they have to consider why would we want to give these things to Iran or get into these kinds of agreements, for what price and what are we going to get for it? And what's the strategic logic for it? It's not like, you know, the Chinese are just standing there for Iranians to show up and ask them for whatever they want, or that the Iranians are willing to negotiate with the Chinese at all costs. And so it is a strong relationship, but sometimes we sort of make these relationships as more than they are. The Chinese or the Russians will never support Iran or any other country the way, let's say, the United States supports Israel. So if we sort of try to set that as the bar, that will never be achieved. That's a special relationship that the Chinese will not give any country, let alone Iran. And there was a third question. I think I missed that. The very first one, I think you asked, or second one.

I think I missed it too. Let's see. Let me turn— I'll re-ask in a second. Let me turn to a couple of different questions right now, just both about the role of proxies in the region, one looking back, one looking forward. So looking back was how much autonomy did Iran's proxy militias have despite being linked to Tehran's Axis of Resistance And what does Western media and political leaders— what do Western media and political leaders gain by always prefacing Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Houthis as Iran-backed, Iran-backed, Iran-backed? That's looking back a bit, although a little bit in the present. And this question is about how might the end of the Israel-Hamas war, assuming that happens fully, as you acknowledged earlier, broader regional escalation reshape the axis of resistance in the coming years?

Well, I mean, the axis of resistance as we know it has broken. So, you know, how it might reconstitute or whether it reconstitutes at all is not easy to predict at this point in time. Yes, the end of Gaza War will matter, how it ends and what might be the shape of the Middle East after that. But At the moment that we are, the way we thought about Axis of Resistance with its military capabilities, missiles, et cetera, on Israel's borders is just not there and not easily reconstitutable. So it is not a really live issue. On the proxies, you know, the ascription the media gives comes up, periodically becomes just habitual. Right? We sort of don't say, you know, the Saudi-backed Yemeni government, for instance. It's a way that we basically define organizations, China-backed, Iranian-backed, Russian-backed, etc. You know, between proxies, it differs. There are some that are much closer and much more closely managed by Iran, and there are those that are more autonomous. If you take the Houthis, The Houthis started their civil war with Saudi Arabia first, and then they basically went to Iran as kind of like your enemy's enemy is your friend. They're also not really Shia. So they are an offshoot of Shiism. They don't look at Iran's Supreme Leader as a sort of a spiritual guide, or don't look at Shiism as their creed. And their own religious leader, is what matters to them most, right? And so the relationship is tight militarily, but it's not tight ideologically or politically. Now proxies are a sort of a, are not a clean weapon. It's very different from a missile. You know, in other words, they are most effective if they are actually rooted in the communities where they are. So Iran had an Afghan militia in, in Afghanistan, was known as the Fatemiyoun Brigade. They were Afghan Shias that were recruited to fight against ISIS. They were a very good fighting machine, but they were always strangers in Syria. And when Syria was collapsing, Iran took them all out and took them somewhere else. But for Hezbollah in Lebanon or Iraqi militias in Iraq, they basically are, part of their power comes from the fact that they are within those communities. They govern them, they are among the people, But that also means that they gradually develop local interests and local sets of ambitions, et cetera. They're part of the local politics. So when they are both fighting together, their relationship is stronger. But when there is a disagreement about direction they might want to go, there's perhaps more tension in the relationship. And secondly, the relationship between Iran and its proxies was much stronger when General Soleimani was in charge. He was an Arabic speaker, had much longer history in actually setting up these organizations. His successor believed in much more giving autonomy to various groups to plan on their own and do what they wanted, which partly might also explain October 7th operation that Iran has said that yes, It supported Hamas, it armed Hamas, it funded Hamas, but it didn't know about the timing of the attack, nor did it actually order the attack. And in other words, you could take that at whatever it is, but it's—

With a big grain of salt. With a big grain of salt.

Well, I would say, no, I wouldn't say necessarily. I mean, in fact, even the CIA had said that they didn't believe from the chatter that the Iranians Yeah, but there were, weren't there archives that were found in the tunnels and reviewed? No, there was correspondences, and there were, but I mean, obviously, if you arm a group and you fund it, etc., you are preparing it for a war. But the argument was that the timing and actually preparation for what they did was planned locally. And it was not that Iran, the argument is that it was not that Iran actually decided that they should launch the attack, for what purpose, as opposed to an organization that is funded by Iran, armed by Iran, given the capabilities, can actually have its own planning as well. And that's also true of things that Iraqi militias did. For instance, an attack on US forces that actually Iran had to basically tell them to back off because it might actually provoke a reaction. And that also goes to the sense of, you know, this idea that everything is tightly controlled from Iran is as much credible as if the United States gave all the weapons training to another country, which is part of its alliance, but expecting that necessarily it controls every decision they make, or that country may not decide to do something because it sees it in its own interest, right? So this idea that, Iran would absolutely control all the decisions, and it's a very tight command and control structure, is not necessarily—

No, but the very fact that on October 8th, Hezbollah started launching missiles, then on April 2024, 300 projectiles and missiles came from Iran to Israel, shows cooperation. With respect to Hezbollah and even Syrian and Iraqi and the Houthis?

Well, no, but the question is, once the war started, once the attack started, then it's a different ballgame. I mean, Hezbollah was never going to sit out because Hezbollah's whole position in Lebanon was based on being more pro-Palestinian than everybody else. And he basically bet all of his future in Lebanon on essentially not being seen as sitting out the war. But the other case was that Assad decided not to participate and actually expelled the Houthi embassy from Damascus literally the day after. And so therefore, Iran did not actually have the control over Assad's decisions. That everybody thought that they did. And so again, you know, the decision of Hezbollah participating in the war, it's not clear, was it Nasrallah's decision or was it Tehran's decision?

