Untangling the Paradox of Iran

Welcome to the New America Foundation. Okay. My name is Patrick Doherty. I am the Deputy Director of the American Strategy Program here at New America. We're very pleased today to have with us Houman Majd, an Iranian American who writes for The New Yorker magazine and advised and translated for the last two Iranian presidents, Mohammad Khatami and Mohammad— Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. In fact, Hooman just came down from New York, where he did the translation for President Ahmadinejad's address to the U.N. General Assembly. If you watched the President's address on CNN, you heard Hooman's voice and you'll be familiar with him. He also just two weeks ago— a few weeks ago returned from Iran, where he had conversations at very high levels, and we're hoping to learn from some some of those meetings. Human Majd is in many ways a living Rosetta Stone, a man who is both 100% American and 100% Iranian. He is the son of an Iranian diplomat and a grandson of an ayatollah. He was schooled in both the UK and the United States. After the Iranian Revolution took a decidedly anti-American cast, he decided to settle in the United States. And had a career that included being a record executive and a movie producer. Today he lives in New York City. In addition to The New Yorker, he writes for The New York Times, GQ, Huffington Post, and has his new book, The Ayatollah Begs to Differ: The Paradox of Modern Iran, in stores now. We also have it out back, so I encourage everyone to pick up a copy, and maybe we can convince Houman to sign a few. Great. Great. One of the characteristics that makes the New America Foundation unique is that we are not afraid to push past conventional wisdom to get at better policy outcomes for the United States and the world at large. Our own Flint Leverett, director of the Geopolitics of Energy Initiative here at New America, did this when he proposed the idea of negotiating with Iran a new grand bargain. The proposal was picked up by Senator Richard Lugar, among others, and opened up in Washington and the presidential primaries new options for U.S.-Iran relations. Hooman Majid's perspectives, I think, offer an even deeper insight into the culture and interests of the Iranian people and their leadership. I think he brings here to Washington an incredibly important insight, and I'm very pleased to host him today and hope you will welcome him warmly. I've asked Hooman to make an opening statement. To take as long as he likes, and then we'll open the floor to questions. Welcome, Hooman.

[APPLAUSE] Thanks very much. I'll try to make this brief so there's more time for questions than just me talking away. In the last week, having translated President Ahmadinejad's speech at the UN, every media appearance I've had has focused in on that as to, you know, why I did it, how I could possibly do it, and I'm starting to get hate mail even though the book's only been out a few days. People assume that if you take a neutral stance in Iran— when I say neutral, I mean as a writer, take a neutral stance and be an observer of the scene— that you're automatically a supporter of that regime, you're automatically a supporter of the system. That is not what I tried to do in this book. What I tried to do in this book is just present the facts the way I saw them, observations the way I saw them, and give Americans mostly— it is really not written for a largely Iranian audience. Hopefully Iranians know who they are and they understand the system. But for Americans to understand a little bit more who it is we are talking about when we talk about Iran, both in terms of the politicians and in terms of the people. We do tend to demonize someone like President Ahmadinejad, rightly so in many cases. This year in particular, it was very uncomfortable. His speech was very uncomfortable in places. I explained to them on Monday, to the Iranian entourage that came from Tehran, including the Iranians who were here at the UN, that using excerpts from the Protocols of the Elders of Zion was not going to do them any good, and it was incredibly uncomfortable to hear. But I didn't think it was my job to help Ahmadinejad. My job was to just do— it wasn't really a job, it was something I do because for journalistic reasons when I translate for Ahmadinejad. They, of course, don't feel that way. They feel that Zionism and Judaism is separate and, you know, he doesn't think he's an anti-Semite and he likes to meet with, you know, rabbis and all kinds of people when he's here to prove that he's not an anti-Semite. I think he has a lot of anti-Semitic tendencies and some of the things he says are incredibly anti-Semitic. But I lost my train of thought on that. But in terms of who the Iranian people are, who is Ahmadinejad, this book that I've written is not a profile of Ahmadinejad. It's not a support of him. It's not a support of the Supreme Leader. Somebody wrote me one hate mail was like, you know, you can— they said spit on you, toof on you for being a supporter of the Supreme Leader. It's like, I don't understand where in the book I said I am a supporter of the Supreme Leader. I tried to explain who the Supreme Leader is, why he is who he is, and why the system has allowed for him to be the man in charge. And he really is the man in charge. President Ahmadinejad isn't. I replied politely to the hate mail. And then I get some fan mail from people who think that presenting Iranians to Americans in a light that they may not have seen is a good thing. And it's warts and all. There's a lot of criticism in this book, but there is a lot of what the culture is and who these people are. It's not a political tome. It's not about— it's not an analysis. I'm not trying to tell anybody what we should be doing with Iran, what the United States should be doing with Iran. I'm not trying to analyze the political situation and make predictions for the future as to who's going to be in charge, who's not going to be in charge. But Iran is now— the Islamic Republic is a reality, and some people in diaspora, in the Iranian diaspora, are simply not willing to accept that. It's a reality that's there. It's a system that has been relatively stable for 30 years. It's had its ups and downs, and now there's a little bit of instability. It's likely to be around for my lifetime, and as such, I don't want to be, and I don't think Iranians should be, like the Russian exiles in Paris in the early part of the 20th century, hoping for the czars to come back. That is unlikely to happen. This is from someone who goes to Iran a lot and sees people. It's not necessarily that people are very happy in Iran, they're in love with their system, they're in love with their president. That's not the case. The same is true, I think, in America. We're very unhappy right now. Generally, there's not a very great happiness with either George Bush or even The system seems to be failing, particularly this week. And I think that Iranians are like everybody else in the world. Economics mean a lot to them. Their livelihood means a lot to them. Politics means a lot to them. There is a certain amount of freedom in Iran. There are certain restrictions in Iran. But generally, people don't wake up every morning thinking, oh my God, I live under a tyranny. What am I going to do? I want to escape. That is not the case. That just is not the case. There is a lot of movement for change. Iran is going to have two things— three things were the topic of conversation in Iran in late summer this year: the Georgia crisis and how it was to the great benefit of Iran, and the U.S. presidential elections and the Iranian presidential elections. So they are very concerned about what is happening here and who is going to be the next president and what that means for relations with Iran. And they're very concerned about who their next president is going to be because that's going to affect their pocketbook and also affect relations with the outside world. So again, to be brief, I just wanted to make a brief opening statement to tell you what the book is and what it isn't. It's not a human rights record. I actually say in my introduction that I stayed away from that even though I do criticize in many places, the record of the Islamic Republic when it comes to human rights. I criticize everybody. I do tend to show quite a bit of admiration for former President Khatami, and I make no apologies for that. I think that he is— I think he's great for Iran, and I think he's great for America. And there's a good chance that he may run again for president, and I would support him. So That said, I think I'll let Patrick ask questions.

Well, can you hear me? Okay. So I had a quick question from reading your book. There was one great quote I want to find here and get you to expand on it. And you were talking with the Deputy Foreign Minister for Research in Tehran, and he says We're not after public diplomacy. 1.5 billion Muslims have woken up after 500 years of Western hegemony and we don't want Dick Cheney or Condoleezza Rice to give us orders. We are interested not in compromise but in coexistence. Could you talk about that coexistence? What is it? How does Iran define it? To what extent is this reflective of the kind of the elite opinion in the decision-making level of Iran? I know there's multiple centers of power, to what extent does that sense of coexistence— is it consistent, and does it pervade that thinking within Tehran?

I think it does. I mean, unfortunately, that quote was given by Dr. Mohammadi, who is a vile creature, and I'll say that. When you mention his name to anybody in Iran, they all wince, even conservatives. He is really a vile creature. But He knew I was writing a book. I was taking notes, and he actually denied the Holocaust to me and claimed that only 300,000 people died in the Holocaust. And he said he was a professor and he had studied the issue extensively. But there is no point arguing with a person like that. He is a very, very hardline person who has managed to stay in his post in the Foreign Ministry despite many attempts to have him removed. But what he said does reflect the leadership's position on foreign relations. It does. I'll explain that. I mean, he says no compromise. When he says compromise, what he means and what other Iranian officials will mean when they say no compromise, if they use those words, compromise to many Iranians means Iran ends up with the short end of the stick. It's happened many, many times whenever there's been a sense of compromise, a sense sense that, okay, we are going to give up something here in order for you to give up something, is that America or the West or the great powers do not actually give up anything. So they say, okay, no more compromise, end of story. We are not going to compromise our position. Again, it is semantics, but coexistence to him, and again, I would not put too much faith in what he thinks coexistence is because he does not really have— he has a few supporters, but he does not— he is not really— indicative of the leadership in Iran. Coexistence means generally what the Iranians have begged for, almost begged for, for the last 30 years is respect. And we tend not to respect Iran. We tend not to respect the Islamic Republic. Forget about the fact that we don't have diplomatic relations with them, which is a case with the US only, but in general, the way that Iran is treated by the West by Western, even Western officials or Western presidential candidates. A good example is Barack Obama, who is very popular in Iran. There's even rumors going around Tehran that he's originally from Bushehr. Now they're going to make him himself, they're going to claim him as one of his own. For those of you who don't know, Bushehr is in the south of Iran. There tend to be a lot of Arabs and even African people with African blood. Somehow they've decided that he's from Bushehr and his father was originally from Boucher. But there's a lot of affection. But when he said— I can't remember exactly when it was, 3 or 4 weeks ago— that he would— more than that, it was maybe a couple of months ago— that he would meet with the Iranian leadership, which was a change in his earlier position, that he would meet with the Iranian leadership at a time and place of his choosing. That was viewed exactly as a continuation of previous American attitudes or Western attitudes to Iran, which is like, no, we decide when we are going to meet with you. It is not up to you. We are the ones who decide. We will grant you the honor, we will grant you the favor when we decide at the time and place that we choose. That is offensive. That is offensive to Iranians. Whether you think it is or whether you think it should be or not, it simply is. It is like we are a sovereign nation. On the question of meeting and discussing mutual issues of mutual interest, it shouldn't be about at a time and place of your choosing. It should be about let's sit down and talk. Let's agree where we're going to sit down and talk. So those are small examples, and coexistence to Iranians really means respect, respect more than anything else.

You mentioned that the top 3 issues on your last trip to Iran were the altercation between Russia and Georgia, the the American election and the Iranian election. On the last two, the Iranian election and the American election, how are they going to play out? They're set to very specific calendars, and there's been a lot of promises made on both sides. How do you see these two events playing out going forward? What's going to be their relationship, and what advice would you have, say, to the next American president, because the Iranian elections are after the American elections?

Yeah, the Iranian elections are on June 12th, 2009, exactly— well, a little bit less than 6 months after the next president takes office in January. I was told by a few people in Iran, officials on both sides, on both the conservative side, but not supporters of President Ahmadinejad, but on the conservative side, and by people who are big supporters of the reformers, on the Khatami side. They said if Obama becomes president— and they assume that anybody who lives in America and is a writer has access to Barack Obama— please tell him not to do anything with Iran. And the reason was that if Barack Obama does in fact engage in dialogue with Iran and gives Ahmadinejad a coup almost of establishing some sort of bilateral relations, it will make it very, very hard for the Iranian reform system to win the elections in 2009. I think if McCain wins the election, I think that's just a given. I don't think it makes— there's any chance of John McCain either talking to— I mean, there's a chance that he might bomb Iran, but I don't think he's ever going to talk to Iran. And Sarah Palin is certainly not going to sit I would suggest that they talk to Iran.

If we could assume that McCain would continue a relatively hardline policy and keep the pressure up, how would that play into the Iranian elections in June?

I think that it would be to the— I mean, this is the sad part of being an Iranian-American who supports Obama here and Khatami there, is that if McCain wins, it's better for Khatami. So who do I support? I think if he does, I think it's very bad for Ahmadinejad. Ahmadinejad makes great efforts to show himself as this world— as a statesman, this leader of a great country who comes to New York on every trip. This trip more than ever, he really— I mean, it was interesting because he did a few things that were different from last year. He held a press conference, which I was present at, right after his speech at the UN. He basically wouldn't call on any American reporters. He called on Iranian reporters, on Arab-speaking reporters, Pakistani reporters. It was all for the audience back home. He had a dinner for scholars. He loves to call them scholars. He invites people from various think tanks. I don't know why he doesn't invite you guys, but he invites people from various—

Maybe next time.

He had the Woodrow Wilson Center there and not Haleh Esfandiari. She was not invited, or if she was, she didn't come, but two of her colleagues did come. And he sits at a table with about 30 or 40 people, and everybody asks questions and makes statements. And they opened up the meeting with the Iranian ambassador to the UN saying, "This is off the record." So for me as a writer, it's like, "Oh, it's off the record. I can't write about it, but I can talk about it." And then they had two huge TV cameras. Set up. And he said, oh, by the way, don't worry about the TV cameras. It's like, well, why shouldn't I worry about the TV cameras if it's off the record? I mean, what? So I know for a fact that that— he said, oh, that's for the President's own, you know, it's for his website and it's for his campaign next year. He's going to show himself as someone who engages with American scholars who are very polite to him, incredibly polite to him. And I actually asked Gary Sick, who was there, I asked him afterwards because I didn't feel it was my place to to ask this question because he always— Ahmadinejad always prefaces anything to do with American and U.S. relations, Iran relations, by saying, well, it wasn't us that broke off relations, it was the U.S. that unilaterally broke off relations. Nobody challenges him and says, yeah, but you took our embassy and took all the employees hostage. What are we supposed to do, have diplomatic relations with no ambassador and no embassy? But nobody challenges him on that. Anyway, my point is that he's going to use that those events that he had in New York and in general his foreign policy stance to great advantage, or try to use it to great advantage. It's like, I'm the one who's doing these things. This is— and in some ways he's right. President Khatami, when he used to come to the U.S., didn't do those things. When he used to come to the U.N., would not hold— if he did, they were very private. There were no cameras. There were 10 people. Last time he came, there were 12 people at a very small private dinner that was not publicized in any way. And he wouldn't— I mean, it's just a different different, but he has, but you know, Khatami doesn't have a Karl Rove and Ahmadinejad does.

And it looked like his, even his UN Assembly speech was really geared towards the audience back home as well as the Non-Aligned Movement and the Organization of the Islamic Conference. That seemed to be his audience, really.

Absolutely. He wanted to show that he's, I mean, there were a couple of elements with the speech this year. The anti-Semitic, anti-Israel stuff was partly because the Supreme Leader had kind of scolded him. And his vice president. Just a few days prior, his vice president had said Iran is friends with all the people in the world, including Israelis. Israel, you know, the people of Israel are not our enemies. And that caused a big, big fuss in Iran and among the conservatives and hardliners who thought he should be impeached and so on and so forth. Supreme Leader finally came out and said, okay, enough squabbling, but Israeli people are not our friends. And I think Ahmadinejad had to make some kind of anti-Israel, anti-Israeli, which he does anyway. I think he's quite pleased to do that.

Anyway, what about it?

Yeah, automatically does anyway. But I think it was a little bit more virulent this year than it would normally have been. But it was, again, I think, for the audience back home. And, you know, he's going to say, look, I go there, I stand up at the UN, I have proof, I have dinner with American scholars, they sit there respectfully, they talk to me, we talk, we have exchanges, I'm very polite. At the UN, I stand for our rights, and it has worked. When he had a dinner with Iranians the night after the dinner with the scholars, that was the whole thing, the whole premise of his dinner and speaking to these Iranian Americans at the dinner was that everything I have done has worked. They threaten us with sanctions, they threaten us with this, they threaten us with that. What have they been able to do? Nothing. They keep telling us they are going to attack us. Sometimes they come to us and Diplomats from other countries will come to say, "If you don't do this, America is going to attack you. They are going to attack you on March 3rd at 5:45 AM." And we say, "Thank you very much for the information, but we don't believe it and it is not true." So he is, yeah, I mean, I think that if McCain wins the election here, depending on what, unless we go to war with Iran, I think in general, it's not very good for him because he's not going to be able to have that final thing that he wants, which is to say, I was the one who was able to establish relations with America on our terms, on our terms.

Okay, let's open it up. Burton, Burton Gerber.

Thank you for coming today. My pleasure.

The New York Times—

Oh, Burton, we've got a microphone coming to you.

Oh, I'm sorry.

That's all right.