Okay, just one round of questions because we have a last segment and that's the book.

Yeah, so we do this last round and it really continues with the theme really around the future of the Israel-Iranian relationship. The question that we might have come back to was one of will Israel invade Iran once it is not tied down in Gaza? And then a couple of questions on the nuclear, the strategy of the nuclear bomb. In your opinion, what are the advantages and disadvantages of Iran to pursue a nuclear bomb? As a deterrent? And a related question is asking whether the real motive, given the rhetoric at least, of destroying Israel is strategic deterrence, or might it actually, the pursuit of a nuclear weapon, have a more aggressive purpose to attack Israel?

I mean, if you're asking, would there be another round of fighting between Iran and Israel, it's highly likely. Because in some ways, nothing— certain things were not closed completely in the first round. And so Israel did do severe damage to Iran, but then, you know, Iranian missiles proved to be actually a fairly large concern for Israel during the war, the latter part of the war. The regime in Iran didn't fall, and actually its nuclear program It's not obliterated as was claimed. It still might be there. There might be, nobody knows how much of it survived, how much of the 60 kilogram, 400 kilograms, 60% enriched uranium has survived and whether Iran might have other plans, et cetera. So, and there is no sort of a peace at the end of it. There is a verbal ceasefire that President Trump negotiated, but it's fairly fragile. Now, whether it comes after the Gaza War, while Gaza War is still in train, we don't know. But I don't think actually we're at the end of this conflict. And the more they fight, the more the sort of enmity I think will grow. And then it becomes, the other side becomes a strategic logic for the other side. I mean, you know, at some point it becomes a cold war between Iran and Israel, the only regional sort of rivalry, unless one knocks the other one out, or that you end up having a circumstance in which they decide to arrive at a veritable cessation of hostilities or a peace treaty. But we're not there at all. I don't think either side is at that point that would think that this is the moment that you're going to accept the other side, given this as is. So yes, I think we still might be in for more fighting that happens. Invasion, you know, suggests a land invasion. That's not going to happen between Iran and Israel because they don't have a border. So war between them is exactly what we saw. Which is it could have a cyber element. It could have, it's going to be with missiles, aircraft, and drones. And next time it might be bloodier. But unless there is a decisive blow by Israel that you would really say it's a moment of defeat for Iran, then, you know, it will continue because I think Israel also understands that until it reaches that point, that, you know, still Iran is still an enemy, still an enemy, still standing. So, so long as it's enemy and it's still standing, I think in Israel's conception, it's still a threat. And if it's a threat, it's in Israel's crosshairs. So, so I don't think we're at the end of this.

Yeah.

And I know we're going to wrap up, wrap up just if I could. One more question. We had several versions of this, but the basic question is, if you were advising President Trump, And I'm sure you are. What would you advise him with respect to US policy towards Iran?

I mean, you have to first of all have a sense of what do you want the endpoint here to be. You see, that decides your policies. So if it's a maximal goal of I want to change this regime and I want to be able to go in and make sure that there's not a single centrifuge spinning, that takes you down a very different path. If your goal is that I want to arrive at a point where I have access to the oil of the program, I'm sure that nothing is happening. I also want to sort of arrive at a cold peace in the Middle East for now. And perhaps, as I said, that there is a pathway to use the deal to force change from within in Iran, to be able to support those who want a different path with Iran. Then that takes you down a different course. It may very well be that President Trump thinks Iran needs to get weaker before you talk to it. Iran may think that it needs to get stronger before it talks to the US. As I said, it's a game of chicken, but I think the US has to start by thinking, what does it want, right? President Trump has made multiple indications that he doesn't want another big war in the Middle East. So ultimately, if you don't want war, there's only two options before you. You either accept Iran going nuclear, or you have to arrive at a satisfactory deal to prevent it from going nuclear. There's not a fourth or fifth option here, right? And so you have to adopt a strategy here. You either choose to go to war with Iran, which has its own calculations and preparations. You basically say, we're willing to let them become North Korea, you know, we're not going to go to war, but we're not going to make peace with them either. Or you have to say there is a deal to be made, maybe not today, in a month, in 2 months' time. And then, you know, we have to craft that deal in a way that it actually answers US's interest. So I think that, you know, if you ask me, I think, you know, I don't think war in the end is, necessarily is going to be conclusive. And we haven't got a necessarily a good record with settling these issues militarily. And Iran is going to be extremely complicated. And leaving Iran to go nuclear is actually a pretty bad idea, right? Leaving it as is, it is very dangerous. And I don't think it's acceptable to Arabs and to Israel for Iran to go nuclear. And so ultimately, the United States, has to assume a position. Can it craft the future of the Middle East, taking all the realities that are in front of it? Which is, it wants peace in the Gulf to harness the economic promise of the Gulf. It wants peace in the Levant without Iran there. No Iran in Syria, no Iran in Lebanon, no Iran in Gaza. And it also wants Iran not to have a nuclear weapon. So is there a diplomatic way that they can get to this end? I don't know if there is, but they have to test this proposition to see whether there's a diplomatic path.

Well, thank you for that. Thank you for the audience for the questions. Thank you very much. Let me turn back to Micheline to wrap up a bit.

Just, I read the book, The Grand Strategy. I learned a lot. I think it's a great book. I really strongly recommend you to buy it and get the signatures of Vali Nasr, the autograph of Vali Nasr. And if for those of you who want to speak to him, he would be sitting over there. So first, one round of applause and another one. So wait for the second one. So first for Vali Nasr, great talk. Thank you so much. And the second round of applause most of all my team, the team that has actually been there to organize— Mandy, Sage, Elena, Sophia, Eve, am I forgetting? Andrea, and the tech behind. Thank you so much.

Yeah, thank you all for being here. Thank you.