Yeah, Burton Gerber, Georgetown University. The New York Times this morning has an article about an interview that the president gave with several New York Times reporters, and one question that he sort of sloughed off, didn't want to answer, dealt with the economy. So I wanted to ask you a few things about that. What is— because which doesn't get written about very much here in the United States— what is the main problems of the Iranian economy? What's it doing for the people right now, the question of the gasoline prices which led to riots last year or the year before, or demonstrations, not riots, demonstrations. How does all that affect both the president's prospects for reelection, the attitude toward the general question of the Islamic Republic by the population, and to what Iran is doing in terms of its foreign policy, which is obviously expensive in working with Hamas and Hezbollah and nuclear program?

Well, I'm not an economist, so it's hard for me to answer the question in terms of what the problems of the economy are. There are things that are obviously on the surface. Iran has a lot of oil and sells a lot of oil. It doesn't sell it at $110 a barrel. It's usually sold at a discount, 30% I think discount, because the oil is not of the same quality as And I don't understand that, to be honest with you, but I know that they sell oil for around— they were selling oil for around $80 a barrel when it was $110 when I was in Iran. The economy is in shocking shape. The economy of Iran is in shocking shape. Why it's in shocking shape is a question for economists to answer, not me. But I can, you know, I've been witness to it. In Tehran this summer, every single day for 2 hours a day, the electricity goes off. There's not enough power. There are long, long lines at gas stations, long lines, you know, 300, 400 cars just waiting to fill up with gas. Gasoline is rationed. When I say rationed, it's you get a certain allocation per month, and if you go over that allocation, you have to pay market price, and market price is like $2 a gallon as opposed to 35 cents a gallon. That's all going to change next year. The government's reaction to that, Ahmadinejad's reaction, his government's reaction to that has basically to print money, which has been not very helpful. It's done what it always does, which is create inflation. It's also been to hand out money. Just when I was there, I was in a cab coming back from a meeting, and the cab driver asked me, so did you go and get your 200,000 tomons yet? 200,000 tomons is about $210, $220. And I said no. And I'd heard that you could go and get 200,000 tomons from the government. It's just a handout. It's like our tax incentive except you actually have to go and show your birth certificate and get your 200,000 toman. I wouldn't have qualified anyway, I think, as someone who lives abroad, but I should have tried probably. $200 is $200. But it would have paid for the cab rides. But that's what he's doing, and he intends to— what he intends to do during the campaign next year, which some people say he will not be allowed to do by the Supreme Leader, is to hand out a lot of cash hand out a lot of cash on the— on, you know, as a poverty helping, you know, helping alleviate poverty. And he does that anyway when he goes to the provinces. People, you know, he collects letters, people say, oh, I need, you know, 500,000 to an operation for my aunt, and he gives it to them in some cases. Not in all cases, otherwise the country would have been bankrupt by now, but in many cases he has. And that's been the way the government has spent its money. So he— I mean, that's buying votes, I think, and he is going to engage in that. There's no question, to some degree, to the extent that he can, to some the central bank allows him to. But the state of the economy is bad for many reasons. They don't want to admit the sanctions are hurting. They are hurting. Businessmen don't want to invest in Iran. Even real estate, which has traditionally been the one area of Iranian— of the Iranian economy which has always been strong, and you would think it shouldn't be with people like wanting to leave the country, but it is. It's incredibly strong, and now it's starting to be affected because people are just— prices are coming down. It's not because of a mortgage crisis. We don't have mortgages in Iran because— we do, but not in the same way that there are here.

Is it getting worse?

What's the—

that's a good snapshot. Is it getting worse? The economy?

No, it's getting worse, definitely. And the sanctions are hurting. And, you know, somebody very high up in the previous government said to me, if the U.S. does impose sanctions on the Central Bank of Iran, it will be an absolute disaster. And he didn't want to be quoted on it. But— You won't tell anyone. No, I'm saying he personally didn't want to be quoted on it. But I think that's true, and this person is a businessman as well as a politician. I think that's true. It's already very difficult for businessmen in Iran to do business with the West, and you have to do business with the West. You have to do— even with Asia, some Asian banks don't want to do business, opening letters of credit, all kinds of things. There's kind of this trickle-down theory that works in reverse too. Even though there's a lot of trade between Dubai and Iran, a lot of things get smuggled into Iran, it's still— even banks in Dubai don't want to do business with Iran right now.

What about China?

China does business all the time, and that's probably a saving grace for the Iranian economy right now. But the Chinese are also dumping inferior goods into Iran right now, something that nobody writes about or knows about, but they are dumping a lot of goods. I mean, just this week, 2 weeks after the Europeans and the Americans banned Chinese milk products, the Iranians finally decided to ban milk products in Iran too. Not that there is necessarily a lot of it, but they are— the Chinese do view Iran as a very good market for their really low-cost shoddy goods, and the Iranians are buying them because they they don't have too many other choices right now. Great.

Okay, another question right here in front. Judd Herriot, documentary filmmaker. I'm curious about Iran's perception of its role, its position in the Middle East. Does it view itself as a strong leader? And if so, does it realize that developing nuclear weapons— and everybody seems to feel that that's what they're going to eventually do— will really seriously upset the strategic balance? Do they really understand this?

I can't speak for the leadership. I think that they view their— the leadership views their role as one of being, yes, a very— perhaps being the most important country in the Middle East. I'll give you a good example. At the Iranian dinner, at the dinner for the Iranians that Ahmadinejad threw on Wednesday night in New York at the Grand Hyatt, they have— the Iranians are very sensitive about the Persian Gulf. About the word Persian Gulf. As some people in this room know, they had a huge banner, I mean half the size of the wall, which said Persian Gulf forever, and a map of the Persian Gulf. On the north is Iran, south is the Arabian Peninsula. The flag of Iran was superimposed on the Arabian Peninsula, not on the north side, which is where Iran is. I can't believe that that was accidental. There was no— there were no Arabs in the audience, there were no Americans in the audience, so it was for purely nationalistic Iranians who were going to go see Ahmadinejad speak and talk and maybe shake his hand. And Persian Gulf forever, to them, whoever designed this banner, meant Persia's influence, at least if nothing else, extends to the entire Arabian Peninsula, all of the Middle East basically. Do they understand that— well, you say that they are developing nuclear weapons. I don't know that they are. And I'm not saying that this is not a defense of their military policy. I actually doubt that they are at present developing nuclear weapons. I think they're smart enough to know, as other people have said, that being capable of enriching uranium means that you can develop nuclear weapons whenever you want. They realize that, and that may be enough of a threat to the Arab states and to the other countries in the— as Gary Sick once said to me a long time ago, he said, you know, if you can enrich uranium, you're a long weekend away from building a bomb. So if Iran develops its enrichment capacity to the point where it's a long weekend away from developing a bomb, that's pretty good as far as they're concerned. And I think that is a strategic— strategically, that's what they're after more than anything else. I don't think they actually— I believe them. On both sides, on the reform side and the conservative side, believe them when they say we are not actively developing nuclear weapons. There is no reason for them to right now, I think. I think if they were caught, and they could be caught, it would be disastrous for them and I don't think they are going to risk that at this point.

How does the nuclear issue play into this concept of coexistence?

Well, I mean, you know, nationalistic Iranians will always tell you why shouldn't we have nuclear nuclear weapons. And there is this conversation in Tehran for those of us who are— those people who do go back and forth to Iran or are able to go. They will hear it all the time. There are plenty of Iranians who say, why shouldn't we have? Israel has 200 weapons. Pakistan has nuclear weapons. Why shouldn't we? Why are we the ones who are not to be trusted with it? Well, Pakistan is supposed to be trusted with nuclear weapons. I mean, people say— I mean, it is kind of astonishing to the average Iranian. I am not saying, you know, you don't have to be a supporter of the Islamic Republic, but it is a difficult— It's a difficult argument to make to an Iranian that you should under no circumstances be allowed the technology because we don't like your leaders, we don't trust your leaders. You should not be allowed the technology that will one day allow you to make a nuclear weapon. So, the coexistence thing is, well, you know, coexistence for, as I said, it depends on who's saying coexistence. I mean, I think Dr. Mohammadi, that vile creature that I talk about, probably means Iranian hegemony over the entire region. I think coexistence for some other Iranian officials means Iranian power, certainly, but I don't think they want to necessarily intimidate other countries. I think, you know, there's been—

Or wipe them off the map.

Well, I don't think they want to wipe them. I think they would like to see them wiped off the map as opposed to actually wipe them off the map. Iranians aren't really very warlike people, I don't think.

At least since Darius.

Darius was an exception, yes.

Okay, somebody in the back. Any questions? Sir with the striped tie, yeah. The microphone's coming.

Michael Marshall, UPI.

Following up on the regional influence question, what role does the idea of a Shia revolution play in that? And is the Shia revolution an idea that is sort of burning hotly in the hearts of the top leadership, or is it mostly about politics for them? I think it is mostly about— I think it burns very hotly in the hearts of some of them, but not all of them. I think they have already— I mean, they are quite pleased with themselves that they have already kind of accomplished a Shia Republic in Iraq. And I think that looking at Bahrain, where there is a 75 or 80% Shia majority, I think they think that that's going to go next or they want it to go next. They don't think they actually have to do anything for that to happen. But I think there's plenty of people who feel like, yes, I mean, you know, the Shia revival, as Vali Nasr puts it, is very real and Iraq has been an absolute gift to them and I think they recognize that and are appreciative of it. But I don't think that they want to make the world Shia as Ayatollah Khomeini did. Ahmadinejad is always inviting President Bush and various people to religion, and the implication is inviting them to become Shia. I think it is unlikely that— he invites them to await the Shia Messiah, the Mahdi, as he did in his speech. And again, I did try to not laugh as I said it. But I don't think even he thinks that President Bush will become Shia, although I think actually President Bush would make a very good Shia.

There's the code. Okay, right up, right up front here.

Thank you. Mike Miyazawa. The day before yesterday, there was a gathering of some 20 people at Nixon Center, and it was about Iran. And the panelists were 3 Iranian dissidents, and as usual, they are very critical of the current Iranian leadership. So I asked I asked them, how many years since February 1979 have you lived in Iran? None of them lived in Iran since 1979. So it turned out that it was exactly the same case as Iraq before US invasion of 2003, or Myanmar, Burma, as of today. Those dissidents do not have a firsthand experience in what life in those countries is like as of today. So this is a kind of problem for me because I want to see both sides of the coin, and what we hear in Washington, D.C. is only one side of the coin from the dissidents. So I'm very glad that you said in Iran ordinary people live an ordinary life. They are worried about economy, they are worried about politics, and so on. So my question is, the nuclear issue— I don't know whether it's for weapons or for nuclear energy, but in any event, is this a kind of a household issue among ordinary Iranians?

It's not. No, it's not a household issue. It hasn't been made a household issue yet. We'll see what happens in the campaign for the next presidential election because it could become a household issue. So far, it's all been about rights, defending the rights of the Iranian people, and it's been— the government has done a very good job in convincing the people of Iran that the nuclear issue is another example of the West or the superpowers denying the basic rights that Iran has. And they're very good— you know, the funny thing is, and I think I even say this in my book, I either said it in my— I can't remember now whether I said it in my book or in an article. That a cab driver can tell you in Iran what the articles of the NPT are. He'll list them for you. I don't know if that's true of a cab driver in Washington. So they're quite well-educated. Oh yeah, yeah, here, yeah, probably, yes, yeah. Even the dissident Iranian cab drivers, yeah. But that was to me amazing. The first time a cab driver was telling me about the articles of the NPT, it was like, well, you read, you've read the NPT? Yeah, sure, I've read the NPT. I know exactly what our rights are. Why are they telling us you know, we can't enrich uranium.

Could you talk more about this, the sense of rights in the Iranian culture?

I think that's a—

and the inferiority-superiority complex that you've written about?

I've written about it, and some Iranians may not like that I've written about it because I think we do suffer from both inferiority and superiority complexes, and I think it plays out, you know, obviously in our foreign policy. There is very much— I mean, you know, whether it has Shia roots or just purely Iranian roots, In Shia Islam, there's definitely that inferiority, superiority. I mean, we are the right religion. I mean, you know, that's Ahmadinejad. How could anybody not see Shia Islam as being the correct one? You know, the grandson of the Prophet Muhammad died for us. Why wouldn't the other Muslims understand that? Unjustly died. His rights were taken away from him. So, this idea of rights, you know, his right to be the caliph is very important in Shia Islam, and it's become part of, It's moved away from religion. It's become part of a general sense of being oppressed, which is for most Iranians—

Being a minority.

Being a minority, yeah.

Within the Sunni world.

Yeah, exactly. Iranians are also very racist about Arabs too, so distinguishing ourselves from the Arabs is also a factor, although with Iraq that kind of makes it a little complicated.

Okay, we're going to go in back and then we'll come up front. Yeah, lady in the back. If you could identify yourself too.

I'm Diane Pearlman, political psychologist, also interested in conflict dynamics. I have a 3-part question. One is I'm very concerned about Israelis sort of having a very irrational— just completely gripped by the conviction that Iran is going to attack them and that they have to attack soon. And there are a lot of dots to connect that, you know, with U.S. Help could attack Iran. And I'm doing some writing and stuff about that. And I just wrote a piece on Huffington yesterday about pressuring Iran and the law of opposites. So I have some questions. One of the things I said is that sanctions have the opposite effect. And in the literature on sanctions, they fail most of the time and usually provoke a sense of defiance, and that positive inducements and tension reduction work better. And the other question is, you said that McCain would be better for Khatami and— Khatami, sorry. Thanks. Okay. Okay, you can finish your question. And I had the impression that sort of the more threatening we are here, the more it increases the hardliners and Ahmadinejad.

That is correct.

I would say that's correct.

So then wouldn't Obama be better?

Sanctions and McCain-Hatami.

Yeah, certainly. I mean, the sanctions— again, I'm not an expert, but I think that sanctions can be self-defeating in many instances. In Iran's case, there are sanctions that if we were to apply them would hurt the system to the extent— so much. For example, the example I gave earlier, the Central Bank of Iran being sanctioned or put under sanctions, that it may force the Supreme Leader to compromise, for want of a better word, because the Supreme Leader's goal— he has one goal and one goal only in life. That's to maintain the stability of the system. That's his goal. He is the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Revolution, not of the Islamic Republic. So his goal is to protect the revolution, the ideals of the revolution. If those ideals are under threat, in other words, society is, you know, the stability of society is threatened, he will act. And he has done in the past. He hasn't acted so far. He doesn't generally like to interfere too much in the day-to-day affairs of the country or be seen to interfere too much day-to-day in the affairs of the country because you have to have some semblance of a democracy after all. And I think there is some semblance of a democracy there. So when people elect President Ahmadinejad, he, you know, is allowed to run the country. But if the sanctions get so severe in Iran's case that the system is threatened, I mean, Iran is not North Korea. It's not a hermit state. Iranians travel. There's flights to Iran. People go back and forth. People go to Dubai all the time. There's satellite TV. There are a lot of freedoms in Iran. I don't want people to misunderstand that. It doesn't mean women can go out without hijab or stuff like that, but there are a lot of freedoms that don't exist in certain nations, in communist— even Cuba. There are freedoms in Iran that don't exist in Cuba. And so the Supreme Leader is aware of that. So if people become aware the sanctions are hurting their lives to the point where they're really suffering, it's going to have a major effect. It's not like the North Koreans who aren't really aware if they're suffering, why they're suffering.

Yeah.

What's the mechanism for the the Supreme Leader to do that, to make the compromise because he's kind of above it all.

He is above it all, yes.

And he doesn't necessarily, besides the Republican Guards or the Revolutionary Guards, my apologies, he doesn't have direct control over ministries. He has to kind of go through the president, at least as I understand it.

He doesn't go through the president. On the Foreign Ministry, he doesn't go through the president. But on the other ministries, I mean, he doesn't go through the president. The cabinet comes and sees him. He has— yeah, he doesn't insert himself into the day-to-day affairs of Iran. He does on foreign policy. He has an entire foreign policy team of his own. And there have been occasions where you see where his hand is shown, where like he sends Ali Akbar Velayati, for example, his former— Iran's former foreign minister, to go and meet with Putin in Russia, which is going around the foreign minister and around Ahmadinejad. So there are times when he feels that it's necessary to do that. I have no idea what Ali Akbar Velayati said to Putin last year when he went and met him, which really upset Ahmadinejad and Mottaki. But whatever he said must have been something that the Supreme Leader wanted said on his behalf, not on the behalf of the Ahmadinejad government. So, I mean, there isn't a mechanism. He's got lots of advisors. He has an office, quite a big office, a big bureau that handles all kinds of affairs. And most of the cabinet members do go and see him from time to time. Okay.

Thanks.

What effect would sanctions have? Sanctions could have a very negative effect. How would they affect him? Well, the economy would be shattered. And that would not be good for— Well, I think that if the central bank were sanctioned for a while, they would be defiant, but they would try to find a way to get those sanctions lifted, whatever it costs.

Would they give up their nuclear program?

Well, I don't know they would give up their nuclear program. No, I don't think they would do that. But I don't think we expect them to give up their— at this point, I don't think we expect them to. Harvey Feldman, former ambassador to the United Nations. I'm curious about your support for former President Khatami. I can't really think of anything that he accomplished when he was president. I think if you had traveled to Iran during his presidency, you would find that he had accomplished a lot for Iranian society. Maybe viewing it from America in terms of what he accomplished in terms of foreign— well, even in terms of foreign relations, he accomplished a lot too. Rafsanjani started it. He started the opening of Iran to the West, and Khatami kind of finished it. Relations with Saudi Arabia, relations even, you know, softening the relations with Cairo, which was a big deal for— Cairo has asked Iran many times to change the name of a street, Khaled Eslambouli, which is the assassin of Sadat. And Iran under Khatami promised to do so. Actually, it's still It's still Khaled Assembli. But anyway, he opened up Iran and he opened up Iranian society. This idea that Iranians didn't have to be fearful of the government, that they could have certain social liberties, I think that took hold in his presidency because he was a liberal and he set the tone. And I think you kind of have to have gone back and forth or been there or lived there. It's funny because nowadays people criticize Khatami a lot in society of Iran, and he was getting unpopular toward the end of his presidency because for exactly that view. What has he done? We thought we were going to be able to have discos and bars and all kinds of stuff happening, and it didn't happen. We were supposed to be able to stand up to the conservatives. He was supposed to be able to stand up to the Supreme Leader Khatami or stand up to human rights abuses that were going on under his regime. His attitude, as he explained it to me, was that it's better to fight the the system from within than to resign. And he did offer to resign a couple of times. But I think that if you look at it purely from, I mean, what I was going to say is that, sorry, I lost my train of thought again. Even though he was unpopular at the end of the presidency, I found it interesting that now, 4 years after, 3 and a half years after his presidency, this time whenever I mention his name in a casual political conversation, even in a taxi cab or in a store or in a shop, they'll always say, "Khodab yom orzash," which means, you know, "God bless him." You know, we should have kind of appreciated that we had a better life under him. So there is this sense that there was a, you know, for some people anyway. I'm not saying he has overwhelming support of the people, but there is a sense at least for people who live in Iran that he did do more for Iran for the standard of living. I mean, the economy wasn't as bad under him, that's for sure. There weren't gas lines at the gas stations, their electricity wasn't going off 2 hours a day. People, you know, whether rightly or wrongly, they attribute that to the current administration.

Great, thanks. Sir, just wait for the microphone to come. Thanks. Oh, okay. Actually, in the back behind you, and then we'll come to you after.

Thank you, thank you very much. John Limbert from the U.S. Naval Academy. I just opened your book at random, by the way, and was very pleased to see this picture of the Bobby Sands hamburger stand, which you say is an irony lost on many Iranians, but it's a wonderful thing. I'm so glad you included that.

I almost got arrested this time just 3 weeks ago in Tehran for trying to take a picture of the street sign Bobby Sands, which was misspelled.

Oh, okay.

At one end of the street it's misspelled. It's spelled B-A-B-Y-S-A-N-D-Z, and then the other end is correctly spelled, but the Revolutionary Guards were right on top of me.

As an Irishman with— who's on the US terrorist watch list.

Exactly.

Because of my name, I get the joke too.

That's right.

I'm glad you mentioned the issue of respect and I'd like to pursue it just a little bit with you. One of your diplomatic, one of your journalistic colleagues, by the way, Barbara Slavin called Iran the Rodney Dangerfield of the Middle East.

She's right, yeah.

Just doesn't get any respect. Just doesn't get any respect.

She knows Iran very well and she knows Iranians very very well.

Exactly. But in your conversations with the Iranian interlocutors, particularly, you know, some of them perhaps in the think tanks and government, did you— was there any sense, did you detect any sense that this lack of respect might in some way be related to some of their policies?

To their behavior?

In the past, yes, of— I mean, the rhetorical excesses the posturing and the diplomatic ineptitude? And you've given some examples, and I think some of— I think the president has given some examples in the last few days.

Well, other than the US embassy hostage crisis, which I think they recognize as having been, if not a mistake, as having damaged their credibility in terms of respect. But other than that, They don't consider any of their actions— I mean, rhetoric in Iran and in Farsi, as the Iranians in this room will attest to, is flowery and is never meant to be— never intended to be taken literally. But in terms of their actions, they feel completely— they can defend their actions in terms of their support for Hamas and their support for Hezbollah completely. They see no reason why they should be disrespected for supporting Hezbollah. In fact quite the opposite, think that America should be disrespected for automatically supporting Israel. So that is a political stance that I do not think is going to change. I think that, I mean, certainly not under the Islamic Republic. Hezbollah is a creation of the Islamic Republic. It is Iran's, I mean, Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah, his official title is Representative of the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Revolution in Lebanon. That is his title. I mean, Iranians are proud of that, or at least the Iranian leadership is proud of that, that Nasrallah is a representative of their Supreme Leader. Used to be Khomeini, now it's Khamenei. So it is their creation and they, you know, that is power. In the same way that we at some point may have been proud that we exerted, we extended our power in the Philippines and various places of the world. Iranians in general, I think, in the leadership at least, I mean, are kind of proud of that, and I don't think they're going to back off that at all. So I don't know if that answers your question. [Speaker] But you—

I mean, there was no sense that there might be a relationship here?

[Speaker] No. No, the only thing that they do understand is when you talk about the— well, actually, I should— since Ahmadinejad has been in power, they understand the Holocaust issue. People are very embarrassed by that who are his opponents, even conservatives, even people like Hassan Rouhani, for example. Who might run for president if Khatami doesn't. And I was sitting with his chief of staff a few weeks ago, and the things he said about Ahmadinejad— and Rouhani is a conservative, he's in the same party officially. I can't remember which one, combatant clerics or clerics who are combatants. They have these different names. But you should have heard the things he was saying about Ahmadinejad, how embarrassing and how awful and how disrespectful it is. So, Yeah, I mean, since Ahmadinejad has been in power, the Holocaust and Israel issue has become— they understand that. He doesn't, but they do. Other people do. And of course, the embassy crisis, which they understand was not very good for public relations. Okay.

Hi, my name is Marshall Lilly.

In terms of Ahmadinejad's reelection campaign, what are his biggest weaknesses domestically? The economy more than anything else, I think. And his— I mean, one would hope, and I think that they will, the reformers or whoever goes up against him will, if there has been no movement in U.S.-Iranian relations and there is still a standoff on the nuclear issue, they will use the fact that there are sanctions and the economy is bad, and they will use the fact that it is partly because of his rhetoric. I would hope that that would be the negative campaigning that they would run against him. All they have to do is show images of him denying the Holocaust, the Holocaust conference in Tehran, all that stuff. I mean, people in Iran realize, at least among certain classes, the intellectual classes and politicians, understand that that makes it so much easier for the US to push through sanctions at the UN and to get the rest of the world to be basically anti-Iran.

Right here, if you could identify yourself.

Yes, Al Richman, former State Department official. Two surveys in Iran occurred earlier this year and presented what to me seemed a contradiction, and you've partly touched on it. On the one hand, Iranians favor talks with the U.S., a relationship, and Also, they favor a cooperative role in the Persian Gulf. On the other hand, they support by two-thirds military aid to Hamas, Hezbollah, and other militant groups in the Middle East, which seems to me is a contradiction. I wondered if you could touch on that. I think it's a contradiction in the Western mind. It's not a contradiction in the Eastern mind. Hamas and Hezbollah are just not viewed the same way we view it. This is again part of the problem we have in general in dealing with other cultures, and you are aware of it yourself having been in the State Department, is that we do not understand the way the mind works. We think of Hezbollah and Hamas as militant and as being terrorist organizations. We have them labeled as terrorist organizations. Iranians just do not. Most of the Third World does not. The entire Arab world does not. Except for their leaders perhaps who are under American influence. You're never going to convince an Iranian, the average Iranian, that Hamas is not a legitimate resistance force against Israel. You will be able to convince them that Hamas should at some point come to some sort of negotiations with Israel and come to some sort of settlement with Israel. I think that you can, but you can't convince people who believe that a resistance movement is a freedom fighter movement. That it isn't. And the same would have been true for, you know, if the reverse was true. When we had freedom fighters fighting against communism, it would be very hard to convince an American that those people are terrorists. There were people on the left who did think that they were terrorists, but in general— so it's not as big a contradiction for Iranians to feel that support for Hamas and Hezbollah doesn't have to come at the— relations with America doesn't have to come at the expense of that, even though according to Sadeq Kharrazi, who was an ambassador and is very close to former President Khatami and was the author of the letter to George Bush in 2003, even though those were on the table as well from the Iranian side, and that was cleared by the Supreme Leader. For killing 265 American Marines in Beirut? Yes, they do, yeah.

And they still think that the US has no reason to be—

No, it's not that they don't think the US has no reason to be unhappy about that. They also will— they'll then point out and say, well, America has killed, you know, 500,000 Iraqis. I mean, you know, it's not an argument you're going to win with them because they think that that was a legitimate— the Israeli— the American troops in Iran— in Lebanon were an occupation force supporting the Israelis. I know what I'm saying. This is the attitude, is that the American troops who were there were a legitimate target because they shouldn't have been there.

Okay, other questions on Hamas while we're on the topic? Right here.

Hi, I'm Carolyn Poplin from Georgetown Law School. Does that mean that most Iranians particularly Iranians outside the big cities, feel that Israel should be wiped off the map?

I don't think that most people in Iran feel Israel should be wiped off the map, no. First of all, that's an American expression. That's the way it was translated in America. Wipe off the map is not part of the conversation in Iran. People aren't talking about their president having said Israel— first of all, they'll say it in Farsi, they won't say it in English. So they'll use the Farsi expression which various people have translated differently, but basically means Israel will one day disappear from the pages of time or will one day be removed from the map. It's not a topic of conversation. Most Iranians, really, to be honest with you, the ones that I come across, don't care that much.

Is there more anti-Semitism in Iran than there used to be?

I think there's— Actually, maybe less, to be honest with you.

A large Jewish population.

Yeah, I actually, I'm embargoed from talking about this, but one of the reasons I was in Iran was to, I'm doing an article for GQ about the Jewish minority in Iran, and I spent a lot of time with Iranian Jews in Tehran. I'm not allowed, I'm embargoed to talk about it until the article comes out. So, by GQ, I mean, that's my contract. I'm not allowed to talk about it. It'll be the January issue.

Come on, we'll look forward to it. Okay, I wanted to switch to Georgia. You had a great vignette that you shared with me earlier about an Iranian's views on what the United States should do with Iran after the Georgia invasion. Could you talk about that and talk about this long history that Iran and Russia has, and to what extent Are Iranians, at least in the political sphere, looking at the rise of Russia as an opportunity geopolitically for them?

Well, they are definitely looking at it as an opportunity. I mean, the leadership is. I was in Iran when Georgia was invaded by Russia, and the Iranian reaction was, as you may have— if you followed it, was kind of subdued and in fact somewhat pro-Russian. Iranians claim that Georgians are actually originally Iranian, and they actually go farther. They say the South Ossetians are actually Yazidis. That's the town I'm from. So the Yazidis were being oppressed by the Georgians. But anyway, a few people said to me they couldn't understand how stupid America could have been to allow this to have happened, how stupid America could have been— American foreign policy— to not have seen it coming. But more importantly, one person said to me, who again I can't quote him, his name, said, you know, the Americans are really, really dumb. With this move by the Russians, what America should do, they should be arming us to the teeth and they should be giving us nukes. If they give us nukes, they will— we will guarantee that the Russians will not have a warm water port. I mean, it goes back, you know, to 100 years of the idea of Russian hegemony in the region. They said Americans are just too stupid to understand that we're the only thing that stands between Russia and complete Russian hegemony over the region. And there is a little bit of truth to that. I mean, he was saying it half-jokingly. He certainly said they should arm us to the teeth, and I think he would like for us to give them nukes as well. Just solve the nuclear issue once and for all. We're just going to give you some. You don't need to enrich, you know. How many bombs do you need? The idea— but goes back to the idea that the U.S. and Iran have a lot of similar interests in the region, far more than is known. And Iran has had not a very pleasant history with what used to be the— even with the czars of Russia, we lost Georgia, which was Iranian too. They're right, it was part of Iran at one point, the Persian Empire, to the Russians. I think there's a much greater distrust of Russia in Iran, even among the leadership, than there is of the United States.

And did the invasion heighten that?

No, the invasion was viewed as an opportunity. Look, if the Americans are too stupid to figure this out, we're going to use this to our advantage, and they clearly did. This week was the obvious result of it. With Lavrov refusing to have a meeting on the Iranian nuclear issue here at the UN, which was a coup for Ahmadinejad, basically. It would have been embarrassing for him to be sitting in New York at the UN while they're imposing sanctions on his government. So they got that from the Russians. They also got probably what is a guarantee that the Bushehr nuclear plant will be completed and started up by January with Iran actually basically supporting the Russian invasion in so many words. And I mean, Ahmadinejad again in his speech said the ridiculous by blaming it partly on the Zionist conspiracy, but again, he did that for a domestic audience. I don't think he thinks that Americans think that the Zionists were behind the Russian invasion of Georgia.

Good. Okay, we're going to go back. Someone right there. Hi, Alan Brown from the Canadian Embassy. Just a question about Iranians' perception of Ahmadinejad. I've heard some Iranian Americans say that within Iran, there's kind of a class distinction. He's seen sort of maybe as a Sarah Palin character, you know, more popular among the more fundamental and maybe less educated, and the elites kind of mock his use, the way he speaks Persian and his lack of sophistication. Is that true?

That's partly true. The elites who today mock him were the people who were being mocked by the Shah's regime for being unsophisticated like him. But 30 years go by and they are the sophisticated ones and they do mock him. Yes, in fact, when his speech arrived in New York with him on his plane on Sunday night and I saw it on Monday morning, one of the comments that one of the entourage said to me was like, "God, the Farsi is so bad. I don't know how you're going to make the English any good. And I think we didn't make the English very good. So yes, there is that. There is a little bit of that Sarah Palin vibe. He's a regular guy and he plays that up. I mean, he does play that up. I mean, Canada has an embassy in Tehran, so you guys know what goes on. I think the average person, right now with 3.5 years gone by and his promises of making Iran a more pluralistic society, equaling pay, having more equal pay, none of that has come to fruition. I think even some of the lower— I hate to use the word, but some of the less educated and the lower classes inside are starting to turn against him. But if he is attacked for being what he is, for not having flowery poetic Farsi, then the effect will be to make him more popular. So I think it's uncannily similar to the election here where certainly Khatami, Rouhani, Rafsanjani, those people are considered the elite, the intellectuals that have gone to university. I mean, he's gone to university too, but he's considered lower class.

Perhaps we can set up a debate between Palin and Ahmadinejad and you can translate for us.

He would love it. He would love it.

Okay. Pat, did you wanna ask a question by any chance? No? Okay. Dena, wait for the question or the microphone.

I'm Dena Malé. I work at the Century Foundation.

I'm half Iranian.

A little louder, please.

This is Dena, Dena Malé, and I work at the Century Foundation and I'm Iranian American. And I've been to Iran a couple of times and I was just wondering what you thought of kind of the role of the youth in politics in Iran, and maybe if you could give a little bit of a description of the disconnect between the people of Iran and the government.

A question about the youth for our online audience there.

The youth that I've come across, and not being youthful myself, I don't come across too many youths, but when I do come across them and I do manage to engage them in conversation, has been that they, they've kind of given up. And I think they're not very political. They want their freedoms. They want certain freedoms. They're not activists. They're not political. There are those who are, obviously, in universities. There are political groups. There are dissidents who are in jail, unfortunately. But in general, my sense has been that they just want to be left alone and not have the kind of government controls over their lives that exists, and that's, I understand, is natural. But if they think, I think if they can be convinced, the youth who are now of voting age and would have been much younger in the Khatami years, if they can be convinced that what they want from society is actually going to be, it's going to be important for them to vote, I think they'll come out and vote.

How does that break down along the class lines? You're In your book, you're talking about how sharp and distinguished the lines of class are in Iran. How does it break down with the youth?

In terms of?

In terms of engagement, in terms of that kind of disaffection with the system.

Well, it tends to be mostly the wealthier in the northern suburbs of Tehran. I mean, you go to the provinces and I think there's a little bit of disaffection there too because there just isn't any entertainment in the Islamic Republic. Public. It's a very difficult thing to tell young people that you just, you know, your entertainment is going to be in the home, which it is. But because they're young, they don't have homes, so it's in their parents' homes or it's on the street corner. And so that's a very, very difficult thing for them. I think that— but these people have grown up in that system. They haven't really— I mean, they see on satellite television lives abroad and stuff like that. I think sometimes they dream, dream of having a life abroad, but I think that Obviously, the more religious classes have less of that disaffection than the wealthier ones in North Tehran.

Okay, thanks. More questions? Yeah, right back there. Again, if you could identify yourself.

Sure, I'm Roya Soleimani.

I'm with the University of California. I'm also an Iranian American who has not had the opportunity to go to Iran yet, but I was wondering what your observation is of the civil society groups in Iran with the heavy-handed rhetoric coming from in the West now. How has that affected, maybe in the past few years you're going and coming, do you see a difference and a weakening in the civil society groups and the activist groups in Iran?

Well, the activist groups are always weakened whenever the U.S. expresses support for them, absolutely. I mean, the last thing they want is to be identified with the U.S. I think U.S. policy towards Iran, this is my opinion and, you know, people would argue with me, I think that our foreign policy towards Iran has been, you know, disastrous. In terms of, you know, George Bush talks about— I'll give you an example. George Bush talks about talking directly to the Iranian people, and then he does it on Voice of America or Radio Farda, which are watched and listened to in Iran but don't have a lot of credibility. There is an Iranian representative of the state television sitting in New York who has requested probably 1,000 times to go and interview George Bush since the year 2000. And has been rejected every single time. If George Bush really wants to talk to the Iranian people, go on Iranian television. It's very simple. They'll put him on. And that's— I mean, I don't understand why the Bush administration doesn't do that. I mean, Voice of America TV is considered propaganda TV. And even though a lot of Iranians do watch it, it's entertaining. I watch it when I'm in Tehran. It's fun. But it is. It's fun to be sitting in Iran and watching people download these Islamic Republic. It's fun. But if you really want— if we really want to have engagement with the Iranian people, then he should go on IRIB, Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting. And obviously Ahmadinejad goes on American TV. Why shouldn't he go on Iranian TV? But so every time we've expressed support, every time we've passed, you know, $75 million in Congress for regime change in Iran. All that does is just hurt them. And they always say it. I don't know, nobody's listening. I think that somebody here earlier was talking about the exile groups and the exile groups having a lot of influence here, and they haven't been to Iran for the last 30 years. And I think that that's unfortunately the case in Washington, that there are people who would much rather see America just go to war with Iran, get it over with, regime Regime change, bang, and then we'll figure it out. And put me in charge, please.

So in that scenario where, say, President Obama and the next Iranian president are sitting down, what could you see as the deal, the outlines, the broad outlines of the deal? What do they agree on? Do they talk just for a long time and just have a lot of talks?

Is that enough? They drink a lot of tea.

They drink a lot of tea.

In Iran, they drink a lot of tea.

Where do you see the deal going? Is it a grand bargain? Is it looking regionally?

I think it has to be a grand bargain. At this stage, I think it has to be a grand bargain. I mean, on the nuclear issue, I think that America has to— Jacques Chirac said and was scolded for it that Iran's going to have a nuclear weapon and nobody's going to be able to do anything about it and it's not a big deal. And I think that may have been an exaggeration. I think there are ways for Iran to be prevented from having a nuclear weapon, but there is no way to prevent Iran from enriching uranium on its soil. That is over with. I mean, there is one way, war. There is war. I mean, war potentially could stop that. But I think there has to be a grand bargain because there are so many common interests that I think someone like Barack Obama, quite honestly, I think someone like even McCain who is a smart man would understand too that there are a lot of common interests. It's like, you know, back off on wiping Israel off the map, if you want to have a seat at the table negotiating a two-state solution, or even if you want to come to the table with a one-state solution, because that's their solution, is a one-state.

Israel-Palestine.

Yeah. If you want to come to that, if you want to be a part of that, if as supporters of Hamas and of the Palestinian resistance you want to be a part of that dialogue, fine, you can come and sit at the table, that's okay. But you'll have to be part of the negotiation, you can't just like come in and say, well, it's this or nothing. I think there's a lot of issues. There's that, there's— and of course on the Israeli issue and the Lebanon issue, Hezbollah plays a role. Iraq, I mean, somebody asked me on Bloomberg Television yesterday, they asked me about Iraq, or day before yesterday about Iraq and the surge has worked and how do the Iranians view that. I said they don't view it as the surge is having work, they view it as they having stopped the violence in Iraq. That's the Iranian government. We were the ones who stopped it. Why is nobody giving us credit for it? So Iraq is also part of that equation. It's like, okay, is it going to be an Islamic Republic? Well, it is going to be an Islamic Republic. Is it going to be subservient to Iran? What kind of influence is Iran going to have? What kind of influence is America going to have? Those are all questions that have to be, you know, over many cups of tea. Yeah.

Great. Okay. More questions? Right here. We've got our online audience, so I just want to make sure they can hear. Cody Akavi, unaffiliated and neutral. I wanted to know what your sense was of how Iranians felt— How Iranians felt about Afghanistan and Pakistan since the so-called war on terror is kind of moving in that direction.

What is their sense about it?

Do they feel sense of more security because it's moving away from their border, or is this still very, very much—

Well, Afghanistan and Pakistan are both on their borders, so it's not really moving away from their borders.

But moving towards like Waziristan and Bajaur?

Yeah, in that area. Well, the Iranian attitude towards Afghanistan is— the official attitude, and I think it is the overall Iranian government's attitude— is that, you know, they hate the Taliban, they hate al-Qaeda, and they want Hamid Karzai's government to succeed. A little bit of instability doesn't hurt, though. It doesn't hurt Iranian interests. In general, a little bit of instability doesn't hurt Iranian interests. I think that's true of anywhere in the region. If there's instability, a little bit of instability that they can then influence, it's to their advantage. But I don't think that they want— Your question about the war on terror moving there in terms of how they're— are they concerned about it? Are they concerned about more troops going to Afghanistan? I mean, they're already surrounded by NATO troops anyway. I don't think they're concerned that the troops are going to be— there are going to be more troops in Afghanistan, there's going to be a live war there.

More specifically about instability in Afghanistan and how Pakistan and instability there would have effects across the region.

Yes, and instability in Pakistan could have a bad effect on Sistan-Balochistan, which is Iran's own— has problems in its own— on its own territory with Sunni rebels there. It's not a topic that has come up much, to be honest with you. I haven't had long discussions about that specific topic, and it's relatively recent, so I really don't have a proper answer for you. I'm sorry.

Okay. New questions and then— okay, ma'am, you can ask a second.

How do ordinary Iranians think about ordinary Americans?

The microphone doesn't seem to be working.

How do ordinary Americans— Iranians feel about ordinary Americans?

Yeah.

I think very good. I mean, every American reporter that I know who has gone there, every American— I don't know how many American tourists go there, but every American reporter that I've talked to who has gone there, on occasion I've been there, and I've been there this at the same time, they're all actually, if it's their first visit, they're all amazed at how much the ordinary Iranians like them and talk about how much they like America. So, I mean, you've read about that in the paper and it's true. Iranians do like America. They watch American TV all the time. They watch American shows. They would love to have American products. They, in fact, do have American, but they come through Dubai and they're expensive. So it's just our government that they don't like? Well, I wouldn't even say that they don't like our government. Implies that the entire country hates the American government, and it's certainly not the system of government they hate. There's actually an admiration, I think, for the system, including— I mean, President Khatami has said that, that he admires the American government or the American system. I think in general George Bush is not a very popular man, and I mean, they just don't view him as —when we support dissidents, it's the kiss of death, yes. Okay.

Brian.

Hi, I'm Brian Till.

I work here. Two-part question. The first part is getting back to nuclear. If there is a grand bargain, given that it will be sort of U.S. objective one, do you think enrichment can be stopped? Not necessarily the bomb, but enrichment altogether. No. Okay. And the second piece of it is we had Brzezinski and Scowcroft here the other night, and and one of the things they mentioned, I think it was Brzezinski actually, they didn't mention much together, but one of the things that came up was less the fear of a nuclear Iran and more the fear of the proliferation that that spurs. Does that figure into their calculation and, I mean, is that something they fear? I don't think that that does figure into their calculations right now. Of course, they would never admit that it does because they would say that we're not after a bomb, so why would it, you know, we're not concerned with proliferation because we're not a proliferator. A proliferator. And in terms of your— so I don't think that's part of their calculations right now in terms of thinking about what the proliferation issue would be for the region. In terms of the enrichment issue, Ahmadinejad said at a private dinner this week to a few people, he said, you know, I proposed 3 years ago, and it's true, he did at his UN speech, that there should be a consortium to enrich uranium on Iranian soil, which includes Americans. And he said that would guarantee Americans' presence on Iranian soil monitoring the enrichment process and it couldn't be diverted. I mean, that's as open as we can be. How much more open can we be? And someone asked him if that offer was still on the table because it seems like maybe someone like Barack Obama might think that might be a solution to the enrichment. And he said, well, that was 3 years ago. Well, things have changed. We now enrich. We have 4,000 centrifuges. And so now it's become— so it's— he's saying that's a lost opportunity, but I don't think it is. I think that something like that will happen. But the idea of not enriching on their— I mean, if you want to maintain the stability of the Islamic Republic and the Islamic system, if you're the Supreme Leader and you say that it's really important for this system to exist and to flourish, to then back down on something like that, having done it, having enriched uranium and having had your plants there operating with 4,000, 5,000, 6,000 centrifuges and reaching that— passing that technological hurdle, to then say, "Okay, well, America asked us not to, so we are just going to say no." I mean, the credibility of the Islamic system is gone. That is the way I think they view it, and that is my opinion. Their entire credibility is gone. And it is not just inside Iran. Throughout the world. It's like, okay, so you always said that you're going to stand up to America, but I guess you really can't. If they tell you to stop enrichment, you're going to.

Okay, go ahead, Doha.

Doha Chidemolo, I'm an intern at the New America Foundation. My question is about Turkish-Iranian relations. Turkish? Turkish-Iranian relations. And Turkey is over 65% dependent on Russian energy, and is seeking other energy resources in the east, and Iran is one of the countries as well. So what do you think about Georgian crisis and how it's going to affect Turkish-Iranian relations, and how the next president elections in Iran is going to affect new Iranian and Turkish relations?

I'm not an expert on Iranian-Turkish relations, so I'll preface by saying that. But Iranian-Turkish relations have been very good in the last few years, partly because of the Islamist or so-called Islamist government in Turkey. That's— for Iran, that's something to support, anything that moves closer to religion in a secular state particularly. But relations are very practical with Turkey right now. And, you know, Turkey is one of the few countries that does a lot of business business in Iran, one of the few countries that I would call Western, not just because it is part of NATO, but because they have a Western infrastructure, economic infrastructure as well as they have technology and all that. And they are investing quite heavily. If you go to a hotel in Tehran, the biggest number of foreign visitors or businessmen you see staying in the hotel, I have witnessed this, are Turkish. So there is a lot of business going back and forth. And I think Iran is happy with that, and I think that The next president of Iran will want to maintain good relations with Turkey, and I think Turkey wants to maintain good relations with Iran even though it's technically an ally of the West. It also can be a bridge, and I think the Turks want to act as a bridge as well by hosting Ahmadinejad in Istanbul as opposed to Ankara, which was kind of a little shocking for a lot of Turks and in some ways insulting. It shows that the Turks were going to go out of their way to be that bridge for Iran if Iran chooses to use it and if the United States chooses to use it.

Well, remains to be seen. In the back.

My name is Damon Taylor. Quick question about in what way, in what ways do the values and traditions of the Persian Empire impact Iranian society in terms of how they approach each other, how they approach— perhaps does it have any impact on foreign policy, interactions with others outside the region, etc.? I think it has a little bit of a psychological effect, yes. I think every Iranian is aware of their history of the great Persian Empire, and this is where the Iranian inferiority superiority complex comes in. It's like we're kind of dismayed that nobody else knows about our great history. We get really upset when a film like 300 comes out that kind of makes the Spartans the heroes and us the bad guys. It was a great empire. Most historians know that. If you grew up in the West, you grew up with a Greek tradition of ancient history, and so you read ancient history from the perspective of the Greeks. If you grew up in Iran, you read it from the perspective of the Iranians. But Iran is the only country in the world where you read it from the perspective of the Iranians. So they are the only ones who know about it. So there is this little bit of this sense like, yeah, we're such a great empire, we're such a— you know, Ahmadinejad at his speech to the Iranians the other night was going on about the great Persian Empire. I mean, he didn't see the irony of like opening a statement in Arabic and then going on about the great Persian Empire, which I pointed out to someone sitting at my table. Why is he speaking Arabic if he's talking about the great Persian Empire? But he talked about the great Persian Empire, talked about, you know, the contribution, he just kept saying, "These Americans were telling us to stop enrichment, to stop nuclear fuel enrichment. These are people who, when we had mathematics, when we had this, when we had that, when we were the greatest civilization in the world, when we knew that the Earth was round, they didn't even have a bath." I mean, and the Iranians are clapping, "Yeah, you're right. We were a great empire." So it does play into this idea that we would like to be an empire again. I mean, there's a little bit of, I admit, I would feel a little bit of a thrill if I could see the Persian Empire. When I saw the map of the flag of Iran on the Arabian Peninsula, there was a moment there when I thought, "Yeah, right on." Let's wrap up on that question actually.

Saudi Arabia. I'm just joking.

For anybody who is an Arab in the room, I'm just joking.

Saudi Arabia. In terms of Getting back to this grand bargain idea, looking at how we move forward in the region, what is a stable new status quo for relations across the Persian, Arabic, Gulf of Arabia, whatever you want to call it? What is that new formula? Where would we get to? What would satisfy Tehran? And what would, do you think, be acceptable to Riyadh?

Well, I'm not sure the Iranians care that much what's acceptable to Riyadh because what satisfies Iran is— in terms of what? What would satisfy?

In terms of this, if we're thinking about a grand bargain, we're thinking about— Oh, the U.S. grand bargain. U.S. grand bargain and everybody's at the table, if we're looking at—

Well, the Saudis would prefer for there not to be a grand bargain, as we know. But in terms of what would satisfy the Iranians, I don't know that America should care, and people are going to accuse me of being anti-Arab, but should care that much what the Saudis think. I think it's— what is in American interest is in American interest. I mean, we shouldn't forget that the fact that there are American bases in Saudi Arabia is one of the reasons there's terrorism against America in the world. We shouldn't forget they're supporting the Saudi royal family to the extent that we do, supporting Saudi Arabia to the extent that we do, has been a real problem in terms of terrorism against America. I don't think that America should care that much, but it will. I accept that it will. I think what's acceptable to Tehran is that America understands that Iran is going to be technologically far more superior than America would like it to be. I think that in terms of what's acceptable to Saudi Arabia and what the pressure they're going to put on the US is to diminish Iran's role in Iraq and with the Palestinians and with Hezbollah, obviously, where Saudi Arabia would rather be the player than Iran. So there's this contest for that. Where it ends up, it's impossible to say. I mean, it depends on who is the American president, who's guiding American foreign policy, and it depends on where the Supreme Leader feels he can make his best deal. I think he's willing to give up some influence but not a lot. I think the long-term goal is for the Shia Republic of Iran to be the beacon of Islam in the Middle East and not Saudi Arabia.

And that's a great way to end the program. Thank you so much, Reza. This is extraordinary. Thanks very much. And thank you again. Just so you all know, we'll be doing another event on Iran October 7th. We'll be releasing Flint Leverett and Hillary Mann's new report on talking about a grand bargain, so perhaps Hooman could log in on the web and watch that. But thank you all very much.